Army commanders and activation

[Jagger]

An army commander has a 1 or 2 strategic rating. He is very rarely active. Unfortunately even it he becomes active, there is no guarantee that his corps/divisions will become active. Often times, he is providing a negative bonus to the strategic ratings of his subordinate commanders. With inactive corps, an active army commander is not much use.

Should there be a strategic activation bonus to subordinate commanders when the army commander is active? Something that increases the probability that if the army commander is active, his corps are also active.

And perhaps the reverse. If the army commander is inactive, a negative bonus to his subordinate commanders activation potential.

[McNaughton]

An army commander has a 1 or 2 strategic rating. He is very rarely active. Unfortunately even it he becomes active, there is no guarantee that his corps/divisions will become active. Often times, he is providing a negative bonus to the strategic ratings of his subordinate commanders. With inactive corps, an active army commander is not much use.

Should there be a strategic activation bonus to subordinate commanders when the army commander is active? Something that increases the probability that if the army commander is active, his corps are also active.

And perhaps the reverse. If the army commander is inactive, a negative bonus to his subordinate commanders activation potential.

There already is, in a way, what you are talking about. The mechanics of everything reflects what you want indirectly, yet not quite as coordinated (as in the army being active will not direclty affect the corps, but, the strategy of the commander will). A general with a strong strategic rating will be active themselves, plus tend to activate their subordinate corps (the reverse is true).

A 3-star commander's strategic rating is representative of their ability to command a larger force, and should be wholly based upon that. Wether or not divisions under their own personal command are activated is irrelevant as to how they would influence their own corps (since at this scale, army HQs aren't meant to have combat formations that go into battle, as the commander is wholly consumed by the battle and directing their corps and the reserve).

Basically it is an influence, for a 3-star, rather than a direct application (unless the 3-star gets caught in the battle directly). Lee influenced his commanders, as he created a battleplan, and it is the effectiveness of his chain of command, and his overall battleplan, and the ability of his commanders to follow this plan, which is a 3-star general's strategic rating.

A commander like Lee honestly does not have to activate their own personal units in order to lead an effective battle, nor would their inaction affect the chain of command as they are two separate systems.

[Jagger]

There already is, in a way, what you are talking about. The mechanics of everything reflects what you want indirectly, yet not quite as coordinated (as in the army being active will not direclty affect the corps, but, the strategy of the commander will). A general with a strong strategic rating will be active themselves, plus tend to activate their subordinate corps (the reverse is true).

A 3-star commander's strategic rating is representative of their ability to command a larger force, and should be wholly based upon that. Wether or not divisions under their own personal command are activated is irrelevant as to how they would influence their own corps (since at this scale, army HQs aren't meant to have combat formations that go into battle, as the commander is wholly consumed by the battle and directing their corps and the reserve).

Basically it is an influence, for a 3-star, rather than a direct application (unless the 3-star gets caught in the battle directly). Lee influenced his commanders, as he created a battleplan, and it is the effectiveness of his chain of command, and his overall battleplan, and the ability of his commanders to follow this plan, which is a 3-star general's strategic rating.

A commander like Lee honestly does not have to activate their own personal units in order to lead an effective battle, nor would their inaction affect the chain of command as they are two separate systems.

I can understand corps not moving if the army commander doesn't have a plan or is not ready to execute a plan. But once the plan is put together, he can usually get the army to move as a whole. He just tells the corps to move. And I am assuming the strategic rating reflects a commander reaching a decision and executing the plan.

With the current system, it is very difficult to move an army as a whole when the army and corps commanders have a low strat rating. Invariable multiple corps/army HQ's are inactive.

I am suggesting that if the army HQ is active, a bonus to the strat ratings of subordinate corps would increase the likelihood of formations all moving at the same time. And the reverse when a army commander is inactive. Less probability that corps commanders will execute an independent plan.

Regardless of how inactive an army commander, for example McClellan, once he decided to move, typically the whole army moved. Although once McClellan became indecisive or inactive, most of the whole army when back into sleep mode.

[McNaughton]

I don't think that it necessarily was an all-or-nothing aspect of command. Take the 1862 Maryland Campaign.

McClellan advanced with 6 corps under the following commanders.

Porter
Franklin
Sumner
Hooker
Reno/Burnside
Mansfield

While Reno, Hooker, Mansfield and Sumner moved and fought aggressively (although not necessarily competently), Franklin and Burnside proved to be sluggish and slow (Porter not taking part at all). This was McClellan's primary offensive battle, and it ended up with portions of his force being highly aggressive and active duirng the campaign, while others were not (due to their own initiative, as well as restrictions from higher command).

If the Maryland Campaign was a turn in AACW, I would see McClellan's strategic roll to have failed, meaning that he did not succeed to impart any of his strategic abilities (+ or -) on his corps commanders. They were pretty much left to their devices to fight, meaning that some were active, and some were not, depending on their own ability to command and aggression ratings.

Hooker, Reno, Mansfield and Sumner would have passed their strategic rating roll, while Franklin and Burnside would have failed. McClellan himself would have failed his role, but him being active really did not necessitate that the army was active or not.

To me, the fact that parts of armies are active, and inactive, make the strategic rating that much more important. If you can get your entire army activated, it is a big deal to an offensive campaign. However, getting the entire army active, as the Union, should be the main obstacle in having them crush the southern forces until there is a mix of Army commanders with strong strategic ratings to provide bonus' to the average corps commanders.

[Guru80]

I feel your pain Jagger and I kinda of agree with you. It sucked when the event fired in my last game that Lincoln "borrowed" the army and forced McClellan to be active but the rest of my army, every single Corps, was inactive so it was a waste. I believe there should be some extra bonus that when the Army itself is active there is a higher chance some of the Corps are but it doesn't have to guaranteed that all of them are active, just a higher chance of being active. You know, as the Union, getting even a couple of Corps active at the same time is a miracle, let alone the whole Army and Corps.

[McNaughton]

McClellan being personally active is actually irrelevant to the army as a whole being active. The activation of a 'stack' is just that, dealing with the stack's ability to move and fight and be aggressive. McClellan's chain of command has nothing to do with the activation of his stack for combat, but rather his influence on moving his corps. Activating a stack is more than just someone 'waking up' and being 'aware', but also getting the mechanisms of this command up and running.

The strategic rating of the army commander is designed to affect the sub-corps in a completely different way than their own stack. They influence the corps on a high-strategic-level, positively or negatively. Having your immediate command ready and active does not necessarily mean that you are able to get your larger command going any better (and vice versa).

They are two completely different aspects of the command system, and thereby are totally independent and irrelevant to one another.

The weakness of a general like McClellan is that you are pretty much guaranteed to have a small fraction of your army active at any one time. Generals like Grant are good because their influence on their corps is such that to affect a greater whole activation of the army.

As I stated above, armies were rarely ever active 100% or 0%, some units were active and fought well, while others were not. The Corps commander themselves are just as important as the commander when combat is engaged. Their aggression and ability is somewhat independent of their commander's. However, a weak commander 'can' negatively affect (via mixed up orders, commands to not attack, etc.) and positively affect a corps commander, although there is no 'magic ability' for an army commander to get 'all-or-nothing' out of their army.

If the game is modified as is suggested, I figure it would be a major bonus to the Federals, as all you have to do is wait for the turn that McClellan is active, and you are given an entire large army 100% activated and can initiate your attack with spectacular results. As it currently stands, chances are you will never get 100% activation (historically accurate) and have to advance slowly, with only a portion of your army fighting at 100%.

[Gray_Lensman]

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[Jagger]

I am thinking historically.

I am not looking for 100% activation. I am looking for an activated army commander increasing the possibility of having activated corps. And a deactivated commander having less possibility of activating subordinate corps.

The purpose to increase the possibility of an army moving as a whole which is typically how armies moved during the time frame. Inactivity is primarily due to lack of orders rather than because the player is unwilling to move only a single corps. Once a subordinate general received orders, he usually moved...although perhaps not promptly or as directed.

[Gray_Lensman]

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[McNaughton]

I am thinking historically.

I am not looking for 100% activation. I am looking for an activated army commander increasing the possibility of having activated corps. And a deactivated commander having less possibility of activating subordinate corps.

The purpose to increase the possibility of an army moving as a whole which is typically how armies moved during the time frame. Inactivity is primarily due to lack of orders rather than because the player is unwilling to move only a single corps. Once a subordinate general received orders, he usually moved...although perhaps not promptly or as directed.

But the general's strategic rating, and the activation of their stack are two completely different things. One is preparing your own troops for battle, the other is command and control for the army.

What you ask for is already there, since both stack activation and army strategic bonus are all dependent on the strategic rating of the commander, if they have a strong rating, their corps should be active, and provide bonus' to other corps. If their rating is weak, then the reverse will happen. I really don't see the need of the requested feature since unless your goal is to get 0% or 100% activation, it will change absolutely nothing. If your general has an activation rating of 2, they won't be active much, and their corps commanders will recieve absolutely no bonus. If their rating is 4, then they will be active, and tend to provide strong strategic bonus. I see no need to add an additional requirement unless the goal is all-or-nothing.

Armies moved in groups, either as individual corps, or as army wings. It was faster to move an army in detached groups. In most cases time was given for the armies to concentrate, but in many battles (Antietam, Gettysburg, Shiloh, etc.) battles were joined before one or both sides were fully concentrated meaning that forces joined the battle when they arrived. Some generals were quicker at moving than others, some were slower than average.

To me, the strength of the CSA should be in the Army of Northern Virginia having a core command that is active all of the time. This is accomplished through Lee's strong Strategic rating, and Jackson's and Longstreet's Strategic ratings as well. The CSA is encouraged to concentrate forces under these two commanders, as the multiplication of force, and 100% activation should be irresistable.

The USA, on the other hand, should be encouraged to have as many corps as possible due to the unreliability of their commanders in regards to being activated. With 9 corps in the Army of the Potomac, you can bet that at least 4 will be activated per round, meaning that 50% of your army will be fighting at 100%, with the rest at 65%. In fact, I believe that there are too many 'good' USA generals that appear in late 1862/1863 which allows them to field a qualitative army that equals that of the CSA. Even by the end of the war, in a straight up battle the CSA still fought successful battles in lieu of massive odds.

[Jagger]

Historically, Union armies in general, rarely successfully moved as a whole. That is the point McNaughton was getting at, and the reason I agree with his particular view. Everything, I am reading in Shelby Foote's Narrative Volumes pretty well substantiates this fact, and it was the major reason, that the Union took it on the chin in so many battles during the first 2 years.

As I said before, it would be interesting to have a What-If MOD, but I would not want to see the vanilla game scenarios changed in this way. That's just my personal opinion.

If McClellan develops a plan and issues orders to all his corps, would the corp commanders move their troops or not? I would bet the great mass of corps commanders would follow orders, move their troops and attempt to meet the spirit of the orders as understood. I find it hard to imagine that many corps commanders simply ignored orders.

If McClellan doesn't have a clue as to his next move or simply doesn't want to move or orders defense, his corps commanders usually don't take off on their own.

As it exists, basically we cannot move an army at all with someone like McClellan unless we are willing to move a single corps every 2 weeks if we are lucky.

[McNaughton]

If McClellan develops a plan and issues orders to all his corps, would the corp commanders move their troops or not? I would bet the great mass of corps commanders would follow orders, move their troops and attempt to meet the spirit of the orders as understood. I find it hard to imagine that many corps commanders simply ignored orders.

If McClellan doesn't have a clue as to his next move or simply doesn't want to move or orders defense, his corps commanders usually don't take off on their own.

As it exists, basically we cannot move an army at all with someone like McClellan unless we are willing to move a single corps every 2 weeks if we are lucky.

I don't think it is just a matter of 'will' but that of 'ability' as well. People are peculiar individuals, of personality, habit and intelligence. Some may get a message, and not see its urgency. Others may (like McClellan) 'delay' or 'disobey' orders due to their own interpretation of the stituation (Porter at 2nd Bull Run for example). Others may have difficulty with their own command situation and not effectively organize their force for a march on short notice. Others may have lax discipline when it comes to enacting their march. There are many reasons why a stack is inactive, and strategic ratings are a 'general' representation of a commander's competence, aggressiveness, and will to organize, move, and fight with their command.

Also, it isn't as if these corps are static if unactivated, just face multiple penalties if moved and moved offensively. It just means that you will be moving slower, uncoordinated, and with a penalty when you do engage enemy forces. Pretty much what the USA Army of the Potomac and CSA Army of Tennessee experienced when they went on the offensive.

The optimal situation should never exist for the Union army until late in the war when it gets generals with enough strategic ratings and enough senoirity to command the main armies. The CSA should already start off in a position to have a strong core of efficient corps, which is the sole reason for its survival in combat against a numerically superior Union force.

[willgamer]

Firstly, thanks to all for a very insightful thread into the way leadership is designed.

Since the unmodified strategic/offense/defensive rating are not shown in-game (yes, I know RTFM, but I'm lazy), is this correct for in-command-chain:

1. The army cmd. strategy-minus-2 rating is added to the corp cmd. rating; the offensive and defensive ratings are also added, but without reduction.

2. The above modified offensive and defensive ratings of the corp cmd. are added to each division cmd.

3. The abilities of all 3 are in effect unless a particular ability's notes say otherwise.

[McNaughton]

Firstly, thanks to all for a very insightful thread into the way leadership is designed.

Since the unmodified strategic/offense/defensive rating are not shown in-game (yes, I know RTFM, but I'm lazy), is this correct for in-command-chain:

1. The army cmd. strategy-minus-2 rating is added to the corp cmd. rating; the offensive and defensive ratings are also added, but without reduction.

2. The above modified offensive and defensive ratings of the corp cmd. are added to each division cmd.

3. The abilities of all 3 are in effect unless a particular ability's notes say otherwise.

Yes and no, I believe there is a random aspect to the application of strategy and attack/defence ratings. However, abilities that apply do so as guaranteed. Pocus can clarify this better.

[kyle]

Thanks for everyones input on this matter, it actually made me better understand the mechanics and relation of the army commander and corps commander.

I think the current system is very accurate to historic feel.

Do Corps commanders really ignore superior commands orders/work on their own initiative that often? (question I think Jagger posed but phrased differently)

I'd say Yes! You simply have to look at Lee's own troubles in getting his troops to coordinate attacks properly. And that's with a supposedly superior commander. Everyone here probably knows not only the dismissed/delayed orders of Longstreet at Gettysburg, but there is Stuart and whatever he was doing and then Heath??? (though i think he was division) and whatever he was doing on the first day. Then Ewell seemed to be on his own command.

The peninsula campaign, the south under Lee had miscoodinated attacks that allowed the Union to escape.

I believe in edit start:Chancellorsville//end of edit// (battle where Jackson was shot, not sure if that's the right battle) the south was just as bungled as the Union in having higher commands orders followed.

Then out west leaders were always in constant conflict (still only referring to Southern command chain).

Granted, the self initiative or lack of, might have been on a more tactical/battle scale, but the scale of the game, perhaps more the current design then scale,doesn't allow self initiative/lack of on that scale.

On a side note somewhat related:
If anything there should be less retreating/withdraws from a "hex" when a Southern unit and Union unit meet (withdraw from battle shouldn't mean withdraw form hex). And then which units engage is further influenced, not only by leaders strategy rating, but how long it takes them to engage. Particularly out East, weren't armies in close proximity for months at a time without fighting? I guess what I'm getting at is there could possibly be longer delays for movement and battle initiation.

Back on topic:
But for any example one could find that a leader was "following" orders, I'm sure you can find two to three examples were they weren't. And in the South's case, the "following" orders example could be the same example were they weren't following orders.

[willgamer]

Yes and no, I believe there is a random aspect to the application of strategy and attack/defence ratings. However, abilities that apply do so as guaranteed. Pocus can clarify this better.

Ooops! I had missed what Hobbes said in his Quick Ref:

Combat efficiency increase per off./def. Stack Commander ability point: 5%.

Combat efficiency increase per off./def. Division/embedded Brigade Leader ability point: 3%.

Corps outside of their Army range are not dismissed but suffer from -1 to strat and -1 to off rating (and won't get the Army Commander bonus).

More complicated than my earlier posts.

[Gray_Lensman]

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[kyle]

Yes, Chancellorsville is the one I meant.... close...Chicamuaga started with C...only about 300 miles or so in wrong Theatre I think...

But I read a little on the Chancellorville battle, as brillant as the Jackson/Lee plan was, there were parts that seemed ill executed. Stuart was praised for his leading of the Infantry division. But others... (Union side was a mess..Hooker seemed to have a good battle plan for the Union... and nobody seemed to cooperate with the plan..)

Where did I get Chicamuaga...Was that One of Bragg's assualts out west with Longstreet?

[lodilefty]

But I read a little on the Chancellorville battle, as brillant as the Jackson/Lee plan was, there were parts that seemed ill executed. Stuart was praised for his leading of the Infantry division. But others... (Union side was a mess..Hooker seemed to have a good battle plan for the Union... and nobody seemed to cooperate with the plan..)

Not sure anyone could 'execute' in the Wilderness!

Stuart took command of Jackson's wing and did the best anyone could with the post-attack disorganization. Not bad for a jockey!

Hooker was the problem with Hooker's plan. He froze. His own words: "I just lost confidence in Joe Hooker"

[kyle]

http://www.civilwarhome.com/CMHchancellorsville.htm

"Stuart took command of Jackson's wing and did the best anyone could with the post-attack disorganization. Not bad for a jockey!"-- From what I've read I'd agree, I also had wonder what Stuart would have been like as an Infantry commander, never knew unitl recently that he had his chance and performed admiriably. And from what I here, he liked to be admired..

There where others who lingered though before and after Jackson was shot(some on Lee's side of the battle apparently)... and seemed to prevent the Union from suffering higher losses.

The above link was one of two sources where I read similar statements concerning the subordinates, and missed opportunities.

But this battle is more of an example of leaders not following orders on a tactical scale. The scale borders on the strategic side. I was trying to show an example of even when there was/is brilliance, there were shortcomings and leaders acting on there own judgement, that influenced the greater scheme

[kyle]

civil war official records

The War of the Rebellion in Cornell University's Making of America

has some nice reading on how the Union didn't exactly move together in the Mountain region under Fremont.

# Volume XI - in Three Parts. 1884. (Vol. 11, Chap. 23)

Chapter XXIII - The Peninsular Campaign, Virginia. Mar 17-Sep. 2, 1862.
Part I -- Reports, Mar 17-Jun 24

Are there any % decreases/penalties due to stack inactivation. Or is it just that you can't be in offensive posture? When I've played the Union, I've never been really bothered(never played them in pBem though)by the fact McDowell or McClellan stacks were inactive, because I'd give them defensive units and defensive duties. And Milroy and Hamilton? seemed to be active enough as it was. If anything, I am surprised by the Lack of being inactive.

And being the HQ unit, if I remember correctly, McDowell and McClellan still seemed to join in fights via the "March to the guns" when nearby.

And when I was the South in my Pbem my opponent kept most of his troops in divisions. They swarmed around like nats, not a problem exactly, but very annoying, and in more than one occassion, they "accidently" got in my way of an offensive.