Fov - Fow

[GShock]

FOV = Field of View (everything visible within the Fog of War)
FOW = Fog of War (Everything invisible outside the Field of View)

Question: Should we really know -

1) The entire composition of an enemy stack (by tooltip)
2) The exact number of units building it (by base lights)
3) The stack's entrenchment level (by base icon)
4) The Stack's supply level (light colors)

...when they are in our FOV?

Regions are big and there's no satellite view....
Looks to me the only thing we don't know is the exact number of men in units but for the rest we know everything...too much imho.

Some uncertainty would make the FOW more challenging and realistic...deception is a key strategy.
It would better the MP experience too...you could bluff and there are many examples of fake armies (dummies, scarecrows, helmets on the sticks etc) in all wars and all eras i know of.

I'm still laughing about Saddam's fake alluminium tanks in Gulf War 1st...did you know Italy produces them?

[Jabberwock]

I'm still laughing about Saddam's fake alluminium tanks in Gulf War 1st...did you know Italy produces them?

One of the sillier arguments against SDI was that the Soviets, or whoever - would just build "fake" missiles with no warheads.

[anarchyintheuk]

FOV = Field of View (everything visible within the Fog of War)
FOW = Fog of War (Everything invisible outside the Field of View)

Question: Should we really know -

1) The entire composition of an enemy stack (by tooltip)
2) The exact number of units building it (by base lights)
3) The stack's entrenchment level (by base icon)
4) The Stack's supply level (light colors)

...when they are in our FOV?

1-2. Yes, provided both armies have been in contact or close proximity (same or 1-2 areas). Both sides were able to accurately identify corps level formations at almost all times. Newspapers provided almost all the information that you needed concerning command structure and commanders. For example, the Union used corps badges that provided exact corps and division information and the AoP was aware of the location and composition of Jackson's and Longstreet's corps.

3. Yes. Entrenchment information was probably the easiest information to obtain during the CW. Game wise this information should be available if you're w/i 1-2 areas in any event. The information provided allows you to choose an appropriate posture, representing the ability of a commander to either attack or not attack units benefitting from entrenchments.

4. Yes. Relative supply information was also easy to obtain. Willingness of pickets to fire, garbage left behind, activity of supply trains, condition of horses, uniforms, etc.

Scouting and picketing was a continuous process during the ACW. IMO the FoW system and its modifiers are one of the best 'under the hood' programming elements in this game.

Decent estimates were available for numerical strength as well . . . at least if you weren't McClellan.

[Gray_Lensman]

deleted

[McNaughton]

Decent estimates were available for numerical strength as well . . . at least if you weren't McClellan.

Actually, McClellan deserves some defending here. Most of the reports given to McClellan, notably from Pinkerton (somehow are seen as effective, but were responsible for the completely off base info in the 1862 campaigns) stated that he was drastically outnumbered. Seeing how mobile and aggressive he was, given what he thought he was up against, maybe McClellan can be seen in a different light? It wasn't until later in the war, after intelligence on both sides improved, when it was generally discovered and believed that the North heavily outnumbered the South.

I personally think that early-war intelligence is too great, given the multitude of times that both sides were confused or tricked about the numbers of their opponents. By 1863, the knowledge of the composition of enemy forces became more apparant, through more effective use of cavalry, and soldiers who could do effective intelligence gathering.

[Spharv2]

Actually, McClellan deserves some defending here. Most of the reports given to McClellan, notably from Pinkerton (somehow are seen as effective, but were responsible for the completely off base info in the 1862 campaigns) stated that he was drastically outnumbered. Seeing how mobile and aggressive he was, given what he thought he was up against, maybe McClellan can be seen in a different light? It wasn't until later in the war, after intelligence on both sides improved, when it was generally discovered and believed that the North heavily outnumbered the South.

I personally think that early-war intelligence is too great, given the multitude of times that both sides were confused or tricked about the numbers of their opponents. By 1863, the knowledge of the composition of enemy forces became more apparant, through more effective use of cavalry, and soldiers who could do effective intelligence gathering.

Pinkerton turned in to McClellan, what McClellan wanted to hear.

[General Quarters]

Other generals AT THE TIME often thought Mac was overestimating the enemy.

[McNaughton]

Pinkerton turned in to McClellan, what McClellan wanted to hear.

Um, even if true (impossible to qualify the motives or information of Pinkerton) this still means that McClellan had his intelligence operation telling him he was outnumbered...

[McNaughton]

Other generals AT THE TIME often thought Mac was overestimating the enemy.

And just as many providing him with thoughts of caution in regards to enemy strength (Porter for example). Lincoln was always nagging McClellan to both crush the Army of Northern Virginia, but tying an arm behind his back by hounding him about the security of Washington (for example, forcing McDowell's I Corps to remain near Washington instead of advancing on Richmond as part of McClellan's plan during the Peninsula campaign).

Lee was pretty much given full rein in his theatre of combat, with very little political pressure. The commander of the Army of the Potomac was constantly berated with political pressures from Washington.

Hooker, Burnside and Meade all faced similar criticisms from Washington about their inability to persue and/or crush the Army of Northern Virginia after their critical battles with it.

[Spharv2]

Um, even if true (impossible to qualify the motives or information of Pinkerton) this still means that McClellan had his intelligence operation telling him he was outnumbered...

While every other source was telling him that his numbers were a load of horse manure. I'm not as down on Little Mac as most. His grand strategy was very well done, the Peninsula campaign was honestly a masterpiece, but when push came to shove, it was his fears, and his insecurities that cost the Union some brilliant victories. He insisted on inflated numbers beyond what any rational human being knew was possible for the confederacy. If you take the numbers he turned in to the US government at face value, the CSA had mobilized something along the lines of 60-70% of their white population and put them in arms in the first year and a half of the war, which is patently ridiculous. If you think that this was due to Pinkerton, then you're saying that McClellan was an utter moron, which he most certainly was not.

[Spharv2]

Lee was pretty much given full rein in his theatre of combat, with very little political pressure. The commander of the Army of the Potomac was constantly berated with political pressures from Washington.

None of the Confederate generals were given free reign. Lee and Bragg came closest, Lee because he understood that the commanding general was always subordinate to the civilian leadership (Something McClellan never understood), and persuaded rather than threatened in order to get what he could. Bragg because of his friendship with Davis.

Read Lee's personal letters and his letters to and from Davis and you'll see that Davis was nearly as demanding as Lincoln, difference being, their correspondence was quite a bit more gentlemanly, especially compared to the shots Lincoln and Mac were sending back and forth. Davis also understood that the war was not going to be won without risks on their part. Lincoln knew that they had the strength to do pretty much everything that needed to be done, if the generals would lead. You'll notice that once Lincoln got generals in charge who understood this fact, they were given a very free reign.

The loss of McDowell's corps did not cost Mac the Peninsula campaign, his lack of will did.

[tc237]

An excellent study of early war Union intellegience gathering is Edwin C. Fishell's "Secret War for the Union".

Fishell goes into great detail on the McClellan-Pinkerton relationship.
His conclusion is as Spharv says, Mac took from Pinkertons reports what he wanted, to substatiate his conclusions, and threw out the rest.

After a while, Pinkerton started inflating his own numbers when reporting what he knew McClellan wanted to hear. For that he can be faulted.

[General Quarters]

And just as many providing him with thoughts of caution in regards to enemy strength (Porter for example). Lincoln was always nagging McClellan to both crush the Army of Northern Virginia, but tying an arm behind his back by hounding him about the security of Washington (for example, forcing McDowell's I Corps to remain near Washington instead of advancing on Richmond as part of McClellan's plan during the Peninsula campaign).

Lee was pretty much given full rein in his theatre of combat, with very little political pressure. The commander of the Army of the Potomac was constantly berated with political pressures from Washington.

Hooker, Burnside and Meade all faced similar criticisms from Washington about their inability to persue and/or crush the Army of Northern Virginia after their critical battles with it.

Lincoln held the troops back because leaving a certain number of troops to defend Washington was one of the conditions he demanded and Mac accepted before undertaking the Penin campaign. Mac claimed to have left them, but War Dept staff found that the numbers did not add up. So Lincoln pulled back the requisite forces.

The political pressure on AoP was indeed terrible, but one reason for Lee's success is that he took Davis into his confidence, kept him briefed, even asked frequently for his advice. Mac was the opposite of that. The other difference was, of course, that Lee fought and won battles. It was hard to get Mac to move, even later when he had the enemy's marching orders in his hands. And the only kind of fighting he seemed comfortable with was sieges.

Even with the troops Lincoln held back, Mac could have won the Penin campaign if he had persisted. It was a shortgage of nerve, not a shortgage of troops, that made him cower under the guns of the ships, which is where, by the way, he was during the fighting.

[PBBoeye]

Fishell goes into great detail on the McClellan-Pinkerton relationship.
His conclusion is as Spharv says, Mac took from Pinkertons reports what he wanted, to substatiate his conclusions, and threw out the rest.

Sounds familiar.

So, would many agree with anarchyintheuk's support of the FoV/FoW system?

[GShock]

@anarchyintheuk

1-2. Yes, provided both armies have been in contact or close proximity (same or 1-2 areas).

I'm concerned about the map representing entire regions and regions are big areas. You need a scout to see an army and being in 2 adjacent reason doesn't always mean in visual contact. We must estimate that the scout/spy needs:
1) days to reach it
2) days to assess its value
3) days to come back (if you can come back while crossing the lines) and make the report which cannot possibly always be accurate.

I see the turn begins and i have life, death and miracles of all i can see in my Fov and i think it's too much information.

Both sides were able to accurately identify corps level formations at almost all times.

Not even the Japos in Sengoku Jidai could positively identify the consistency of enemy armies. There were basically only rough extimations and we're talking here of armies where each soldier had his own banner and displayed his armor with pride (as social status symbol).
From the times of Wu Tzu, armies by night were instructed to build 2000 fires the first night, 1000 the second and so on, to trick the opponents into thinking "they are easy, they are deserting" not to mention the latest example i brought on the 1st Gulf War fake tanks.

Newspapers provided almost all the information that you needed concerning command structure and commanders.

CNN was embedding reporters with the troops in the front back by then?
They could deliver exact figures to press machines so these could be printed in time before the battle, at max 15 days later?

In 15 days you make estimation, send the news, the paper is printed, and then delivered throughout the nation, including to the general who's on the other side of the front lines? Satellite perhaps?

For example, the Union used corps badges that provided exact corps and division information and the AoP was aware of the location and composition of Jackson's and Longstreet's corps.

The fact Historically this happened, doesn't mean it has to happen in the game. If Jackson and Longstreet made mistakes and unveiled moves and consistency of their forces this doesn't mean all forces in the maps must be seen in details. There should be (imho) different types of FoV according to the general's ability and population loyalty of the regions involved. I might know and i might know for sure...or i might think i know and instead be wrong...or i might know only partial information.

In the game is just : I see / I don't see....and this is wrong imho.

Entrenchment information was probably the easiest information to obtain during the CW. Game wise this information should be available if you're w/i 1-2 areas in any event. The information provided allows you to choose an appropriate posture, representing the ability of a commander to either attack or not attack units benefitting from entrenchments.

I put myself into the clothes of a spy, and go to observe the enemy entrenchment. I suppose i can get shot or captured or fail for some other reason to report such an entrenchment level to my committer. Well...to see how complex is an entrenchement i suppose i should enter into it, right?

And well...i guess u see it's the same point as above. The fact something historically happened doesn't mean it must always happen in the game. (i.e. spy dead = no report, i.e. spy sold to the enemy = false report and so on) I remind we all only know what history brought back to us nowadays and it doesnt' have to be necessarily true.

Relative supply information was also easy to obtain. Willingness of pickets to fire, garbage left behind, activity of supply trains, condition of horses, uniforms, etc.

See in theory all of this is easy. In practice, in wartime, across the front lines, anything may happen to the scout/spy...including miscalculating or...being tricked by the enemy general's deception skills and even not making it in time to make the report before the battle begins or one of the 2 armies runs away.

In the statement on the "ease of counting the manpower", armies don't always march formed for battle; That is the general's decision.

If i got 15.000 men, i can march 3x5000 and the spy can't get past the first band of 5000 men to see and report the other 5000 and next (last) 5000, then to go back, cross the lines 3 times (5000+5000+5000) and report [b]always correct figures.

On the game map you see 1 region and 2 stacks with 3 units in the first and 5 in the second. Those 8 total units in real are not so easy to spot, count or test for readiness/hunger and that region in real is not that little.

[McNaughton]

The best source of information came from the countless stragglers and deserters. These weren't 'professional soldiers', trained to give only their name and serial number.

Countless officers and soldiers were payrolled when they were captured by an enemy on the march, as they had no way in the world to hold them prisoner. In many cases, (such as the Antietam campaign), through intention or accident they informed their side breaking their oath of parole not to.

Also, every town or villiage you entered almost inevitably contained at least one civilian who is sympathetic to your cause, willing to provide accurate information regarding the enemy force that just moved through. Even with just 5% sympathy in a county means that at least 5% of the population is willing to give you information.

Unless a lot of effort is taken to decieve their opponent (Yorktown, etc.), there was very little done in the way to conceal ones military disposition as there were more important things at the time (chasing down their opponent, or remaining one step ahead). Even here, as in other campaigns, part of the deception was to inform their own troops of incorrect information (such as when/where an attack was taking place), so when there was the inevitable desertion to the opposing side, the 'wrong' information was given. But this was also a rare tactic, but what it does is acknowledge the fact that information was easy to come by at the time. (It is better not to let your opponent know where you are right now, than to know what you are composed of).

The examples of the Magruder's, Beauregards, Grants, who used 'deceptive tactics' were the rarity rather than the norm, even in their own commands (just because they did it a few times, doesn't mean it always happened). Most generals, even the great ones (Jackson for example) did not employ tactics to decieve the enemy in numbers. Beauregard was the only one who repeatedly used these tactics, but even here he is given a specific trait in the game to represent it.

The 'best' examples are tactical use of secrecy of manoever. Longstreet went through a painfully tedious march in order to quietly march his soldiers south during the second day of Gettysburg, in itself caused delays. Jackson more successfully secretly manoevered during the Chancellorsville campaign. Even here, secrecy was limited, and in the heat of battle because of situation. There was no time to gather information, or even interegate deserters/prisoners.

Cavalry's job was to attain information, from civilians, stragglers, and deserters, as well as through direct raids on rear-area forces. Their high relative speed allowed significant information to be gained and delivered back to military commanders even without direct contact with the core of the enemy force.

[Jagger]

The best source of information came from the countless stragglers and deserters. These weren't 'professional soldiers', trained to give only their name and serial number.

Countless officers and soldiers were payrolled when they were captured by an enemy on the march, as they had no way in the world to hold them prisoner. In many cases, (such as the Antietam campaign), through intention or accident they informed their side breaking their oath of parole not to.

Also, every town or villiage you entered almost inevitably contained at least one civilian who is sympathetic to your cause, willing to provide accurate information regarding the enemy force that just moved through. Even with just 5% sympathy in a county means that at least 5% of the population is willing to give you information.

Unless a lot of effort is taken to decieve their opponent (Yorktown, etc.), there was very little done in the way to conceal ones military disposition as there were more important things at the time (chasing down their opponent, or remaining one step ahead). Even here, as in other campaigns, part of the deception was to inform their own troops of incorrect information (such as when/where an attack was taking place), so when there was the inevitable desertion to the opposing side, the 'wrong' information was given. But this was also a rare tactic, but what it does is acknowledge the fact that information was easy to come by at the time. (It is better not to let your opponent know where you are right now, than to know what you are composed of).

The examples of the Magruder's, Beauregards, Grants, who used 'deceptive tactics' were the rarity rather than the norm, even in their own commands (just because they did it a few times, doesn't mean it always happened). Most generals, even the great ones (Jackson for example) did not employ tactics to decieve the enemy in numbers. Beauregard was the only one who repeatedly used these tactics, but even here he is given a specific trait in the game to represent it.

The 'best' examples are tactical use of secrecy of manoever. Longstreet went through a painfully tedious march in order to quietly march his soldiers south during the second day of Gettysburg, in itself caused delays. Jackson more successfully secretly manoevered during the Chancellorsville campaign. Even here, secrecy was limited, and in the heat of battle because of situation. There was no time to gather information, or even interegate deserters/prisoners.

Cavalry's job was to attain information, from civilians, stragglers, and deserters, as well as through direct raids on rear-area forces. Their high relative speed allowed significant information to be gained and delivered back to military commanders even without direct contact with the core of the enemy force.

McNaughtons exactly right. From today's perspective, it is amazing how much information was provided by prisoners and deserters, etc.

[PBBoeye]

I have no issues with the intelligence system as portrayed in unit recognition. I especially enjoy the way it fluctuates dependant on the units you have (cavalry, spies like Boyd, etc) and on the location of the target region relative to the region your unit occupies. I think it is a great system.

Now, I am not as pleased with the status of intelligence at the national level - ie., knowing if the enemy has instituted a draft. A bit OT, but related in a sense.

Good system overall. Me likey.

[GShock]

Cavalry's job was to attain information, from civilians, stragglers, and deserters, as well as through direct raids on rear-area forces. Their high relative speed allowed significant information to be gained and delivered back to military commanders even without direct contact with the core of the enemy force.

That's true in the game for their high patrol values are there to testify the importance of cav units as scouts.

Civs or low-rank prisoners/deserters do not know now the exact consistency, location, force of every detachment (we would call "element" in this game) you can imagine what they knew back then.

One thing is to use a spy-plane and see and then report while another thing is to cross lines with a horse several times to check and then report back the info acquired travelling in zones where the enemy MC is high.
The moment the report arrives, the spied-army could have moved already or have engaged and "changed" supply/consistency/stance/entrenchment etc etc.

According to:
My Patrol/ his patrol levels. (the way i track his scouts who are going to catch my spies)
My hide/ His Hide levels. (the way my spies can spy secretly on the way his army uses deception)
Loyalty in my region/Loyalty in his region levels. (the way the region allegiance helps/hinders the job of my spy providing good/bad info)

These parameters should judge whether some or all of those details are reported back exactly/accurately/inaccurately/not reported at all (impossible to find out that particular info or spy killed/captured or delayed in the coming back to report).

The game just says : You see = You see all.

I don't think it's an accurate way to simulate the gather of intelligence which is a key factor in combat.

[McNaughton]

That's true in the game for their high patrol values are there to testify the importance of cav units as scouts.

Civs or low-rank prisoners/deserters do not know now the exact consistency, location, force of every detachment (we would call "element" in this game) you can imagine what they knew back then.

One thing is to use a spy-plane and see and then report while another thing is to cross lines with a horse several times to check and then report back the info acquired travelling in zones where the enemy MC is high.
The moment the report arrives, the spied-army could have moved already or have engaged and "changed" supply/consistency/stance/entrenchment etc etc.

According to:
My Patrol/ his patrol levels. (the way i track his scouts who are going to catch my spies)
My hide/ His Hide levels. (the way my spies can spy secretly on the way his army uses deception)
Loyalty in my region/Loyalty in his region levels. (the way the region allegiance helps/hinders the job of my spy providing good/bad info)

These parameters should judge whether some or all of those details are reported back exactly/accurately/inaccurately/not reported at all (impossible to find out that particular info or spy killed/captured or delayed in the coming back to report).

The game just says : You see = You see all.

I don't think it's an accurate way to simulate the gather of intelligence which is a key factor in combat.

Are you sure? I have seen different levels of detection based on the composition of friendly and unfriendly forces. I have been modding, and testing, and in my 1861 scenario as the Union I can see everything I can about Beauregard's force, as it has a hide value of 0, and my force in Alexandria has a detection value of 5. However, in the Peninsula I have a detection value of 2, while MacGruder has a hide value of 1, meaning all I can see is that the stack is commanded by a 1-star general (can tell it is MacGruder by his picture), and that there are some unknown units of an undetermined size, and his hide factor is 1.

Here's a pic...


*Detection Value 2
*Hide Value 1

At 2:1 I was able to determine that there was a 1-star in command, that there were regular, irregular, militia, cavalry and supply. As well as his hide value.

Maybe all of your detection ratings have been high, while your opponent's hide ratings have been low?

It wasn't hard to figure out what unit you are up against. Historically, units really didn't shift around from one to another. You end up with the same regiment, in the same brigade, in the same division, in the same corps, for years. The only times this is shuffled up are in the major army reforms (of which were limited due to logistics) after diastrously bloody campaigns.

People are constantly moving around in this timeframe. As I said earlier, a lot of information was gathered from non-combatants. It is not hard to figure out, overhear marching instructions, talking to soldiers who are foraging for food, etc., what unit they are part of. You may not hear of their plans, but you are very likely to hear about their unit, or, just read their regimental flags! It was impossible to tell friend from foe, as everyone spoke the same language.

Gaining information on unit composition wasn't hard, nor did it take space-aged technology, as everything was slowed down during this period compared to contemporary action.

[Pocus]

There are 4 levels of intelligences, depending of your excess (or not) of detection points, compared to the hide value of the enemy.

[GShock]

Starting from your very same picture, we are assuming in only 15 days (during the resolution phase) you could (with all of your combined forces who are moving, fighting, resupplying, replacing, etc) come up with these information about MacGruder. (who also has been moving, fighting, resupplying, replacing etc) and that's how in the planning phase u can see what you show us in the pic.

I'm not saying it's impossible but it's very unlikely to get always that accuracy in reports.
Some of these info are so detailed sometimes that you wonder if your scout in 15 days has actually ENTERED the enemy entrenchment to count all soldiers sleeping in the underground section just to make an example...or perhaps was there asking the leader himself how many steaks and fries the cooks cooked the previous day....

I would like to know that those info i see could also be wrong and not necessarily true.

Something like "I see but am not entirely sure i see *all*" instead of "what i can see is *exactly* what there is" that's all