Stalemate, Late October 1861

[Torca]

Forget western theater, forget ships, forget foreign intervention.
No pussy footing! Since turn one proclaim call for volunteers, full mobilization, 8% bonds, extreme tax, commercial concessions and even some money printing. Basically get as much money and manpower as you can as fast as possible. Start making regiments at the east, Henry Ford style.
On every 3 regiments I've built 1 artillery unit. Even pulled some regular troops from the west. There I recruited only militia, irregulars, few cavalry units and some horse artillery to make a delay force. When I was satisfied with the force on the east, couldn't make or wait for more (probably late July 1861, can't remember exactly), made some replacements, leaving some 5000 men to garrison Harpers Ferry gathered all that up and went strait for Washington with last regiments arriving from the West, GA and NC. Over the Manassas through Alexandria where I captured loads of supply wagons than across the Potomac to lay siege on Washington which was early or late September 1861. At late October when it was starting to snow and my supplies where running short charged Washington fortifications and took it. Stalemate! Which is actually Confederate victory. They got their CSA. Union morale dropped to 32, 865 VP over Union 466, POW 14400, combat losses 68000 - Union 78000.
That was game against AI on hard mode. It didn't move capitol tho but I guess it was to late when it was under siege. Anyway even if it did, at spring I would continue North burning everything until Union gives up.
To summarize, if CSA don't get stalemate until first snow of 1862 at the latest they will most likely loose. No meter how good CSA generals and troops are Union will win by shear numbers. If Union loose an army of 50 000, no problem, another army of 100 000 will come. The longer war last the lesser is chance for CSA remaining CSA.
I'm gona try Union side now.

[Queeg]

The AI could do a bit better job of defending Washington, I think, particularly early on. When playing as CSA, I impose a house rule on myself of not trying to take Washington until late 1862. I just adopt the role-play mindset that the South initially viewed the war as being a purely defensive struggle and that invading Maryland to attack Washington would have been inconsistent with that view. Makes for a longer, more interesting game.

[Torca]

That's why CSA lost the war. The question is do you want to win the war or not. As the years went by both sides realized they are actually at war and "we gona do this gents way" is not working. By that time it was to late for CSA. Grant is not great general he just was the first general to figure out there's only one, but only one way to win and he got Sherman to implement the strategy.
South has only one card to play, slim but still a chance. Gather an army large as possible even if that means to weaken West theater. Once they start moving North they burn everything along the way, towns, farms, livestock,... everything, choke the North with refugees, don't stop until they reach Washington. Once there burn it to the ground and than ask Lincoln if he's up for truce. Nope?! Ok, we continue North the same way until we reach Canadian border. If they fail in that one go? Well, than ask Lincoln if they can be friends again.
After 2nd Manassas, Lee figured it will take at least two months for Union to regroup. Fifteen days later McClellan came with 100 000 men and nearly wiped Confederate army. In 1864 that same McClellan was running for presidency with peace option. South hoped to hold on until he wins the elections but that was clutching the straw.
As Sherman said "War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it; and those who brought war into our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out. The more cruel war is lesser it will last". Simple as that.

Anyway, it's easy to be a general after the battle or war.

[Black Cat]

That`s a reasonable plan for 1939 in Europe, however the culture of both North and South prevented them realizing that until 1863, as you point out.

By then it was too late for the South.

It will be interesting to see if the Game engine allows a more elegent way to win as the CSA, but I suspect not.

[Crimguy]

I disagree on your analysis of Grant. In fact, I generally dispute the belief that either the CSA had better soldiers or better generals as a whole.

Grant's western campaign was very well executed (with the possible exception of the lax disposition of his army at Shiloh), and his attack on Vicksberg was exceptional, and on par with anything the CSA Generals did.

I do agree with much of what you said though. While there was a chance that the CSA could have rolled up the Feds after 1st Bull run, and subsequently taken Washington, it's a big maybe. The moment was lost perhaps a day after that battle, and while it would have been an incredible loss of morale to lose DC, the long term implications are difficult to analyze. In hindsight, they were probably best off not taking the battle to the enemy in Pennsylvania in 1863, and not trying to attack Sherman outside of Atlanta in 1864. The biggest mistake on the CSA's part was ever falling into an offensive trap. Even their greatest victories were ones where they were on the defensive, and converted that defense into counterplay against generally inferior generals in the Eastern theater.

This would have denied the victories the Republicans so desparately needed to have a chance in the 1864 election, and might have resulted in an armistace. McClellan was a democrat, but not a peace democrat. His platform favored peace with Union, something the peace democrats reluctantly got behind in hopes of gaining the White House. I do suspect there was a realistic chance of secession had McClellan won the election.

[blackbellamy]

Losing Washington would have been a temporary inconvenience at best, just like it was the last time.

[tagwyn]

In the war of 1812!! L3

[Torca]

Baltimore crammed with refugees desperate for food I wouldn't call inconvenience. South's biggest mistake was to fire upon Fort Sumter without any consideration of or preparation for consencvences.

[TheWombat]

This is perhaps the one thing that bugs me the most about the game, which overall I think is a wonderfull product. My first full war campaign ended in November as my Confederates took Washington and triggered a statelmate. The Union sent the bulk of its forces to Harpers Ferry and the Shenandoah, and left mere militia to hold the capital.

I am thinking, too, that I should adopt a "house rule" against the AI restricting assaults on Washington in the early going. It's more important to me to have a good exciting game than to "win," especially against the computer. But it would be nice if there could be some game code/AI sort of way to make these sorts of attacks much less likely to succeed, or to happen.

[Pocus]

Capitol importance is majorly increased in upcoming 1.06.

[Torca]

Sure, a game against real player would be completely different. I still stand that CSA has only one card to play and should play it sooner than later.
I did try another game and stopped in Alexandria over the winter to "build up". Union charged 3 times to recapture Alexandria but were repulsed with huge losses on both sides. By the time of spring McDowell installed himself across the Potomac in Washington with huge army, just sitting there. To engage him would be suicide so I went around hoping to draw him away from Washington. Captured York, Baltimore, Wilmington, Montgomery, Dover and Denton. McDowell still not budging with more and more troops coming into Annapolis via the sea. I failed to take Harrisburg and had to abandon Lancaster. Over the winter 1862 I could see another Union army massing at Harrisburg and rivers of troops pouring in from Kentucky and Illinois. Now only thing I can do is to completely withdraw back across the Potomac to Virginia hoping to be able to build a dam strong enough to contain the river of Union troops...

[TheWombat]

Capitol importance is majorly increased in upcoming 1.06.

That sounds promising. If the AI starts to attach a lot of importance to Washington, then it might well mount a more robust defense.

Of course, the other issue is the weight given to Richmond, even when it's not the capital yet. From what I can see (and I have not really dived in deeply) the option to move the capital from Montgomery to Richmond is just that, and option--why would the Confederate player WANT to move his capital to the comparatively vulnerable Northern Virginia region (in the game, at least)?

[Pocus]

Because the capital status act as a coefficient on base production, and Montgomery is a bit crappy on this aspect

[jam3]

Warfare in the Napoleonic era was essentially all centered around large set piece battles. The entire reason the ACW is so interesting is that it is where the mindset changed from fighting large set piece battles to one of constant warfare.

Thats ultimatly where Grant can be given credit. The Anaconda plan essentially laid out the details for waging complete and total non-stop war on the south, war ever since the Anaconda plan was put into actions has forever been changed worldwide.

I think looking back with a contemporary perspective its very easy to say "well the south should have just pressed Bull Run", its not simply a matter of politics, culture, or self determination of the C.S.A. Its truly a matter of military logistics of the time. Attempting to take "Fortress" Washington early in the war would have done nothing but end it that much faster for the south imho. The assault losses would have been in the area of 20 to 1.

[mayonaise]

the southern army was just as disorganized in victory as the union was in defeat after bull run. they had zero chance to mount an offensive.

[Castel]

generally dispute the belief that either the CSA had better soldiers or better generals as a whole.

Mc Dowell, Mc Clellan, Pope, Burnside, Sherman...they were far to be great quite honestly.

The fact that the war lasted 4 years proves that there was a serious problem.

Lee was good, sure, but hell, his men were starved and outnumbered most of the time.

So what's the deal ?

In my humble opinion, the north biggest weakness was its lack of good high officers.

[Conhugeco]

The fact that the war lasted 4 years proves that there was a serious problem.

I've always wondered when I see statements like this exactly how long it should have taken the Union to suppress the rebellion. 90 days?

I think it should have taken 8 years, which means that the Union did very very well, and that the Confederacy was fundamentally incompetent.

Dick

[Torca]

I agree, Union did fine! We're not in a hurry, let them come, bleed them, choke them with blockade than move in to scoop up what's left of them. The problem was politics and public pressure to end it fast.
I also agree there was no way to press Washington after 1st Manassas but in harvest season of 1862 South should've played "one go" card.

[Bodders]

As I mentioned in the 'general' section discussion under 'victory, but a bit too soon' you don't even need to follow this strategy.

I did a relatively normal mobilisation along all fronts on hard/very high detect bonus and took Washington in November, 1861 under patch 1.06. On 'normal' aggression, McDowell abandons Washington for the valley and doesn't leave enough behind under Scott.

I'm trying again on 'low' and happy because McDowell hasn't abandoned it. Now if you followed the strategy in this thread I'm still not sure he'd have enough in Washington to defend but it doesn't really interest me to be honest. I don't think it would work against a human player and in any game you can work out 'tricks' that beat the ai. I'd rather try and beat the ai in the '64 election

As others have mentioned, until the improvements on capital defense are finished, you're better off either not attacking Washington or try on low aggression as I am - I'm interested in further details on that

Oh, as an aside, The Wombat, your capital will move to Richmond in late June/early July time automatically. That's when the CSA income goes up from 30 or so a turn to 100 or so, you'd definitely move from Montgomery if this didn't happen automatically

[Pocus]

The 'defend the capital, salvage the game' problem (hello Hayden ) is a nice one to solve.

a) Use too much strength to defend the capital needlessly, and you blunt AI armies and it won't go on the offensive.

b) use not enough, and a player, focusing on taking the capital will be able to do that without problem.

[Bodders]

Yes, interesting point, Pocus.

Have it cost less morale to the ai to lose the capital, maybe? Yes I know it's a 'cheat' but I'm never averse

McDowell should probably have no interest in going anywhere during 1861 and eat up the 'no offensive' morale loss unless on 'reckless' - that would probably allow the ai to build enough that it isn't easy to take even with an 'all out' build strategy.

[Pocus]

perhaps you were lucky also... the AI is capable of moving away his capitol, unless you take it by surprise. So in this case, Washington would only cost a 'mere' 10 morale points...

[Bodders]

perhaps you were lucky also... the AI is capable of moving away his capitol, unless you take it by surprise. So in this case, Washington would only cost a 'mere' 10 morale points...

I've never seen it do this, I must admit - I suppose it thinks Scott's defensive force is strong enough - which with the 35% penalty it's nowhere near enough of course.

[cegman]

How about make it so that Units defending the capitol have no Penalty. Would this be a posiblity with the current system you are using? Possibly a Invisible general with 99 command points.

[Torca]

At first my attention was not to go for Washington in 1861 but opportunity presented itself when McDowell didn't retreat directly to Washington after battle of Alexandria so I went for it. Crossed Potomac directly to Washington with almost entire army. Just left Alexandria garrison there with some supporting troops. If AI counterattacked back to Alexandria he would have me cut off, probably.

[Jacek]

The problem is a) the Washington stack has about 250 points of strength. b) McDowell ,with his army stack, suffers from inactivity and cannot respond properly to protect the Union capital. If just the AI moved some forces to buff the Washington garriosn like those obosete Patterson stack north of Winchester. That would probably do.

[tagwyn]

Sherman was a heck of a good general!! McDowell, McClellan, Pope, McCllelan again, Hooker, Burnside, Banks, Fremont ad nauseum... Were NOt Good Generals. We are lucky the Brits decided not to intervene. I would hardly call Sharpsburg a victory. It was terrible!! Union shoud have destroyed the NVA. If McClellan had renewed the attack with the part of AoP that had NOT fought at all Lee is destroyed!!!

[McNaughton]

Sherman was a heck of a good general!! McDowell, McClellan, Pope, McCllelan again, Hooker, Burnside, Banks, Fremont ad nauseum... Were NOt Good Generals. We are lucky the Brits decided not to intervene. I would hardly call Sharpsburg a victory. It was terrible!! Union shoud have destroyed the NVA. If McClellan had renewed the attack with the part of AoP that had NOT fought at all Lee is destroyed!!!

Actually, McDowell and Hooker were adequate (and in the case of Hooker superb) generals. McDowell commanded his army very well during 1st Bull Run, and it collapsed due to the unrealistic pressures of having this force assault a Confederate force of almost parity in size. The fact that the armies were completely green leads to the very difficult task of attacking (easier to defend with a green army, than attack). Frankly, McDowell nearly had his victory, and would have had it should Johnston not have arrived at the critical times of the battle.

Hooker was a military genious, yet in his one chance, he lost his nerve (a lot of other factors, which paralelled Lee during the Gettysburg campaign). Frankly, judging his entire career on Chancellorsville is limiting, since every other engagement he fought, as corps commander, and divisional commander, he was exceptionally proficient. Also, he was the one who reorganized and manoevered the Union army to its engagement at Gettysburg, with Meade taking over at the eve of battle.

Bunside himself was an enigma. His operations against Longstreet in the West were short of brilliant, and helped lead to the spectacular victory at Chatenooga.

Regarding McClellan, you are basing things on after the fact knowledge. We all know Lee was whipped after Antietam, but, due to false intelligence, McClellan was under the assumption he was up against superior numbers. In fact, when you take this into account, McClellan was exceptionally aggressive (if indeed he thought he was up against 100-200 000 rebels in the Peninsula and Maryland campaign). He held great responsibility, of holding the only force between the Rebels and Washington.

The Fact is, destroying a civil war era army in the field is easier said than done. Artillery, exhaustion, etc., all take their toll, and keep the enemy at arms length. Indeed, neither the Army of Tennessee or Army of Virginia was ever annihilated in the field, in fact, neither was the Army of Virginia, which suffered a spectacular defeat at 2nd Bull Run.

What do you have to say about Lee who was unable to defeat the Army of Virginia at the Battle of Chantilly? Just because he, like McClellan, couldn't destroy a field army, does not mean that they were incompetent.

The fact is, the North had a tougher job than the south. They had to invade and defeat a foe on their territory. The Confederates were born and raised on the ground that 90% of the battles were fought on. Frankly, the Federals fought substantially more successfully in enemy territory than any Confederate force did in Union territory. Every Confederate battle in Maryland, Pennsylvania and Kentucky was a defeat (Antietam was a defeat, regardless on what anyone says). The Federals not only won all their battles in their territory, but, a good number in enemy territory (Peninsula battles were generally Union victories, Grant was practically undefeated out West, etc.).

So, not only did the north have to fight in strange territory, they proved more than capable of out soldiering and out generalling southern contemporaries in a balanced manner (i.e., faced their share of victories and defeats). The South didn't have the ability, or will, to fight the same level of a campaign that the North did.