At the start of the war, all officers were trained in military theory derived from the Napoleonic Wars. Some never got over it (P.G.T. Beauregard?). I'll agree with you on the Seven Days, but at that point no one on either side had the experience (or the staffs) to handle such huge armies. At Chancellorsville, Lee tried to follow up the success of Jackson's devastating flank attack with general attacks the next day, but he was outnumbered 2:1 and his strength already ground down by two days of fighting. 2nd Manassas illustrates the general theme that the winners were usually as broken up as the losers. Lee did turn that victory into an (in my opinion) ill-advised invasion of Maryland, but his army was already worn out at that point. Grant did it at Vicksburg because Pemberton retreated into an enclosed fortified position rather than retaining his freedom of maneuver. He had no choice, considering who was running the war. In the Appomattox campaign, Grant faced an army with shattered morale and disintegrating logistics. As for Chickamauga, a more resolute pursuit might have crippled the Union army, but thanks to Braxton Bragg's unimaginative tactics his own army was as beat up as his opponent.
In fact, leaving aside sieges (Donelson, Vickburg) in which the Confederates foolishly allowed themselves to be trapped, no army was destroyed in the open field except Hood at Nashville and Lee at Appomattox. Lee was at least trying to regain freedom of movement with a disintegrating army and logistics. Hood? If you can think of a more bizarre campaign in the history of warfare, please enlighten me.
I don't want to say that because it wasn't done, it couldn't have been done. Despite a lot of trying, it wasn't. The armies were too large, too resilient at the tactical level and the combat so deadly that even if you won you were too badly injured to finish it. Grant did, with the resources of the Union to back him, at enormous cost and a nine month campaign, not a single battle.
At the start of the war, all officers were trained in military theory derived from the Napoleonic Wars.
I'll agree with you on the Seven Days, but at that point no one on either side had the experience (or the staffs) to handle such huge armies.
ill-advised invasion of Maryland
Grant did it at Vicksburg because Pemberton retreated into an enclosed fortified position rather than retaining his freedom of maneuver.
In the Appomattox campaign, Grant faced an army with shattered morale and disintegrating logistics.
At the start of the war, all officers were trained in military theory derived from the Napoleonic Wars.
GraniteStater wrote:The above is not a criticism of the OP. If I may, too many here just trot out assertions that would've been hauled into court for vagrancy about fifty years ago.
Read more than one author. Compare. Reflect. Think. Then, one can perhaps draw conclusions that aren't susceptible to being overly reduced. And when one does, qualify statements, put them into context. And always remember, we weren't there - all we have are records and documents.
Read Tuchman's Practicing History if one really wants to learn how an historian works and thinks.
Whereas Grant, while serving as a QM, was breveted at Chapultepec (could be wrong on the fight) for bravery and intrepidity - QMs didn't usually get involved in scrapping.
Wow, he had some hard crits of Lee, huh?
GraniteStater wrote:I should read that book. Fuller, you say?
aariediger wrote:And with reason too. While many people see Grant and Lee as similar generals, they had different styles, and fought different wars. In chess terms, Grant is white, he plays the conventional role of attacker, has ‘tempo’, while Lee is asymmetrical Black, fighting a defensive battle, trying to find an opportunity to steal the initiative. Lee was spontaneous, taking advantage of mistakes and surprising opponents. Grant was methodical, his surprises were planned. For example, my previous post pointed out both Grant and Lee’s use of the central position, but the circumstances were different. Lee finds himself in the central position between McClellan and Pope, and strikes both in turn before they can unite. His defensive and opportunistic usage is contrasted with Grant at Vicksburg.
Rather than simply finding himself lucked into the central position, Grant plans to create the situation. He drives between Pemberton and Johnston, placing himself in the central position from which he will defeat each in turn, and follow through with the destruction of the former. This is the pre-planned, offensive usage of one of Napoleon’s most important tactics. Here we see the difference between Grant and Lee. Both knew how to take advantage of an opportunity, but Grant sets himself apart by creating his opportunities.
aariediger wrote:And with reason too. While many people see Grant and Lee as similar generals, they had different styles, and fought different wars. In chess terms, Grant is white, he plays the conventional role of attacker, has ‘tempo’, while Lee is asymmetrical Black, fighting a defensive battle, trying to find an opportunity to steal the initiative. Lee was spontaneous, taking advantage of mistakes and surprising opponents. Grant was methodical, his surprises were planned. For example, my previous post pointed out both Grant and Lee’s use of the central position, but the circumstances were different. Lee finds himself in the central position between McClellan and Pope, and strikes both in turn before they can unite. His defensive and opportunistic usage is contrasted with Grant at Vicksburg.
Rather than simply finding himself lucked into the central position, Grant plans to create the situation. He drives between Pemberton and Johnston, placing himself in the central position from which he will defeat each in turn, and follow through with the destruction of the former. This is the pre-planned, offensive usage of one of Napoleon’s most important tactics. Here we see the difference between Grant and Lee. Both knew how to take advantage of an opportunity, but Grant sets himself apart by creating his opportunities.
...but I think the South was very close to winning.
...it amazes me that the Northern population upheld the motivation to wage a bloody war when they could have ended it so easily, even if they were not fully aware of the real causes.
GraniteStater wrote:When?
GraniteStater wrote:Really? 'Amazing'? And the North was delusional, or tricked by that rascal, Lincoln, if I'm reading this right?
There were certain fundamental principles at stake, one of which was whether a dissatisfied minority in a free republic could arbitrarily defy lawful authority by force of arms, simply on an apprehension of what an administration might do - and entirely in contravention of repeated statements by that administration (yet to take office, mind you) that it had no intention of exercising unconstitutional powers to change the domestic arrangements of the several States.
The North had definite dissensions within it - war Democrats, peace Democrats, radical Republicans, "antebellum" Republicans, but most of the North, although divided on the exact terms of the results, were for prosecuting the war. The 1862 elections were a good barometer of this resolve. The Democrats gained seats, but not anywhere near the amount needed to change policy. Note that in '64, Lincoln carried the soldier's vote in a tidal wave. IMHO, if Sherman had not taken Atlanta, nor Sheridan won Cedar Creek, Lincoln still would've won, just not as pronouncedly. Yes, there was a great deal of war weariness by '64 and without the two events above, a great many people would've been sick of no light at the end of the tunnel, but I think Lincoln would've still won, but probably with a more fractious Congress.
GlobalExplorer wrote:Before the 1864 election of course. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_presidential_election,_1864
There was a good chance that the North, especially the soldiers would simply give up.
It's quite obvious that Lincoln wanted the War, the northern population did not. Like Roosevelt in 1940 he was dragging the country behind, onto the battlefield. Don't get me wrong, I know Lincoln was not an idiot and he had to do it because otherwise the USA would fall apart and never be again. So yeah, while he had his long term goal that we all understand, the short term result was still that men from Northern states died by their thousands in a war they did not understand, against people which were not their enemies. Sorry if that goes against your convictions. I wouldn't disagree though that Lincoln was probably the greatest president you ever had.
There was a good chance that the North, especially the soldiers would simply give up
It's quite obvious that Lincoln wanted the War, the northern population did not.
...men from Northern states died by their thousands in a war they did not understand...
GraniteStater wrote:Oh, that's why Lincoln took the soldier's vote 85 - 15. Got it.
A 'good chance'? Show from the record, please. The election results in '62 and '64 would tend to demonstrate otherwise, in any fair reading of these, not to mention the initial overwhelming response to calls from volunteers. Don't get real fired up about the Copperheads and the New York Herald's editorials - if ever anyone blew hot and cold, it was Greeley.
Lincoln, 1864: "This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable that this Administration will not be re-elected. Then it will be my duty to so co-operate with the President elect, as to save the Union between the election and the inauguration; as he will have secured his election on such ground that he cannot possibly save it afterward."
GraniteStater wrote:With all respects, you are fast reaching the 'throw the spaghetti and see if it sticks" school of discussion. History is not up for grabs. There are facts. Then there are logical and rightful conclusions we may draw. Historians disagree about some of these, but they try to base their conclusions on something resembling logical inferences that can be supported by the facts. I am very afraid I see little of this in the statements you make. If I may say so, I see some unacquaintance with events in mid-19th century America and what these meant to the parties involved.
You're entitled to your opinions. So am I. Do bear in mind, however, that if one insists that Columbus discovered Pomerania, then perhaps one shouldn't be expecting that Ph. D. in history from Heidelberg anytime soon.
Dear Granite Stater, I value your opinion, but declaring yourself the PhD in a discussion, that's pretty much laughable and beggin for a bruising
I hope you have not inferred from some grammatical mistakes that I made that I am receiving a lecture from you! It's up to you if you cross the line to arrogance, but I hope you won't expect me to leave such jabs uncommented. Ok, Friends again
The quote I gave, was the assessment of Lincoln himself and his advisors and it was extremely pessimistic. It was the response to your previous denial of facts (when I wrote that war weariness in the North could have ended the war under some circumstances, at some point, you made it sound like it was something I had taken out of a Klu Klux Clan pamphlet).
I think the Lincoln statement refutes yours, so I'll let it stand. If Lincoln believed that he may not be re-elected so much, it can only mean that he may not have been re-elected indeed, and that no one can tell me that it's an absurd notion.
I agree however that it may be truer to facts that Lincoln and his staff did not have the clear picture themselves. But the fact remains that Lincoln's re-election was a great uncertainty (Great Britain had come to the same conclusion at some time), and a Northern Drôle de guerre under the next management was a possibility - under some circumstances, at some point. At the election 1864 that point and the conditions had passed though.
But that's something we already know don't we.
GraniteStater wrote:To say that Lincoln could've avoided the war if he had the will, is, sorry, just nonsense. Try to remember that armed rebels fired on a Federal installation. And he, according to your lights, should've done what - shrugged it off? Are you aware of the responsibilities of a US President? Are you familiar with the oath he takes?
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