Importance of opening the Mississippi

[khbynum]

Gray Fox recently posted in the main forum:

"An ancient axiom of war is not to fight on two fronts at the same time. That is why I hold in the center with a line of strongpoints along major rivers and attack in the east. If you attack down the Mississippi this would require a lot of men and supplies that you should be using to take Richmond. The so-called Western Campaign is a bad idea militarily.

In RL, everything produced for export in the Midwest was shipped down the Mississippi to New Orleans and everthing imported traveled this route in reverse. The game should reflect this as a Confederate blockade of all the harbor cities in the midwest until the Mississippi is cleared. Since it does not, no economic reason exists to clear Ole Miss."

I've included the whole quote here as a matter of courtesy, but I'm not asking about the Fox's opinions on grand strategy (I disagree) or game strategy (eagerly awaiting a PBEM demonstration of his controversial ideas) but rather the historical question.

By the time of the Civil War, railroads and canals (Eire, B&O) had greatly reduced the dependence of the Midwest on the Mississippi as an outlet for produce or a source of goods. One of the economic stimuli for secession was that the South could no longer use the Mississippi trade as a counter for Northern tariffs. I don't get a great sense from my readings of trade disruption in the Midwest caused by the CSA closing the Mississippi, especially since the South never blocked the rivers above Cairo. On the other hand, the USA accrued considerable benefit by opening the river. Late in the war Jefferson Davis wanted troops sent across the river from the trans-Mississippi, only to be told it was impossible in the face of Union naval control.

Was closing the Mississippi a waste of military power? If so, who benefited the most, North or South? I welcome your erudition.

[GraniteStater]

Glad you brought it up, you're right. I too, felt that Mr. GF was overemphasizing the Mississippi. It was very important, but, IIRC, the Erie Canal alone was a major change in the commercial axes of the nation - Great Lakes to NYC; NYC became the hub of commercial America.

[Jim-NC]

I don't know about the economic value, but there was a great perceived morale value. There was a strong union drive to open it. They wouldn't have spent all the time and effort if they (the union leadership) didn't think it did something for them.

I don't know about then, but now, river barge traffic is still a huge factor in moving goods. Even with railroads, a lot of bulk freight moves by river in the US. It's cheaper than the railroads (probably as a single barge can hold the equivalent of many rail cars).

[Gray Fox]

http://northamericanimmigration.org/213-new-orleans-louisiana.html?newsid=213

“From the first steamboat that plied the Mississippi in 1812, the number regularly calling at the port grew to 3,000 by the 1850s.”

http://www.maritimeheritage.org/ports/usNewOrleans.html

“By the 1820's and 1830's, New Orleans was the commercial and financial intermediary for goods from all reaches of the Mississippi.”

Also, in the game as in RL, the Erie canal is drained during the winter because it freezes over. Then as today, river barges move more cargo less expensively than RR.

[GraniteStater]

"grew to 3,000" - every year? Every day? Unclear. I'll bet NYC had 3,000 loadings in a month.

"By the 1820s and 1830s" - uh, I can't recall the exact date, but the Erie Canal was in 1832, IIRC. The central point is once the Great Lakes were connected directly to the Eastern seaboard, and in particular, NYC, then the axis of commerce shifted to a very large degree. No one has suggested that New Orleans ceased to be important, it was, but NYC became NYC. RRs connecting Chicago to NYC only hastened this - the canal business lost its importance by the 1840s, it was eclipsed by RRs, and I'm pretty darn sure of that statement as an historical fact.

Shipping down a major river, not a canal, is a different proposition. The Mississippi was, and remains, important. Watch the Burns's documentary on the history of NYC. The Erie canal started the re-orientation of the upper Midwest to NYC - directly. RRs layered on top of this.

The simple fact is that New Orleans was not the financial and commercial hub of the nation - and, IIRC, wasn't the biggest port, either. NYC was, in all categories, clearly by 1850. There were reasons for that, the principal one being New York took over once the interior could ship directly to NYC. And by 'shipping', we include RRs and all transportation - says the guy who helped document Yellow Freight's operations in 1999.

[Gray Fox]

The Erie canal was finished in 1825. So if NO was the commercial and financial intermediary in 1820 and still so in 1830, then the Erie canal did not change this. The canal was still closed during the winter which may be why. The documented importance of NO to trade on the Mississippi is brought to you by The Merritime Heritage Project which uses research from the National Archives and Merritime Library. Sites with .org, .gov, .edu, etc. are academic sources.

If the Union can blockade Richmond at the opposite end of a river, why doesn't the CSA blockade all of the Union ports on the opposite end of the Missisippi? Any alternate means of trade these river harbors used would be less efficient and would therefore have an additional cost. Since this is not the case in the game, no economic reason exists to free the Mississippi.

I also hold that since the Romans fought both the Greeks and Carthaginians at the same time over two millenia ago, it has not been a sound military plan to fight a war on two fronts at the same time.

[havi]

hmm the two fronts thing! how about america in ww2 in pacific and europe?

[tripax]

In the game there are, depending on how you count, there are up to 7 land paths of invasion of the CSA by the USA. Two routes in the West exist, a far West route from California which isn't really much of a route if at all opposed, and a swampy route through Springfield, Missouri, Fayetteville, Arkansas, to Little Rock and thense the Mississippi. More practically are the paths East of the Mississippi. The least good is Cumberland Gap towards Knoxville, Chattanooga, and Atlanta. Second worst is via Bowling Greene and Nashville into Alabama. Third is the Shenandoah Valley into western Virginia and North Carolina - from there either to Richmond, Knoxville, or elsewhere. The best path to invasion, but the most well guarded, is via Manassas and Fredricksburg towards Richmond.

This leaves the Mississippi. It is a valley, and thus traversable even when the river is closed by overlooking CSA-held forts. It provides a great path for supplies, once opened. It opens up the Arkansas and Red Rivers for control of the major inland cities in the Trans-Mississippi, etc, etc. Since defensive, trench warfare becomes increasingly available during the game, it also allows the player more choices of paths, as if one county is defended by entrenched troops, the neighboring county might be free and the Union is everywhere given many choices for fruitful marches.

Since it is much harder to bottle-neck the north along this path, the Mississippi is a great way for the North to wear down southern productivity and especially southern moral to a point where it is able to overwhelm the South, even in the East. In terms of manpower, 75,000 men well led down the Mississippi can easily push down to Memphis, and 25,000 more can capture extend gains to Corinth, Little Rock, Nashville, and Bowling Green. Gaining Vicksburg and New Orleans is much more difficult, as supply lines become long and defence becomes stout. Those 100,000 men will divert at least 50,000 Confederates from the east. So moving those 100,000 East means fighting those same 50,000 Confederates, but this time concentrated in Winchester, Fredricksburg, and Norfolk. In the West a likely gain of 6 key cities becomes, in the East, a difficult gain of one or two. For me, as the Union, the game is always finished in the East but won along the Mississippi.

I think in real life, the same is true. But I really don't know. Perhaps, as I too believe, the Mississippi wasn't as economically important as it was 30 or 50 years earlier. But it seems that it made great sense as a route of invasion. What was the next best option? Has any continental war been fought on a barely 100 mile front (the distance from Fredricksburg to Staunton)? Was such a war (only invade through Virginia) even considered?

[GraniteStater]

The Erie canal was finished in 1825. So if NO was the commercial and financial intermediary in 1820 and still so in 1830, then the Erie canal did not change this. The canal was still closed during the winter which may be why. The documented importance of NO to trade on the Mississippi is brought to you by The Merritime Heritage Project which uses research from the National Archives and Merritime Library. Sites with .org, .gov, .edu, etc. are academic sources.

If the Union can blockade Richmond at the opposite end of a river, why doesn't the CSA blockade all of the Union ports on the opposite end of the Missisippi? Any alternate means of trade these river harbors used would be less efficient and would therefore have an additional cost. Since this is not the case in the game, no economic reason exists to free the Mississippi.

I also hold that since the Romans fought both the Greeks and Carthaginians at the same time over two millenia ago, it has not been a sound military plan to fight a war on two fronts at the same time.

I did not contravene the importance of New Orleans - to this day, it is a highly important port. This does not obviate the historical record, though - NYC became the Big Apple, period, and had established itself as the premier business hub in the nation by the mid 1840s, if not earlier. A major impetus to this growth was the Erie Canal and then the railroads. Both connected the Midwest to the foremost port on the eastern seaboard.

All of which should show why it would be folly to 'blockade' Northern harbors on the Mississippi - basically, the North couldn't care less, you're not even a mosquito bite doing that. In the game, you might interfere with some movements for a while, but no lasting threat I can envision.

And if you want to know why the North wanted to cut the Mississippi, then I can refer you to none better than the cutter himself - read Grant's Memoirs, he'll explain it in detail.

[Gray Fox]

hmm the two fronts thing! how about america in ww2 in pacific and europe?

Havi, I am certain that I am not the only soldier on the planet to have heard that it is a bad plan to fight a war on two fronts. That is why Germany and Japan attacked us on two fronts. The U.S. did not decide to attack either of these countries and in fact once at war it was decided to fight Hitler first and hold in the Pacific, i.e., fight on one front.

[GraniteStater]

In the game there are, depending on how you count, there are up to 7 land paths of invasion of the CSA by the USA. Two routes in the West exist, a far West route from California which isn't really much of a route if at all opposed, and a swampy route through Springfield, Missouri, Fayetteville, Arkansas, to Little Rock and thense the Mississippi. More practically are the paths East of the Mississippi. The least good is Cumberland Gap towards Knoxville, Chattanooga, and Atlanta. Second worst is via Bowling Greene and Nashville into Alabama. Third is the Shenandoah Valley into western Virginia and North Carolina - from there either to Richmond, Knoxville, or elsewhere. The best path to invasion, but the most well guarded, is via Manassas and Fredricksburg towards Richmond.

This leaves the Mississippi. It is a valley, and thus traversable even when the river is closed by overlooking CSA-held forts. It provides a great path for supplies, once opened. It opens up the Arkansas and Red Rivers for control of the major inland cities in the Trans-Mississippi, etc, etc. Since defensive, trench warfare becomes increasingly available during the game, it also allows the player more choices of paths, as if one county is defended by entrenched troops, the neighboring county might be free and the Union is everywhere given many choices for fruitful marches.

Since it is much harder to bottle-neck the north along this path, the Mississippi is a great way for the North to wear down southern productivity and especially southern moral to a point where it is able to overwhelm the South, even in the East. In terms of manpower, 75,000 men well led down the Mississippi can easily push down to Memphis, and 25,000 more can capture extend gains to Corinth, Little Rock, Nashville, and Bowling Green. Gaining Vicksburg and New Orleans is much more difficult, as supply lines become long and defence becomes stout. Those 100,000 men will divert at least 50,000 Confederates from the east. So moving those 100,000 East means fighting those same 50,000 Confederates, but this time concentrated in Winchester, Fredricksburg, and Norfolk. In the West a likely gain of 6 key cities becomes, in the East, a difficult gain of one or two. For me, as the Union, the game is always finished in the East but won along the Mississippi.

I think in real life, the same is true. But I really don't know. Perhaps, as I too believe, the Mississippi wasn't as economically important as it was 30 or 50 years earlier. But it seems that it made great sense as a route of invasion. What was the next best option? Has any continental war been fought on a barely 100 mile front (the distance from Fredricksburg to Staunton)? Was such a war (only invade through Virginia) even considered?

A cogent analysis.

[Gray Fox]

In the game there are, depending on how you count, there are up to 7 land paths of invasion of the CSA by the USA. Two routes in the West exist, a far West route from California which isn't really much of a route if at all opposed, and a swampy route through Springfield, Missouri, Fayetteville, Arkansas, to Little Rock and thense the Mississippi. More practically are the paths East of the Mississippi. The least good is Cumberland Gap towards Knoxville, Chattanooga, and Atlanta. Second worst is via Bowling Greene and Nashville into Alabama. Third is the Shenandoah Valley into western Virginia and North Carolina - from there either to Richmond, Knoxville, or elsewhere. The best path to invasion, but the most well guarded, is via Manassas and Fredricksburg towards Richmond.

This leaves the Mississippi. It is a valley, and thus traversable even when the river is closed by overlooking CSA-held forts. It provides a great path for supplies, once opened. It opens up the Arkansas and Red Rivers for control of the major inland cities in the Trans-Mississippi, etc, etc. Since defensive, trench warfare becomes increasingly available during the game, it also allows the player more choices of paths, as if one county is defended by entrenched troops, the neighboring county might be free and the Union is everywhere given many choices for fruitful marches.

Since it is much harder to bottle-neck the north along this path, the Mississippi is a great way for the North to wear down southern productivity and especially southern moral to a point where it is able to overwhelm the South, even in the East. In terms of manpower, 75,000 men well led down the Mississippi can easily push down to Memphis, and 25,000 more can capture extend gains to Corinth, Little Rock, Nashville, and Bowling Green. Gaining Vicksburg and New Orleans is much more difficult, as supply lines become long and defence becomes stout. Those 100,000 men will divert at least 50,000 Confederates from the east. So moving those 100,000 East means fighting those same 50,000 Confederates, but this time concentrated in Winchester, Fredricksburg, and Norfolk. In the West a likely gain of 6 key cities becomes, in the East, a difficult gain of one or two. For me, as the Union, the game is always finished in the East but won along the Mississippi.

I think in real life, the same is true. But I really don't know. Perhaps, as I too believe, the Mississippi wasn't as economically important as it was 30 or 50 years earlier. But it seems that it made great sense as a route of invasion. What was the next best option? Has any continental war been fought on a barely 100 mile front (the distance from Fredricksburg to Staunton)? Was such a war (only invade through Virginia) even considered?

If you have too many troops in the east, then take Richmond and end the war. Even if a human player moves the capital to Atlanta, he loses 10NM for the move and another 10 NM when you overwhelm Richmond. Use your surplus of forces to continue down the east coast and take Atlanta. Game over.

As I have already demonstrated, if the Union sends 100k soldiers anywhere but Washington D.C., then I will take those 50K Confederates and beat the Union capital like a drum.

[GraniteStater]

Havi, I am certain that I am not the only soldier on the planet to have heard that it is a bad plan to fight a war on two fronts. That is why Germany and Japan attacked us on two fronts. The U.S. did not decide to attack either of these countries and in fact once at war it was decided to fight Hitler first and hold in the Pacific, i.e., fight on one front.

Just FYI, we didn't exactly mark time in the PTO - the first US counter-offensive was Guadalcanal, in August of '42, months before Torch. The PTO was getting 40% of all US supplies well into early 1943.

The US did fight a war on two fronts, and won on both. The US projected power across two oceans and tens of thousands of miles. Nazi Germany had trouble keeping troops on land 500, 1000 miles away properly fed, equipped and supplied. The IJN forgot they were an island and neglected ASW shamefully, losing 55% of their merchant fleet to US subs.

No maxim is graven in stone. Ask Alexander, ask Caesar, ask Robert E. Lee. Read Grant's Memoirs and how he came to the realization he didn't need a base, he would take what he needed from the country in which he operated until he re-established communications before the ramparts of Vicksburg.

Principles are guides, not the bars of mental prisons.

[Gray Fox]

If a river harbor is blockaded by a ZOC at the river's mouth, then Union harbors should be blockaded by the CSA control of the Mississippi. Richmond could send its produce to other ports, but this would cost more and that is what the effect of the blockade creates. Thousands of steamboats have a greater throughput tonnage than a 7 foot wide canal to NYC that freezes over.

[havi]

yes of course 2 fronts is isnt the ideal, but the union had the bigger machine and can force csa to but he forces in missisippi away from richmond and then make it easier to catch the richmond! ask GS how easy it is to capture richmond even if u have 3:1 ratio he didnt get it and he tried hard! Union is a bigger machine and if he force CSA to use forces in the west then those forces r not in east waiting in trenches of those boys in blue and CSA has the leader advantage too longstreet, jackson, lee if i can give all the CSA troops for them i will be in Alaska with in one week bye bye union after that!

[GraniteStater]

If you have too many troops in the east, then take Richmond and end the war. Even if a human player moves the capital to Atlanta, he loses 10NM for the move and another 10 NM when you overwhelm Richmond. Use your surplus of forces to continue down the east coast and take Atlanta. Game over.

As I have already demonstrated, if the Union sends 100k soldiers anywhere but Washington D.C., then I will take those 50K Confederates and beat the Union capital like a drum.

Demonstrated against whom? Athena? Look, I haven't beaten Athena on Colonel - I've only played one (1) AI game to the end - a Union victory in late 63 on LT. Colonel level ain't easy.

But the AI cannot, and does not think. It does not make decisions within decisions within decisions, it has no clue about a Big Picture, no strategic assessment capability and its tactics are usually (not always, I will grant, sometimes Athena can be downright subtle) bull-rushing.

I haven't played my AI games out, on both sides, because I've had too much fun with PbeM.

havi is a Damn Good Tactician, against whom I was damn lucky to barely eke out a technical win on VPs. Example - Virginia - yes, eventually, I was able to corral him in Richmond, but it took much, much too long. If it hadn't been for the gun at the end of the fourth quarter, I'd still be trying to pick that lock.

I was able to get Little Rock - near the end of the game, after grabbing MO & the upper Arkansas river. He was very stubborn and I was again fortunate to finally take the place. My Sea Island/Savannah/Charleston campaign was a chess match all the way and was again very lucky in one battle, keeping the rescue off Schenk's Corps so he could take Charleston, after months and months of feints and countermarches.

RebelYell is new to the game, new to the map, I believe, and I have stolen a march or two on him in Tennessee - but he has denied me the upper Arkansas so far, and I have yet to force the Rappahannock in VA. He still has Norfolk and if I try to scope out Richmond on the Peninsula, he smacks me up 'side the haid pretty good, usually with Jackson, who moves fast. We're in mid-64 and I have made little progress in a couple of places. My biggest accomplishment was catching him at a disadvantage in New Orleans, thus seizing it in late 62.

My game with RebelYell has an entirely different strategic context from my game with havi - entirely. Among other things, RY took a different approach himself.

Tactics are used to achieve ends determined by strategy - navy or not? Industry or not? Support units or not? Embargo cotton or not?

Everything a good human does has a context, a theme. Athena doesn't know what these things are, the devs try mightily to give her one, by establishing Priorities and evaluation routines, but, in the end, she's just code and code can be beaten. Humans get a feel for what the code is likely to do and devise counters.

There are No Magic Bullets. Every move you make can be countered. If there weren't a panoply of choices, if there were just one or two things to do that almost guaranteed Victory, then it would be a very uninteresting game.

Personally, I think I have arrived at a New Approach for me - Big Navy, Big Blockade, Big Industry, Patience and watch the Resources Roll In. This takes time, though, lots of it, and I'm sure a good CSA player, maybe even you, Gray Fox, could beat me to the punch.

But after this PbeM, I think I want to be the CSA for the next one. I have my philosophy there, not as well developed, I haven't played the CSA as much as I should, but I have a clue or two.

And I'll find out. It's only by losing that I started to see how to win.

Nathaniel Greene didn't win a single battle in the southern colonies, but he won his campaign.

There are No Magic Bullets.

[GraniteStater]

If a river harbor is blockaded by a ZOC at the river's mouth, then Union harbors should be blockaded by the CSA control of the Mississippi. Richmond could send its produce to other ports, but this would cost more and that is what the effect of the blockade creates. Thousands of steamboats have a greater throughput tonnage than a 7 foot wide canal to NYC that freezes over.

Are you serious??

CSA control of the Mississippi in 1861 had absolutely no adverse effect on Northern commerce. It wasn't just the canal - the canal industry had become secondary by mid-century, anyway.

Seriously, you need to read more. The South's transportational infrastructure was primitive, to be charitable, other than the RRs it had and some of the major ports. Southern roads, with certain exceptions, like the Valley turnpike, were notorious for being bad and little more than trails. Richmond's commerce wasn't going to shift easily to other ports, other than by rail and the South had certain daunting challenges with that, such as few repair facilities, no works I know of that could make a locomotive, conflicting gauges, and key points yet to be linked.

What RR lift it did have was earmarked for military purposes - shifting goods for other markets was low priority.

[RebelYell]

Demonstrated against whom? Athena? Look, I haven't beaten Athena on Colonel - I've only played one (1) AI game to the end - a Union victory in late 63 on LT. Colonel level ain't easy.

But the AI cannot, and does not think. It does not make decisions within decisions within decisions, it has no clue about a Big Picture, no strategic assessment capability and its tactics are usually (not always, I will grant, sometimes Athena can be downright subtle) bull-rushing.

I haven't played my AI games out, on both sides, because I've had too much fun with PbeM.

havi is a Damn Good Tactician, against whom I was damn lucky to barely eke out a technical win on VPs. Example - Virginia - yes, eventually, I was able to corral him in Richmond, but it took much, much too long. If it hadn't been for the gun at the end of the fourth quarter, I'd still be trying to pick that lock.

I was able to get Little Rock - near the end of the game, after grabbing MO & the upper Arkansas river. He was very stubborn and I was again fortunate to finally take the place. My Sea Island/Savannah/Charleston campaign was a chess match all the way and was again very lucky in one battle, keeping the rescue off Schenk's Corps so he could take Charleston, after months and months of feints and countermarches.

RebelYell is new to the game, new to the map, I believe, and I have stolen a march or two on him in Tennessee - but he has denied me the upper Arkansas so far, and I have yet to force the Rappahannock in VA. He still has Norfolk and if I try to scope out Richmond on the Peninsula, he smacks me up 'side the haid pretty good, usually with Jackson, who moves fast. We're in mid-64 and I have made little progress in a couple of places. My biggest accomplishment was catching him at a disadvantage in New Orleans, thus seizing it in late 62.

My game with RebelYell has an entirely different strategic context from my game with havi - entirely. Among other things, RY took a different approach himself.

Tactics are used to achieve ends determined by strategy - navy or not? Industry or not? Support units or not? Embargo cotton or not?

Everything a good human does has a context, a theme. Athena doesn't know what these things are, the devs try mightily to give her one, by establishing Priorities and evaluation routines, but, in the end, she's just code and code can be beaten. Humans get a feel for what the code is likely to do and devise counters.

There are No Magic Bullets. Every move you make can be countered. If there weren't a panoply of choices, if there were just one or two things to do that almost guaranteed Victory, then it would be a very uninteresting game.

Personally, I think I have arrived at a New Approach for me - Big Navy, Big Blockade, Big Industry, Patience and watch the Resources Roll In. This takes time, though, lots of it, and I'm sure a good CSA player, maybe even you, Gray Fox, could beat me to the punch.

But after this PbeM, I think I want to be the CSA for the next one. I have my philosophy there, not as well developed, I haven't played the CSA as much as I should, but I have a clue or two.

And I'll find out. It's only by losing that I started to see how to win.

Nathaniel Greene didn't win a single battle in the southern colonies, but he won his campaign.

There are No Magic Bullets.

I was got off guard with your surprise hump over the mountains to Chattanooga, that was gutsy as there could have been a corp just being railed in or just passing.

[GraniteStater]

I had a bit of intel & took a gamble to some degree. As careful as I try to be, deep down, "he will take more chances and take them quicker than any officer in the army."

But we are way OT for a History thread.

Look, there's no point in the CSA 'blockading' Union river ports, the historical record just doesn't justify it.

[anjou]

hmm the two fronts thing! how about america in ww2 in pacific and europe?

Well Japan had to deal with the Chinese on the Mainland and the British Raj in the SE. Germany, we all know their problem.

[Gray Fox]

I enjoy everyone’s opinions. If you play one way and you don’t care about 2500 years of military wisdom then that is your choice. I didn’t post that no one has ever fought a war on two fronts. I posted that this is a bad idea, which is indisputable military history. If you have too many Divisions on the east coast, then take them and overwhelm Richmond and roll down the east coast where the industry is. Nashville, Memphis, Vicksburg and NO are worth less NM than Richmond even if it is no longer the CSA capital.

The OP is whether the Mississippi was important to trade in the Midwest, to which I posted actual scholarly statements about the importance of the Mississippi to trade in the Midwest. Academic research trumps opinions.

[GraniteStater]

There is no gainsaying it's important, very important. It wasn't indispensable, however.

The US conducted an unprecedented war on two fronts across the globe and financed the Allies, too - pure muscle, it could do it.

"The race is not always to the swift, nor battle to the strong, but time and chance happeneth to all men."

[tripax]

I enjoy everyone’s opinions. If you play one way and you don’t care about 2500 years of military wisdom then that is your choice. I didn’t post that no one has ever fought a war on two fronts. I posted that this is a bad idea, which is indisputable military history. If you have too many Divisions on the east coast, then take them and overwhelm Richmond and roll down the east coast where the industry is. Nashville, Memphis, Vicksburg and NO are worth less NM than Richmond even if it is no longer the CSA capital.

To me, starting about 250 years ago, trenches changed things a bit as strategic-scale flanking became more important because the 2:1 or 3:1 necessary attacking advantage was made even more difficult. Once Grant went East, he saw Western actions as a flanking manouver and part of a strategy to destroy Lee's Army in particular, not simply the Confederacy in general. And even the Romans used a second front in Catalonia to repulse Hannibal. But perhaps this wasn't meant to be a second front. In any case, I very much agree about the central military importance of Virginia in the war, and only suggest that the West and the Mississippi in particular could be a part of a worthwhile strategy for success in Virginia.

The OP is whether the Mississippi was important to trade in the Midwest, to which I posted actual scholarly statements about the importance of the Mississippi to trade in the Midwest. Academic research trumps opinions.

In, "Notes on the Economic History of New Orleans, 1803-1836", James Winston notes that between 1840 and 1860, Chicago had grown from 4,500 to over 100,000, and rail lines from Chicago and St. Louis to the East Coast were increasingly becoming the trunk of US trade. He also points to sources outlining the collapse of the steamboat era around the same time.

The attachment railroads1850s.jpg is no longer available

I'm looking for a more up to date study of the economics of New Orleans, let me know if you find anything interesting.

[Gray Fox]

GS-In WW II, carriers that could have secured the convoy lanes to Europe were in the Pacific fighting Japan. Troops that could have opposed Japanese aggression were being stationed in the U.K. The reason Japan attacked European colonies in Asia was because the Allies were occupied in Europe and would not be able to respond to a second front. Fighting on two fronts was a bad idea that cost the Allies thousands of extra lives. It was forced on us by two aggressors. We did not willfully chose that situation.

tripax-I did a search and found nothing for that document or the author. Do you have a link?

For the record, players were advocating the Western campaign and I am not a proponent. I commented that no military or economic reason exists to want to do this. I hope that we can agree that "fighting on two fronts is a bad idea" is the proven wisdom of military history for millenia. Now, unless a game event recreates the importance of NO to trade in the midwest, no economic reason exists to clear the Mississippi either.

If you argue that the Mississippi was indeed not important to trade in the midwest, then you are agreeing with my central point. I had offered evidence to support the arguement for an economic reason because I am an intellectually honest person. However, if it makes no military sense to clear this waterway and you don't think that it had an economic importance, then why does anyone still advocate a campaign to clear it?

[RebelYell]

I have advocated before events and NM and VP values that would represent MO and KY situation better, their loss should be a crippling blow to the Union.

Also political events to push to East Tennessee, like the Richmond events in the East.

These are historical factors that drove the Union to use significant forces and operations in the West, they should be in the game.

[Mickey3D]

Fighting on two fronts was a bad idea that cost the Allies thousands of extra lives. It was forced on us by two aggressors. We did not willfully chose that situation.

A quick note even if WW2 is not the subject of this forum and thread :

Given that US was forced into war with Axes countries, it was may be not a completely bad idea to have two fronts. Indeed USA, by allowing the opening of a second front in Europe, put Germany in a difficult position impeding its war effort in USSR. Moreover, due to the nature of the war in the Pacific, it was anyway difficult for USA to use immediately all its power on this theatre of operation.

Regarding Mississippi, I can't add any value to the discussion but I wonder if there was any political constraint in the decision to wage the war in this area ?

[tripax]

I'm attaching a zip file of the paper to which I refered, which I got from here: http://jah.oxfordjournals.org/content/11/2/200.short. If you don't have institutional or other access to the paper, let me know and I can PM you the password for the zip file (sorry for the encrypt).

[ATTACH]27625[/ATTACH]

It is a very old paper, so I'd love to see a more recent, quantitative study of the economics of New Orleans and/or the Mississippi Valley in the antebellum, civil war, and reconstruction period.

As to your greater point, I think one reason that the West received so much attention was that there was a lot of political pressure and personal interests from the Presidency and War Department to defend Unionists in Missouri, Kentucky, and Tennessee. As I'm going through Grant's memoirs (which are very biased on this point), it seems that once New Orleans and Memphis/Corinth were taken, Grant was much more interested in taking Vicksburg and Mobile than his superiors (Hallek, Stanton, Lincoln). On the other hand, once an troops were under a command, Generals were very resistant of their being transferred out. So command inertia alone could perhaps explain why Grant eventually did get his way and finish closing the Mississippi, even if it was smarter to stop at Memphis/Corinth (given that they weren't allowed to follow Grey Fox's strategy).

I don't know much about military theory, but the history of it suggests that there had to be some reason the Mississippi Valley was such an important theater. Maybe it was just politics mixed with bad practice. Maybe I'm wrong about the economics, and that was a major factor, too.

[Gray Fox]

A quick note even if WW2 is not the subject of this forum and thread :

Given that US was forced into war with Axes countries, it was may be not a completely bad idea to have two fronts. Indeed USA, by allowing the opening of a second front in Europe, put Germany in a difficult position impeding its war effort in USSR. Moreover, due to the nature of the war in the Pacific, it was anyway difficult for USA to use immediately all its power on this theatre of operation.

Regarding Mississippi, I can't add any value to the discussion but I wonder if there was any political constraint in the decision to wage the war in this area ?

It was a good idea for the Allies to open a second front against the Axis. We fought on one front in Africa and the Russians fought on one front in their homeland. The axis was forced to fight on two fronts. If the Union opens a second front, then the Union has two fronts to commence offensive operations. That is the difference.

Again, if the Union has so many Divisions in the east then you should just crush Richmond. It's the bigger priority. The Union didn't do this because no one could beat Lee. So the side-show of the western campaign was created.

@tripax-This is a good source...which does not extend to 1860. Winston has a great deal of research evidence for his statements about NO up to 1836 and then ends with the statement about declining importance of NO which he makes without any evidence. A source like this for 1860 would be great.

[Mickey3D]

Again, if the Union has so many Divisions in the east then you should just crush Richmond. It's the bigger priority. The Union didn't do this because no one could beat Lee. So the side-show of the western campaign was created.

For sure, if Richmond had been captured following the seven days battle may be the war would have been shorter without the need for a huge campaign along the Mississippi. Now, if you consider the situation blocked in the East, opening a front in the West where you have more space for maneuver and two rivers as "invading highway" is a decision not devoided of value (and moreover it forced CSA to stretch its forces).

I'm not historian but I think there was also some politics involved in the decision to attack in the Mississippi/Kentucky/Tennessee area : pro unionist regions in Tennessee and to secure Kentucky against CSA. Once you start to do this, it seems logical to include Mississippi in your campaign (due to its economic, logistical and symbolic value).

[Gray Fox]

When I play the South at the battle of Gettysburg I always win. Every time. I don't rest at the end of the first day, but instead chase the already defeated yankees off of Cemetery Ridge. When you re-fight a historical simulation you don't have to repeat the historical mistakes. The Union could not beat Lee in Virginia. So they opened a second front by invading NO. This did not end the war. The Union then opened a third front in KY/MO. This did not end the war. Grant took the length of the Mississippi. This did not end the war. Sherman burned Atlanta and this also did not end the war. Finally, Grant took Richmond. Within months, the war ended. Soooo....you can repeat the historical mistakes and do everything possible to not win the war until 1865 or you can do the opposite and win it sooner. Much sooner.