Fri May 22, 2009 3:47 am
I know I'm dragging up an old thread here but I'd like to say somethings on Joe Johnston. Unlikely to change anything in the game I suppose but he is my favorite at the moment and I came here a little late to get involved in the prior discussions.
Joe Johnston was a very good army builder and trainer. He exhibited this talent in the Shenandoah prior to 1st Manassas/Bull Run when he created a strong (for the time) Army of the Shenandoah and brought it up to be arguably the most professional force in North America. He was helped in this by Edmund Kirby Smith, Thomas J. Jackson, A.P. Hill, JEB Stuart and William N. Pendleton but this doesn't diminsh his contribution it only shows his ability to delegate responsibilities to his subordinates.
He also showed his ability to organize an Army following the battle of 1st Manassas/Bull Run when he had to sort through the chaos that victory brought that mostly volunteer army. His frequents arguements with Jeff Davis and Judah P. Benjamin would hamper his progress in this and the fact that power in Virginia was split between him and Lee didn't help either.
He showed his ability to organize and train Armies in the Vicksburg Campaign but the poor state of Confederate transport made progress there slow. He showed this ability again when in command of the Army of Tennessee when he had to not only bring order to the chaos Bragg's purges had brought but restore morale to a beaten and demoralized force.
The most impressive moment that Johnston exhibited this skill was when he was returned to command in the Carolinas and in the space of about a month created a strong viable army that not only stood between the Army of the Tennessee and Sherman's final victory but almost routed Slocum's wing at Bentonville.
Politically Joe was supported by all of Davis' opposition. This opposition, led by Louis T. Wigfall from Texas, used Johnston as their chief weapon against Davis and his running of the War from about the point of Johnston's wounding at Seven Pine/Fair Oak's right to the end of the War. Joe went to them because they were a sympathetic ear to his problems when Davis' didn't want to listen to him (which it turned out was most of the time) and he was prepared to overlook the discord he was causing in Confederate Politics and pretend that he didn't know anything about that just so he could play to that sympathetic audience.
This left the Confederacy split in high politics about 50/50 with only the fact that Johnston main detracter and the man who he was involved in a heavy feud with being the President being the deciding factor.
Strategically Johnston's view rested on the ideas of Concentration of Manpower, use of interior lines for wuick distribution and chiefly on the idea that territory lost can be retaken later but manpower lost is lost forever.
Tactically Johnston was certainly good. He was not prepared to attempt something he felt hi Army wasn't capable of (as seen in his refusal to advance into the North following 1st Manassas/Bull Run, his refusal to launch into a suicide mission against Grant at the Big Black River and Vicksburg and when he turned down the offensive for the Army of Tennessee proposed by Davis and Bragg where by the AoT would march up to Knoxville and try to get behind Sherman's positions but leave Atlanta defenseless and the AoT in a logistically usustainable position).
His battle plans usually involved some kind of flanking move (having been heavilly influenced and impressed by such things by Winfield Scott). At 1st Manassas/Bull Run it was Johnston he distributed the troops to the field and brought about eventual victory by leading the reinforcement to attack the Federal Flank. At Seven Pines/Fair Oak his plan called for Huger's division to succor the right flank, D.H. Hill's division to attack the Federal centre and attract their atention while Longstreet's enlargedd Division would stike at the weakened and exposed Federal Right Flank. AT Cassville his plan was for Hardee to draw the Army of the Tennessee and the Army of the Cumberland down towards Rome then double back toward Cassville to link up with the AoT again while Polk's Corps engaged the Army of the Ohio as it approached Cassville seperately from the other to Federal Armies and while the AotO was engaged Hood's Corps was to strike at it's flank. AT Bentonville the plan was for Braxton Bragg to engaged and halt the enemies advance while Hardee and D.H. Hill struck at the flank.
Joe's problem was in his execution.
At Seven Pines/ Fair Oaks he left the battle to begin on its own, fully believing that everyone understood the roles they had to play and leaving them to do as they were expected to. Only, not everyone knew their roles. Despite going over the plan in detail with Johnston the night before Longstreet didn't understand what he was supposed to be doing and got the deployment of the forces totally wrong, got in Hugers way and blamed him for it afterwards. The truth was that Johnston was to blame for not making sure his plan was being followed but Longstreet was to blame for getting such a simple plan so totally wrong.
At Cassville Johnston left the battle to begin on its own, again fully expecting everyone to know their roles. He had given each of his three subordinates the roles that suited them. Ever reliable Hardee was to demonstrate against the bulk of the Federal forces and withdraw, tricking them into thinking he was the rearguard for the whole Army. Polk, of average ability and better for morale than anything else, was given the simplest of tasks, engaging them Army of the Ohio and getting it to stay in position long enough for Hood to arrive. And the overly offensive Hood was to be the sword, to strike down on the enemy and do as much damage as possible. These plans were ruined when Hood move much to early and was not in the position he was expected to be in then withdrew following reports of federal presence at his rear without confirming if there was any presence there or not.
At Bentonville Johnston made sure the battle began but delegated much of the fighting to Bragg. Bragg crucially called for reinforcements and got Lafayette McLaw's division when it would have been better used in the flanking attack.
So while Lee's delegation to subordinate paid off Johnston's delegation to sbordinates didn't.
It is often overlooked just how much Johnston was loved by his men. When he was removed from command of the Army of Tennessee many Colonels and lower rnaking General's feared that a mutiney in the Army was imminent and went to great lengths to quiet the ranks. Some men deserted when news of Johnston's removal reached them but most of them remained though their morale was weakened.
When Joe Johnston returned to Georgia years after the war, when he was more well known for his feud with Davis than anything he had done during the war and was not all that popular with the people at large, he was going to a Confederate Memorial service with Edmunfd Kirby Smith in an open topped carridge when someone from the crowd spooted him and called out "that's Johnston! That's Joe Johnston!" doxens of men burst from the crowd and surrounded him, stretching their hands out to him in glee. Someone uncoupled the horses from the carridge and men took their place and pulled the old General the lenght of the parade ground cheering loudly as they went.
Sam Watkins probably summed up the common soldiers view of Old Joe Johnston when he learned of Johnston's death in 1891 when he said "Farewell old fellow! We privates loved you because you made us love ourselves."
So that was my general overview of Joe Johnston. A good builder and organizer of Armies, a general who liked to delegate responsibilities to subordinates but had little luck in doing so, a good logistician who always stayed within the bounderies of what was possible for his Army to achieve, a good tactician with a tendency toward flanking moves, a strategist who's philosphy rested on "manpower is more important than territory" and "manpower should be concentrated into large armies where it is needed most", a great morale builder, a major player politically who allowed himself to be used by the Davis-Opposition just so he could have a sympathetic audience, not a very original general nor all than naturally talented (he owed his succes to hard work mostly - good connections as well) but also not very lucky in independent command.
How this would translate to game stats I dont know. I've only recently gotten the game in truth, but that's my assement of Joe Johnston none the less.