Hmmm found this and was amused

[pepe4158]

"Joe Johnston gave me more anxiety than any of the others." (US Grant)
"...the most enterprising" of all the Southern generals. (WT Sherman)

[soloswolf]

He certainly did a lot with what he had in hand. Which is more than you can say about many officers, on both sides.

[arsan]

I think Lee also said McClellan's was his most "capable adversary" or something like this...

[GShock]

I think Lee also said McClellan's was his most "capable adversary" or something like this...

History has been unfair i think with both Mc Clellan and Mc Dowell.

When war erupted, the Union Armies were mostly inept and poorly trained. Lincoln pressing hard but it's easy from the whitehouse ...a little less from the field where you can see inept leaders leading inept troopers against entrenched rebels who were so motivated to actually start the war itself. Don't forget the advancing troops were sitting ducks in the middle of the field. Move, shoot, reload, charge when *constantly* being under fire.

It's easy, i say, for all of us, to judge Mc Dowell and Mc Clellan harshly. It's not just about the fact that most certainly both were unwilling to commit troops to battle because of their fear of risking their reputation...it's about the fact that judging POST FACTO is always easy.

Grant's campaign in VA arrived when the CSA was already collapsing, and STILL if Gettysburgh had ended differently things might not have ended as they ended.

[Heldenkaiser]

History has been unfair i think with both Mc Clellan and Mc Dowell.

I agree with you regarding McDowell in 1861 and McClellan in his early days. It's true, they didn't have much of an army (but then neither had their opponents who moved anyway--as Lincoln said "you are green, they are green, you are all green alike" or something to this effect). But anyway, a comparison between McDowell in '61 and Grant in '64 would hardly be fair.

What is hard to fathom is how one could fail with an army like the Army of the Potomac in 1863, as Hooker did. Or even in fall 1862. Not attacking fortified positions on the Peninsula with an army that was basically green, I agree, one shouldn't judge McClellan too harshly for that. However, not attacking vigorously at Antietam, with an army that had been through the Seven Days & Second Bull Run and was basically veteran throughout, when he had Lee cornered, with a river at his back, and outnumbered him two to one--that's when McClellan really failed and lost his claim for a place in the history books as a great field commander for good.

Of course, his place in history as an organizer and shaper of an army nobody would seriously deny.

[Brochgale]

The more I read into the details of the war - the more convinced I am that history was unkind to more than one General. It is difficult to be objective because all historians are subjective?
Ironically I take the view that many a Civil War General might have made for better Presidents for both the Union and The Confederacy. Although I dont know what sort of Presideny Grant made as I have not read anything on it.
If you accept the proposition that both Lincoln and Davis took far too many of the Strategic decisions - then it perhaps follows that both were disasters for thier respective causes?
In other words dont blame the Generals - blame those pushing them or taking decisions for them. Although in Lees case Davis I suspect let him do pretty much what Lee had a notion to do - since he appeared to dote on Lee?

[tagwyn]

Grant was a terrible president!! McClellan was concerned about facing the situation where his army was defeated in detail and there being nothing left to defend the country. He was far too cautious. Only a fool could have believed what the Pinkerton's told him. Johnson was a capable general but again too cautious when the stakes required more.

[pepe4158]

Yeah if I may weigh in on Mac a bit, history seems to be a little hard on Mac, he was no genius for sure, but look at his union counter-parts in the east. Everyone manages not only to get beat, but utterly beaten and routed (until Meade) or bloodied so badly aka Burnside he might as well have been.
So its not suprising that until Meade, Mac has the best record against Lee with his draw at Antietam, so not surprising the union soldiers admire and loved old Mac.
Also his plan to invade up the peninsula was quite inovative....he lacked the courage to see it through, but really scared Davis and hence he changes generals to Lee.
Funny...with Mac threating the southern capital, Lee digs in around Richmond, and this being early in the war the southern pappers dub Lee, 'the King of Spades' wounding his southern pride, to the point of possibly making him reckless.
Hence in the game he has the, 'reckless trait.'
You know in the game I am not a big Mac hatter either, the only reason I agree with Helden's assessment, that he is an, 'enormous liability' is that he will just up n dissapear (destroying my command structure) to become a politician, or I would give him an army. Cant risk he will leave it just stranded tho....so every time I need to form a new army, Mac takes a little boat ride

[GShock]

It is undeniably true that the winner writes history. Historians actually WRITE but the one who MAKES it is the winner. I.E. If CSA had won, probably slavery would still be an issue right now and even the "free world" (Nexus is the only slavery i know and it was abolished in the Classical roman period thousands of years ago) could possibly have tolerated it.

Green on Green, yes...good point but the armies of the Union not only were green, they also were constantly deceived by CSA better leaders (Magruder and his fake guns are an example) and mobility. There was no satellite view at that point in time and scouting was difficult, very difficult...do not forget VA willingly seceded and their population were so loyal to the cause...the capital of CSA was in VA as well...hard to obtain information there.

To the top of it, Union had to use green troops on the offense. Yes, i hesitate in judging any general because it's not only the leadership but also the resources and the circumstances that decided the outcome of this war. A second beating like in Manassas could have ended the war immediately for CSA, do not forget the bordering states were troublesome, even AACW shows in MD there were riots at the very beginning and in MD there's Washington.

[W.Barksdale]

...in MD there's Washington.

Sorry. Washington is actually in the District of Columbia and not in any state.

edit: I know this doesn't impact your argument at all. I just wanted to point this out. In fact, I think you can use DC and Washington as synonyms.

[soloswolf]

Sorry. Washington is actually in the District of Columbia and not in any state.

edit: I know this doesn't impact your argument at all. I just wanted to point this out. In fact, I think you can use DC and Washington as synonyms.

Not really needed, don't you think?

[tagwyn]

Ditto!! Do you think? Lee was called "King of Spades" because of his work on fortifying the coast of Carolinas and GA and VA. Actually, Flag Officer DuPont broke thru into Carolina with Gen Tom Sherman and sat there like a bump on a log when they could have taken Savannah/Charleston. Eventually these troops (12,000) were recalled to fight in AoP. Lee was sent down to defend but wryly noted that there was nothing to defend WITH. apy:

[W.Barksdale]

Not really needed, don't you think?

If you want youngers thinking DC is in Maryland than no.

[MkollCSA]

Well lets not forget that Davis didnt give lee command because Mac made him nervous....he was given command after J. Johnston was wounded at Seven Pines in June 62', when he was appointed the papers dissapproved because they were afraid he wouldnt be aggressive and wait for the Union Army to come to him. This was because in the early part of 61' Lee was in command of forces in Western Virginia were he was defeated at the battle of Cheat Mountain and then sent to the carolinas to fortify the coast were the lack of the Cofederate Navy hampered that effort and he was blamed for tons of setbacks because of this....so keeping that in mind when Davis appointed Lee the commander of the Army of Northern Virgina, he was pretty much gambling....he took a commander who has thus far had no success in battle and to the public eye couldnt even throw together a proper defence in the costal areas and here he goes getting command of the largest army the CSA could throw at Mac in the eastern theatre....very gutsy...but it paid off...for a while at least. and Antietam (known as Sharpsburg in the south) should have crippled the south...Mac only sent about 3/4 of his army into battle and still managed to punch through the confederate center....A.P.Hill's division saved the day by driving back Burnside's Corps...but if Mac would have sent in his reserves to capitalize on his breakthrough in the center...Lee would have been cut in half and destroyed outright....and Mac didnt even bother to persue Lee before he crossed south of the river again....which mac could have taken the Army of Northern Virgina out of action....this is one reason Mac is looked on so poorly...there is really no excuse for such actions...he had to know his army was more than twice the size of the confederates and Lee had to commit his full force to battle...he would have been able to send fresh troops against Lee's beaten and tired army.

[pepe4158]

Well lets not forget that Davis didnt give lee command because Mac made him nervous....he was given command after J. Johnston was wounded at .

I know, but you have to think Mac being so close to Richmond had to be a factor huh?...or at best Lee is only given temporary command. Davis was desperate for a general to stop Mac, n Lee convinced him he was the man by regular updates and reports, that Johnston was lacking.

[pepe4158]

Ditto!! Do you think? Lee was called "King of Spades" because of his work on fortifying the coast of Carolinas and GA and VA.

Am sure it was a factor too

[Brochgale]

I know, but you have to think Mac being so close to Richmond had to be a factor huh?...or at best Lee is only given temporary command. Davis was desperate for a general to stop Mac, n Lee convinced him he was the man by regular updates and reports, that Johnson was lacking.

I have read in some Civil War accounts that Davis after First Bull Run forbade any attack on Washington by Beauregard. Beauregard having requested that Johstons command be combined with his for invading Maryland when as far as Beauregard was concerned they had yankees on the ropes?
Beauregard for President of CSA I say?
In comparison to Lee, Johnston was certainly cautious, Lee being the symbol of recklessness. Have you ever read any of Johnstons reports - snzzzzzzz!!!!

[Jabberwock]

I know, but you have to think Mac being so close to Richmond had to be a factor huh?...or at best Lee is only given temporary command. Davis was desperate for a general to stop Mac, n Lee convinced him he was the man by regular updates and reports, that Johnson was lacking.

I don't think Davis' problems with Johnston had anything to do with Lee. Lee was the one man who could communicate well with the major field commanders after Davis' administration fell out with them. Bory was in the west. The only readily available choice other than Lee was G.W. Smith (not in game terms, but historically). Smith and Davis both knew he couldn't handle the job. He was on the verge of a nervous breakdown.

[soloswolf]

Lee being the symbol of recklessness.

Why do you say this?

[pepe4158]

I don't think Davis' problems with Johnston had anything to do with Lee. Lee was the one man who could communicate well with the major field commanders after Davis' administration fell out with them. Bory was in the west. The only readily available choice other than Lee was G.W. Smith (not in game terms, but historically). Smith and Davis both knew he couldn't handle the job. He was on the verge of a nervous breakdown.

Hmm I didnt know I implied Lee had anything to do with Davis's problem with Johnston, I said Lee gave constant updates and reports to Davis, and that Johnston had been lacking in this area.

[Brochgale]

Why do you say this?

Lee knew that the Souths Fabian War Policy was doomed to failure sooner or later. The Yankees would just grind them down. So he took chances that Johnston and many other Generlas would not have taken. That is not to fault him - it was the reality as he saw it perhaps? Howver after Gettysburg he became as much a Fabian as Johnston was?

[Jabberwock]

Hmm I didnt know I implied Lee had anything to do with Davis's problem with Johnson, I said Lee gave constant updates and reports to Davis, and that Johnson had been lacking in this area.

Sorry - thanks for the clarification.

[soloswolf]

Lee knew that the Souths Fabian War Policy was doomed to failure sooner or later. The Yankees would just grind them down. So he took chances that Johnston and many other Generlas would not have taken. That is not to fault him - it was the reality as he saw it perhaps? Howver after Gettysburg he became as much a Fabian as Johnston was?

If you want to use a Fabian allusion, I think that the Johnston --> Hood parallel is much stronger than applying it to Lee. I think Lee having the reckless is applicable in the game due it's mechanic, but I do not agree with the term being applied to him. I am anything but a Lost Causer, I just think the word is a bit strong for the evidence.

[Jabberwock]

Johnston recognized that throwing his command at Grant or Sherman would help end the war quickly, in their favor. I don't think of that as too cautious. Maybe he could have guarded his flanks better in the early stages of the Atlanta campaign, but he was outnumbered two to one. Even if he won a Chancellorsville type victory, he couldn't afford it. I don't think falling back on prepared positions in those circumstances is too cautious. In the long term, Lee couldn't afford his victories either, any more than he could afford to stay on the defensive like Johnston.

Addressing some other points that have been raised -

Bory was a good field general on the defensive, but he was as nuts as McC ... in his own way. All his strategic plans required giving him personal command of at least two field armies, and then throwing them north in a desperate gamble.

DuPont & Tom Sherman took several points along the coast to use as resupply stations for the blockade. The cumulative effect of those kind of victories was decisive. Several of those points had been abandoned by Lee's orders. He had no choice, they were indefensible against naval artillery.

Concerning McC? Second Bull Run. Disgusting.

[pepe4158]

Concerning McC? Second Bull Run. Disgusting.

Hmmm am quessing you mean that he left Pope in the Lyrch so to speak when he could have supported him?.....terrible military move, smart political move tho lol...which addresses what I tried to convince Le of, most northern generals were only really politicians masquerading as field officers.

[MkollCSA]

second bull run...all you need to know is Jackson.....he did a great job with his "Wing" with J.E.B. Stuart destorying the supply depot at Manasass Junction then hit Pope's Rear and force him into retreat. awesome

[pepe4158]

Well wouldnt you agree tho that Longstreet showed his brilliance too?...waiting for just the right moment to charge into Pope's tired flank, Longstreet is often overshadowed by Jackson, as I consider Longstreet actually the greatest of the southern generals IMO
Geesh and in the game he starts with only 1* ...whats up with that, I thought he was the senior general>...hmmm quess not?
Hmmm he is so hard to develop in PvP too... Unbelievable,as many like I do contend he was probably the best southern general.

[Le Ricain]

I don't think Davis' problems with Johnston had anything to do with Lee. Lee was the one man who could communicate well with the major field commanders after Davis' administration fell out with them. Bory was in the west. The only readily available choice other than Lee was G.W. Smith (not in game terms, but historically). Smith and Davis both knew he couldn't handle the job. He was on the verge of a nervous breakdown.

I think that the answer is actually much simpler. After Johnston was wounded, Lee was the only general available and in Richmond. Being Davis' Military Advisor, there would not have been any problem with replacing Lee. It would have been different had Lee actually had a commnad.

[MkollCSA]

Longstreet did show his tactical brilliance at second bull run....but remember his force didnt even make it into the battle until about 1 pm and the battle had begun at 7am....Schurz ordered his attacks on A.P. Hill and Kearney decided not to support him so that used up alot of Pope's strength...uncoordinated attacks and just sheer idiocy with the "joint order" made pope's attacks that day almost a failure before they began...when Longstreet got on the field and could put his divisions into action Pope's attacks were already losing its steam....not taking away from Longstreet...he saw mcdowell moving to support renyolds and him and lee decided that was the time to attack that sector (which pope didnt even think longstreet was on the field) complete lunacy on pope's part contributed to his defeat

[Jabberwock]

Right. I'm no apologist for Pope, he had been promoted past his competency. Whatever anyone's opinion of the Porter controversy - McClellan's inaction with Franklin and Sumner's corps was inexcusable. Sumner was furious at being held back.