Robert E. Lee

[Chris0827]

133 CSA Robert E. Lee ldr_CSA_RELee4 $Fast_Mover $Reckless $Engineer NULL 25 100 3 2 General 1 NULL 6 6 5

Lee looks good but I would add charismatic. He was almost worshiped by his men. Even after a punishing defeat like Gettysburg the morale of his army remained high. The 'Lee to the Rear" incidents at the Wilderness are a perfect example. Several times Lee attempted to lead attacks but the men refused to move forward unless he went to the rear.

[runyan99]

I dunno. I think maybe Lee's offensive rating is too high. Lee's offensive battles at Chancellorsville and Gettysburg were hardly outright successes. And, his first offensive campaign in Western Virginia, where he did not fight a battle, was a total failure, although not entirely his fault.

Lee's best battles were fought on the defensive. Maybe the offensive rating needs to come down.

Certainly less of an offensive general than Jackson. Perhaps 6-4-5?

[Chris0827]

I dunno. I think maybe Lee's offensive rating is too high. Lee's offensive battles at Chancellorsville and Gettysburg were hardly outright successes. And, his first offensive campaign in Western Virginia, where he did not fight a battle, was a total failure, although not entirely his fault.

Lee's best battles were fought on the defensive. Maybe the offensive rating needs to come down.

Chancellorsville was a smashing success. He was outnumbered by more than two to one and without Longstreet. He lost Jackson but that wasn't any fault of Lee's. It did possibly make him overconfident and lead to him making bad choices at gettysburg. I would'n't argue with lowering his rating a point however. 6's should be rather rare and he already has a 6 in strategy. The Reckless abitity covers some of his offensive mistakes.

[runyan99]

I agree that Lee should probably be Charismatic, as he is probably the most revered and loved general of the whole war. We can agree to compromise, I think, by reducing his attack score by one. I suggest:

133 CSA Robert E. Lee ldr_CSA_RELee4 $Fast_Mover $Reckless $Engineer $Charismatic 25 100 3 2 General 1 NULL 6 5 5

136 CSA Robert E. Lee ldr_CSA_RELee3 $Fast_Mover $Reckless $Engineer $Charismatic 15 20 3 3 General 1 NULL 6 5 5

[veji1]

I think Lee should have 6 in offensive... He played an aggressive game for 3 years be it on the operationnal or tactical field... Did it succeed ? Eventually not , but he still became a godlike figure int the civil war and for civil war buffs... Not giving him a 6 in an AACW game is like not giving a 6 to Napoleon in a NW game because he botched it at Waterloo or Borodino... If you want you can reduce his defense rating... after all he didn't like to defend and victories that he obtained by doing so ( fredericksburg for ex ) weren't because he chose too but because he didn't have a choice...

I would rather see him with a 6-6-4 than a 6-5-5.

Just my two cents

[rickd79]

Sorry, but I can't agree with dropping Lee's defensive rating. Whether he wanted to fight like that on a consistent basis or not, the results speak for themselves.
Additionally, if we consider the ability to coordinate and deliver strong counter-attacks part of a "defensive" rating, then his work at 2nd Bull Run, Antietam, Chancellorsville, The Wilderness, and Spotsylvania all have to be considered.
He ran into the most trouble when he got a bit over-confident and aggressive on the offensive (Malvern Hill, Gettysburg).

[runyan99]

Yes, strategically Lee was very offensive minded and active. Thus the '6' strategic rating. The tactical results of his attacks however, were mediocre to poor. In my opinion even Chancellorsville was a 'stealth' Union victory, because Lee's attack bled the Confederate army. Malvern Hill and Gettysburg are examples where his tactical decisions in the attack were quite poor.

Keep in mind, Pickett's charge was Lee's brilliant idea.

Jeez, maybe he should be a 6-3-5.

[Korrigan]

Keep in mind, Pickett's charge was Lee's brilliant idea.

If this is what you want to simulate, you might want to give him $Hothead instead of Reckless then.

This won't lessen his talent and might even be usefull in tight fights.
However, an hothead leader might cause his army to suffer huge casualties in an illprepared battle...

[Korrigan]

New proposition:

133 CSA Robert E. Lee ldr_CSA_RELee4 $Fast_Mover $Hothead $Engineer $Charismatic 25 100 3 2 General 1 NULL 6 6 4

136 CSA Robert E. Lee ldr_CSA_RELee3 $Fast_Mover $Hothead $Engineer $Charismatic 15 20 3 3 General 1 NULL 6 6 4

This makes Lee a military genius in Strategy, a Tactical Genius in Attack and a Very Good Commander in Defense.

Comments?

[runyan99]

I like Reckless better than Hothead. These traits only affect the first two hours of a battle anyway. Lee's suicide assault came on the third full day at Gettysburg.

We've got rose colored glasses on when we look at Lee in posterity. I understand. We want him to be an offensive genius, even if the record says he wasn't. I've tried to argue that on balance, Lee was a better defender than an attacker. Fredericksburg was a victory. Gettysburg was not.

[Pocus]

Hothead is a harsh penalty for the main CSA commander, and can unbalance the game. Reckless is already penalizing enough IMHO.

[Korrigan]

Fair point.

[Korrigan]

133 CSA Robert E. Lee ldr_CSA_RELee4 $Fast_Mover $Reckless $Engineer $Charismatic 25 100 3 2 General 1 NULL
136 CSA Robert E. Lee ldr_CSA_RELee3 $Fast_Mover $Reckless $Engineer $Charismatic 15 20 3 3 General 1 NULL

Ratings:
6-5-4
6-4-5
6-5-5
other...

Give your opinion supported with historical facts. This will be AGEOD's decision.

[Chris0827]

I'd go with 6-4-5

Let's look at Lee's battles and losses on both sides

His attacks
Seven Days - Victory 20,000 con, 16,000 union
Gettysburg - Defeat 28,000 con, 23,000 union
Fort Stedman - defeat 3,000 con, 1,000 union

Meeting engagements
The Wilderness - Victory 8,000 con, 17,000 union

Counterattacks
Second Manassas - Victory 8,000 con, 14,000 union
Chancellorsville - Victory 13,000 con, 17,000 union

Defending
Fredericksburg - Victory 4,000 con, 13,000 union
Antietam - Defeat 11,000 con, 13,000 union
Spotsylvania - draw 12,000 con, 18,000 union
Cold harbor - Victory 3,000 con, 13,000 union
Petersburg - victory 3,000 con, 8,000 union

I didn't feel like looking up the exact numbers but they are probably pretty close. Lee wasn't present at Five Forks or Sayler's creek and I was too lazy to loook up the smaller battles. It looks to me like Lee had greater success either defending or counterattacking. Even in his victory at the Seven Days he lost more men than the AoP and the south couldn't really afford that.

[Spharv2]

True enough, but then again, he was always attacking a larger force. I'm not as big a Lee supporter as some, but he couldn't stand on the defensive all the time, and his chances to attack were usually appearing in risky situations. His plans during the Seven Days battles were good (Except for Malvern Hill), but foiled by lethargy, newness to command, and the Confederates inexplicable lack of terrain knowledge.

Chancellorsville, was a simply stunningly audacious plan, and frankly his only option other than retreat. Fact is that he routed a far superior force, with what was basically three fairly weak forces.

Gettysburg was really the only battle where he attacked with anything approaching equality in forces, and in that case, he did so against what was a superb defensive position.

I don't know how you can really even put Stedman on there, it was a last gasp attempt, and there was really no hope for success even if there had been men to support and everything had gone perfectly. The attempt had to be made though.

Of those three, Gettysburg is the only one I would count against his attack rating, and then only for his actions on day 3. If he had been able to push through on day 1 or 2, the tables could have been turned. So, considering everything, 2 bad days (Malvern Hill and Day 3 at Gettysburg) out of the numerous battles seems pretty good. I would go with 6-5-5.

[runyan99]

Well I could easily argue that the Day 2 attacks at Gettysburg were just as ill advised and hopeless as Pickett's Charge was. It wasn't just one bad day at Gettysburg. It was three bad days. Unless you want to give Lee a pass for the first day, because he really wasn't in charge of his army on the first day. But that was another problem, wasn't it?

I really need to go back over the 7 Days campaign, but I haven't got a chance to reevaluate his performance there quite yet.

I was advocating 6-4-5, and I think those numbers are defensible from a historical perspective, but I could easily live with 6-5-5. And 6-5-5 might be a better choice for a game, because it will still give the Confederate player a good offensive capability (whether or not it is wise to try to use it is another question) and will pacify the starry eyed pro-Southern players who might squeal and complain if Lee only gets a '4' offense.

6-5-5 doesn't give him a perfect attack score, and does not make his defense inferior to his offense. I can accept that.

[Spharv2]

I don't think that Day two was that ill advised, if they succeed, the entire AoP is put into an untenable position. If that happens, they face a choice to stand and fight at a large disadvantage, or retreat and lose a huge battle on Northern soil with the attendant political pressures that would cause. Day 2 actually had a chance, and a hope of further success. Day 3, even if completely successful does nothing except get a large portion of Lee's force trapped. Even if they took the heights, they would have been in the same untenable position they attempted to put the Federals in throughout the battle.

[PDF]

I've no hard data on hands, but IMHO Lee was a strategic genius sure, but not a tactical one.

I'd go for 6-4-4 or something like that.

[veji1]

thing is the strat rating in this game doesn't measure the strategic genius but rather operational ability.

If Lee had 6-4-4, which is a sensible evaluation, then you'd have to lower the strat rating of almost every other leader in the field to make sure only Lee and a handfull ( ie less than 5 ) get 6 in strat.

[Pocus]

Strategic genius as to be handled by the player, by essence. Only the player has the right to send leader X to theater A or theater B, or create armies, etc. So what can be given to a counter piece is the ability - or not - to move&operate efficiently at the operationnal level, when higher level orders are already issued (by the player).

[lycortas]

133 CSA Robert E. Lee ldr_CSA_RELee4 $Fast_Mover $Reckless $Engineer $Charismatic 25 100 3 2 General 1 NULL 6 3 5

136 CSA Robert E. Lee ldr_CSA_RELee3 $Fast_Mover $Reckless $Engineer $Charismatic 15 20 3 3 General 1 NULL 6 3 5

I feel that Lee's attacks were poorly thought out and too often consisted of frontal attacks. Gettysburg is on Lee's shoulders no matter how much his worshippers want to blame Hill, Ewell, Early etc. Early in the Seven Days you can blame on Jackson but not Malvern Hill, although i am sure many gamers blame Magruder.
This goes straight to my next point; Lee was a suggester not a general. When he had Jackson and Longstreet, who worked very well together, he could be a great general, without them he was charismatic and daring but not a great general.

Mike

[Jabberwock]

Careful -
If they don't burn you for your opinion on McC, they'll get you for that one.

[lycortas]

Yea, i know.

I just think that we underrate the traits and overrate the ratings.

Also, there was no firey beam from heaven that rated a general the way we do.

Picture Murfreesboro, Early in the day 3 Union divisions get attacked. Two divisions flee, take heavy casualties, lose prisoners and guns, and no one remembers their names anymore. Well, okay, some of us do.
The third division was commanded by a young man named Sheridan, he not only did not rout, he held and caused heavy casualties to the confederates, pretty much saving the day.

Obviously Sheridan is a genius right? He was also in the by far best defensive position on the field and he was the closest to the covering Union batteries. What would have happened to Sheridan if he had been the outermost division in the line?

A good general takes advantage of his circumstances and a bad general fails to take advantage of his circumstances. A good general can be in a bad position and still win, and a bad general can be in a good position and still lose. Hooker, cough cough.

Do i think Sheridan was an idiot? no, but i would like to see an alternate future where he commanded the outermost division. would anyone know his name today?

What Lee tried at Chancellorsville was audacious, daring etc.
He was in a bad position. A third of his army was elsewhere.
And he won.
But it was a fluke, maybe the greatest in military history. It would not have
worked against Mac. It would not have worked againt Meade. It probably wouldn't have worked on Grant. But it worked on Hooker and Howard.
If Sickles had disobeyed orders here as he did at Gettysburg how would the day have gone?

[Jabberwock]

Post that in the Sheridan thread and I'll agree with you. I'm a little scared to agree with you here. I'd rather be the one with the matches than the one standing in the woodpile.

[FM WarB]

At the risk of stirring up a Hornets' Nest worse than that at Shiloh, I propose the following: If you are playing historical, not random generals, Lee should not be allowed to go west. His commitment always was to defend the state of Virginia.

[tagwyn]

Pickett's Charge! If it had gone the way he planned, it would have worked. IMHO apy:

[CWNut77]

At the risk of stirring up a Hornets' Nest worse than that at Shiloh, I propose the following: If you are playing historical, not random generals, Lee should not be allowed to go west. His commitment always was to defend the state of Virginia.

Sigh...in my current PBEM game I had him heading an army defending a fort in Nashville -- sent him across the River to take Bowling Greene with 25,000 troops and they ALL got massacred or taken prisoner...by MCCLELLAN!

Disgraceful, I know...

[wpurdom]

There are two schools of thought about the offensive policies of Southern commanders, Lee in particular: the traditional school and the "Attack and Die" /Longstreet/Joe Johnston school.

In evaluating this dispute, most people ignore the maxim that amatuers study tactics, professionals study logistics. In the Civil War, losses from desertions and deaths dwarfed losses in battles. Lee's army declined in the end not so much due to losses in battle, a few key commanders aside, but inability to properly feed and maintain the men and horses. He always had a shoestring logistics, repeatedly had to resort to expedients like sending Longstreet to Southern Virginia to keep him fed and could not afford to permanently lose the Shenandoah valley. In part, both Northern invasions, particularly 1863, were motivated by logistical concerns that it was too difficult to support the Army in Virginia.

Even as to Gettysburg, from the Southern perspective the campaign was not a total disaster, due to the logistical advantages - the big drawback was the bolstering to Northern morale, not the casualties suffered by the army.

My own view is that Davis and the Southern commanders were not crazy as the Attack and Die school would have it (aside from the goat of West Point John Bell Hood), that remaining on the defensive and surrendering the initiative was unsustainable politically and logistically. Things did not go well for the South as they surrendered the initiative prior to Shiloh and around Vicksburg, or prior to Seven Days in Virginia (outside of the Valley where they attacked), and matters would have proceeded no better for the South had they sat in Chattanooga prior to Murfreesboro or retreated to Dalton instead of attacking at Chickamauga, or sat in Richmond in early 1862 instead of attacking with an army with a badly disjointed and unsettled command structure. But attacking despite a disadvantage in numbers in the era of rifled muskets came at a real and inevitable cost (leaving aside small-scale actions such as the Valley campaign attacks by large armies in the Civil War inevitable exact a great deal of casualties).

Finally, one must judge the talents and achievement of objectives from the perspectives of the time. There is no doubt that the perception of both sides was that Chancerlorsville was a great success for the South - and that driving an Army back across the river was a remarkable result even if one questions with hindsight the costs v. benefits. In other words, even if Lee would have done better to simply block Hooker, assuming that would work, making the wrong decision about attacking does not say he was nad at it.

[wpurdom]

There is no question that Lee would ocassionally irrationally decide it was worth seeing if his troops could do the impossible as at Malvern Hill, Antietam and the 3rd day of Gettysburg. And he was willing willing to utilize the talents of his subordinates by giving freedom of action, until they proved they couldn't handle it. But when he had to, he became the commander - hammering McClellan away from Richmond despite the collapse of his subordinates, entirely frustrating Grant's campaign in 1864 (at the cost of rendering both armies combat ineffective) despite being outnumbered 2-1 + dand the crumbling of his command structure, until the Valley and Georgia fronts collapsed and destroyed his logistics in the winter of 1864-65.

[ncuman]

In evaluating this dispute, most people ignore the maxim that amatuers study tactics, professionals study logistics. In the Civil War, losses from desertions and deaths dwarfed losses in battles. Lee's army declined in the end not so much due to losses in battle, a few key commanders aside, but inability to properly feed and maintain the men and horses. He always had a shoestring logistics, repeatedly had to resort to expedients like sending Longstreet to Southern Virginia to keep him fed and could not afford to permanently lose the Shenandoah valley. In part, both Northern invasions, particularly 1863, were motivated by logistical concerns that it was too difficult to support the Army in Virginia.

The argument justifying the Battle of Gettysburg, that it was necessary to give Virginia a break from supporting Lee's army, sounds good but it has one major flaw with it; the flaw is the fact that Virginia managed to feed Lee's army for 2 more years after Gettysburg. Unless you accept the grissly notion that after the slaughter at Gettysburg it was easier to feed the army because there were a lot less mouths to feed (I don't) it has to be assumed that Lee would have figured out a way to feed his army whether he invaded Pennsylvania or not.

The notion of keeping the initiative is perhaps a much more valid argument. Lee saw the collapse of the Western Theater of the war, and may have felt the need to take a gamble to reverse the fortunes of the war back in the South's favor while he still had the manpower to do it. Hindsight says that maybe some of Lee's army should have been sent West to help out at Vicksburg, but that wasn't Lee's nature. He was a risk-taker, and up to that point Lee's gambles mostly paid off.