Wilhammer wrote:Perhaps what we need is another rating; persistence.
How willing was the commander willing to sustain and commit a blood bath to win a battle?
And then, what are its chances of doing so in certain regions?
A guy like Mac, who was opposed to the war and was thus very reluctant to press destruction of the Confederacy, might be considered somewhat fanatical in the defense of Md, but far less so moving South.
I agree.lycortas wrote:I am going to commit Civil War heresy today... sigh... don't burn my effigy too much.
I would rate Mac at 1-2-4 slow move, poor spy, charismatic, maybe defensive engineer.
Mac was rated by Lee as his toughest opponent. Bit of praise there.
Mac never made the idiot mistakes that Pope or Burnside made. Or for that matter Banks or Milroy.
Mike
soloswolf wrote:As an FYI: None of the ratings will be changed for any of the Generals. All this McClellan discussion you have been up to is interesting to be sure, but it has been stated multiple times that the stats will not be changed.
Any and all of these conversations lead to heated arguments about why this guy was maligned by history, or why so and so is the best ever. It never ends well, so they have closed the books on that front.
If you really want something different, I am sure somebody could assist you with modding it.
Colonel Dreux wrote:I figured out how to mod the generals, just like editing a depot or fort. I've edited McClellan to a 4-2-4 with Master_Logistician added in . He was on another level from Pope and Burnside, and they are 2-2-2 and 2-2-3 in the game respectively. Will change the game, I know, but bring it on Yankees.
Other officers have now been edited as well, so it should all balance out I think.
Rondor wrote:Of course you gave him those stats as a protest, right??
Right?
I would like to know why you feel Little Mac refused to send Franklin to assist Pope at 2nd Bull Run? He was ordered to several times by Halleck.
Colonel Dreux wrote:I didn't change the ratings as a protest, I changed them because comparable to how others are rated, in my humble opinion, his ratings should be better, definitely better than Burnside and Pope.
I don't think the Second Bull Run was decided on McClellan sending in more troops from Washington. Pope didn't even know Longstreet was on the battlefield before it was too late. Pope thought he had half of Lee's army in front of him and that they would eventually start to retreat. He also attacked Jackson's Corps piece meal which made it easier for Jackson to repulse the attacks on the first day.
Logistical and troop movements orders also got fouled up by even the best of generals. So I don't see that being a big strike against McCllelan. Pope had plenty of enough army to beat Lee.
Rondor wrote:I am certainly not defending Pope. I am saying that Mac essentially acted in a manner that specifically was meant to hurt Pope. He was ordered to send his troops more than once. He refused because he disliked Pope and wanted him to lose the battle. Personally, I would have had him hung if I was Halleck.
It is very well documented that Mac thought himself a military genius yet he consistently and without fail severely overestimated his opponents numbers to an extent that I do not believe any other ACW general can approach. He was never quite ready to move due to some logistical concern or another.
He should have been a training officer and nothing more. There is a reason why leaders like Patton, Napolean, Lee et al are considered the best. L'Audace! Toujours de L'Audace! This is a saying Mac never understood.
anarchyintheuk wrote:Pope's situation was far more fluid than Mac ever encountered. He had a hard enough time determining what troops were under his command, much less what Lee had. The circumstances of Pope's defeat were primarily due to Mac's own actions. His failure to either advance again from Harrison's landing or withdraw his troops from there more quickly allowed Lee the opportunity and time to advance on Pope.
If you find fault with Pope for 'outnumbering Lee and screwing up big time in front of a smaller force' how would you describe Mac's advance up the Penisula against Magruder or his entire conduct of Antietem? He probably outnumbered Magruder 5-1 and Lee 2-1 maybe 3-1. As bad as Pope was, I find it hard to believe that he would have done worse in either situation (although he may have done worse during the 7 Days). Pope was nothing special as a commander but at least you didn't have to threaten to fire him to get him to move.
Questioning Mac's field generalship is difficult because he evidenced so little of it. He wasted a month besieging Yorktown against Magruder, dawdled in front of Richmond for another month, repeatedly left Porter isolated during the 7 Days, failed to direct the retreat to Harrison's landing allowing his corps commanders to conduct it, abandoned his army even before it reached Malvern Hill, failed to defeat Lee even having obtained his battle plans prior to Antietam and was little more than a spectator there after giving the intial orders to advance by the right.
It's hard not to admire Mac's ability as an organizer and trainer of troops and potentially as a strategist, but as a battlefield leader and tactician he was one of the worst commanders the Union or the US army has ever had. His demonstrated lack of loyalty and his constant involvement in political issues hardly recommends him either.
Sorry, but Mac brings out the worst in me.
Colonel Dreux wrote:Robert E. Lee thought him the best Union commander he faced.
Mickey3D wrote:As far as I know (but I'm not historian), Lee stood the ground in Antietam even if he was outnumbered because he knew McClellan was in command.
That's not the kind of thing I would do when facing the best ennemy commander... (or the other ennemy commanders are really a bunch of morons).
Colonel Dreux wrote:Lee stood his ground because McClellan foiled his northern invasion. Lee had no other choice but to stand his ground.
Mickey3D wrote:Once again I'm not an historian, but the few I can remember from my readings is that Lee chose to wait several days (September 15th and 16th) seeing the force of McClellan gathering on the other side of the river and being severly outnumbered before September 17th (Longstreet and Jackson were not there).
Politically he was perhaps forced to stand his ground (I can imagine that leaving Maryland without a fight would not have been very glorious), but I don't think he would have done it in front of an ennemy he knew would have taken immediately advantage of CSA army weakness (on the 15th force ratio was 3 to 1).
Grant was perhaps a "butcher" but he would have tried to seize the opportunity knowing that destroying ennemy army was primordial.
Colonel Dreux wrote:I respectfully disagree. Putting Pope's failure down to McClellan's inaction is historically bogus. McClellan was under orders to park himself in D.C. Lincoln took part of his command and gave it to Pope. Pope, outnumbering Lee, still failed miserably. He didn't just fail, he was beaten. McClellan was never beaten, he just retreated from his line in front of Richmond killing and mutilating thousands of Confederates in his AoP meatgrinder.
My statement was concerning the circumstances . . . Pope was only in danger because of Mac's inaction. He had a 100k army sitting at Harrison's landing for two weeks after Halleck had ordered it back to Washington. Knowing Mac's lack of initiative meant that Lee could count on the AoP remaining bystanders while he concentrated against Pope by first sending Jackson then Longstreet. Had Mac decided to advance again, instead of complaining about the lack of reinforcements, being outnumbered 2-1, etc., Lee could never have concentrated against Pope.Pope lost because of Pope. He thought Jackson was retreating when he wasn't. He forgot about Longstreet's Corps (even when he had intelligence that he was coming up to the line). He blames one of the only competent generals on the day, Fitz John-Porter, for the defeat.
I agree Pope lost the battle fair and square. But for Mac's inaction, the battle would never have occurred.Pope was also wildly despised by most of the officer corps because he was hyper arrogant and a political appointment due to his friendship with Republican radicals in Lincoln's cabinet and in Congress.
Pope was also despised because he came from the western armies, which had actually had success. He was appointed for the same reason Mac was, a limited success, Island No. 10 for Pope, Rich Mountain for Mac. Pope's personal qualities are irrelevant.Lastly, who cares if McClellan was slow? At least he didn't slaughter his troops with insane frontal assaults like Grant did. Grant couldn't even defeat a weakened AoNV in the summer of 1864. He failed at the same task McClellan failed at, i.e., destroying the Confederates in one summer campaign. McClellan reached the outskirts of Richmond just like Grant did, and he did it without losing a lot of men. He didn't have to siege Yorktown probably, but he did, took Yorktown, saved peoples' lives and took a bunch of Confederate guns. What a bumbling fool.
Lincoln cared that he was slow. Richmond was relatively undefended but it wasn't after the siege at Yorktown. No where in the course of the war did so few troops hold up so many for so long. Bumbling fool is a good description of his actions during the Penisular Campaign.He also successfully moved the AoP to a new supply line on the James, blunted Lee's attacks during the Seven Days, and successfully retreated from a few miles from Richmond to fight another day.
That's one way to interpret it. Sitting in front of Richmond for three or four weeks after Seven Pines allowed Lee to seize the initiative which he never gave up, concetrate 2/3 of his army against 1/5 of Mac's (Porter's corps) and attack it. Porter and his troops deserve credit for blunting Lee. During the attack Mac was little more than a spectator. It was Sumner who despatched troops to Porter on his own initiative. Mac's successful retreat was conducted by his subordinates, mostly Keyes and Sumner. Why he even decided to retreat is another matter. Mac then boarded an ironclad and missed the last couple of the Seven Days.McClellan also had no support whatsoever from the Lincoln administration. They hated him. Thought he was a traitor, etc... The politics were foisted on him because he was the Commander in Chief effectively and you had radicals who wanted the War over in a couple of months. They were a constant nuisance and he had to deal with them whether he liked it or not.
The administration was fully behind him . . . at first. Continually delaying an offensive was bound to lose him some of the goodwill that came with his appointment. Ball's Bluff and the Centerville embarassment cost more. All he had to do was look at pressure that was put upon McDowell for an offensive. Few, if any, thought him a traitor until he ran against Lincoln. Radicals and Moderates wanted the war over in a few months, all AoP commanders would have that expectation upon them. Victory would have served to silence any naysayers, he never achieved it despite having it handed to him on a platter (Antietam).Robert E. Lee thought him the best Union commander he faced.
I don't know the circumstances of that quote so I won't comment, other than to say Mick Jagger once said Devo's version of Satisfaction was the best he had hear.Fredricksburg would have never happened if McClellan was in charge. Like Grant said, who knows what he would have done with more time and political support.
My statement was concerning the circumstances . . . Pope was only in danger because of Mac's inaction. He had a 100k army sitting at Harrison's landing for two weeks after Halleck had ordered it back to Washington. Knowing Mac's lack of initiative meant that Lee could count on the AoP remaining bystanders while he concentrated against Pope by first sending Jackson then Longstreet. Had Mac decided to advance again, instead of complaining about the lack of reinforcements, being outnumbered 2-1, etc., Lee could never have concentrated against Pope.
I agree Pope lost the battle fair and square. But for Mac's inaction, the battle would never have occurred.
Pope was also despised because he came from the western armies, which had actually had success. He was appointed for the same reason Mac was, a limited success, Island No. 10 for Pope, Rich Mountain for Mac. Pope's personal qualities are irrelevant.
Lincoln cared that he was slow. Richmond was relatively undefended but it wasn't after the siege at Yorktown. No where in the course of the war did so few troops hold up so many for so long. Bumbling fool is a good description of his actions during the Penisular Campaign.
That's one way to interpret it. Sitting in front of Richmond for three or four weeks after Seven Pines allowed Lee to seize the initiative which he never gave up, concetrate 2/3 of his army against 1/5 of Mac's (Porter's corps) and attack it. Porter and his troops deserve credit for blunting Lee. During the attack Mac was little more than a spectator. It was Sumner who despatched troops to Porter on his own initiative. Mac's successful retreat was conducted by his subordinates, mostly Keyes and Sumner. Why he even decided to retreat is another matter. Mac then boarded an ironclad and missed the last couple of the Seven Days.
The administration was fully behind him . . . at first. Continually delaying an offensive was bound to lose him some of the goodwill that came with his appointment. Ball's Bluff and the Centerville embarassment cost more. All he had to do was look at pressure that was put upon McDowell for an offensive. Few, if any, thought him a traitor until he ran against Lincoln. Radicals and Moderates wanted the war over in a few months, all AoP commanders would have that expectation upon them. Victory would have served to silence any naysayers, he never achieved it despite having it handed to him on a platter (Antietam).
I don't know the circumstances of that quote so I won't comment, other than to say Mick Jagger once said Devo's version of Satisfaction was the best he had hear.
McClellan would never have thought of a winter campaign, nor would he have thought the quick march to cross the Rapahannock. Too bad for Burnside and his troops that the pontoons didn't arrive until too late. McClellan seemed to be fixated upon the Peninsula as the only route to approach Richmond.
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