berto wrote:I think we need to be careful with the argument: If it didn't happen in The Real Game, then it shouldn't be allowable in this game, AACW. That if historical commanders never attempted something, that something should be off-limits to us game players.
In the face of overwhelming 2-1/2 to 1 odds, divide your forces, then divide your forces again--then go on the attack and win!
Order your center to stand pat, then watch in awed stupefaction as your soldiers spontaneously charge uphill in the face of certain destruction--but against all odds, take the position!
Despite the grave misgivings of your commander and president, cut yourself off completely from your sources of supply, march into the enemy's heartland--then six weeks later miraculously reappear to take a major enemy coastal city from the rear!
Ill-advised, foolhardy, impossible even? Yes, yes, and yes.
Yet Lee (Chancellorsville), Grant, (Missionary Ridge), and Sherman (March to the Sea) oversaw these highly improbable events just the same.
If Forrest had never been, would we now dismiss as "impossible" some of the exploits he magically achieved time and time again? (Fact is, after improbably capturing two Union gunboats, Forrest was in a position to cross the Tennessee at Johnsonville, just at that moment he chose not to.)
Allow for the occasional stroke of genius or just plain dumb luck.
IMO, it would be best not to absolutely prohibit forced river crossings in the face of enemy gunboats, no matter their disposition or number. It should be risky, maybe in the extreme, but still permissible.
I think it would be so cool to find myself in Kirby Smith's situation and, overcoming my fears and all good reason, attempt a Mississippi River crossing in mid to late 1864. What if, what if...
If for some reason the nuances can't be programmed, I suppose I would agree: if it didn't happen in history, don't allow it to happen in game.
If it can't be programmed. But I suspect it can. Simplifying abstractions have their place, but maybe this is not one of those places. Easy for me to say, but I don't face Pocus & co.'s hectic work load and time constraints.
I pretty much concur with your comments although I prefer "thoughtful" to careful since these are core design decisions.
A counter example to your cases would be the North's ability to purchase repeating rifles. The Union Army refused. Some Union commanders, notably John Wilder, actually loaned his brigade the money to do so. As a result his "Lightning Brigade" achieved near ledgedary status.
"Stated one of General William T. Sherman's soldiers: "I think the Johnnys are getting rattled; they are afraid of our repeating rifles. They say we are not fair, that we have guns that we load up on Sunday and shoot all the rest of the week."
The ill-supplied Southern trooper could not hope to match the firepower of these repeating weapons, for they utilized special copper rim-fire cartridges that were beyond the production capability of Confederate ordnance." http://www.civilwar.com/content/view/2035/46/
But how many people think a Union Army adopts repeating rifles option sounds like fun? I venture not many as it would make for an even stronger Union armies (or just try to mod the Union data to double all infantry/cavalry firepower). About the only use I could see would be giving a tyro an advantage vs a grognard in head to head.
But with perfect hindsight, it's a no brainer to take the option if offered.
One issue is level of abstraction. It's fair to say, at present, it's very uneven for land vis-a-vis naval with several experts wanting a more detailed naval system.
With the current abstraction of river crossing/blocking, what is the best rule for number of elements to block? Some, including myself, think the original 1 element is better than 10.x.
Given the diverse views on what history might allow/disallow, I believe startup options are needed.