AGEOD Forums

How does terrain affect combat strength?

Also, the terrain in east Tennesee, southern Kentucky is a nightmare to move an army through. Seems to take forever. As Union player I have opted for a plan that avoids campaigning through these regions. I put up what amounts to a cavalry screen to prevent CSA raids. But I know eventually I will have to move through here to take Knoxville and Chatanooga. Any body have advice for this treachorous terrain? Given the amount of historical activity these areas recieved I am surprised how difficult the terrain is.

And one more terrain question...

How in the world can a Union player replicate the historical coastal campaigns? Taking the coastal forts has to be a costly affair, or is it a matter of bringing sufficient siege artillery (how much is enough)? Is naval support effective in this venture or will I lose many ships? I suppose I need to take a harbor for supply before I begin a siege. Is this strategy worth it?

Terrain is an advantage to the defender. More difficult terrain = easier to defend. It also affects frontage, that is how many units can fight at once, although it is just one factor; the formula is complex and not published.

I don't think taking the coastal forts is all that difficult. Usually they are not reinforced and the coastal artillery starts out low. A single division should do the trick.

Ships will take a beating bombarding forts, but since it only cost war supplies its not that big of a deal as Union. Don't use light ships though, as they will get sunk.

wolflars wrote:How does terrain affect combat strength?

Also, the terrain in east Tennesee, southern Kentucky is a nightmare to move an army through. Seems to take forever. As Union player I have opted for a plan that avoids campaigning through these regions. I put up what amounts to a cavalry screen to prevent CSA raids. But I know eventually I will have to move through here to take Knoxville and Chatanooga. Any body have advice for this treachorous terrain? Given the amount of historical activity these areas recieved I am surprised how difficult the terrain is.

With a few exceptions, most of the activites in that area used the valleys for movement and only crossed the mountains where roads and/or rivers made the way usable. Unfortunately for most of the year the roads/rivers weren't usable. One example, both armies spent almost three years fighting to control Cumberland Gap because it was on a major route from the east Tennessee valley area (and southwestern Virginia) into Kentucky. (The Wilderness Road) After the gap changed hands for the final time Grant came through the area while on his way from Chattanooga to the Eastern Theater to look at the roads use as a supply route for a movement up the Tennessee Valley into the Shenandoah Valley and the rest of Virginia. The road was so bad he cancelled the plan. This same road was used by Bragg after Perryville and was a reason why Buell did not pursue Bragg's forces into Tennessee.

When Burnside moved in from Kentucky to capture Knoxville hehad to split his forces into three groups in order to get them all in place within a reasonable amount of time. The westenrmost from came down a route that roughtly follows modern US 27 from Burnside, KY to Harriman, TN and had to basically build the road as they went along. The middle group came down more established roads (basically the route of US 25-W) but still had to go out of their way to take advantage of gaps in Cumberland and Pine Mountains. The easternmost group used the Wilderness Road (modern 25-E) until they got almost to Cumberland Gap (which was held by the CSA at that time) and had to cross some high mountains and bypass the gap in order to surround the CSA forces there and force them to surrender.

That is also why the East Tennessee and Virginia (or whatever else it was called, the name was different in Virginia) was so important. It was the only easy route through the area.

Wow, you certainly know alot about cumberland gap tennessee... oh, wait, ok, I see why now
Very interesting