AGEOD Forums

Hello All,

Just wanted to observe that naval bombardment under 1.6 is still excessive. I initally observed what appeared to be more reasonable results but am now in considerable doubt regarding this.

I think the issue here appears to be that naval bombardment is not addressed according to its own unique circumstances.

If damage or fire is coming from naval elements there should be a damage shave based on this consideration alone. Further, irrespective of naval bombardment to any degree, no unit should ever be "wiped out" irrespective of pulses etc. A assault I will grant but bombardment? I dont recall any instance in the civil war in which naval bombardment completely "wiped out" any command in a ship to shore engagement.

respectfully,


Sheytan

edited for additional comment, forts!!! need to have a special naval bombardment defensive plus. If anything they should be most resistant to naval bombardment. I will begin to do some research on fort/naval assault to see what really happened historically. If I am able I will add that material here.

Start with:

Fort Hatteras, NC
Fort Walker, SC
Fort Hindman, AR
Coggins Point, VA

Monitors, while able to take a pounding, were singularly inneffective at shore bombardment. Mortars boats could knock out parapet guns, create fire risks, and kill anyone in the open from long range, but couldn't breach walls or take out casemate guns. It would take rifled broadsides firing shell to break down walls. Range was a critical factor. Shelling unprotected troops from ships was just as effective as shelling them from land, and return fire (except plunging or against immobilized ships) was less effective. IMHO any unfortified command faced with a decent sized naval bombardment would scatter (if possible) or surrender. Nothing spectacular, no interesting history to write about.

The advantages to shore forces came from:

1. site - offering plunging or converging fire, natural or man-made obstructions, elevation as a defensive factor
2. armament - heavy guns with adequate powder + torpedoes (mines)
3. construction materials and design of forts

Site was the most important.

There are four issues as I see it.

1. Monitors are too powerful offensively.
2. Other ships are no longer powerful enough offensively. We certainly don't need the old 'Iwo Jima' system back, but results should actually be tweaked back in that direction.
3. The fort model is not detailed enough, especially with regards to site.
4. There are no models for mortar boats or torpedoes.

I would go further and suggest that site is the only thing that matters. Ships bombarded coastal forts and vice versa, simply because the whole point of the forts is to interdict shipping traffic, therefore if the fort is sited in range and line of sight of where ships can go, ships can maneuver to be in range and line of sight of the forts.

I don't have my sources handy, but wasnt there a case where a union fleet induced the surrender of a coastal fort by bombardment alone? Presumably it was an older pre-war brick fort, and was not accessible to reinforcement/resupply/support by land or from other batteries.

As for bombarding troops in the open, the problem is that the area you can command from ships' guns (river or ironclad) is very small, and smaller still with direct line of sight. Those areas are almost always tactically insignificant, so the target troops just move elsewhere.

The only example I can think of of a bombardment like that would be during the night at Shiloh, when Union gunboats supposedly kept the Rebel army from getting a good night's sleep. But that could have been accomplished just as easily with land-based artillery firing blind. Certainly it does not seem to have had decisive effect. The real contribution of those gunboats IMO was establishing naval superiority on that stretch of river so that Buells's troops could cross over to take the offensive on day 2.

For game purposes I would suggest removing the ability of fleets to bombard non-fort positions entirely.

- Alex

I would propose two changes.

#1. Lower the range of coastal guns (in fact, I have an idea to revamp heavy artillery, eliminating the difference between coastal and land batteries, since they were all the same guns). They were mostly smoothbore weapons, and usually outranged by naval vessels, and definitely by land based rifled artillery.

#2. Increase the number of 'Coastal Artillery Batteries' in a fortress. Presently, an entire fort's artillery is represented by two batteries (a water battery and a land battery). However, based on usual numbers of guns, most pre-war forts should have many more 'water batteries'. A fort had about 40-60 guns (50% engaged at a time), a ship had about 10-20 guns (50% engaged at a time). Presently forts are very undergunned.

*Forts should be tough to destry, but also have a tough time destroying naval vessels. They should heavily interdict supply (i.e., if you take Mobile or New Orleans, but not their supporting forts, then you are in trouble!), but naval vessels should not be in outstanding danger from the fortresses, but, neither should the fortresses worry about ships. What was a major danger to forts, was even a small land battery of rifled guns, they outranged the forts, and could pinpoint damage on the brick walls and make a breakthrough werever the gunners wanted, without fear of reprisals from the fort's guns.

I am currently reading 'Blue and Gray Navies; The Civil War Afloat" by Spencer Tucker and have so far gotten to the latter stages of the Vicksburg campaign. It's a fairly new book and anyone interested in the period naval warfare should pick it up. Some information from him relating to this topic:

-Coastal (non river) Fortresses, of earth or masonry or both, were very susceptible to being reduced by heavy Naval artillery fire (usually in conjunction with adequate amphibious forces, unless they were very significant, which was rare.

Excerpt about the assault on Port Royal: (I'm typing from the book so forgive any typos)

"The action began at 9:26 am when a IX-inch Dahlgren at Fort Walker fired on the Wabash and a gun at Fort Beauregard immediately followed suit. The Wabash returned fire, followed by the Susquehanna, and the fighting became general. After passing through the channel, the ships turned in succession according to plan, passing eigh hundred years from Fort Walker. They then circled and turned to mid channel, again following it in while engaging borth fors at long range before turning south. The second Union pass was at only six hundred yards from Fort Walker. While the Union ships poured shells into the fort, the inexperienced Confederate gunners found it difficult to hit the moving Union ships. Fire from the fort steadily dimished in intensity, and by the time the Wabash was in position to commence fire for a third time with its starboard guns against Walker, Confederate fire had entirely ceased and the engagement was over. At 11:15 am the Ottawa signaled that the Confederates had abandoned the works....." (pg.88-89)

For reference, U.S.S Wabash was a 4800 ton Screw/Steam Frigate mounting 44 guns, two X-inch rifles, twenty-eight IX-inch rifles, and fourteen VIII-inch rifles. It was joined in the assault by one frigate, three sloops, 4 gunboats, and a sailing sloop the U.S.S Vandalia, while Fts. Beauregard and Walker were small to medium size Forts mounting a combined 43 guns (only about half facing the sea).

Smaller forts were easily handled, as in the case of Ft.Clark and Ft. Hatteras during the operations against the Hatteras Inlets. And so were 'medium' forts as in the excerpt above.

-Major Coastal Fortresses were more likely to be surrendered by being cut off from supplies and isolated/encircled by either naval, or, more often, ground elements, or by direct assault with infantry and ground based siege artillery, rather than be destroyed by naval artillery alone . An example was Fort Pulaski, a large brick fort with walls almost 8 feet thick, mounting forty-eight heavy guns, and considered by Gen. Lee to be "impervious to Union attack". The army placed heavy smoothbore Columbiads and Parrot Rifles on Tybee Island - the guns opened fire on April 10, the Fort was surrendered on April 11th.

-Major River Fortresses were rarely reduced by naval fire, from guns or howitzers. Like the Major Coastal Forts (Fisher for example) they were simply by passed and cut off from supply/besieged by land forces (Island No.10,). Foote's attacks on Donelson were in fact abortive.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Fort_Donelson_river_battery.jpg

-The Mortar Boats of Porter and the rest were had mixed record due to fuzing issues, and probably did more as weapons of fear and intimidation, as they were used to continually bombard targets for days and weeks at a time.

"The mortars fired at the rate of about 1 shell every ten minutes. At night, in order to provide some rest to the crews, the fired at a rate of 1 shell every half hour. For six days and nights the mortars fired 16,800 shells, almost all of them at the fort (Ft. Jackon, LA) and without notable result. The problem seems to have been fuzing, the shells either burst in the air or buried themselves in the sorth earth before exploding" (pg.195)

"One item has dissapointed me - those great mortars are a dead failure; they did nothing at all, went wild, burst in the air, and caused no apprehension at all to the garrison. I am worried about this because this is the great dependence, those 13-inch mortars, that our friends in the Gulf are looking to, to reduce the forts in the Mississippi" - Flag Officer Samuel Du Pont, Commander of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, commenting on the use of mortar boats against Fort Pulaski.


One final comment - the firepower that was able to be brought to bear on soft ground units from Naval artillery was significant.

-New Orleans proper was surrendered without a fight as after Farragut's ships had run Fort Jackson and St. Phillip, they could fire shot and shell into New Orleans or any troops within it with free reign.

- When General Williams three thousand man union force in Baton Rouge, LA was surrounded and backed up against the Mississippi by Confederates under Gen. Breckenridge, and their lines broken, it was the Essex
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Essex_(1856)
and a division of Union gunboats that held off the Confederates from capturing the Union troops, even forcing the Confederates back. Had the C.S.S Arkansas been able to attack the Union boats, it's likely the U.S troops would have been forced to surrender.

-When McClellan lost his nerve (and mind) during the Peninsula campaign, believing he was outnumbered, he withdrew across the Chickahominy to be protected by the Union gunboat division in the area -

"I would most earnestly request that every gunboat or other armed vessel suitable for action in the James River be sent at once to this vicinity, and placed under the orders of Cdr. Rodgers, for the purpose of covering the camps and communications of this army" - G. McCellan on July 1 to Flag Officer Goldsborough.

Excellent post Gabriel. Very solid research and supporting facts. I will have to give the book you are referring to a try, it seems like it would be quite interesting.

Thank you Gabriel. Nice research.

Gabriel wrote:"The mortars fired at the rate of about 1 shell every ten minutes. At night, in order to provide some rest to the crews, the fired at a rate of 1 shell every half hour. For six days and nights the mortars fired 16,800 shells, almost all of them at the fort (Ft. Jackon, LA) and without notable result. The problem seems to have been fuzing, the shells either burst in the air or buried themselves in the sorth earth before exploding" (pg.195)

"One item has dissapointed me - those great mortars are a dead failure; they did nothing at all, went wild, burst in the air, and caused no apprehension at all to the garrison. I am worried about this because this is the great dependence, those 13-inch mortars, that our friends in the Gulf are looking to, to reduce the forts in the Mississippi" - Flag Officer Samuel Du Pont, Commander of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, commenting on the use of mortar boats against Fort Pulaski.

Farragut personally put as much faith in the mortar boats ability to reduce forts as DuPont had in the ability of his monitors to do the same. Not much.

Gabriel wrote:- When General Williams three thousand man union force in Baton Rouge, LA was surrounded and backed up against the Mississippi by Confederates under Gen. Breckenridge, and their lines broken, it was the Essex
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Essex_(1856)
and a division of Union gunboats that held off the Confederates from capturing the Union troops, even forcing the Confederates back. Had the C.S.S Arkansas been able to attack the Union boats, it's likely the U.S troops would have been forced to surrender.

Which led me to this interesting blurb - from Harper's Weekly:

"When the long roll was beaten the gun-boats Essex, Sumter, Kineo, and Katahdin took up their positions, the two former to protect our left and the two latter our right flank The Essex and the Sumter opened fire in the woods, their shells screaming through the trees, tearing them into shreds and scattering an iron hail around. Signal-officer Davis, of the Kineo, stationed himself on the tower of the State House, from which elevation he had an excellent view of the field, and could signal to the vessels where to throw in their shells. After the battle had raged for some time the Union troops began to fall back on the Penitentiary, when several well-directed shots from the 11-inch guns of the boats kept the rebels in check. Shortly after this the firing ceased.

At half past three P.M. firing was re-opened, the gun-boats Kineo and Katahdin shelling the woods in different directions where the enemy were, doing great execution. It has been stated that one shell from the Kineo killed from forty to sixty rebels. Toward evening the firing again ceased: but the gun-boats continued to send in a shell every half hour in different parts of the woods during the whole night, with the view of keeping the rebels at bay; but they had already fled, the gallant charge of the Sixth Michigan having completed their discomfiture."

aaminoff wrote:I don't have my sources handy, but wasnt there a case where a union fleet induced the surrender of a coastal fort by bombardment alone? Presumably it was an older pre-war brick fort, and was not accessible to reinforcement/resupply/support by land or from other batteries.

You are probably thinking of Fort Walker at Port Royal, SC. I believe it was a new brick construction.

aaminoff wrote:As for bombarding troops in the open, the problem is that the area you can command from ships' guns (river or ironclad) is very small, and smaller still with direct line of sight. Those areas are almost always tactically insignificant, so the target troops just move elsewhere.

I don't totally disagree. I think the operative variables may have been maneuverability, maneuvering room, elevation, and the presence of opposing land forces. In places like Baton Rouge, Port Royal Sound, or the James Estuary, gunboats had a fine time directing fire just where they wanted. In the Red River, at Vicksburg, or Charleston Harbor they problems. The CSS Virginia would hypothetically have made a poor platform for shore bombardment, simply because she could not maneuver well. At Baton Rouge and Malvern Hill, the enemy infantry were concentrated for an attack. At Fort Hindman or Fort Fisher, they were concentrated for defense.

Perhaps just the ability to bombard unfortified infantry and cavalry should be restricted to support of friendly units. In a perfect world, where Pocus has an infinite amount of time to program these things, but still get them done quickly.

I think right now the level of abstraction regarding forts is strategic. I recognize that some of the suggestions I have made here and on other threads border on tactical. AGEod has been quite good at finding the operational (once they have had time to consider the various points-of-view). Hence my admiration.

this would be great :

a fleet cannot bombard forces in the open unless there are friendly forces in the territory. Great idea.

Or they are under bombardment by those forces (i.e. Drewry's Bluff or Coggin's Point).

I think it has to do with dispersion. A force in the open is much more dispersed than one close in range. While they aren't fortified, they are still not very vulnerable to artillery fire, especially artillery fire limited to a coastal force (it isn't as if the land force is standing, in perfect lines on the banks of the river waiting to be bombarded).

Bombarding should primarily take place against fortresses, or in support of friendly troops engaged in battle.

Maybe the true firepower of warships should be lowered (i.e., their killing power), but their ability to cause cohesion damage much greater (the threat and fire from warships caused less physical damage, and more psychological damage, against troops in forts, and troops on the battlefield).

This way, a coastal fleet cannot 'kill' a fortress, but in combination with a land attacking force can surely lower their cohesion making the land force have a much greater chance of success. Also, if your fleets bombards passing troops (not engaged in battle) they would primarily just lose cohesion (interdicting roads, messing up timetables, disorganizing regiments, etc.), making it not very worth while unless the force is on the way to engage in battle (vs being able to totally wipe it out).

Some good ideas here. Let's not forget the suggestion of the on/off toggle for shore units on whether to bombard or not, too. There are some places you just can't put artillery units as the south against a USA human player, because they will consistently get gone...

mikee64 wrote:Some good ideas here. Let's not forget the suggestion of the on/off toggle for shore units on whether to bombard or not, too. There are some places you just can't put artillery units as the south against a USA human player, because they will consistently get gone...

Yes, have to give Runyan kudos for that idea.

McNaughton wrote:Maybe the true firepower of warships should be lowered (i.e., their killing power), but their ability to cause cohesion damage much greater (the threat and fire from warships caused less physical damage, and more psychological damage, against troops in forts, and troops on the battlefield).

This way, a coastal fleet cannot 'kill' a fortress, but in combination with a land attacking force can surely lower their cohesion making the land force have a much greater chance of success. Also, if your fleets bombards passing troops (not engaged in battle) they would primarily just lose cohesion (interdicting roads, messing up timetables, disorganizing regiments, etc.), making it not very worth while unless the force is on the way to engage in battle (vs being able to totally wipe it out).

Cohesion damage should be higher than killing damage for all types of mortar and shell fire against soft targets. A condition was observed during the ACW known as "soldier's heart" that later became known as shell shock. There are descriptions of this occuring under Magruder's command on the Peninsula, apparently due to the heavy volume of artillery fire they were subjected to.

Once it was discovered that plenty of loose dirt or sand inside a fortress decreased the damage from mortar attacks, casualties from those attacks, and damage to vulnerable areas like magazines went down.

Where third-system fortresses had a big advantage over non-brick forts, was that they had casemates protecting some of the artillery from indirect shell fire.

Direct rifled shell fire could take down fortress walls. If it came from ships, they had to get closer than land batteries to achieve similar accuracy. This obviously increased their vulnerability. They took the greatest punishment when their mobility was restricted. Monitor-class ironclads did not have as many guns as other types of ships. Those are the differences.

How many fort commanders refused to surrender to the land forces on hand, claiming the navy beat them, then the army showed up at the gates after the white flags went up? Off the top of my head: Fort Hatteras, Fort Henry, Fort Hindman. I'm sure I could find more.

I fully agree about trying to shell dispersed or passing troops.

Gabriel wrote:One final comment - the firepower that was able to be brought to bear on soft ground units from Naval artillery was significant.

-New Orleans proper was surrendered without a fight as after Farragut's ships had run Fort Jackson and St. Phillip, they could fire shot and shell into New Orleans or any troops within it with free reign.

- When General Williams three thousand man union force in Baton Rouge, LA was surrounded and backed up against the Mississippi by Confederates under Gen. Breckenridge, and their lines broken, it was the Essex
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Essex_(1856)
and a division of Union gunboats that held off the Confederates from capturing the Union troops, even forcing the Confederates back. Had the C.S.S Arkansas been able to attack the Union boats, it's likely the U.S troops would have been forced to surrender.

-When McClellan lost his nerve (and mind) during the Peninsula campaign, believing he was outnumbered, he withdrew across the Chickahominy to be protected by the Union gunboat division in the area -

"I would most earnestly request that every gunboat or other armed vessel suitable for action in the James River be sent at once to this vicinity, and placed under the orders of Cdr. Rodgers, for the purpose of covering the camps and communications of this army" - G. McCellan on July 1 to Flag Officer Goldsborough.

I'm under the impression that the psychological effect that naval guns had on land forces far exceeded their actual capacity for harm. Gunboat firepower weighed heavily on the considerations of some commanders, yet if you go looking for an example of gunboats causing a significant number of casualties to a division or corps, you are going to have a hard time finding an example, I think.

The Peninsular campaign is a good example, as you mention. McC wanted the protection of the gunboats, and J. Johnston retreated to Richmond in great measure due to the threat of the gunboats, and yet they never were a significant factor during the land battles at all.

The land bombardments in the game, where fleets are inflicting hundreds of casualties, or even wiping out entire forces on occasion, is hard for me to picture happening in reality.

Unless the land forces are formed up in line of battle directly on shore, the naval guns aren't even going to have a target to aim at, and it seems highly improbable for them to be effective in this role.

runyan99 wrote:The Peninsular campaign is a good example, as you mention. McC wanted the protection of the gunboats, and J. Johnston retreated to Richmond in great measure due to the threat of the gunboats, and yet they never were a significant factor during the land battles at all.

Hi Runyan,

Their psychological effect was certainly more important than their actual effect, but they were a significant factor.

http://www.multied.com/Navy/cwnavalhistory/June1862.html

June 7 - U.S.S. Wachusett, Commander W. Smith, U.S.S. Chocura, and Sebago escorted Army transports up the York River, supported the landing at West Point, Virginia, and countered a Confederate attack with accurate gunfire.

http://www.multied.com/Navy/cwnavalhistory/July1862.html

July 1-2 "During the whole battle Commodore Rodgers added greatly to the discomfiture of the enemy by throwing shell among his reserve and advancing columns.'' The Washington National Intelligencer of 7 July described the gunboats' part in the action at Malvern Hill: "About five o'clock in the after-noon the gunboats Galena, Aroostook, and Jacob Bell opened from Turkey Island Bend, in the James River, with shot and shell from their immense guns. The previous roar of field artillery seemed as faint as the rattle of musketry in comparison with these monsters of ordnance that literally shook the water and strained the air. . . . They fired about three times a minute, frequently a broadside at a time, and the immense hull of the Galena careened as she delivered her complement of iron and flame. The fire went on . . . making music to the ears of our tired men. . . . Confederate ranks seemed slow to close up when the naval thunder had torn them apart. . . During the engagement at White Oak Swamp, too, the Intelligencer reported, the gunboats "are entitled to the most unbounded credit. They came into action just at the right time, and did first rate service.''

July 10 - Continual Confederate concern about the gunboats was noted by a British Army observer, Colonel Garnet J. Wolseley, who wrote that he "noted with some interest the superstitious dread of gunboats which possessed the Southern soldiers. These vessels of war, even when they have been comparatively harmless had several times been the means of saving northern armies.

Malvern Hill from a different source -

http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/civilwar/misc/malvernhill.aspx

The 5th New York Infantry had ordered out a skirmish line and pickets, when about 5:00 pm Sergeant William Hoffman observed the rebels on the edge of a cornfield. Colonel Warren upon receiving word of this ordered Lieutenant Dumont, presently serving the signal corps to notified the gunboats Jacob Bell, Galena, and Aroostook, in the James River to commencing lobbing shells in that direction.

Four zouave signalman in the cornfield wig wagged back to the signal station to regulate the aim of the gunboats. The gunboats had been firing one hundred pound shells. The commands at Turkey Bend who stood their watching these rounds fly through the air likened them to flour barrels. The sound of them whizzing through the air was frightening to all that were within range of their drop zone fearing that if one fuse was cut short it was going to land on them.

The wiping out of entire commands in the game has apparently been solved. There is very little danger of that anymore. Entire commands may now thumb their noses at ships. Even their psychological effect has been nullified.

runyan99 wrote:I'm under the impression that the psychological effect that naval guns had on land forces far exceeded their actual capacity for harm..............

Unless the land forces are formed up in line of battle directly on shore, the naval guns aren't even going to have a target to aim at, and it seems highly improbable for them to be effective in this role.

If you are making the case that naval artillery, river based or otherwise, shouldn't be wiping off infantry formations off the face of the earth through bombardment alone, and if that is indeed what is happening in game, I concur entirely.

Against large troop concentrations I like McNaughton's idea of inflicting large cohesion damage, making it an easier thing for amphibious or near by ground forces to assault (or defend) a position more effectively. In the examples I cited of forts being 'reduced' by gunfire, in no case I can think off were there mass casualties inflicted on the defending garrison of the fort, they either simply abandoned the fort if possible, or were taken prisoner by army elements. If cohesion is the way to reduce combat capability without inflicting massive casualties, that would be consistent with what I know of operations against the river and coastal forts of the south (I look at this through the prism of history and the Union usually being offensive against fortified positions, but in this game it could easily go the other way,,well,,not easily).

I would however like to see physical damage be wrought against the actual fortifications themselves, as well as the gun batteries, but I haven't played enough to know if you can even destroy forts in this game or if you simply have to take them.

Gabriel wrote:Against large troop concentrations I like McNaughton's idea of inflicting large cohesion damage, making it an easier thing for amphibious or near by ground forces to assault.

Someone correct me if I am wrong, but I believe the battle engine is set such that a hit must occur before cohesion is reduced. I don't believe cohesion damage is inflicted by itself-a hit must occur first.

Again correct me if I am wrong.

Gabriel wrote:I would however like to see physical damage be wrought against the actual fortifications themselves, as well as the gun batteries, but I haven't played enough to know if you can even destroy forts in this game or if you simply have to take them.

This could be modeled on the ability to create breaches that happens when a fort or city is under siege. A small chance based on the amount of direct fire available. If the modelling of forts is expanded, other factors could be considered as well.

You have to take a fort before you are given the option to completely destroy it. I don't believe this should be changed. Look at the 1863 fighting at Fort Sumter as an example. It was effectively reduced to rubble, but the Union wasn't able to take it. The rubble was still functioning as protection to the defending garrison.

Just wanted to note that in my games I'm seeing ironclad fleets take a real pounding when trying to bombard or bypass infantry divisions which are heavily entrenched.

That is so very true.

As for "pounding", I would restate as "wipe out".

runyan99 wrote:Just wanted to note that in my games I'm seeing ironclad fleets take a real pounding when trying to bombard or bypass infantry divisions which are heavily entrenched.