deep enemy assaults!

[squarian]

After reading more history on the 1862 campaigns by Lee and Bragg just this evening and the comments about the thoughts behind their attempts to move into northern territory. It was not impossible for these types of raids to occur or be attempted. Historically, they were not, but the fact remains that they could have been attempted and had the war gone a different way with successes in either of the 1862 campaign moves by Bragg or Lee, it is quite likely that raids would have been attempted further north than historically done.

The discussion seems to me to have centered mostly on questions of 1) supply - could CSA forces have kept themselves fed and armed deep in Northern territory and 2) policy - would invading the North undermine CSA political objectives, esp. in relation to Br & Fr. There must also have been strategic issues - in both theatres, a major invasion of the North would have unmasked important strategic invasion to USA ripostes. That is, invasion may have been possible in logistical terms but undesirable in strategic terms.

The main issue to me, however, is not whether a game is "historical" in the sense of faithfully following the events of the historical model. The debate between accuracy and playability has reared its tired old head once again here, and it's a false distinction. There's nothing more tedious than listening to "if you want history go read a book" and "that could never happen in real life" bounce back and forth like moldy old tennis balls.

The point is not whether a game is accurate, but whether the historical alternatives it offers are plausible. Can you, as someone reasonably well-informed about the historical events, do something in the game which requires you to suspend disbelief? As GL points out above, invading the North was a serious option for the Confed high command - therefore, it is a plausible alternative in a ACW game, and for me a t least it does not shatter the illusion of "realism" which all wargames lay claim to by definition, as long as the historical constraints which led the CSA command to reject it are also present.

Of the three reasons why the Confed high command might have rejected the option to invade the North, strategic considerations are obviously present in the game, supply limitations may be subject to debate but are at least represented passably well, and while the foreign policy ramifications needs work this is an acknowledged issue. The way the game treats an invasion of the North is plausible - in fact, nothing in this game so far has required me to suspend disbelief - at least not since the absurdly high battle casualties problem was fixed.

[TheDoctorKing]

Whereas up until very recently, I was somewhat convinced that there should be a penalty for CSA movements into northern territory, I don't believe in any penalty for raiding the North now.

One of the objectives of Lee's original 1862 Campaign was to invade the North thru to the Susquehanna and threaten Philadelphia, Baltimore, or Washington, in order to gain Foreign recognition, by presenting the foreign governments with proof that the south could win the war. This was prior to the release of the Emancipation Proclamation. Also, Bragg's intent was to move on Cincinnati if successful in central KY. Now, historically we all know that neither of these objectives came to pass, but the fact that the southern leaders were contemplating them has convinced me that they were not worried about any sort of political backlash, but actually counted on positive benefits had they been successful. To sum it up, they were militarily defeated but not politically inhibited in their attempts to invade the north.

This is why I will absolutely NOT be providing any penalty for CSA invasions of the North in this game, and in fact I'm removing some penalties I was originally contemplating that was present in some future work for beta testing.

You are obviously reading different history than me. And reading and writing history is what I do for a living. Do you have any sources for this?

[Major Tom]

Of the three reasons why the Confed high command might have rejected the option to invade the North, strategic considerations are obviously present in the game, supply limitations may be subject to debate but are at least represented passably well, and while the foreign policy ramifications needs work this is an acknowledged issue. The way the game treats an invasion of the North is plausible - in fact, nothing in this game so far has required me to suspend disbelief - at least not since the absurdly high battle casualties problem was fixed.

Squarian - I basically agree with everything you said, but would still like to see the effectiveness of deep raids toned down. I think it's too easy for raiders to stay supplied, and they move quickly enough that they are difficult to catch or chase away. I'm in favor of seeing the rules tweaked in a way that slows them down, making the raids more risky ventures. Foraging should take time, at least a day or more variable based on the number of elements foraging. Maybe that's already happening but I'm not aware of it. Also, it should take some time to take control of even an ungarrisoned structure, maybe one day plus an extra day per city size category. And as I've suggested before, there should be some small movement penalty for moving in regions with 100% enemy military control. I know these are probably game engine changes, so they probably won't happen, but a few small measures like this would help reduce effectiveness and largely risk-free nature of raiding.

[denisonh]

Squarian - I basically agree with everything you said, but would still like to see the effectiveness of deep raids toned down. I think it's too easy for raiders to stay supplied, and they move quickly enough that they are difficult to catch or chase away. I'm in favor of seeing the rules tweaked in a way that slows them down, making the raids more risky ventures. Foraging should take time, at least a day or more variable based on the number of elements foraging. Maybe that's already happening but I'm not aware of it. Also, it should take some time to take control of even an ungarrisoned structure, maybe one day plus an extra day per city size category. And as I've suggested before, there should be some small movement penalty for moving in regions with 100% enemy military control. I know these are probably game engine changes, so they probably won't happen, but a few small measures like this would help reduce effectiveness and largely risk-free nature of raiding.

Tom has a good point. Deep raiding should not be "immediatley rewarded" by taking places and recieving significant supply but only gain after spending a couple if days in the location. It would be a significant improvement, as having a cav unit wandering around the deep south or upstate NY would have to pause to fully reap the benefits. A real reason that was not the case historically as there was only raids with "achievable objectives" engaged in.

Seeing partisans/single cav units working through Northern Ohio/Upstate NY and Union cav running through the deep south lead me to believe there is room for improvement. Penalties for suicide missions may be in order. Soldiers ain't real kean on missions with no chance to survive......

[Gray_Lensman]

Tom has a good point. Deep raiding should not be "immediatley rewarded" by taking places and recieving significant supply but only gain after spending a couple if days in the location. It would be a significant improvement, as having a cav unit wandering around the deep south or upstate NY would have to pause to fully reap the benefits. A real reason that was not the case historically as there was only raids with "achievable objectives" engaged in.

Seeing partisans/single cav units working through Northern Ohio/Upstate NY and Union cav running through the deep south lead me to believe there is room for improvement. Penalties for suicide missions may be in order. Soldiers ain't real kean on missions with no chance to survive......

The only thing that would make it a suicide mission is if there were known military units in the area and for sure it didn't seem to ever stop Stuart on his raids completely around McClellan in the presence of thousands of known USA military units. By the way there was a raid into Upstate NY that actually took place. In that case it was staged out of Canada, but there wasn't any fear of it being a suicide raid either.

Sorry, but the argument of stopping these raids because you consider them to be suicide raids is a non-starter.

[Gray_Lensman]

You are obviously reading different history than me. And reading and writing history is what I do for a living. Do you have any sources for this?

Usually, I don't respond to these types of chest-thumping posts because Rafiki gets somewhat annoyed when they degenerate into "I'm smarter than you" types of comments. In this case, I will give you some excerpt quotes from one of my more sources (primarily because of the political commentary that is interspersed in it.)

Here's one source (I do favor Shelby Foote's Narratives just because of the interspersed political commentary, most other sources being much better in detailed battle reports, but the subject here is primarily a political question on the viability of CSA invasions/raids of the north)

(bottom of page 661,Shelby Foote's Narrative Vol. I Fort Sumter to Perryville)

... * 2 * (after Pope's defeat at the 2nd Battle of Manassas)

As Pope's frazzled army faded eastward up the pike toward Washington, and as Lee's -- no less frazzled, but considerably lighter-hearted-- poked among the wreckage in search of hardtack, the problem for them both was: What next? For the former, the battered and misused conglomeration of troops now under McClellan, who had ridden out to meet them, the question was answered by necessity, They would defend their capital. But for the victors, confronted as usual with a variety of choices, the problem was more complex. Lee's solution, reached before the men's clothes were dry from the rain-lashed skirmish at Chantilly, resulted -- two weeks later, and by conincidence on the same date as Wilder's surrender to Bragg at Munfordville -- in the bloodiest single day of the whole war.

The solution, arrived at by a narrowing of choices, was invasion. He could not attack the Washington defenses, manned as they were by McClellan's army, already superior in numbers to his own and about to be strengthened, as he heard, by 60,000 replacements newly arrived in response to Lincoln's July call for "300,000 more." Nor could he keep his hungry soldiers in position where they were. The northern counties had been stripped of grain as if by locusts, and his wagon train was inadequate to import enough to feed the horses, let alone the troops. A third alternative would be to fall back into the Valley or south of the Rappahannock. But this not only would be to give up much that had been gained; it would permit a renewal of pressure on the Virginia Central -- and eventually on Richmond. By elimination, then, the march would be northward, across the Potomac.
...

(bottom of page 668, Shelby Foote's Narrative Vol. I Fort Sumter to Perryville)

Sixty airline miles beyond Hagerstown lay Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, where the Pennsylvania Railroad crossed the Susquehanna River. "That is the objective point of the campaign," Lee explained. Destruction of the bridge there, suplementing the previous seizure of the B & O crossing at Harper's Ferry and the wrecking of the Monocacy aqueduct of the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal -- this last would be done by Walker, in accordance with instructions already given him, on the way to Point of Rocks -- would isolate the Federal East from the Federal West, preventing the arrival of reinforcements for McClellan except by the slow and circuitous Great Lakes route. "After that," Lee concluded, "I can turn my attention to Philadelphia, Baltimore, or Washington, as may seem best for our interests." The war would be over -- won.


Now, I'm using these particular excerpts primarily to show that there was no such thoughts of political costs to be paid for attempting such movements, but on the contrary to show that probably the only thing that prevented the outcome was the loss of Lee's marching orders and subsequent discovery by McClellan such that he actually reacted sooner than Lee expected causing Lee to pull his army together at Sharpsburg, MD (Antietam Creek). Is there any doubt in anybody's mind that had McClellan not had the good fortune to stumble across Lee's marching orders that the movement visualized by Lee would not have taken place?

I know that this is not exactly the same thing as Cavalry raids, but my point is that there was nothing (political or morale penalty wise) to stop these activities. The only limitation being the actual circumstances of how the civil war historically occured. In the case of Cavalry raids there were several known raids of tremendous distance, Morgan's raid into Ohio being one of the notable ones. What stopped his raid... Well, it wasn't anything to do with being physically impossible, but instead a gathering of forces to pin him in, and it took a bunch to do just that along with riverine naval support. Now admitedly the game has some design flaws concerning the fact that a turn is 2 weeks in length, making it rather hard to respond to a Cavalry raid in progress, but building Militia units for the important structures along with some reaction Cavalry forces of your own possibly given an "Interception" type order can mitigate this quite a bit.

For sure, there is absolutely no political line of reasoning regarding Foreign Intervention, or southern morale effects that would have prevented these raids had they (the CSA leadership) determined to do so.

[Clovis]

My 2 cents: we have to consider a raid is really possible when the raiding force remains to the relative vicinity of a friendly base, or like Grierson raid, is going from a base to another.

What's impossible is the very long range raid, say Missouri toward Chicago. Not because only supply problem but because of a factor not developed in wargame: the survival instinct. Men aren't suicidal and must have a hope to go back in security. A raid from Virginia toward New York would have seen men deserting.

Moreover, we have to solve 2 different problems: AI and human players are doing deep raids but the solution has to be different 2.

Curently I solved CSA AI deep raid question. For human players, I'm inclined to think we have to divide North in 2 zones: one in vicinity of Confederate territory where raids are possible, the second being one where CSA units would dissolve by events...Of course, the seizure of key towns in the North by CSA would change this boundary and the same for a Great Britain entry in the war.

[Clovis]

Example from my current SVF game against CSA AI. We're in may 1862. As union, I forgot to seize the Cumberland gap and Esatern Kentucky and now CSA AI is pushing North from here.

You may see Ruggle's force coming back from Indiana, Jeb Stuat's one beginning one raid toxward Columbus while Ewell is just passing through Ohio to reach Western Virginia.

I find this plausible.

[Gray_Lensman]

deleted

[Clovis]

The problem with this is, since this is a game, the CSA territory may move north with CSA game successes. Defining a zone that is deep, might not be so deep with a successful CSA player.

My initial thoughts were to provide what I thought were justifiable political costs for 1861-1862, until I read about Lee's rationale for invading the north in the summer of 1862. This somewhat knocked the political costs ideas completely out of the picture since apparently the upper level CSA leadership was not at all hamstrung by any such thoughts.

We could define a list of cities modifying zones ( Baltimore, Cincinnati, Saint Louis, etc and even small ones). The possession could be the condition to fire events both modifying zones and AI behaviour.

[Gray_Lensman]

We could define a list of cities modifying zones ( Baltimore, Cincinnati, Saint Louis, etc and even small ones). The possession could be the condition to fire events both modifying zones and AI behaviour.

Sounds like a good start for a Campaign AI event file, if it can be made flexible enough to adapt to all of the 2-player campaign scenarios' starting conditions.

[Clovis]

Usually, I don't respond to these types of chest-thumping posts because Rafiki gets somewhat annoyed when they degenerate into "I'm smarter than you" types of comments. In this case, I will give you some excerpt quotes from one of my more sources (primarily because of the political commentary that is interspersed in it.)

Here's one source (I do favor Shelby Foote's Narratives just because of the interspersed political commentary, most other sources being much better in detailed battle reports, but the subject here is primarily a political question on the viability of CSA invasions/raids of the north)

(bottom of page 661,Shelby Foote's Narrative Vol. I Fort Sumter to Perryville)

... * 2 * (after Pope's defeat at the 2nd Battle of Manassas)

As Pope's frazzled army faded eastward up the pike toward Washington, and as Lee's -- no less frazzled, but considerably lighter-hearted-- poked among the wreckage in search of hardtack, the problem for them both was: What next? For the former, the battered and misused conglomeration of troops now under McClellan, who had ridden out to meet them, the question was answered by necessity, They would defend their capital. But for the victors, confronted as usual with a variety of choices, the problem was more complex. Lee's solution, reached before the men's clothes were dry from the rain-lashed skirmish at Chantilly, resulted -- two weeks later, and by conincidence on the same date as Wilder's surrender to Bragg at Munfordville -- in the bloodiest single day of the whole war.

The solution, arrived at by a narrowing of choices, was invasion. He could not attack the Washington defenses, manned as they were by McClellan's army, already superior in numbers to his own and about to be strengthened, as he heard, by 60,000 replacements newly arrived in response to Lincoln's July call for "300,000 more." Nor could he keep his hungry soldiers in position where they were. The northern counties had been stripped of grain as if by locusts, and his wagon train was inadequate to import enough to feed the horses, let alone the troops. A third alternative would be to fall back into the Valley or south of the Rappahannock. But this not only would be to give up much that had been gained; it would permit a renewal of pressure on the Virginia Central -- and eventually on Richmond. By elimination, then, the march would be northward, across the Potomac.
...

(bottom of page 668, Shelby Foote's Narrative Vol. I Fort Sumter to Perryville)

Sixty airline miles beyond Hagerstown lay Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, where the Pennsylvania Railroad crossed the Susquehanna River. "That is the objective point of the campaign," Lee explained. Destruction of the bridge there, suplementing the previous seizure of the B & O crossing at Harper's Ferry and the wrecking of the Monocacy aqueduct of the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal -- this last would be done by Walker, in accordance with instructions already given him, on the way to Point of Rocks -- would isolate the Federal East from the Federal West, preventing the arrival of reinforcements for McClellan except by the slow and circuitous Great Lakes route. "After that," Lee concluded, "I can turn my attention to Philadelphia, Baltimore, or Washington, as may seem best for our interests." The war would be over -- won.


Now, I'm using these particular excerpts primarily to show that there was no such thoughts of political costs to be paid for attempting such movements, but on the contrary to show that probably the only thing that prevented the outcome was the loss of Lee's marching orders and subsequent discovery by McClellan such that he actually reacted sooner than Lee expected causing Lee to pull his army together at Sharpsburg, MD (Antietam Creek). Is there any doubt in anybody's mind that had McClellan not had the good fortune to stumble across Lee's marching orders that the movement visualized by Lee would not have taken place?

I know that this is not exactly the same thing as Cavalry raids, but my point is that there was nothing (political or morale penalty wise) to stop these activities. The only limitation being the actual circumstances of how the civil war historically occured. In the case of Cavalry raids there were several known raids of tremendous distance, Morgan's raid into Ohio being one of the notable ones. What stopped his raid... Well, it wasn't anything to do with being physically impossible, but instead a gathering of forces to pin him in, and it took a bunch to do just that along with riverine naval support. Now admitedly the game has some design flaws concerning the fact that a turn is 2 weeks in length, making it rather hard to respond to a Cavalry raid in progress, but building Militia units for the important structures along with some reaction Cavalry forces of your own possibly given an "Interception" type order can mitigate this quite a bit.

For sure, there is absolutely no political line of reasoning regarding Foreign Intervention, or southern morale effects that would have prevented these raids had they (the CSA leadership) determined to do so.

Joseph L. Harsh's Confederate Tide rising contains an extensive analysis of the Southern strategy in 1861 and 1862 and details the alternative plans for a Northern invasion. he focuses too to the Maryland situation, CSA considering it like a possible future Southern State in case of a victorious outcome.

[Major Tom]

Sorry, but the argument of stopping these raids because you consider them to be suicide raids is a non-starter.

Gray - I don't think denisonh was arguing that the raids should stop, and I know I wasn't. Raids, even deep ones, were a historical part of the war, and they are also a fun aspect of the game, up to a point. But it sometimes seems to get out of hand. My complaint is not that raids happen, but that it's so hard to deel with them. Even if you devote forces to tracking down and catching the raiders, catching them seems a lot harder than it ought to be.

[Clovis]

Gray - I don't think denisonh was arguing that the raids should stop, and I know I wasn't. Raids, even deep ones, were a historical part of the war, and they are also a fun aspect of the game, up to a point. But it sometimes seems to get out of hand. My complaint is not that raids happen, but that it's so hard to deel with them. Even if you devote forces to tracking down and catching the raiders, catching them seems a lot harder than it ought to be.

Considering the WEGO structure of a turn, it will be very difficult to solve this. Implementing new rules permitting a force to react to a raid is certainly too much work AGEOD can produce in the close future.

In any case, raids in the North were few. the real problem belongs to the easiness to go deep and often.That can be solved with events. A cheap but working solution.

[denisonh]

Gray - I don't think denisonh was arguing that the raids should stop, and I know I wasn't. Raids, even deep ones, were a historical part of the war, and they are also a fun aspect of the game, up to a point. But it sometimes seems to get out of hand. My complaint is not that raids happen, but that it's so hard to deel with them. Even if you devote forces to tracking down and catching the raiders, catching them seems a lot harder than it ought to be.

What he said. Raids are important and historical part of the game. If the CSA chosses to do more, so be it.

But chasing non-mounted Bushwahackers around Lake Erie is more difficult than it has to be and somewhat ahistorical. Even the raids were just that, raids. They weren't veritable campaigns where a cavalry regiment spent 2 1/2 to 3 months roaming Ohio, Pennsylvannia and upstate NY never getting caught and always able to keep supplied.

Just an observation.

[TheDoctorKing]

Usually, I don't respond to these types of chest-thumping posts because Rafiki gets somewhat annoyed when they degenerate into "I'm smarter than you" types of comments.

I'm very sorry to have given offense. I never intended to imply that I thought I was smarter than you. What I was suggesting was that I am professionally required to read extensively in this subject so I know a good deal about it.

But on the larger point, as you have already suggested, you are a volunteer, you do this work for your own pleasure, and you do things your own way. I am totally not trying to undermine your work. Indeed, I commend you for a notable public service. You are entitled to make the game the way you want. I am trying to help, though perhaps you don't want my help and that's fine. If you are interested in some alternative sources on this topic message me and I'll send you some of my ideas. I don't think that we need to, as somebody put it kick this subject around like a moldy old tennis ball any more.

[Clovis]

Sounds like a good start for a Campaign AI event file, if it can be made flexible enough to adapt to all of the 2-player campaign scenarios' starting conditions.

AI may be sufficiently controlled by events to keep things simple. I really believe whe have to prohibit AI to do long range raids because it hurts it more ( dispersion of forces, losses by attrition during winter, etc).

For human players, the system would be more developped:

- with the starting positions, CSA raids would be allowed in the East South of Harrison Philadelphia line, in Western Virginia; in the West, in Illinois " little Egypt", Around Saint Louis, Cincinnati; in the far West in Kansas

- with the capture of a supply depot in Maryland or PA, the limit would be placed South of a line NY/ Pittsburg; in the west, capture of Cairo, Saint Louis would open whole Illinois, Cincinnati the whole Ohio and Indiana

- entry in war of Great Britain would allow CSA raids on all Northern territory


For USA, at start, Virginia, Kentucky and Tennessee, Western Virginia, Missouri and Arkansas

Capture of Nashiville or supply depot in Tennessee would allow raids in Georgia and Alabama, Corinth and Memphis in Mississipi, Northern LA; New Orleans or Mobile Southern LA and Southern Texas, Vicksburg Mississpi, Texas, Alabama; some towns in the eastern coast, Georgia, NC and South Carolina.

[Gray_Lensman]

deleted

[Gray_Lensman]

deleted

[Gray_Lensman]

deleted

[arsan]

In a near future update a city will not be able to be captured by an enemy force consisting of nothing but fast moving "horse" movement type elements until 1863 and later and then only by a force accompanied by Cavalry (late) elements. Standalone depots are still subject to capture if left non-protected.

This includes:
Cavalry (conscripts) (all factions)
Cavalry (early) (all factions)
Indians (mounted)
Bushwackers (mounted)
Raiders (mounted)
Rangers (mounted)

Stacks accompanied by "foot" movement type elements will be considered an invasion force instead of a raid and as such will not be subject to the "City No Capture" rule.

Interesting idea!
This could be a good solution as the deep cavalry raids will be nearly impossible because a unit will not be able to resupply on the empty little enemy cities.
With a supply stock worth of only two turns they will be forced to go back to his own lines very soon, so the raids will be "superficial"

Cheers!

[Franciscus]

Will the AI be able to manage this new rule ??

[gchristie]

For what it is worth, I like Gray's approach:

"In a near future update a city will not be able to be captured by an enemy force consisting of nothing but fast moving "horse" movement type elements until 1863 and later and then only by a force accompanied by Cavalry (late) elements. Standalone depots are still subject to capture if left non-protected."

It seems an increasingly adopted pbem house rule, but he handles it in a more elegant fashion.

That being said, don't change this game too much, 'cause I think it's great. If I make mistakes - I try to learn from them so don't take away my right to mess up.

A loyal member of the "Player flexibility, even when we goof" caucus.

[MVDH]

In a near future update a city will not be able to be captured by an enemy force consisting of nothing but fast moving "horse" movement type elements until 1863 and later and then only by a force accompanied by Cavalry (late) elements. Standalone depots are still subject to capture if left non-protected.

This includes:
Cavalry (conscripts) (all factions)
Cavalry (early) (all factions)
Indians (mounted)
Bushwackers (mounted)
Raiders (mounted)
Rangers (mounted)

Stacks accompanied by "foot" movement type elements will be considered an invasion force instead of a raid and as such will not be subject to the "City No Capture" rule.

edit> Thanks to Pocus for providing this new *NoCapture* attribute.

I like the above suggestion for these raiders. Makes sense in both historical and game terms.

Mark

[Redeemer]

Thank you Gray

[Dunhill_BKK]

Well Athena is quite happy with the deep raid.

Polk is currently sitting in Chicago and winter is coming on. I didn't see it coming and I'm not sure how things are going to turn out. I assume Polk will have heaps of supply from Chicago to keep his troops quite happy over Winter. Snow is already on the ground up there.

I thought Polk would stop somewhere in the middle, but he kept on going. Surprisingly an army in the East did a similar thing going all the way north and attacking a defended city. I wiped out that army. Had they won things might have been different.

By the way this is very early in the game, the first winter is just coming on.

[Gray_Lensman]

deleted

[Banks6060]

Here's some interesting changes coming in a near future data update:

In the 1861 April Campaign Scenarios:
a.) Leonidas Polk is now delayed until his historical appearance date (June 25th, 1861). He will now normally show up at Memphis, TN on the 1861 Late June turn. Also, see Tennessee below.

In the NEW (previously a separate add-on mod) 1861 April Campaign w/Kentucky scenario (historical pre-secession military reinforcements are still placed by reinforcement events), however:
a.) Virginia did not secede until April 17, 1861. Virginia and West Virginia become active 1861 Late Apr turn
b.) Arkansas did not secede until May 6, 1861. Arkansas becomes active 1861 Early May turn
c.) North Carolina did not secede until May 20th, 1861. North Carolina becomes active 1861 Late May turn
d.) Tennessee did not secede until June 6,1861. Tennessee becomes active 1861 Early June turn

By "active" I mean neither side's units may move into/from/within those regions until they do become active, much like Kentucky in that same scenario.

Well now THIS is interesting . I like, I like

[oldspec4]

IMO, these are some very good changes

[mikee64]

Agree, these changes sound great!