hanny1 wrote:Except when comparing eithers performence in a campaign, when each is mainly on the offensive/defensive/meeting engagments that then shows who was more effiecent at attacking/defening/mixed, ditto for defending, and hey ho you have not an opinion based on nothing, but a mathamatical explanation based on inputs/outputs.
Comparing battles within a campaign is irrelevant. Situation must be as similar as possible. Other than in war games (I mean like in a war college) these do not exist, especially not within a campaign, and I think one would be hard pressed to find very similar battles at all. One might reduce the scope to single attacks, but even that would be difficult. Then you can dissect what each leader planned, what strengths and weaknesses were realized, and the end results. But since no two attacks are ever the same, and far less their overall situations, statistics of losses will probably reflect more on the situation, and their decision in dealing with those situation, than to provide a mathematical equation with any comparative value.
hanny1 wrote:Grants stratergy of attrition was viable because a 2 to 1 resource advantage returned a 1 to 2 lose rate,
Firstly, Grant's strategy was not attrition, but to directly destroy Lee's army, which is different. To wear down an enemy through attrition, you only need to constantly poke at him, causing a few losses which he cannot replace, while taking as few in return. That takes time; lots of time. Grant wanted a far quicker solution. He wanted a decisive battle, which didn't mean destroying the ANV all at once, but causing a sudden disparity in power, from which Lee could not recover, which makes each subsequent battle all that easier to win, which is a snowball-effect. The outcome is inevitable.
hanny1 wrote:hence 3 to one you claim, is shown to be incorrect opinion, because almost no one had a 3 to 1 advantage in any battle, but many with 1.2 to 1.75 won by offensives at a far better effiecency than Grant with 2 to 1.US had a 3.5 to 1 manpower advantage, a large number were required for rear erea, leaving 2.1 to 2.5 as the max available to engage with, Grants stratergy was sustaiable at 1 to 2, but not at 1 to 5, which was the question i answerd.
Secondly 3 to 1as a mil maxim comes from lace wars in europe, known for low casuslties from art, and small arms, cav comprising 40% of the field force,technology of rifleling of cannon and shoulder arms, shrapnel etc, and having sights on smoothbores made it redundent and incorrect, you no longer walked shoulder to shoulder, fired on lost a man, stop, return fire and kill a man, leaving you to defend with 2.
I believe the 3-1 paradigm is for absolute certainty of winning, and I've never read what scope is meant, for that is as well very important. Of course battles are rarely conducted thusly. Most are, as you have noted, with only marginal advantages. But there are also many battles in which the defender is outnumbered far more than 3-1 and holds out for an inordinately long period of time. I'm reminded of many of the US defenses at the outset of the Ardennes Offensive.
hanny1 wrote:hot gates cost greeks twice the losses of the rest of the war, it was a military blunder to stay, it was a political blunder to send so few and convince northern greeks to ally with Persia
There is nothing in greek primary sources to support your claim, nor was the mil stratergy used in either conflict remotly the same.
you seem to forget, Grant thought he had failled, asked sherman to take Atlanta, lincoln thought he would lose the election, because of lack of mil success.
My knowledge of ancient Greece is very limited, but perhaps you could point me to a source providing support for a different viable strategy the Greek states might have taken.
Yes, Lincoln of course was thinking of the political situation, especially the thought that if he lost the election, it would be to McClellan, who had stated during in his campaigning, that if elected, he would suggest an end to hostilities, possibly return all federal troops to behind Union state lines (what would happen in Kentucky and Missouri god only knows) and negotiate peace, which would have meant accepting the Confederacy's secession and recognizing them as a nation. Lincoln opposed this from before his being sworn into office. So, he needed to bolster his political position, with a demonstration that a military victory over the Confederacy was not only possible, but likely, at this stage of the war. He had to demonstrate that under his leadership winning the war by conquering the South would not be so costly, that the public would discontinue their support of the war.
So, yes, logically, Lincoln needed a major victory; the nation needed it. Otherwise the nation would have ceased to exist as we had known it until then.
without comparision, opion becomes even less usefull as an explanation of events, which is why everyone uses comparision.
Example HERO (histirical evaluation research organization) or i could us RAND etc,was referenced earlier.Typical Ger/Sov force ratios and combat effictivnes for 1943,all given as German combat superiority.
Ukraine june july 3.1
lenningrad june 2.34
Kursk july 2.68
Kharkov August 2.43
overal average 2.64
This is the end result of Quantity judgment model, that uses, inputs for manpower ratio, firepower capability, terrain, weathe,mobility, vulnrability of assets, posture, the 4 examples were 1 draw,2 Sov 1 Ger success, and for the year German combat superiority (COMBAT EFFECTIVE VALUE) over Sov was 100 Germans were the CEV of 264 Sov.For all the year in Russia, ie everything everywhere this value was 248.By 1944 this drops to 163.
Gettysburg campaign, includes all actions, without doing so you have no idea of combat superiority, by comparing all actions of a similar nature, ie stratigic offensive/tactical offensive actions are grouped together, and the average outcome is compared to individual events to compare why that outcome is close or far from an average outcome.
Grants attrition stratergy, which he explained as that and not at all what you posted, is in every decent book, try weighly, the american way of war, who explains Grants stratery of attrition set the standard template for how to wage war, relagating manouver stratergy Sherman) to the back burner.Or West point guide to the CW, or simply search the net for grants stratergy of attrition
NG Hammond is perhaps the best there is for Greek history, many available as google books, most are teaching text, A History of greece down to 330 bc for example, pages 227 onwards,Thessaly, has 4 passes into it, 10k sent north to join thessaly who said it would go over to persia if greeks failled to defend pass at Temp, but would fight if aid sent, 10k arrive at Tempe and find it can be turned at Pass of Perrhaebia, and by sea landing to the west, but no harbour to use to ddefend the earea ment it could be protected by fleet, Macedon tells them Persia is comming on all passes in unprecedented numbers and goes over to Persia, warns greeks they will besurrounded and destroyed, greeks withdraw, Thessaly and 7 other states goes over to Persia.Stratigicly the dicession was wise.Ancient source, herodotus is the best.Stratergy, in antiquity ment something different than in the modern world, livy whe writting about the Punic wars, calls hannibal the father of stratergy, teaching Rome all it learnt about it.
Stratergy to a greek was more about battlefield superiority ( one aspect was bringing more men to contact on the fighting line)than what resources and where to employ, a war was about defending the crops by engaging in battle, or invading to burn/ttake crops if they did not come out to fight, therby recognising your superiority, 10 or 1 per state in the alliance,man committte ran the army, commaning on a rotating bassis, each with a vote, so getting things done was an issue, The Thebans being found of fighting when not facing th spartans, but had enough votes to initiate an attack today, when they were not faceing them prie of place was on the right, so when n the leeft, day after rotating from it, thebes pressd for attack, letting others take on the spartans, For xerxes invasionthey put athens at sea spartan on land in charge to avoid this.
lincoln thought he would lose, because Grant failled to win by election time, he ended up where Mac got to without any loss of life, filled the hospitals with casualties, suffered in 2 months 60% of te losses AoP had taken 3 years to suffer, , Grant was given more than any other commander in the war, with it he used attrition in the East and burnt through what he had been allocatted, loseing 2 for , 1 and then writting to Sherman to destroy all RR leading to Atlanta to preventLee sending aid, while he tries to hold Lee in place, as he had lincoln strip a corps to counter Early,Casualties in the East were now common knowledge, Grant was called a butcher by both sides, union deertion peaked, gold went sky high as markets reacted to grants failure,the scale of lss was unparraled, Lincoln could not risk calling another draft so close to the election, for politicly its unwise, Grant had burnt through the last draft, and more besides, and could no longer continue, so he turned to siege, which 10months later gave victory over Lee, but used 2.1 to 2.5 ratios to work.
On holiday for 2 weeks now, catch you later.