hanny1
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Re: How great was the southern qualitative advantage over the north?

Sat Aug 26, 2017 10:11 am

czert2 wrote:
hanny1 wrote:How to meausure superiority of combatents. one way is to compare what a commander has in resources, and what he removes from the enemies resources compared with the cost of his own rersources. Or in buissines, if it cost me 2 to produce an item and it can only sell for 2 im breaking even, if it sells for 4 im running 100% profit. the same is true for generalship, give a general manpower what he does with it can be adduced as a cost benifit ratio. This is done by taking the amount of manpower he has, the manpower of the opoistion force he removes as killed/wounded/captured, which is divided into his starting mapower, this yeilds his infliction rate, ditto for the opoenet, then his own losses as a percent of his own starting force yields his cost to in flict rate. Taking his cost to inflict and infliction rate gives you a cost benifit value. As does his oposite number. You now have a number value of what a commander achieves with the resources given to him, all the force multipliers like defensive posture in advantage terrain ect, are not really required as whatever they are the generals chose to give and acept battle.

Example, in the eastern theatre in 62, the AoP ( Mac) and ANV (Lee) from Aug 27 to Sept 17th saw engements at 2nd Bull run, South Mtn, Harpers ferry and Antietam. A total of 201,000 US and 137,000 CS forces were used in this campaign, 44,900 USW and 28,000 CS became casulties.( we could add in losses from sickness as this is also a measure of effiecency of the two forces, for instance in ww2 more time was lost to treating sexual disease in ETO, 14 days per case a man was lost to service, than to treating gunshot wounds).So Mac inflicting rate is 13.9% and cost to so is 22% so a total value of -8.1%. if normalized for ease of understanding, for every 100 men he has, he will lose 8% more than he inflicts. Lee otoh, inflicts 32.7% at a cost of doing so of 20.3% so his effiecency is +12.4%, is for every 100 men he has he will inflict 12% more than he losses, the superiority of the CS is therfore 20% over the US in the period. What does mean?, well, it means 100 CS effectivly fight as 120 US when the US hasa superiority of numbers of 68% more manpower. This is a value of superiority for a campaign season, if we take just the value of Antietam we find Mac inflict 18.2% at a cost of 16.4%, a +1.8%, while Lee inflicts 23.6% while suffering a loss of 26.3% a value of -2.7%.


honestly, if you were my commanding officer at war, and perented this to my and other man...ques who will be shot first at deployment ?
you can use your belowed statistic and match, where number counts and matter, like in indutry, production, or logisticks, but you cant use it for actual combat.
and simply chosing place where to fight or not, is not only matter of generals, there are others things to consider, forcing enemy to fight in place favorable to you and bad for enemy is one greatesr arts in art of war.
just imagine sitution, where union general will tell to his troops, we will not fight here, terrain is not good here and i will get bad "hanny1 rating" (tm), lets leave washington to rebel hands and fight later in more favorable terrain, numbers and time for us.

You, stupid people are usually the first to go.
greeks at hot gates were 5 times more effiecent at casualty infliction , depending on whose numbers you use, than in open field egagments like marathon, persion were twice as effiecent at the pass as compared to marathon. greek superiority at casualty infliction 64 to 1 in open 330 to 1 hot gates, was so massive, a force multiplier like defensive posture defensive ground etc was not needed, indeed it doubled greek losses in doing so.
Last edited by hanny1 on Sat Aug 26, 2017 11:30 am, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: How great was the southern qualitative advantage over the north?

Sat Aug 26, 2017 10:11 am

czert2 wrote:
hanny1 wrote:How to meausure superiority of combatents. one way is to compare what a commander has in resources, and what he removes from the enemies resources compared with the cost of his own rersources. Or in buissines, if it cost me 2 to produce an item and it can only sell for 2 im breaking even, if it sells for 4 im running 100% profit. the same is true for generalship, give a general manpower what he does with it can be adduced as a cost benifit ratio. This is done by taking the amount of manpower he has, the manpower of the opoistion force he removes as killed/wounded/captured, which is divided into his starting mapower, this yeilds his infliction rate, ditto for the opoenet, then his own losses as a percent of his own starting force yields his cost to in flict rate. Taking his cost to inflict and infliction rate gives you a cost benifit value. As does his oposite number. You now have a number value of what a commander achieves with the resources given to him, all the force multipliers like defensive posture in advantage terrain ect, are not really required as whatever they are the generals chose to give and acept battle.

Example, in the eastern theatre in 62, the AoP ( Mac) and ANV (Lee) from Aug 27 to Sept 17th saw engements at 2nd Bull run, South Mtn, Harpers ferry and Antietam. A total of 201,000 US and 137,000 CS forces were used in this campaign, 44,900 USW and 28,000 CS became casulties.( we could add in losses from sickness as this is also a measure of effiecency of the two forces, for instance in ww2 more time was lost to treating sexual disease in ETO, 14 days per case a man was lost to service, than to treating gunshot wounds).So Mac inflicting rate is 13.9% and cost to so is 22% so a total value of -8.1%. if normalized for ease of understanding, for every 100 men he has, he will lose 8% more than he inflicts. Lee otoh, inflicts 32.7% at a cost of doing so of 20.3% so his effiecency is +12.4%, is for every 100 men he has he will inflict 12% more than he losses, the superiority of the CS is therfore 20% over the US in the period. What does mean?, well, it means 100 CS effectivly fight as 120 US when the US hasa superiority of numbers of 68% more manpower. This is a value of superiority for a campaign season, if we take just the value of Antietam we find Mac inflict 18.2% at a cost of 16.4%, a +1.8%, while Lee inflicts 23.6% while suffering a loss of 26.3% a value of -2.7%.


honestly, if you were my commanding officer at war, and perented this to my and other man...ques who will be shot first at deployment ?
you can use your belowed statistic and match, where number counts and matter, like in indutry, production, or logisticks, but you cant use it for actual combat.
and simply chosing place where to fight or not, is not only matter of generals, there are others things to consider, forcing enemy to fight in place favorable to you and bad for enemy is one greatesr arts in art of war.
just imagine sitution, where union general will tell to his troops, we will not fight here, terrain is not good here and i will get bad "hanny1 rating" (tm), lets leave washington to rebel hands and fight later in more favorable terrain, numbers and time for us.

Except that's what has been done by many to explain warfare, when a superior resourced side has to overcome an inferior resourced side, but has force multipliers like topography, posture, political direction of stratergy that is not sound on mil grounds and so on, all of which are more detail, but will not detract from the basic explanation of superiority, the reasons for that superiority are of course interesting, but the outcome does not change without them, just a fuller explanation of superiority.
for instance Us expended 470 million rounds to cause its gunshot casualties, cs 150 million rounds, by dividing the casualties from small arms fire, by casualties treated, Kia and missing, you get the superiority of firepower in casualty infliction tweet the 2 sides, you don't need to understand how or why it comes about, but doing so is in itself useful, to measure the difference in casualty infliction, i.e. Superiority/effiecency.

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Re: How great was the southern qualitative advantage over the north?

Sat Aug 26, 2017 1:01 pm

Gray Fox wrote:Gentlemen, strategy wins wars. The Confederacy had no war winning strategy from day one. None of the West Point geniuses in the CSA had spent one day of the previous decade preparing the South to wage a war of attrition. The "just leave us alone" strategy of Jeff Davis suffered from fatal flaws. If you defend everywhere, then everywhere you will be weak. Total defense totally surrenders the initiative to the Union. Lee's two invasions of the North ended in retreat. Making the Union pay for every victory doesn't work because the Union has several times the South's manpower. The Union, with a fairly strong central government, was far better at organizing railroad use, the blockade and manufacturing. The lifeblood of the CSA, blockade runners, were basically freebooters in competition with each other. No government entity aided or organized them. Also, one ship brought enough shoes for the entire Confederate army, but the footwear sat on the dock as more lucrative cargo was moved by the remaining trains. The South never had enough tactical superiority to overcome its lack of a winning grand strategy.


Exactly, and that is why i think that south didnt want civil war in first place, and that they hoped if war break out, it will be fast and short.
truth, due to lack of strategy and political leadership, they were doomed to fail from day one, onlyest hope for south to win war was pressing attack and marsching to washington, just after first bull run.
and actualy everyy politick, and generals think, that thier EVERY war will be short and vicorious, it is truth for WWI generals (and you cant say that any side lacked strategic plans and were not ready for planed war), and even today generals, toubles in iraq and afganistan post 2003 speak for themself.
safest way how to win war is not to carry one at all.

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Re: How great was the southern qualitative advantage over the north?

Sat Aug 26, 2017 1:47 pm

hanny1 wrote:
czert2 wrote:
hanny1 wrote:Try using maths to answer who had a qualitive advantge in a battle or campaign, easier to argue about then.


math, math,math....hmmm..how can you use it for anything so compes like battle ?
if by math you meaned sheer numbers of troops, weapons, etc, it isnt that simple, you need to consider terrain, quality of troops, leadership..etc.
What math moddifier will get excelent commander, and how big poor one ?
how your math will work in very famous meeting of spartans and persians at some not much known place that time (now exist with very different shape).

Because that's how to use math to understand warfare.
Try numbers predictions and warfare by DuPoy, the organisation that correctly predicted the casualty rates, before they occur, for GW1, Iraq and Bosnia, by using maths from a database of past military engagements.

DuPoy worked on the HERo database you refer to for Ww2 eastern front German and soviet combat superiority, appearing in works by Dunnigan to statistical explain German superiority on the eastern front.


Well, to use your example of gulf war 1.
how booth models of GW1 can be so different , as presented by general staff and by dupoy ? i asume booth used mathematical models for thier results, but they simply taken different imputs.
and even if you will have perceft models of past wars, it dont guarantee correct prediction of future war.
just imagine situation at which germans did have perfect models of soviets/russiand of WW1 in prepaation for operation barbarosa.
and now imagine these situations
1. war on east will happen as it happened in history
2. stalins great purge will not happen, so red army will have way more compentet leadrship that it have (together with designers continuing thier works at design bureaus, instead of spending years cutting down trees at gulag , so RA will have better weaponst at start of war)
3. stalin will get overthrown by coup (which he was greatlyy feared, thats why he started great purge), which in reality most likely didt exists, even inceasing combat capability of red army (stalins orders to not to ressist german invasion in fist 2 days are known, together with his orders to hold ground at all cost leading to encirlement of hunderst of tausens of soldiers, which cant be used later in war, because they were captured).
all will result in totaly different wars and results. so how this can be handled by mathematical models based on past wars ?
dont get me wrong, in love to see what - if scenarios, based on reality. i even argued with my bro, why if hitler did sealowe, it will be catastrophe for him, based on matheematical what-if scenario done by nato in 1970s.

and i forgot, for GW2, did dupoy model worked here too ? i mean he was correct not only correct in lenght and causalties of ground war, but did his model predicted long resistance war too ? with correct causlaties ?

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Re: How great was the southern qualitative advantage over the north?

Sat Aug 26, 2017 3:08 pm

hanny1 wrote:
czert2 wrote:
hanny1 wrote:How to meausure superiority of combatents. one way is to compare what a commander has in resources, and what he removes from the enemies resources compared with the cost of his own rersources. Or in buissines, if it cost me 2 to produce an item and it can only sell for 2 im breaking even, if it sells for 4 im running 100% profit. the same is true for generalship, give a general manpower what he does with it can be adduced as a cost benifit ratio. This is done by taking the amount of manpower he has, the manpower of the opoistion force he removes as killed/wounded/captured, which is divided into his starting mapower, this yeilds his infliction rate, ditto for the opoenet, then his own losses as a percent of his own starting force yields his cost to in flict rate. Taking his cost to inflict and infliction rate gives you a cost benifit value. As does his oposite number. You now have a number value of what a commander achieves with the resources given to him all the force multipliers like defensive posture in advantage terrain ect, are not really required as whatever they are the generals chose to give and acept battle.

Example, in the eastern theatre in 62, the AoP ( Mac) and ANV (Lee) from Aug 27 to Sept 17th saw engements at 2nd Bull run, South Mtn, Harpers ferry and Antietam. A total of 201,000 US and 137,000 CS forces were used in this campaign, 44,900 USW and 28,000 CS became casulties.( we could add in losses from sickness as this is also a measure of effiecency of the two forces, for instance in ww2 more time was lost to treating sexual disease in ETO, 14 days per case a man was lost to service, than to treating gunshot wounds).So Mac inflicting rate is 13.9% and cost to so is 22% so a total value of -8.1%. if normalized for ease of understanding, for every 100 men he has, he will lose 8% more than he inflicts. Lee otoh, inflicts 32.7% at a cost of doing so of 20.3% so his effiecency is +12.4%, is for every 100 men he has he will inflict 12% more than he losses, the superiority of the CS is therfore 20% over the US in the period. What does mean?, well, it means 100 CS effectivly fight as 120 US when the US hasa superiority of numbers of 68% more manpower. This is a value of superiority for a campaign season, if we take just the value of Antietam we find Mac inflict 18.2% at a cost of 16.4%, a +1.8%, while Lee inflicts 23.6% while suffering a loss of 26.3% a value of -2.7%.


honestly, if you were my commanding officer at war, and perented this to my and other man...ques who will be shot first at deployment ?
you can use your belowed statistic and match, where number counts and matter, like in indutry, production, or logisticks, but you cant use it for actual combat.
and simply chosing place where to fight or not, is not only matter of generals, there are others things to consider, forcing enemy to fight in place favorable to you and bad for enemy is one greatesr arts in art of war.
just imagine sitution, where union general will tell to his troops, we will not fight here, terrain is not good here and i will get bad "hanny1 rating" (tm), lets leave washington to rebel hands and fight later in more favorable terrain, numbers and time for us.

You, stupid people are usually the first to go.
greeks at hot gates were 5 times more effiecent at casualty infliction , depending on whose numbers you use, than in open field egagments like marathon, persion were twice as effiecent at the pass as compared to marathon. greek superiority at casualty infliction 64 to 1 in open 330 to 1 hot gates, was so massive, a force multiplier like defensive posture defensive ground etc was not needed, indeed it doubled greek losses in doing so.


i think there was misunderstanding.
You are right in that greeks (or any other force) with caustalty ratio of 64 : 1 will have good force multiplier, and it will be showed in multiple battles, so they will have nice manpower efficency, but with causalty ratio at hot gates with 330 : 1, you defeated your own argument - all the force multipliers like defensive posture in advantage terrain ect, are not really required as whatever they are the generals chose to give and acept battle. - which was my main point for shoting you.
Imagine if lee infliced (or sufered) 5x more causalties due to more favorable terrain. And how it will affect battle statistic and resulting battles.

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Re: How great was the southern qualitative advantage over the north?

Sat Aug 26, 2017 5:54 pm

czert2 wrote:
hanny1 wrote:
czert2 wrote:
honestly, if you were my commanding officer at war, and perented this to my and other man...ques who will be shot first at deployment ?
you can use your belowed statistic and match, where number counts and matter, like in indutry, production, or logisticks, but you cant use it for actual combat.
and simply chosing place where to fight or not, is not only matter of generals, there are others things to consider, forcing enemy to fight in place favorable to you and bad for enemy is one greatesr arts in art of war.
just imagine sitution, where union general will tell to his troops, we will not fight here, terrain is not good here and i will get bad "hanny1 rating" (tm), lets leave washington to rebel hands and fight later in more favorable terrain, numbers and time for us.

You, stupid people are usually the first to go.
greeks at hot gates were 5 times more effiecent at casualty infliction , depending on whose numbers you use, than in open field egagments like marathon, persion were twice as effiecent at the pass as compared to marathon. greek superiority at casualty infliction 64 to 1 in open 330 to 1 hot gates, was so massive, a force multiplier like defensive posture defensive ground etc was not needed, indeed it doubled greek losses in doing so.


i think there was misunderstanding.
You are right in that greeks (or any other force) with caustalty ratio of 64 : 1 will have good force multiplier, and it will be showed in multiple battles, so they will have nice manpower efficency, but with causalty ratio at hot gates with 330 : 1, you defeated your own argument - all the force multipliers like defensive posture in advantage terrain ect, are not really required as whatever they are the generals chose to give and acept battle. - which was my main point for shoting you.
Imagine if lee infliced (or sufered) 5x more causalties due to more favorable terrain. And how it will affect battle statistic and resulting battles.
greeks, 6100 chose to fight at hot gates, as part of Spartan commitment to the war and show northern greeks mediazation was not the best choice, when told they were being surrounded 4000 chose to stay, all died, they inflicted 20k losses. Marathon saw 10 000 greeks v 25000 persian, 192 geeks and 6400 persian killed, for the same loss of greek lives 20 Marathons could have been fought at a less effiecent ratio of casualty infliction, the point i made was hot gates was a waste of greek lives, what was the better option was pitched battles against an enemy underarmoured, with shorter weapons reach, wider frontage per man due to weapons used, persian reliance on missle rather than close combat to effect the outcome all of which produced unequal casualty rates. Having a wall on a hill with both flanks secured was all well and good, untill the rear was full of persians, then not so much.More Marathon and Platea are the greeks best choice, not more hot gates.
lee in 64 did achieve a 2 to 1 rate against Grant, who achieved 1 to 2, ie give lee 100 and he chops 20 while losing 10, Grant the oposite, all the reasons why, trenches/river line to defend etc are how the raio is what it is, and its eneraly the same as lee v Burnside at Fredricksburg, which is usually termed a disasteer, while doing it repeatidly in the 40 days was not,but are in a simple explanation not needed to know, that loss ratio did not allow AoT to be reinfourced, instead FL and other deep south units went to VA to keep numbers up, Grant drew on DC for his replacements, allowing Sherman to fight at good odds, and cut the CSA in two.

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Re: How great was the southern qualitative advantage over the north?

Sun Aug 27, 2017 1:17 pm

Dear Hanny1,

although your math is correct, you are missing the larger picture.

The Spartans didn't give a damn about causality ratios at Thermopylae. Their strategy was to buy time, which they did, which eventually lead to the defeat of the Persians. Without it Persia might well have take all of Greece. So the losses be damned, what was a stake was for greater than the losses incurred at Thermopylae.

Grant understood that taking any given city in the South had only marginal strategic value if it allowed Lee's army to remain in the field. Therefore, Grant's target was not Richmond nor Petersburg, but Lee's army.

During the overland campaign, Lee was purely on the defensive, with one exception, as Grant never gave him the opportunity to mount any offensive movement. The exception being Early's march on Washington.

The rule of thumb of military maneuver and attack is a ratio of 3-1, and Grant did not enjoy that ratio. He had to strip inexperience troops from the Washington defense to even attempt to lessen the gap, and the further the campaign advanced, the worse the situation, with regards to troop quality, got.

Additionally, neither side had yet found a solution to the de facto paradigm shift caused by widespread use of the rifles and improved defensive positions. Grant had to work with what he had.

To then accuse Grant of a lack of military leadership in comparison to Lee is not only comparing two widely disparate situations, but disparaging the tremendous challenge presented him.

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Re: How great was the southern qualitative advantage over the north?

Sun Aug 27, 2017 2:42 pm

question and larger picture are the same, how to measure combat superiority. Grant in 40 days to lees is what i posted. AoP was half as effiecent at casualty infliction, with a numerical advantage of 2 to 1. That Lee was on the offensive strategicly in the valley, tacticly at wilderness, and other instances, like Gordon flank attack that saved muleshoe by taking out second wave, enjoyed terrain and fortification benifits when defending, are all indications of why Grant needed 2 to 1 odds to achieve strategic aims.
3 to 1 is combat power, not numbers, and a totaly differnt calculation.
Grant had more assets than any other Union general, he is what is termed the american way of war, amass supperrior resources and apply them.
Northern Greeks certainly disagreed with you, since after the losses at hot gates, defeat and retreat of the navy , they all went over to persia, hot gates failled politicly, was i ifiecent militarily, and bought no time.All greece north of Corinth was lost, Athens was sacked all in the summer campaign time.

Grant without the odds he had, more than other general in the conflict, simply exchanged 2 fo 1, and is a success, with the same odds as a Pope Meade Burnside Hooker, had he may well have failled. US census gives free 6.1 million mil age males to 1.7 white save, this 3.5 to 1 is deseptive as free blacks served on both sides, and slaves filled many non combat roles, and imigration is also a substantial increase to Union manpower, but hey ho its enough to show atttrition worked.

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Re: How great was the southern qualitative advantage over the north?

Sun Aug 27, 2017 6:01 pm

One cannot make a useful comparison of troop strength and casualties, when both sides have completely disparate situations and goals. Conducting an assault inherently includes a far greater risk of incurring casualties. Simply understanding the nature of the situation requires that fact to be regarded.

Yes, northern Greece was not defended by preventing passage at the Hot Gates. Nor could all of Greece be protected from invasion at all. It is the same situation the Confederacy had. If you try to defend everything, you will lose everything. The Greeks understood this and traded territory for time, which thes used to their advantage and ultimately won. Did they lose men and goods through this strategy? Absolutely. But they still won in the end, which is a far better results.

Yes, Grant had undisputed numerical and material advantages, but they do not equal defending on highly defensible ground of your choosing, which was Lee's advantage.

Lee himself understood his situation and owned it. He knew his only way to emerge victorious was to inflict as many casualties on the Federal forces as possible in hopes that the Federal government through public and political pressure would relent in their efforts.

Both Lee and Grant had completely different situations. The Confederacy failed in providing Lee with the means to succeed in his goal. The Federal government did not fail Grant. In my humble opinion, one cannot compare the two generals on this basis.

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Re: How great was the southern qualitative advantage over the north?

Mon Aug 28, 2017 1:14 pm

Except when comparing eithers performence in a campaign, when each is mainly on the offensive/defensive/meeting engagments that then shows who was more effiecent at attacking/defening/mixed, ditto for defending, and hey ho you have not an opinion based on nothing, but a mathamatical explanation based on inputs/outputs.

Grants stratergy of attrition was viable because a 2 to 1 resource advantage returned a 1 to 2 lose rate, hence 3 to one you claim, is shown to be incorrect opinion, because almost no one had a 3 to 1 advantage in any battle, but many with 1.2 to 1.75 won by offensives at a far better effiecency than Grant with 2 to 1.US had a 3.5 to 1 manpower advantage, a large number were required for rear erea, leaving 2.1 to 2.5 as the max available to engage with, Grants stratergy was sustaiable at 1 to 2, but not at 1 to 5, which was the question i answerd.
Secondly 3 to 1as a mil maxim comes from lace wars in europe, known for low casuslties from art, and small arms, cav comprising 40% of the field force,technology of rifleling of cannon and shoulder arms, shrapnel etc, and having sights on smoothbores made it redundent and incorrect, you no longer walked shoulder to shoulder, fired on lost a man, stop, return fire and kill a man, leaving you to defend with 2.
hot gates cost greeks twice the losses of the rest of the war, it was a military blunder to stay, it was a political blunder to send so few and convince northern greeks to ally with Persia
There is nothing in greek primary sources to support your claim, nor was the mil stratergy used in either conflict remotly the same.
you seem to forget, Grant thought he had failled, asked sherman to take Atlanta, lincoln thought he would lose the election, because of lack of mil success.

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Re: How great was the southern qualitative advantage over the north?

Tue Aug 29, 2017 10:40 am

DrPostman wrote:
Straight Arrow wrote:
elxaime wrote:As noted, the south may have initially had an advantage due to the larger percentage of West Point graduates in their ranks and the strength of the militia tradition across the south.


Maybe not such an advantage at all; I believe Maj. Gen. George Pickett said, "The Yankees got all the smart ones and see where it got them."

The Federal performance, in the early war years, sure backs this idea up. Engineers are not always the best leaders of men.


Weren't Lee and Beauregard both engineers?


You do know that quote from pIcket only appears in the fictional novel Killer Angels, and the movie G/burg uses it because its heavily using that book?.

Otoh, WP split its former members without giving the South much advanatage,WP history of the civil war has the numbers but i dont have it to hand, what did, was the 1750 or so VMI trained men who came to serve in the ANV, around half that from Citadel, plus another couple that ran to the low hundreds. so the South benifitted from its military colleges, the North had nothing to match that.

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Re: How great was the southern qualitative advantage over the north?

Tue Aug 29, 2017 1:30 pm

hanny1 wrote:
DrPostman wrote:
Straight Arrow wrote:
Maybe not such an advantage at all; I believe Maj. Gen. George Pickett said, "The Yankees got all the smart ones and see where it got them."

The Federal performance, in the early war years, sure backs this idea up. Engineers are not always the best leaders of men.


Weren't Lee and Beauregard both engineers?


You do know that quote from pIcket only appears in the fictional novel Killer Angels, and the movie G/burg uses it because its heavily using that book?.

Otoh, WP split its former members without giving the South much advanatage,WP history of the civil war has the numbers but i dont have it to hand, what did, was the 1750 or so VMI trained men who came to serve in the ANV, around half that from Citadel, plus another couple that ran to the low hundreds. so the South benifitted from its military colleges, the North had nothing to match that.


Why aren't you replying to Straight Arrow instead of me?

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Re: How great was the southern qualitative advantage over the north?

Wed Aug 30, 2017 1:24 pm

hanny1 wrote:Except when comparing eithers performence in a campaign, when each is mainly on the offensive/defensive/meeting engagments that then shows who was more effiecent at attacking/defening/mixed, ditto for defending, and hey ho you have not an opinion based on nothing, but a mathamatical explanation based on inputs/outputs.


Comparing battles within a campaign is irrelevant. Situation must be as similar as possible. Other than in war games (I mean like in a war college) these do not exist, especially not within a campaign, and I think one would be hard pressed to find very similar battles at all. One might reduce the scope to single attacks, but even that would be difficult. Then you can dissect what each leader planned, what strengths and weaknesses were realized, and the end results. But since no two attacks are ever the same, and far less their overall situations, statistics of losses will probably reflect more on the situation, and their decision in dealing with those situation, than to provide a mathematical equation with any comparative value.

hanny1 wrote:Grants stratergy of attrition was viable because a 2 to 1 resource advantage returned a 1 to 2 lose rate,


Firstly, Grant's strategy was not attrition, but to directly destroy Lee's army, which is different. To wear down an enemy through attrition, you only need to constantly poke at him, causing a few losses which he cannot replace, while taking as few in return. That takes time; lots of time. Grant wanted a far quicker solution. He wanted a decisive battle, which didn't mean destroying the ANV all at once, but causing a sudden disparity in power, from which Lee could not recover, which makes each subsequent battle all that easier to win, which is a snowball-effect. The outcome is inevitable.

hanny1 wrote:hence 3 to one you claim, is shown to be incorrect opinion, because almost no one had a 3 to 1 advantage in any battle, but many with 1.2 to 1.75 won by offensives at a far better effiecency than Grant with 2 to 1.US had a 3.5 to 1 manpower advantage, a large number were required for rear erea, leaving 2.1 to 2.5 as the max available to engage with, Grants stratergy was sustaiable at 1 to 2, but not at 1 to 5, which was the question i answerd.
Secondly 3 to 1as a mil maxim comes from lace wars in europe, known for low casuslties from art, and small arms, cav comprising 40% of the field force,technology of rifleling of cannon and shoulder arms, shrapnel etc, and having sights on smoothbores made it redundent and incorrect, you no longer walked shoulder to shoulder, fired on lost a man, stop, return fire and kill a man, leaving you to defend with 2.


I believe the 3-1 paradigm is for absolute certainty of winning, and I've never read what scope is meant, for that is as well very important. Of course battles are rarely conducted thusly. Most are, as you have noted, with only marginal advantages. But there are also many battles in which the defender is outnumbered far more than 3-1 and holds out for an inordinately long period of time. I'm reminded of many of the US defenses at the outset of the Ardennes Offensive.

hanny1 wrote:hot gates cost greeks twice the losses of the rest of the war, it was a military blunder to stay, it was a political blunder to send so few and convince northern greeks to ally with Persia
There is nothing in greek primary sources to support your claim, nor was the mil stratergy used in either conflict remotly the same.
you seem to forget, Grant thought he had failled, asked sherman to take Atlanta, lincoln thought he would lose the election, because of lack of mil success.


My knowledge of ancient Greece is very limited, but perhaps you could point me to a source providing support for a different viable strategy the Greek states might have taken.

Yes, Lincoln of course was thinking of the political situation, especially the thought that if he lost the election, it would be to McClellan, who had stated during in his campaigning, that if elected, he would suggest an end to hostilities, possibly return all federal troops to behind Union state lines (what would happen in Kentucky and Missouri god only knows) and negotiate peace, which would have meant accepting the Confederacy's secession and recognizing them as a nation. Lincoln opposed this from before his being sworn into office. So, he needed to bolster his political position, with a demonstration that a military victory over the Confederacy was not only possible, but likely, at this stage of the war. He had to demonstrate that under his leadership winning the war by conquering the South would not be so costly, that the public would discontinue their support of the war.

So, yes, logically, Lincoln needed a major victory; the nation needed it. Otherwise the nation would have ceased to exist as we had known it until then.

hanny1
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Re: How great was the southern qualitative advantage over the north?

Thu Aug 31, 2017 9:43 am

Captain_Orso wrote:
hanny1 wrote:Except when comparing eithers performence in a campaign, when each is mainly on the offensive/defensive/meeting engagments that then shows who was more effiecent at attacking/defening/mixed, ditto for defending, and hey ho you have not an opinion based on nothing, but a mathamatical explanation based on inputs/outputs.


Comparing battles within a campaign is irrelevant. Situation must be as similar as possible. Other than in war games (I mean like in a war college) these do not exist, especially not within a campaign, and I think one would be hard pressed to find very similar battles at all. One might reduce the scope to single attacks, but even that would be difficult. Then you can dissect what each leader planned, what strengths and weaknesses were realized, and the end results. But since no two attacks are ever the same, and far less their overall situations, statistics of losses will probably reflect more on the situation, and their decision in dealing with those situation, than to provide a mathematical equation with any comparative value.

hanny1 wrote:Grants stratergy of attrition was viable because a 2 to 1 resource advantage returned a 1 to 2 lose rate,


Firstly, Grant's strategy was not attrition, but to directly destroy Lee's army, which is different. To wear down an enemy through attrition, you only need to constantly poke at him, causing a few losses which he cannot replace, while taking as few in return. That takes time; lots of time. Grant wanted a far quicker solution. He wanted a decisive battle, which didn't mean destroying the ANV all at once, but causing a sudden disparity in power, from which Lee could not recover, which makes each subsequent battle all that easier to win, which is a snowball-effect. The outcome is inevitable.

hanny1 wrote:hence 3 to one you claim, is shown to be incorrect opinion, because almost no one had a 3 to 1 advantage in any battle, but many with 1.2 to 1.75 won by offensives at a far better effiecency than Grant with 2 to 1.US had a 3.5 to 1 manpower advantage, a large number were required for rear erea, leaving 2.1 to 2.5 as the max available to engage with, Grants stratergy was sustaiable at 1 to 2, but not at 1 to 5, which was the question i answerd.
Secondly 3 to 1as a mil maxim comes from lace wars in europe, known for low casuslties from art, and small arms, cav comprising 40% of the field force,technology of rifleling of cannon and shoulder arms, shrapnel etc, and having sights on smoothbores made it redundent and incorrect, you no longer walked shoulder to shoulder, fired on lost a man, stop, return fire and kill a man, leaving you to defend with 2.


I believe the 3-1 paradigm is for absolute certainty of winning, and I've never read what scope is meant, for that is as well very important. Of course battles are rarely conducted thusly. Most are, as you have noted, with only marginal advantages. But there are also many battles in which the defender is outnumbered far more than 3-1 and holds out for an inordinately long period of time. I'm reminded of many of the US defenses at the outset of the Ardennes Offensive.

hanny1 wrote:hot gates cost greeks twice the losses of the rest of the war, it was a military blunder to stay, it was a political blunder to send so few and convince northern greeks to ally with Persia
There is nothing in greek primary sources to support your claim, nor was the mil stratergy used in either conflict remotly the same.
you seem to forget, Grant thought he had failled, asked sherman to take Atlanta, lincoln thought he would lose the election, because of lack of mil success.


My knowledge of ancient Greece is very limited, but perhaps you could point me to a source providing support for a different viable strategy the Greek states might have taken.

Yes, Lincoln of course was thinking of the political situation, especially the thought that if he lost the election, it would be to McClellan, who had stated during in his campaigning, that if elected, he would suggest an end to hostilities, possibly return all federal troops to behind Union state lines (what would happen in Kentucky and Missouri god only knows) and negotiate peace, which would have meant accepting the Confederacy's secession and recognizing them as a nation. Lincoln opposed this from before his being sworn into office. So, he needed to bolster his political position, with a demonstration that a military victory over the Confederacy was not only possible, but likely, at this stage of the war. He had to demonstrate that under his leadership winning the war by conquering the South would not be so costly, that the public would discontinue their support of the war.

So, yes, logically, Lincoln needed a major victory; the nation needed it. Otherwise the nation would have ceased to exist as we had known it until then.

without comparision, opion becomes even less usefull as an explanation of events, which is why everyone uses comparision.
Example HERO (histirical evaluation research organization) or i could us RAND etc,was referenced earlier.Typical Ger/Sov force ratios and combat effictivnes for 1943,all given as German combat superiority.
Ukraine june july 3.1
lenningrad june 2.34
Kursk july 2.68
Kharkov August 2.43
overal average 2.64
This is the end result of Quantity judgment model, that uses, inputs for manpower ratio, firepower capability, terrain, weathe,mobility, vulnrability of assets, posture, the 4 examples were 1 draw,2 Sov 1 Ger success, and for the year German combat superiority (COMBAT EFFECTIVE VALUE) over Sov was 100 Germans were the CEV of 264 Sov.For all the year in Russia, ie everything everywhere this value was 248.By 1944 this drops to 163.
Gettysburg campaign, includes all actions, without doing so you have no idea of combat superiority, by comparing all actions of a similar nature, ie stratigic offensive/tactical offensive actions are grouped together, and the average outcome is compared to individual events to compare why that outcome is close or far from an average outcome.
Grants attrition stratergy, which he explained as that and not at all what you posted, is in every decent book, try weighly, the american way of war, who explains Grants stratery of attrition set the standard template for how to wage war, relagating manouver stratergy Sherman) to the back burner.Or West point guide to the CW, or simply search the net for grants stratergy of attrition
NG Hammond is perhaps the best there is for Greek history, many available as google books, most are teaching text, A History of greece down to 330 bc for example, pages 227 onwards,Thessaly, has 4 passes into it, 10k sent north to join thessaly who said it would go over to persia if greeks failled to defend pass at Temp, but would fight if aid sent, 10k arrive at Tempe and find it can be turned at Pass of Perrhaebia, and by sea landing to the west, but no harbour to use to ddefend the earea ment it could be protected by fleet, Macedon tells them Persia is comming on all passes in unprecedented numbers and goes over to Persia, warns greeks they will besurrounded and destroyed, greeks withdraw, Thessaly and 7 other states goes over to Persia.Stratigicly the dicession was wise.Ancient source, herodotus is the best.Stratergy, in antiquity ment something different than in the modern world, livy whe writting about the Punic wars, calls hannibal the father of stratergy, teaching Rome all it learnt about it.
Stratergy to a greek was more about battlefield superiority ( one aspect was bringing more men to contact on the fighting line)than what resources and where to employ, a war was about defending the crops by engaging in battle, or invading to burn/ttake crops if they did not come out to fight, therby recognising your superiority, 10 or 1 per state in the alliance,man committte ran the army, commaning on a rotating bassis, each with a vote, so getting things done was an issue, The Thebans being found of fighting when not facing th spartans, but had enough votes to initiate an attack today, when they were not faceing them prie of place was on the right, so when n the leeft, day after rotating from it, thebes pressd for attack, letting others take on the spartans, For xerxes invasionthey put athens at sea spartan on land in charge to avoid this.
lincoln thought he would lose, because Grant failled to win by election time, he ended up where Mac got to without any loss of life, filled the hospitals with casualties, suffered in 2 months 60% of te losses AoP had taken 3 years to suffer, , Grant was given more than any other commander in the war, with it he used attrition in the East and burnt through what he had been allocatted, loseing 2 for , 1 and then writting to Sherman to destroy all RR leading to Atlanta to preventLee sending aid, while he tries to hold Lee in place, as he had lincoln strip a corps to counter Early,Casualties in the East were now common knowledge, Grant was called a butcher by both sides, union deertion peaked, gold went sky high as markets reacted to grants failure,the scale of lss was unparraled, Lincoln could not risk calling another draft so close to the election, for politicly its unwise, Grant had burnt through the last draft, and more besides, and could no longer continue, so he turned to siege, which 10months later gave victory over Lee, but used 2.1 to 2.5 ratios to work.
On holiday for 2 weeks now, catch you later.

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