In Command In Missouri by John C. Fremont, Major-General, U.S.A. from "The Century"

[Gen.DixonS.Miles]

*****Not all of the following in any form reflects the thoughts or views of the user "Gen.DixonS.Miles" and are presented solely for the purpose of entertainment and the striking up of analysis and discussion amongst the browsers and regulars of the CW2 and AACW History Club sub-forum and is in no way intended to prove a point or offend anyone.This text was taken from a reprint of "The Century Company's War Series" published and distributed first through the years 1884-1887*****




[CENTER]At the outbreak of war, in the spring of '61, being then in England, I offered my services to the Government, and was appointed one of the four major-generals of the regular army. General McClellan an myself were commissioned of even date, ranking next after General Scott. On my arrival I reported to the President, using a few days to arrange in some order the business which had carried me abroad. There was great confusion and indecision in affairs, and the people in power were slow to realize the actuality of war; it was long before they realized its magnitude. Several commands in the East were suggested to me, but I preferred the West, which I knew, and I held the opinion that the possession of the immediate valley of the Mississippi river would control the result of the war. Who held the Mississippi would hold the country by the heart.
A command was agreed upon between President Lincoln, Montgomery Blair, his Postmaster-General, who was a graduate of West Point, and myself, of which the great object was the descent of the Mississippi river. Necessary to this was first the firm possession of the State of Missouri, freed and protected from the secession forces within and around it. In pursuance of this plan "The Western Department" was created, comprehending, with Illinois, the states and territories west of the Mississippi river to the Rocky Mountains, including New Mexico. For reasons not wholly military, the President reserved the State of Kentucky, but assured me that so soon as I had succeeded in raising and organizing an army for the descent of the Mississippi river, he would extend my command over that State and the left bank of the Mississippi.
The President had gone carefully over with me the subject of my intended campaign, and this with the single desire to find out what was best to do and how to do it. This he did in the unpretending and kindly manner which invited suggestion, and which with him was characteristic. When I took leave of him he accompanied me down the stairs, coming out to the steps of the portico. I asked him then if there was anything further in the way of instruction that he wished to say to me. "No" he answered. "I have given you carte blanche. You must use your own judgment and do the best you can. I doubt if the states will ever come back."
Governor Yates, of Illinois, then in Washington, informed me fully of the unarmed and unprepared condition of the West. I immediately began a search for arms at Washington, and out of those at hand was able to obtain an order for only seven thousand stand.
Arriving at New York, I found that the order for the seven thousand stand of arms had been countermanded. Upon my complaint to Washington, and through the personal interposition of the President, Major Peter V. Hagner was sent to aid me in procuring what I judged immediately necessary for my department. With him I arranged for gathering from various arsenals and forwarding to St. Louis arms and equipments for 23,000 men. This detained me some weeks in New York. Before leaving, I telegraphed to Lieutenant-General Scott, to ask if he had any instructions to give me. He replied he had none.
At Philadelphia we heard the news of the disaster of Bull Run. On the 25th of July I reached St. Louis, and at the start I found myself in an enemy's country, the enemy's flag displayed from houses and recruiting offices. St. Louis was in sympathy with South, and the State of Missouri was in active rebellion against the national authority. The Bull Run defeat had been a damaging blow to the prestige of the Union.
In this condensed sketch I can give only the strong outline of the threatening situation I found, and, in part, the chief measures I adopted to convert our defensive position into one that was vigorously offensive, going into detail only enough to show some of the difficulties that beset me.
There was a wide difference between the situation here and that at Washington. The army of the East was organized under the eyes of the President and Congress; in the midst of loyal surroundings and loyal adivisers where there was no need to go outside of prescribed military usage, or to assume responsibilities. But in Missouri all operations had to be initiated in the midst of upturned and revolutionary conditions and a rebellious people, where all laws were set at defiance. In addition to the bodies of armed men that swarmed over the sate, a Confederate force of nearly 50,000 men was already on the Southern Frontier: 12,000, advancing upon Cairo; Thompson, with 5,000, upon Girardeau; Hardee, with 5,000, upon Ironton; and Price, with an estimated force of 25,000, upon Lyon, at Springfield. Their movement was intended to overrun Missouri, and, supported by a friendly population of over a million, to seize upon St. Louis and make that city a center of operations for the invasion of the loyal states.
To meet this advancing I had 23,000 men of all arms. Of this only some 15,000 were available, the remainder being three-months men whose term of service was expiring. General John Pope was fully occupied in North Missouri with nearly all my disposable force, which was required to hold in check rebellion in that quarter. For the defense of Cairo B.M. Prentiss had 8 regiments, but 6 were three-months men, at the end of their term, unpaid and unwilling to reenlist. at Springfield General Lyon had about 6,000 men, unpaid and badly fed, and in need of clothing. In this condition he was in hourly expectation of being attacked by the enemy, who was advancing in three times his nominal strength."
*****To be continued*****[/CENTER]

[khbynum]

Well, where to start? Everyone, on both sides, felt at that point they were outnumbered and about to be overrun. If Fremont felt put upon, imagine Price, who couldn't even find muskets for his militiamen. I think the South had a chance at a coup early in the war in the Trans-Mississippi, but only on paper and in hindsight. Poorly armed, barely supplied and questionably led, they were lucky to hold their own. In a computer game, it's possible to transfer the Charleston corps by rail and threaten St. Louis, but in reality?

If you want an opinion on Fremont the man and soldier, that's another topic.

[havi]

Please to continue on this.. Is there any memories of southern generals written?!

[khbynum]

Sadly, not many, and most of them self-serving partisan efforts to justify their Civil War record or weigh in on the "Lost Cause" post-war nostalgia. Longstreet, Forrest and Gordon come to mind, but I doubt those can be accessed outside of research libraries. Henry Kyd Douglas ("I Rode with Stonewall") is probably the most famous, written by a member of Jackson's staff, though some critics say it should be titled "Stonewall Rode with Me". The only other one I own is the edited papers of Maj. Edward Manigault on the defense of Charleston ("Siege Train" , Warren Ripley (ed.), University of South Carolina Press, 1986). It's fascinating reading, but hardly at the level of Grant's memoirs.

So, generals? Not that I know of, but I'm not a professional historian. Perhaps others will come up with some references. Most of the ones I would have loved to read didn't survive the war and Lee, alas, never wrote his memoirs.

PS. Oops, how could I have forgotten Gen. Edward Porter Alexander's "Fighting for the Confederacy" (edited by Gary W. Gallagher, Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1989)? He's best remembered as the one who coordinated the artillery for Pickett's Charge, but had a long and illustrious career as a staff and artillery officer. I think Jedediah Hotchkiss's (another Jackson staffer and mapmaker) memoirs may still be in print also.

[tripax]

Many memoirs are free on archive.org or project gutenberg. Gutenberg has a list, here. For archive.org, google searching something like: 'Jubal Early site:archive.org' will come up with good results for many generals.

[anjou]

EPAs is definitely my favorite

[Gen.DixonS.Miles]

[CENTER]****More from Gen.Fremont's In Command in Missouri"**** This was the situation to be met at the outset. The arms and equipments for 23,000 men which I had gathered at New York I now found had been diverted from my department and sent to Virginia. I had no money and the Government no credit; but the chief difficulty was the want of arms. There was no want of men. The loyal population of the North-western States flocked to the Union standard; the German population with a noble unanimity. Having these conditions to face, on the 26th of July I telegraphed my needs to Montgomery Blair, whom I had known intimately. In reply he telegraphed, "I find it impossible to get any attention to Missouri or Western matters from the authorities here. You will have to do the best you can and take all needful responsibility to defend and protect the people over whom you are specially set." Two days afterward Secretary Seward telegraphed to ask what disposition I had made of the arms I had purchased in Europe, asking for an invoice. I telegraphed him that I needed to use these arms for my department, that I had absolutely no arms, and that the situation of the State was critical. On the 30th I sent to the President, as had been arranged, an unofficial letter setting forth the conditions of my command. I informed him that the treasurer of the United States at St. Louis had $300,000 entirely unappropriated, but had refused my request for $100,000 to be delivered to my paymaster-general. I said to him that there were three courses open to me: "First, to let the enemy possess himself of some of the strongest points in the state and threaten St. Louis, which is insurrectionary; second, to force a loan from the secession banks here; third, to use the money belonging to the Government which is in the treasury....This morning I will order the treasurer to deliver the money in his possession to General Andrews and will send a force to the treasury to take the money, and will direct such payments as the exigency requires. I will hazard everything for the defense of the department you have confided to me, and I trust to you for support." To the propositions of this letter the President gave the tacit approval of not replying, and I acted upon it. I had no time to lose. The situation of Lyon at Springfield was critical, and the small disintegrating garrison at Cairo was hourly exposed to assault by an overpowering force. Among the various points threatened, Cairo was the key to the success of my operations. The waterways and the district around Cairo were of first importance. Upon the possession of this district depended the descent and control of the Mississippi Valley by the Union armies, or the inroad by the Confederate forces into the loyal states. I now sent within the Confederate lines a capable engineer officer possessed of the necessary military knowledge, with instructions to go into the States of Kentucky and Tennessee to observe the situation[/CENTER] ***To be continued***

[Gen.DixonS.Miles]

****Haven't updated in awhile I know and I'm sorry but some of us do have to work and can't balance there time well (me)****
-"Of the enemy, ascertain his strength and probable plans, and make rough maps of important localities occupied by troops or likely to be. Five days after my arrival, hearing that Pillow was moving upon Cairo, I left St. Louis for that place, with all my available force, 3800 men. I distributed my command over a transport fleet of eight large steamboats, in order to create in the enemy an impression of greater strength than I possessed. I found the garrison demoralized. From the chief of artillery I learned there were only six hundred effective men under arms. These troops had enlisted for three months, which had now expired. They had not been paid, and there was much sickness among them. The reinforcement I brought, and such assurances as I was able to give, restored confidence; and I prevailed on one of the garrison regiments to remain.
Cairo was the most unhealthy post within my command. fever and dysentery were prevailing. The roomy, shaded decks and convenient cabins of the large steamboats which brought the reenforcements, and the breeze from the water blowing through them, were in strong contrast with the steaming heat of the low, moist grounds of Cairo. This suggested the idea of floating hospitals. Before the sun went down the greater number of the sick were carried to one of the roomiest boats, thus securing good ventilation and perfect drainage. The sudden relief of Cairo and the exaggerated form in which the news of it reached Pillow had the intended effect. he abandoned his proposed attack, and gave time to put it effectually beyond reach of the enemy, and eventually to secure a firm hold on the whole of that important district.
Having secured the initial point in my campaign, I returned to St. Louis on August 4th. Meantime I had ordered Stevenson's 7th Missouri regiment from Boonville, and Montgomery's Kansas regiment near Leavenworth, to the support of Lyon at Springfield. Amidst incessant and conflicting demands, my immediate care was to provide aid for him. Governor Oliver P. Morton, of Indiana, answering my urgent request for troops, telegraphed that if leave were granted from Washington he would send five regiments made up of river boatmen, well adapted for the Mississippi expedition. In answer to my request they were ordered to me. But the order was changed, and instead of joining me they were sent to General Robert Anderson, then in command at Louisville. The same day I asked Senator Latham, at Washington, to aid my application for three thousand men from California, to be placed at El Paso, to operate, against Texas troops moving into Arkansas. On the 5th Marsh reported from Girardeau that the enemy was close upon him, 5,000 strong, and would attack him before morning. At midnight a heavy battery of 6 twenty-four-pounders and 1,000 men were embarked to his aid under experienced officers, and Prentiss further reinforced him below the same morning.
On the 6th General Scott telegraphed me that he had ordered all the troops out of New Mexico, and directed me to confer immediately with the governor of Kansas, and arrange for the safety of New Mexico, sending two regiments "without delay" as the first detachment would leave on the 15th. On the 9th I informed the Government that the greater part of the old troops were going out of service, while the new levies, totally unacquainted with rudiments of military training, would be unmanageable before an enemy. Therefore, I asked authority from the President to collect through out the states educated officers who had seen service. With them I could make a framework on which to organize and army. My request was granted, and I acted upon it at once. On the 10th Prentiss reported form Cairo that the enemy were again concentrating and entrenching at New Madrid about ten thousand strong.

***To be continued, Wilson's Creek coming next post!***

[Gen.DixonS.Miles]

Would anyone like to contribute a dissection of what Fremont is presenting us with thus far? Its alright if your just expressing your personal opinion of what you have read as well.

[tripax]

I love reading this, thanks for posting it. I think a theme I see here is Fremont felt that he had to take control of Missouri quickly. I think early in the war, especially in the West, generals were vying for control of forces with governors. In Missouri on both sides, the state militia were not federally directed. The state had a number of USA and CSA militia forces and militia officers. Also, a lot of the brigadier generals in the west didn't come out of the regular army as they did in the east. General Fremont even had to raise his own escort cavalry (famously under Major Zagonyi), I think.

Most importantly, I think that there was a feeling that people liked to support a winner. This was true in elections at the time. Fremont felt that by displaying his forces in strength throughout the strength this would prevent Missourians from supporting the Confederacy or at least from taking arms in support of the Confederacy. I think this is part of the reason that Lyon didn't have more forces at Wilson's Creek.

But I don't really know what was going on, what do others think?

Also, Fremont still had control over forces in California/Texas. How long were those forces directed by leaders on the other side of the Rockies in this way?

I was curious what telegraph connections existed at the time between St. Louis and Tuscon/San Francisco and were those ever broken during the war? The answer is that no connection existed until a route through Carson City, Salt Lake City, and the Platte River Valley connected San Francisco and St. Louis in late October 1861. Apparently the Sioux were superstitious of the wires and left the lines alone. I don't know if anyone else cut the lines. But I'm definitely curious how Fremont exercised control over the far west.