When was McClellan found out ?

[Diggy]

Hi all -
As a result of playing this game I have begun reading Shelby Foote's Civil War Narrative and have become interested in how Gen McClellan chronically overestimates the size of the Confederate forces he faces.

He continually writes to his wife, complaining about the lack of cooperation from Lincoln and secretary Stanton, and how by his own reckoning he accomplishes military wonders in the face of such (supposed) enormous opposition.

I know that later he went on to run for president against Lincoln in 1864, so I assume that even at this late date no one (except the Rebs !) knew for sure the very favorable odds he had actually faced in his campaigns.

So when did it become public knowledge that McClellan's estimate of his opponents military strength had been consistently exaggerated ? Was McClellan still alive at the time ? What was his reaction ?

As a side note, it is stated that Pinkerton's service was a primary source of McClellans military intelligence. Was Pinkerton affected by the revelation of exaggerated claims ? This is the same Pinkerton who ran a reknown detective agency, right ?

[tc237]

Pinkerton started exaggerating his numbers only after it became apparent to him that McClellan was seeing ghosts.
Prior to that Pinkerton had very accurate intelligence estimates and analysis on the rebel army.
Eventually though, after dealing with McClellan long enough, Pinkerton gave in and started reporting the over-extimates that McClellan wanted.

When was McClellan "found out"?
Could be that Lincoln new about it all along. Lincoln was getting hundreds of reports and had his own little paid intelligence collectors.
After McClellan was relieved, Hooker established an excellent intelligence bureau that carried on to the end of the war, they probably knew about it.
Thing is, no one was going to come public and disparage McClellan, they just didn't do that at the time.
In any case it would have been a tough task, they would have had to give up their own intelligence sources and McClellan was very popular politically

After the war McClellan suporters laid the "blame" on Pinkerton while conversly the "Lost Cause" writers painted McClellan as a dunder brain with stars. (and Grant a drunk, Sherman a terror, yadda yadda...)

Now we are in an era, that I call a golden age, of Civil War research were there are huge amounts of new resources, previously unavailable to past writers like Foote, opening up to modern day Civil War scholars.
Thankfully, many of the old established concepts, misconceptions or myths are slowly being debunked or revised by all this new and accurate information.

McClellan's story might be one of them.

[Diggy]

OK, thanks. From what I have on McClellan so far, the man was no fool, just ultra-cautious as a result of inexperience and an over-active imagination. In fact, at the beginning of the war there were several over-cautious commanders, including Sherman himself, so McClellan wasn't alone.

I wonder what it would be like to have an 'over-cautious' trait for generals which results in exaggerated strengths for enemy units detected ? Don't know if it is do-able but it seems like it would be fun.

Would also be nice if the ratings for generals were not entirely accurate - that is for example that McClellan could have an (apparent) 4-3-4 rating, while in (game) reality have an actual 2-1-3 rating, which would be up to the player to find out from thru first experience. This would reflect the fact that some generals had a good press or undeserved reputations, which their leaders had to find out the hard way.

[gchristie]

One of the best short descriptions I've read about GBM is "George McClellan was the best general that didn’t like to fight that this country has ever produced." He loved the army of the potomoc, and he loved his men, perhaps too much.

And I believe that Robert E Lee, when asked something along the lines of who he thought the best union general he had faced, answered McClellan.

The full story of this fellow has yet to be written, I think. But for Lincoln fans, the verdict is in.

[dublish]

I believe he was 'found out' when the AotP crossed the Potomac in late 1861 (early '62?) to find that Johnston's positions had been protected by painted logs rather than cannon.

McClellan's enemies in the government and the press had a field day when that news broke.

[Mortar]

Well, Ill play the devil's advocate, I actually believe McClellan gets abit of an unfair representation in the game. True he was no Napoleon, but the things that he brought to not only the Army of the Potomac (aside from defeat) but to american military practices were crucial at that point in the war. He did nothing less than turn independently minded rabble militia into drilled professional soldiers. He armed them, fed them, paid them, equipped them, trained them with the european tactics that were the military standard of the day, and boosted their morale in a way no other general of the time probably could, especially after first and second Manassas. Pinkerton could have been the biggest factor in McClellans intelligence, but I was not there so I cant say for sure. It seems his strength was more suited to counter-espionage, rather than field scouting. I think McClellan should have placed more attention on massed cavalry for reconnaisance, than to blindly trust the numbers Pinkerton handed him. I think he was a great army commander who simply had no business being in the field, and he himself admitted having no stomach for the bloodshed.

[rattler01]

I like to some it up as like many Union generals he was afraid to lose. It doesn't help that they were up against generals that proved to be some of the best in American history. Many people argue that is what made Grant so effective. With being a drunk and failed entrepreneur , he had little to personally lose.

And I don't think there is no doubt that he loved his men (too much). However, while cruel, this is a flaw in a general who's army had to take the offensive to win the war. Also IF I recall correctly from is bio. He wasn't willing to rage the total war that ultimately was need to break the CSA. Like Sherman's march to the sea and Grants campaign in Mississippi.

I think if he, Stanton, and Lincoln could have worked together he would have made an amazing Chief of Staff.

[Colonel Dreux]

Pinkerton started exaggerating his numbers only after it became apparent to him that McClellan was seeing ghosts.
Prior to that Pinkerton had very accurate intelligence estimates and analysis on the rebel army.
Eventually though, after dealing with McClellan long enough, Pinkerton gave in and started reporting the over-extimates that McClellan wanted.

When was McClellan "found out"?
Could be that Lincoln new about it all along. Lincoln was getting hundreds of reports and had his own little paid intelligence collectors.
After McClellan was relieved, Hooker established an excellent intelligence bureau that carried on to the end of the war, they probably knew about it.
Thing is, no one was going to come public and disparage McClellan, they just didn't do that at the time.
In any case it would have been a tough task, they would have had to give up their own intelligence sources and McClellan was very popular politically

After the war McClellan suporters laid the "blame" on Pinkerton while conversly the "Lost Cause" writers painted McClellan as a dunder brain with stars. (and Grant a drunk, Sherman a terror, yadda yadda...)

Now we are in an era, that I call a golden age, of Civil War research were there are huge amounts of new resources, previously unavailable to past writers like Foote, opening up to modern day Civil War scholars.
Thankfully, many of the old established concepts, misconceptions or myths are slowly being debunked or revised by all this new and accurate information.

McClellan's story might be one of them.

I'm not sure myths or misconceptions are being debunked more so than revised. Definitely there are new ways of looking at the events of the Civil War and some new information surfaces, but a lot of the reason there are new ways of looking at it has to do with having to say something new and different from what came before. I'm not all sure I agree with everything "new" that is coming out and supposedly clarifying things.

[Heldenkaiser]

And I believe that Robert E Lee, when asked something along the lines of who he thought the best union general he had faced, answered McClellan.

I am sure he said that. But I believe he meant the best Union general for HIM (Lee).

[dublish]

I am sure he said that. But I believe he meant the best Union general for HIM (Lee).

Debatable. The AoNV suffered some of its heaviest losses relative to those it inflicted on the AotP while McClellan was in command. For all the bad that McClellan did (and I'm one of those who think it was a lot), he was able, for whatever reasons, to keep the Union army in fighting form.

[Colonel Dreux]

Debatable. The AoNV suffered some of its heaviest losses relative to those it inflicted on the AotP while McClellan was in command. For all the bad that McClellan did (and I'm one of those who think it was a lot), he was able, for whatever reasons, to keep the Union army in fighting form.

I'm with you dublish. We were debating McClellan in the officers forum recently. Lots of kind and harsh words said about him in his ranking thread.

I like McClellan personally. He was, like you said, not a fool. Even U.S. Grant wondered to himself how McClellan would have done if given more time and more political support. McClellan really only got one campaign season to prove himself, i.e., the summer and fall of 1862. He likely would have worn down the AoNV over time and he would have kept Lee from invading the North again perhaps if fully in control of the whole Eastern theatre. My guess is he would have gotten his army/armies back down to Richmond somehow and besieged it in 1863. Per speculation, but I'm of the opinion he was competent enough to defeat Lee in the end.

Grant himself, with the same amount of time Spring - Fall of 1864 couldn't even defeat a demoralized and weakened AoNV.

[Coffee Sergeant]

Debatable. The AoNV suffered some of its heaviest losses relative to those it inflicted on the AotP while McClellan was in command. For all the bad that McClellan did (and I'm one of those who think it was a lot), he was able, for whatever reasons, to keep the Union army in fighting form.

Perhaps Lee was referring to the Seven Days. That was one of the few battles in which he took more casualties than he inflicted. But I don't think it had much to do with McClellan's generalship. It was also one of the few times Lee was on the tactical offensive as well . Besides, if I remember right McPherson said the heavy casualties suffered had mainly to do with disparity in weaponry - most of the CSA units were still equipped with smoothbores while all the Union forces had rilfled muskets. And the Union forces outnumbered Confederate forces by a considerable margin. And the offensive was an operational success in he was able to push the AotP off the peninsula. Unlike Gettysburg or Antietam

[Colonel Dreux]

Perhaps Lee was referring to the Seven Days. That was one of the few battles in which he took more casualties than he inflicted. But I don't think it had much to do with McClellan's generalship. It was also one of the few times Lee was on the tactical offensive as well . Besides, if I remember right McPherson said the heavy casualties suffered had mainly to do with disparity in weaponry - most of the CSA units were still equipped with smoothbores while all the Union forces had rilfled muskets. And the Union forces outnumbered Confederate forces by a considerable margin. And the offensive was an operational success in he was able to push the AotP off the peninsula. Unlike Gettysburg or Antietam

Some of it was generalship though. McClellan picked the defensive line which Lee kept mutilating his troops against. And he moved the army from a base of supply on the York River to the James River and got away from Lee before Lee could do any serious damage to him.

I think what Lee respected about McClellan was that McClellan was competent and because he had good control of the AoP Lee would not be able to crush him. Lee also wasn't alone in his assessment of McClellan. Other southern generals respected McClellan as well.

[dublish]

I'm with you dublish. We were debating McClellan in the officers forum recently. Lots of kind and harsh words said about him in his ranking thread.

I like McClellan personally. He was, like you said, not a fool. Even U.S. Grant wondered to himself how McClellan would have done if given more time and more political support. McClellan really only got one campaign season to prove himself, i.e., the summer and fall of 1862. He likely would have worn down the AoNV over time and he would have kept Lee from invading the North again perhaps if fully in control of the whole Eastern theatre. My guess is he would have gotten his army/armies back down to Richmond somehow and besieged it in 1863. Per speculation, but I'm of the opinion he was competent enough to defeat Lee in the end.

Grant himself, with the same amount of time Spring - Fall of 1864 couldn't even defeat a demoralized and weakened AoNV.

Now, don't go putting words into my mouth. McClellan had a full year from late 1861 to late 1862 to 'prove himself', and he proved exactly what he was capable of. In the same amount of time, from May '64 to May '65, Grant won the war. I think we agree that McClellan would never be crushed by the AoNV, but the North didn't need just to not get crushed- they needed Lee's army to be crushed, and McClellan was never going to deliver that.

[Colonel Dreux]

Now, don't go putting words into my mouth. McClellan had a full year from late 1861 to late 1862 to 'prove himself', and he proved exactly what he was capable of. In the same amount of time, from May '64 to May '65, Grant won the war. I think we agree that McClellan would never be crushed by the AoNV, but the North didn't need just to not get crushed- they needed Lee's army to be crushed, and McClellan was never going to deliver that.

Words in your mouth? You said he wasn't a fool.

I disagree with you that McClellan wouldn't have crushed Lee's army though. We don't know that. Grant speculated himself that McClellan probably could have done it. Grant didn't even crush Lee's army. The Anaconda Plan did its thing and Grant simply battered Lee into submission.

McClellan was in charge of the AoP for about a full year, but that only included one campaigning season, i.e., the 1862 one. The fall and winter of 1861-1862 wasn't a time for campaigning due to the lack of training and organization of both sides, and in that time McClellan organized and trained the AoP, which seems to be the one thing people respect about McClellan.

[tagwyn]

Gen Lee could not "provide further damage" to McClellan because "the Miscreat" Pope was wandering around and Lee really wanted to "supress" this pile of crap before McC could get back and join him. t

[Colonel Dreux]

Gen Lee could not "provide further damage" to McClellan because "the Miscreat" Pope was wandering around and Lee really wanted to "supress" this pile of crap before McC could get back and join him. t

Yep, McClellan was a gentleman as well, not a pillaging warmonger.

[dublish]

Yep, McClellan was a gentleman as well, not a pillaging warmonger.

Oh, indeed. He was perfectly content to politely leave the Confederates to their business, and was very ready to defer to them if his objectives and theirs happened to conflict with each other.

[Colonel Dreux]

Oh, indeed. He was perfectly content to politely leave the Confederates to their business, and was very ready to defer to them if his objectives and theirs happened to conflict with each other.

He was chivalrous, and not going to push American citizens (which is what Southerners were to Lincoln officially) around needlessly and destroy their property, if he could help it. Today it's called international human rights. Prescient man McClellan was.

[LSSpam]

Besides, if I remember right McPherson said the heavy casualties suffered had mainly to do with disparity in weaponry - most of the CSA units were still equipped with smoothbores while all the Union forces had rilfled muskets.

It had more to do with the disjointed command structure Lee was imposed with immediately upon taking over and the resulting tactical situations that produced.

The majority of the casualties came as a result of two battles, Malvern Hill and Gaines Mill. Gaines Mill was a frontal attack intended to keep the Union force in place while the flank swept them from the field (akeen to what he'd do at Chancellorville when RA Anderson and Mclaws opened the assault while Jackson was marching). Jackson was the flanking force this time but arrived late and was in his infamous "lethargy" at the time.

Malvern Hill was a combination of Magruder getting lost and the poor structure of the CSA Artillery which got swept from the field.

Those 2 engagements alone produced well over 60% of the CSA casualties and in both cases involved a tactical CSA superiority in numbers supposed to be available.

[LSSpam]

I disagree with you that McClellan wouldn't have crushed Lee's army though. We don't know that.

No. We have a very a good idea.

He had two opportunities, better chances then any other general got in the war except for Meade at Williamsport after the Gettysburg retreat and Grant at Petersburg after Fort Stedmen. He got thoroughly cowed by Lee at Seven Days, completely put on his heels despite a large operational advantage in numbers. And this was Lee just in command, saddled with incompetent generals he didn't know, and an army structure (absence of corps, the brigaded artillery, etc) that was ineffective.

Then he was handed a second opportunity on a golden platter at Antietam, but just didn't have the stomach for it.

No, we can say with confidence McClellan's counter-factual performance had he stayed in command would have likely been that of a Meade with better PR. Competent, certainly wouldn't produce a Fredricksburg, but quite capable of giving up a Chancellorville and more likely to spend months like Meade did after Gettysburg chasing his tail around in circles only to end up right where he started with Lee to begin with.

[Colonel Dreux]

No. We have a very a good idea.

He had two opportunities, better chances then any other general got in the war except for Meade at Williamsport after the Gettysburg retreat and Grant at Petersburg after Fort Stedmen. He got thoroughly cowed by Lee at Seven Days, completely put on his heels despite a large operational advantage in numbers. And this was Lee just in command, saddled with incompetent generals he didn't know, and an army structure (absence of corps, the brigaded artillery, etc) that was ineffective.

Then he was handed a second opportunity on a golden platter at Antietam, but just didn't have the stomach for it.

No, we can say with confidence McClellan's counter-factual performance had he stayed in command would have likely been that of a Meade with better PR. Competent, certainly wouldn't produce a Fredricksburg, but quite capable of giving up a Chancellorville and more likely to spend months like Meade did after Gettysburg chasing his tail around in circles only to end up right where he started with Lee to begin with.

I disagree again. We don't know what would have happened. He let Lee get away after Antietam, but so what? All there was to do was go into winter quarters and wait after letting Lee get back down South. My guess is McClellan would have eventually seen the light on the number of Confederate troops and he would have devised a plan to pin Lee down in and around Richmond.

You should remember (you probably do) that technically Meade was still the commander of the Army of the Potomac when Grant was in charge. So Meade finished off Lee with Grant. He just doesn't get the koodoes for it. And I agree with you that Meade and McClellan had some similarities as commanders.

Grant ended the War, but it took him longer than he and Lincoln expected. So even pushing hard as can be and against a post-Gettysburg Army of NV wasn't easy (Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and Cold Harbor) and took some time, and in fact that is what really won the war, time... thanks to attrition and the economic collapse of the Confederacy.

Lee may have freaked McClellan into taking the defensive and abandoning the offensive against Richmond, but Lee didn't have his way with McClellan. Lee struggled to coordinate his army and McClellan was able to smash Lee against up the anvils he setup while he slipped away from Lee.

[LSSpam]

All there was to do was go into winter quarters and wait after letting Lee get back down South.

Or use his relatively fresh corps (Franklin and Porters) to finish off Lee's army, shortening the war by who knows what.

You should remember (you probably do) that technically Meade was still the commander of the Army of the Potomac when Grant was in charge. So Meade finished off Lee with Grant. He just doesn't get the koodoes for it. And I agree with you that Meade and McClellan had some similarities as commanders.

That's incredibly disingenuous. I refuse to believe your grasp of history is that poor.

Meade spent the entire rest of 1863 post-Gettysburg shadow-boxing Lee for absolutely zero effect. You seem to be confusing tactical competency with the basic ability to do operationally what needed to be done. Grant had it, McClellan and Meade lacked it. It took Grant's operational control to do what no other Union commander was able to do, which is pin Lee down and finish him off.

Meade was a competent Corp commander, I'm sure McClellan would have been as well, but they obviously, demonstratively, did not have what it took to finish the war in the Eastern Theatre. Grant did. This is why Grant gets put in the history books.

Lee may have freaked McClellan into taking the defensive and abandoning the offensive against Richmond, but Lee didn't have his way with McClellan. Lee struggled to coordinate his army and McClellan was able to smash Lee against up the anvils he setup while he slipped away from Lee.

Operationally McClellan was completely out-matched against Lee. Again, this is historical record. Despite vast preponderance of numbers, McClellan was fundamentally incapable of doing anything but "checking" Lee. How is that considered a success? You're well supplied, well equipped, outnumber your poorly equipped/supplied foe 2-1, and operating (at the time of Seven Days - Antietam) with an effective and established commanded structure while your opponent is improvising on the fly.

And "holding his own" is the qualifier for success?

McClellan failed by any rational objective measure. Period. Grant, by contrast, succeeded. Give McClellan credit for not getting his army destroyed, which he almost very well did at Seven Days (and arguably would have lost at least a significant portion had Lee inherited the structure of the ANV established by early 1863) but that doesn't make him a competent Army commander considering his advantages.

[dublish]

I disagree again. We don't know what would have happened. He let Lee get away after Antietam, but so what? All there was to do was go into winter quarters and wait after letting Lee get back down South. My guess is McClellan would have eventually seen the light on the number of Confederate troops and he would have devised a plan to pin Lee down in and around Richmond.

You should remember (you probably do) that technically Meade was still the commander of the Army of the Potomac when Grant was in charge. So Meade finished off Lee with Grant. He just doesn't get the koodoes for it. And I agree with you that Meade and McClellan had some similarities as commanders.

Grant ended the War, but it took him longer than he and Lincoln expected. So even pushing hard as can be and against a post-Gettysburg Army of NV wasn't easy (Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and Cold Harbor) and took some time, and in fact that is what really won the war, time... thanks to attrition and the economic collapse of the Confederacy.

Lee may have freaked McClellan into taking the defensive and abandoning the offensive against Richmond, but Lee didn't have his way with McClellan. Lee struggled to coordinate his army and McClellan was able to smash Lee against up the anvils he setup while he slipped away from Lee.

That's the first time I've ever heard of someone describing McClellan as 'smashing' anything. Whatever you're on, I want some of it.

[LSSpam]

That's the first time I've ever heard of someone describing McClellan as 'smashing' anything. Whatever you're on, I want some of it.

Yeah i'm just floored that somehow the mark of success in leading a well-equipped/supplied army with an established chain of command and a 2-1 advantage in numbers is "being able to slip away" from your, by any other measure except the commanding General, inferior opponent.

The very act of being forced to "slip away" in such a situation screams "failure"

[Colonel Dreux]

Or use his relatively fresh corps (Franklin and Porters) to finish off Lee's army, shortening the war by who knows what.

Only at Antietam and in hindsight. The Union didn't know how bad Lee's predicament at Antietam was. The opportunity to destroy Lee was there, but it's only clear to us now. The fog of war in September 1862 was something else.

That's incredibly disingenuous. I refuse to believe your grasp of history is that poor.

Meade spent the entire rest of 1863 post-Gettysburg shadow-boxing Lee for absolutely zero effect. You seem to be confusing tactical competency with the basic ability to do operationally what needed to be done. Grant had it, McClellan and Meade lacked it. It took Grant's operational control to do what no other Union commander was able to do, which is pin Lee down and finish him off.

Meade was a competent Corp commander, I'm sure McClellan would have been as well, but they obviously, demonstratively, did not have what it took to finish the war in the Eastern Theatre. Grant did. This is why Grant gets put in the history books.

I don't think you understand what I'm saying about McClellan. I'm probably not making myself clear. I'm not saying he was as a great a commander as Grant was. I'm saying he wasn't bad. I happen to like McClellan and I think he had some very good qualities as a man and as a general (a number of things about him make him a better man than Grant, for example). It all depends on what your perspective is on what makes a good general, and I have a contrarian view when it comes to McClellan.

Grant is in the history books because he was ultimately successful out West and was chosen to be the overall commander by the end of the War. People forget he was close to losing his job prior to the Vicksburg campaign and that he almost wasn't successful in taking Vicksburg, at least before being replaced by some other general. If he hadn't been able to hold on to his command of the AoT, he wouldn't have been the U.S. Grant we know today. Washington had such a quick trigger with generals that even very competent generals like Grant almost got kicked to the wayside.

The fact is that certain men got chosen to lead out of good fortune and then made what they made of it (very much the truth in Grant's case) and the North and South could have easily had other men lead their armies to great victories or defeats. My point being that had it been someone other than Grant leading the AoP at the end, we'd be talking about how great he was cause he would have inevitably beaten Lee down too.

Operationally McClellan was completely out-matched against Lee. Again, this is historical record. Despite vast preponderance of numbers, McClellan was fundamentally incapable of doing anything but "checking" Lee. How is that considered a success? You're well supplied, well equipped, outnumber your poorly equipped/supplied foe 2-1, and operating (at the time of Seven Days - Antietam) with an effective and established commanded structure while your opponent is improvising on the fly.

I disagree. If McClellan was completely out-matched by Lee, why didn't Lee destroy his army, which was Lee's hope during the Seven Days once McClellan decided to tactically withdraw from in front of Richmond?

I'm also not sure it's the case that Lee was under supplied or had some rag tag Army to use against McClellan. Lee had the advantage of better internal lines, being on his own soil with his back to Richmond, and having an army ready to defend their country. Lee also had as many troops as he would ever have to work with during the Seven Days and not much fewer than what McClellan had. The AoNV may have not been organized to Lee's liking, but it was organized enough to take on the AoP, who itself was not yet that experienced. McClellan also had to worry about his extended supply lines.

And "holding his own" is the qualifier for success?

McClellan failed by any rational objective measure. Period. Grant, by contrast, succeeded. Give McClellan credit for not getting his army destroyed, which he almost very well did at Seven Days (and arguably would have lost at least a significant portion had Lee inherited the structure of the ANV established by early 1863) but that doesn't make him a competent Army commander considering his advantages.

I am not arguing McClellan was successful (I am arguing he was competent though... not ever defeated in battle and moved his army around quite well, even if slowly and cautiously). He did fail in taking Richmond in 1862 (although he was successful in getting up the Peninsula with minimal casualties). What I said was that he successfully withdrew and covered his redeployment to the James River. He made a textbook withdrawal from in front of the foe and executed the maneuver very well. He deserves some credit for this. Just as much as Grant deserves to be criticized for his handling of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and in particular Cold Harbor.

As I have said before in the thread, other Union generals were unsuccessful in taking Richmond. The Union failed to take Richmond not only in 1862, but in 1863 and in 1864. Grant couldn't even do it in one campaigning season. And Grant wasn't even facing a fresh faced Lee or AoNV either. Not to mention Grant's AoP was full of confidence and experience by the time he got to lead it.

[Colonel Dreux]

That's the first time I've ever heard of someone describing McClellan as 'smashing' anything. Whatever you're on, I want some of it.

What happened to the Confederates at Malvern Hill? What happened to A.P. Hill's boys at Mechanicsville?

What happened at the Battle of South Mountain? Were the Confederates at the Sunken Road at Antietam smashed or not smashed?

[Colonel Dreux]

Yeah i'm just floored that somehow the mark of success in leading a well-equipped/supplied army with an established chain of command and a 2-1 advantage in numbers is "being able to slip away" from your, by any other measure except the commanding General, inferior opponent.

The very act of being forced to "slip away" in such a situation screams "failure"

McClellan didn't have a 2-1 advantage in men actually. McClellan had 100,000 + and Lee had around 90,000. They didn't all get used of course, but the armies were more numerically matched than you'd think.

It's also just not fact that Lee's AoNV was an inferior opponent. That is an entirely subjective statement.

[kwhitehead]

McClellan had two major flaws that undermined an otherwise above average leader.

First, he fought ghost armies. This crippled his ability to go on the offensive and deliver the kind of killing blow the AoP was capable of in 1862. They had the numbers in Virginia to take Richmond. They had more than enough strength to destroy Lee's whole army at Antietam. But he was always holding back to counter the coming attack by the ghost army.

Second, he allowed himself and the AoP to be drawn into the political war going on in Washington between those who wanted Union only and the radical Abolitionist. This eventually cost him the political support by Lincoln he needed to be effective.

As to the Seven Days, when you consider Lee had an army that barely existed four weeks prior he accomplished a minor miracle with them. Especially when you consider the best force in his command, Jackson's, was rendered almost useless for some unknown reason. If Jackson had shown any of his old and future agressiveness Lee would have probably destroyed the AoP as he planned to do.

[Colonel Dreux]

McClellan had two major flaws that undermined an otherwise above average leader.

First, he fought ghost armies. This crippled his ability to go on the offensive and deliver the kind of killing blow the AoP was capable of in 1862. They had the numbers in Virginia to take Richmond. They had more than enough strength to destroy Lee's whole army at Antietam. But he was always holding back to counter the coming attack by the ghost army.

Second, he allowed himself and the AoP to be drawn into the political war going on in Washington between those who wanted Union only and the radical Abolitionist. This eventually cost him the political support by Lincoln he needed to be effective.

As to the Seven Days, when you consider Lee had an army that barely existed four weeks prior he accomplished a minor miracle with them. Especially when you consider the best force in his command, Jackson's, was rendered almost useless for some unknown reason. If Jackson had shown any of his old and future agressiveness Lee would have probably destroyed the AoP as he planned to do.

Jackson rendered himself useless. I suspect he was ill and/or just plain worn out. He fell asleep during the afternoon of the Battle of Frayser's Farm or one of the later battles (when his men were supposed to be going in to support another movement)... what the hell?