When was McClellan found out ?

[anarchyintheuk]

Jackson probably was worn out after the Valley campaign. He also wasn't nearly as familiar with the terrain around the Peninsula as he had been w/ the Valley and didn't take the proper steps to recon the area and roads through which he would have to attack (a mistake he didn't seem to repeat). Regardless, he fought poorly during the Seven Days and McClellan was fortunate that he did.

[tagwyn]

Col D: Are you a trained French officer with experience in Vietnam? t

[tremy]

Recommend reading James H Beatie " Army of the Potomac" VOL 3.
It is an eye opener. With Lincolns interference and the naval failures,I'm surprised he managed as well as he did.It rather changed my perspective built up over the last 50 years of master george.

[gchristie]

I am sure he said that. But I believe he meant the best Union general for HIM (Lee).

Perhaps...

And perhaps that they were both engineers and Lee respected McClellan's abilities in that regard.

Speaking of engineers, one of my favorite stories about Lincoln's commenting on McClellan's abilities...

The story was told that President Lincoln said to some colleagues: "General McClellan's tardiness and unwillingness to fight the enemy or follow up advantages gained, reminds me of a man back in Illinois who knew a few law phrases but whose lawyer lacked aggressiveness. The man finally lost all patience and springing to his feet vociferated, 'Why don't you go at him with a fi. fa., a demurrer, a capias, a surrebutter, or a ne exeat, or something; or a nundam pactum or a non est?' I wish McClellan would go at the enemy with something – I don't care what. General McClellan is a pleasant and scholarly gentleman. He is an admirable engineer, but he seems to have a special talent for a stationary engine."

~Ethan S. Rafuse, McClellan’s War

[Colonel Dreux]

Col D: Are you a trained French officer with experience in Vietnam? t

No.

[Stonewall63]

I know I'm a little of a late comer to this discussion in the end but here is my take on all this.

I will say this I will say from a "strategic" ability I put McClellan up there if not equal with Grant as not far off. The reason for this is that McClellan was a strategically sound general in the end. He devised some of the better strategies of the war and really in the end was very near to ending the war in 1862 with taking Richmond.

His largest and only severe fault came when he was on the battlefield. He was a general who was mainly too cautious. He did not seem to want to test out his army and all. Rather than being aggressive he was content to sit back see how his enemy reacted then devise his plan for their. Now while this was perfectly ok with generals like Johnston it did not work for Lee. This was cause Lee is aggressive and used that against him.

Now to compare the biggest difference between Grant and McClellan besides aggressiveness in command was the lack of a "killer instinct" on McClellan's fault. But in the end this was lacking in many generals during this war including Lee who was content usually to beat down his enemies then let the slink away in the end to recuperate and rebuild. The reason Lee came so close at Chancellorsville was more an attribute to Jackson than Lee as Jackson wanted to try and destroy the army of the Potomac while Lee was content to let them leave in a defeated state.

Also to correct some mistakes from above, McClellan did not deal with fake cannons over the potomac this was actually at Yorktown during the Peninsula Campaign where Magruder stalled him using fake works and positions till he was pulled out. Also for most of the beginning battles of the Seven days the operational and battles were handled by Porter not McClellan and it was mainly his defensive expertise along with the uncoordinated Confederate attacks that led to the massive casualties.

I'm not saying McClellan could have won the war in that I feel Lee understood his nature too well in the end but McClellan was a good officer who has gotten a bad rep in the end. While I don't think he was the best officer I would truthfully list him in the top 10 Union Generals of the war in that while he was ultimately unsuccessful he came really the closest to ending the war until Grant was brought east and with his dogged determination forced Lee to continually fight it out and this is what destroyed Lee in the end not any specific battle.

[Heldenkaiser]

(...) he came really the closest to ending the war (...).

Yes--nowhere closer than on 17 September 1862. Even after he had completely mismanaged the battle by sending in his corps piecemeal, it still needed just one word from him to commit Porter and destroy the ANV for good. But he was taking council from his fears, and hence he simply didn't have what a good strategist (that he was, and btw so was Halleck, another one of those thoroughly competent generals whose bad reputation in nationalist legend leads to their complete misrepresentation in the game as utter losers) needed to turn into a good general--the instinct that tells somebody when to trust his luck.

[Colonel Dreux]

Yes--nowhere closer than on 17 September 1862. Even after he had completely mismanaged the battle by sending in his corps piecemeal, it still needed just one word from him to commit Porter and destroy the ANV for good. But he was taking council from his fears, and hence he simply didn't have what a good strategist (that he was, and btw so was Halleck, another one of those thoroughly competent generals whose bad reputation in nationalist legend leads to their complete misrepresentation in the game as utter losers) needed to turn into a good general--the instinct that tells somebody when to trust his luck.

It's easy to see what could have been done in hindsight. The battle at Antietam was also a defensive battle in nature since the AoP was having to respond to Lee's foray into Maryland. Lincoln and the government were also always overly concerned about protecting Washington.

The other problem with this is that Porter encouraged McClellan not to use his corps by reminding McClellan that he was all that stood between Lee and Washington.

One last comment about McClellan though. I've been reading David G. Martin's book, "Gettysburg July 1" book, which is considered the most comprehensive book on the first day's battle at Gettysburg. Martin writes that apparently in the I. Corps a rumor was spread that McClellan was back in charge of the AoP. They knew Hooker had just been replaced, but some how word spread that McClellan not Meade was in charge (this was amongst the soldiers themselves). So when the first two brigades of the I. Corps deployed on July 1 they actually cheered for McClellan being back in charge and went into battle thinking he was leading them, and they were very happy about this. Both those brigades ending up sticking it to the Confederates for most of the day until finally having to retreat do to the XI. Corps collapsing and Confederate reinforcements finally breaking the I. Corps line.

McClellan was loved and they considered Antietam a great victory, in part thanks to McClellan. Interesting stuff.

[tagwyn]

ANOV was NEVER demoralized!! Lee said McClellan was good because it made him look better than he really was. t

[Sarkus]

One last comment about McClellan though. I've been reading David G. Martin's book, "Gettysburg July 1" book, which is considered the most comprehensive book on the first day's battle at Gettysburg. Martin writes that apparently in the I. Corps a rumor was spread that McClellan was back in charge of the AoP. They knew Hooker had just been replaced, but some how word spread that McClellan not Meade was in charge (this was amongst the soldiers themselves). So when the first two brigades of the I. Corps deployed on July 1 they actually cheered for McClellan being back in charge and went into battle thinking he was leading them, and they were very happy about this. Both those brigades ending up sticking it to the Confederates for most of the day until finally having to retreat do to the XI. Corps collapsing and Confederate reinforcements finally breaking the I. Corps line.

McClellan was loved and they considered Antietam a great victory, in part thanks to McClellan. Interesting stuff.

Of course, but it's similar to Montgomery (UK) during WW2. He was loved by his British troops because they knew he wouldn't sacrifcie them. The same was true of Union troops under McClellan - they knew he valued them too much so of course they loved him. But that isn't always the best approach to winning a war, as Montgomery's controversial reputation (and McClellan's) prove. Patton argued that it was better to be more agressive because even if it means more deaths in the short-term, a shorter war means fewer deaths in the long-term. Grant's approach was along the same lines.

McClellan had many useful traits and I think history has been generally fair with him in giving him credit for building the AoP into something from nothing. He was a brilliant organizer, which is no surprise since that's what he was doing before the war in civilian life. But you can't ignore his ridiculous belief in huge Confederate forces or his lack of action as a result. Nor can you ignore some of the "savior of the Republic" stuff he seems to have believed about himself.

[Colonel Dreux]

Of course, but it's similar to Montgomery (UK) during WW2. He was loved by his British troops because they knew he wouldn't sacrifcie them. The same was true of Union troops under McClellan - they knew he valued them too much so of course they loved him. But that isn't always the best approach to winning a war, as Montgomery's controversial reputation (and McClellan's) prove. Patton argued that it was better to be more agressive because even if it means more deaths in the short-term, a shorter war means fewer deaths in the long-term. Grant's approach was along the same lines.

McClellan had many useful traits and I think history has been generally fair with him in giving him credit for building the AoP into something from nothing. He was a brilliant organizer, which is no surprise since that's what he was doing before the war in civilian life. But you can't ignore his ridiculous belief in huge Confederate forces or his lack of action as a result. Nor can you ignore some of the "savior of the Republic" stuff he seems to have believed about himself.

That isn't entirely why the soldiers of the I Corps cheered for McClellan on July 1, 1863... they huzza'd him because they saw him as the victor of South Mountain and Antietam. It wasn't that he just cared for them, but Antietam was considered a great victory by the North, i.e., McClellan kicked Lee back into Virginia.

Nobody ignores McClellan's foolish estimation of Confederate troops. He clearly didn't know how to count. That alone doesn't mean he wasn't a decent general though.

Grant also didn't shorten the war arguably by being "aggressive". He didn't even defeat Lee in the 1864 campaign season. He did murder a lot of his soldiers though. That's definitely the truth.

[Sarkus]

That isn't entirely why the soldiers of the I Corps cheered for McClellan on July 1, 1863... they huzza'd him because they saw him as the victor of South Mountain and Antietam. It wasn't that he just cared for them, but Antietam was considered a great victory by the North, i.e., McClellan kicked Lee back into Virginia.

AoP troops also cheered when he replaced Pope after 2nd Manassas. At that point he had no significant victories to his name. My point was that his popularity wasn't because he was a winner, it was because they thought he would take care of them. Same reason why Montgomery was popular with his troops.

Nobody ignores McClellan's foolish estimation of Confederate troops. He clearly didn't know how to count. That alone doesn't mean he wasn't a decent general though.

How do you seperate those, though? McClellan's "foolish estimation" meant he didn't act when he could have, including at Antietam. Most accounts of that battle note that Lee and the Confederates were pushed to the limit by the uncoordinated Union attacks that day. That lack of coordination, along with the high percentage of his troops that McClellan never bothered committing to action meant that what turned out to be a victory could have been much more. And that doesn't even factor in his lack of aggression leading up to the battle or his lack of action afterwards that ultimately lead to his dismissal.

Grant also didn't shorten the war arguably by being "aggressive". He didn't even defeat Lee in the 1864 campaign season. He did murder a lot of his soldiers though. That's definitely the truth.

We're roaming off topic here, but the reality of the Civil War was that the attacker almost always had higher casualties then the defender as a result of the technology and tactics used. Blaming Grant for that broader truth is a bit unfair. Plus, of the 10 costliest battles of the war, only two happened in 1864.

[Le Ricain]

We're roaming off topic here, but the reality of the Civil War was that the attacker almost always had higher casualties then the defender as a result of the technology and tactics used. Blaming Grant for that broader truth is a bit unfair. Plus, of the 10 costliest battles of the war, only two happened in 1864.

You are correct that only two of the ten happened in 1864. However, four of the ten involved Grant; which I think was the point Colonel Dreux was trying to make.

[Sarkus]

You are correct that only two of the ten happened in 1864. However, four of the ten involved Grant; which I think was the point Colonel Dreux was trying to make.

I was specifically responding to Dreux's focus on 1864 and Grant. I'm not arguing that there weren't some bloody battles involving the guy, but the two that weren't in 1864 were Shiloh (where he was defending) and and Fort Donelson (which makes the top 10 list because of all the CSA casualties and where there weren't that many Union losses.)

Besides, do we refer to Lee as a "bloody butcher" even though he commanded the army that lost the most men of any battle in the entire Civil War (at Gettysburg)? No. So simply pointing to casualty figures clearly doesn't tell the whole story.

Again, though, this is turning into a debate about Grant and not one about McClellan.

[Gray_Lensman]

deleted

[gchristie]

From reading about McClellan (McPhearson, Foote, Kearns Goodwin), I had formed a low regard for his generalship in the field, and an intense dislike of his character. But...I've come to discover from playing AACW...that I behave much like him in PBEM games. After all my effort to create and constitute my northern forces, I'm rather invested in their welfare, I'm too timid in committing them to battle and I tend to overestimate the size of my opponents' forces.

Now, if the game would allow me to write wildly self-aggrandizing letters that mock my superiors to my virtual wife the transformation would be complete .

The game does allow us to view the generals from a new perspective, and sometimes reveals something new about ones' self.

[Colonel Dreux]

Lincoln wanted a general that understood the "math", that being that the south absolutely could NOT keep up with a casualty exchange rate of 2 to 1. Also, those same men that you refer to as being murdered, (the Army of the Potomac) cheered when they realized that Grant was continuing to take the fight to the enemy after the Wilderness fiasco. They finally realized they might die but they were going to die accomplishing something instead of restreating as had always previously been the case. Had Grant retreated like all the other northern generals previous to him instead of maintaining his "aggressive" stance, the south would not have had such a horrible final 1864 winter (literally being under siege and quite close to starvation) and might well have survived quite easily thru 1865.

Now I don't credit Grant for conducting anything approaching a "brilliant" tactical campaign in 1864, but his continuing "aggressiveness" definitely contributed to shortening the war by stymieing the mobile "offensive" power of the Army of Northern Virginia and prevented Lee from being able to accomplish what he had previously been able to accomplish at will and that in itself brought the end of the war much sooner than it would have been had Grant retreated like all the previous northern (Army of the Potomac) generals.

I can't disagree with this. This is all true. Grant furthermore had the benefit of getting to use a veteran army and one that was not going to have to deal with an AoNV that was at its best. I definitely think Grant was an excellent general and fighter, and arguably the best the Union produced.

I just don't think McClellan was bad or even average. I think he was above average and I think, arguably, he could have bottled up Lee in 1863 and laid siege to Richmond much like Grant ended up doing (which he didn't want to do). He would have smartened up with more time in command as well. At some point, I think, the evidence would be all too clear on what Lee had for an army, and McClellan would have responded accordingly much like he did when he got the captured plans before Antietam.

[Colonel Dreux]

I was specifically responding to Dreux's focus on 1864 and Grant. I'm not arguing that there weren't some bloody battles involving the guy, but the two that weren't in 1864 were Shiloh (where he was defending) and and Fort Donelson (which makes the top 10 list because of all the CSA casualties and where there weren't that many Union losses.)

Besides, do we refer to Lee as a "bloody butcher" even though he commanded the army that lost the most men of any battle in the entire Civil War (at Gettysburg)? No. So simply pointing to casualty figures clearly doesn't tell the whole story.

Again, though, this is turning into a debate about Grant and not one about McClellan.

True about Lee, but Gettysburg was an epic battle of 3 days. And Grant himself would have told you he could have done better in 1864, I think. His whole campaign was frontal assault, after frontal assault. He kept moving forward toward Richmond of course which would lead to the ending of the War, but he didn't achieve his goal for the summer, which was to end the War then, and or at least destroy Lee's army.

The problem is Lincoln and his administration didn't give anybody much time. Grant himself almost lost his command while in Mississippi due to his Shiloh performance and the fact that it took him a number of tries to finally get at Vicksburg. It wouldn't have been because he was an awful commander, but because politicians in Washington were constantly demanding change and being prodded by people to give so and so general a chance.

The war could have just as easily been won by some other general in charge of the AoP, I think... like Meade for example, or whoever survived physically and politically.