I don't recall having heard this number, but it's interesting to know, and supports my conjecture, that the amount of cotton produced by the South had nothing to do with how much was exported.
Correct, and there is a distinction between exported and traded to the Union and confiscated by the Union and resold North.
I wouldn't go so far as to say campaigns were organized for this, but I know there were actions within campaigns geared at capturing cotton, especially by Porter IIRC who was motivated by personal gain.
The teche region campaign used assets earmarked for Port Hudson was undertaken for thye benifit of control of cotton lumer etc, so that it could be exported North from NO, the commanding generals brother being the agent for the Mil; district made 200,000 from the campaign including 25,000 bales of cotton shipped to the Northern textile industry. There are quitea few examples of such actions.
Captain_Orso wrote:Yes, but AFAIK the runners commissioned and built by the CS government were only "über" in as far as they were built specifically with the idea of running the blockade, and were only more of the same compared to the runners the British officers were building.
Uber as in being specificly made for the job, coal tar engines as well as sail, they were uber in their sailing perfermence and in what they brought in, because that was what the CS wanted ( chemicals medicine for example) and directly purchased rather than relied on the private enterprise of individuals and the 10% of tonnage of the shiop of a liost t6he CS wanted in gheneral and the ships purchasing agent could arange to purchase.
Not sure what you mean by this.
The CS policy was to starve europe of cotton to effect intervention, but they could have chosen to flood the market with all they could export both choses are effected by the level of effectivness of the blockade. Imo giving the CS this choice, and two different effects based on each, perhaps with RGD based on them, whil;e the Union only has the chose of how much blockade influence to excert isa better method.
BCF by McPherson from page 620 onwards sumarises the cotton exchanges.
Others works deal in more depth. Stanley Lebergotts work is sumararised in BCF, at its m,ost basic he states twice went to europe that went North from confiscated.http://www.thebhc.org/publications/BEHp ... -p0312.pdf
"Lincoln's policy did not go unchallenged. Among others, Gen. Edward Canby wrote to the president that cotton traders "follow the track of the army (and) traffic in its blood," with all the "baseness of Judas Iscariot, but without his remorse." Lincoln responded that, since higher cotton prices enabled the Confederacy to make as much profit as before the war off a small fraction of the antebellum tonnage, it was better to let Northern commercial interests buy and export the cotton than to let the rebels do it directly."
Um--- say what? Wasn't the whole point of the blockade to deprive the South of benefiting with much needed war material?http://mobile.nytimes.com/blogs/opinion ... the-enemy/
Amazon book description:
"Trading With The Enemy" by Philip Leigh
"While Confederate blockade runners famously carried the seaborne trade for the South during the American Civil War, the amount of Southern cotton exported to Europe was only half of that shipped illicitly to the North. Most went to New England textile mills where business “was better than ever,” according to textile mogul Amos Lawrence. Rhode Island senator William Sprague, a mill owner and son-in-law to Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase, was a member of a partnership supplying weapons to the Confederacy in exchange for cotton. The trade in contraband was not confined to New England. Union General William T. Sherman claimed Confederates were supplied with weapons from Cincinnati, while General Ulysses S. Grant captured Rebel cavalry armed with carbines purchased in Union-occupied Memphis. During the last months of the war, supplies entering the Union-controlled port of Norfolk, Virginia, were one of the principal factors enabling Robert E. Lee’s Confederate army to avoid starvation. Indeed, many of the supplies that passed through the Union blockade into the Confederacy originated in Northern states, instead of Europe as is commonly supposed. Merchants were not the only ones who profited; Union officers General Benjamin Butler and Admiral David Dixon Porter benefited from this black market. President Lincoln admitted that numerous military leaders and public officials were involved, but refused to stop the trade.
In Trading with the Enemy: The Covert Economy During the American Civil War, New York Times Disunion contributor Philip Leigh recounts the little-known story of clandestine commerce between the North and South. Cotton was so important to the Northern economy that Yankees began growing it on the captured Sea Islands of South Carolina. Soon the neutral port of Matamoras, Mexico, became a major trading center, where nearly all the munitions shipped to the port—much of it from Northern armories—went to the Confederacy. After the fall of New Orleans and Vicksburg, a frenzy of contraband-for-cotton swept across the vast trans-Mississippi Confederacy, with Northerners sometimes buying the cotton directly from the Confederate government. A fascinating study, Trading with the Enemy adds another layer to our understanding of the Civil War."https://civilwarchat.wordpress.com/2014 ... the-enemy/
more detail from the author
Ships to Mata
Historian James Ford Rhodes:
If accurate statistics could be obtained it would surprise [no one] that the North received more cotton from the internal commerce than did Great Britain from the blockade-runners; the greater portion of this [cotton] staple came from a region under control of the…Confederacy…This trade was a greater advantage to the South than to the North…the South obtained salt, quinine, powder, and arms, absolute necessaries for carrying on the War.
Since Matamoros was a neutral Mexican port federal warships could not blockade it. Before the Civil War only about one ship annually cleared New York for the Mexican town. However, a year after the War’s first important battle at Bull Run the average was about one per week. Ships to Matamoros were also cleared from Boston, Philadelphia, and other Northern harbors. Cargoes included a multitude of northern made items that would have been considered contraband if shipped directly into the Confederacy. They encompassed weapons, munitions, and military uniforms, among other articles. For Yankees willing to help arm the Confederacy at a profit, Matamoros was little more than a legal fig leaf to cover dubious, if not treasonable, conduct. When UK recognised the CS as beligerants it was legal to send material to thje CS, post was the Union legal poisition was that this aid lengthened the war by 2 years and cost 2.15 billion more expense than would otherwise have been the case in its compensation, for the almost total loss of its whalling fleet to UK purshased ships, and 20% of all CS shoulder firearms issued during the war comming from the UK manfucateriors being amongst many examples, especially in the first 12 months as UK imports amounted to half all CS firarms issued, as the CS had 1 production facility only and the US issued 10 to 1 from internal production.
Naval Blockades in Peace and War: An Economic History Since 1750 is the most authorative and usfull https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=h27 ... 64&f=false