pgr wrote:Man...I forgot how the subject of logistics could bring out the trolling...
Grey Fox and others are absolutely correct in stressing the logistical challenges of providing feed for an army's worth of combat and draft animals, and the limits it placed on wagon trains in particular, something that really seems to hit a nerve with Hunny
due to the fox being mathematical incompetent, factually unaware of the most basic events, it hits nerve. Since it's how all bodies of troops behaved, it's no wonder he has no idea of what happened as he does not understand what is possible or not in logistical means.
Could armies live off the land and supplement their supplies? Of course, but only if they stayed on the move and made scarifies in concentration to do it. You also can't do it in close proximity to the enemy. Living off the land could facilitate a maneuver or raid, but not a long term offensive effort.
all armies live of the land, its hoe all of them operated,. Cs started that way running up a massive debt to its population it could never repay,and us adopted the same methods as part of the hard war concept, to make the people feel the burden of war directly, beginning with Hallecks 1863 orders to qm departement of standard 20 wagons to 000 men as the basis of supply in the field. Of those 7 are devoted to food and water, the rest to munitions baggage medical etc. This gives a forward lift capacity of 7@2250 which is 15750lbs lift, and a daily consumption, for the 000 men at 3 lbs, food, 3 lbs water, a requirement of 6000 a day, so the concept is a 3 day capacity from asserts assigned, day 1 goes forward 15 miles, and replaces water for free, so only food is reduced. So from inception the operation has limit of 15750/3000 which is 5 days to exhaust all supply of food. But campaigns last longer than that, we know there is no rolling magazine of wagons to replace daily consumption, because 5 days forward means 4 points behind each with a wagon, i.e. The number of wagons required doubles every 5 days. What does happen is that the 15 miles forward has also covered 5 miles to either flank, so the sq miles covered is 75, depending on pop levels, and 20 is a fairly typical number for the states campaigned over, means at subsistence level, 2 crops a year, there is in that area, 82,ooo lbs in barns of cereal crops, which feeds the 1500 people in that 75 sq miles till next harvest. The first day will empty 2 wagons, which on day 2 then are used to acquire by requisition this, 5 hours to go forward 15, leaves 3 hours to cover 5 miles to a flank and back.If the 000 stay in the region, there is enough to supply them and the civilians for 2500@3 7500 for 11 days before consuming all stocks. So as long as the move continues, its ability to supply itself from the land, is suffiecent to maintain itself.An army otoh introduces a scapular problem, corps of 20 to 25k, occupy move through in a days march 300 sq miles, while an army gathered for engagement and concentrate in the presence of the enemy, occupies a deployment of 2 sq miles, and draws supplies from 100 sq miles around its deployment by virtue of half a days travail for wagons to draw in supplies. So Lee 75000consumes 225000 but can only draw from a 102 sq miles, and a third or so of that is also in the influence of the enemy who is also seeking to do the same from the 114000 stored there, so the cs is consuming twice what exists, even if the us prescience does not reduce its ability to gather, the us armies being larger, despite larger wagons allocation, the number varied with season and object, Sherman at Atlanta had 20, in march to savvanaa twice, that, and up the carolinas, up again by 50%, so quite a variety based on circumstances, but hallecks general rule is the base level. So while the prescience of the enemy is a factor, it's the size of the force that determines the rate the qm canr replace consumption. all armies followed the above in the field, note I used only human food water consumption, animal requirements make the amounts required larger, but the example is good enough to illustrate the concept of how armies supplied themselves from the land for everything except munitions. the only time right became important was to create dumps for extended non movement, usually winter. Like last time, if you read any book on logistics, it will explain this to you as how armies operated in the wbts, it's a century later when munitions, pol become 90% of daily requirements, not food fodder, that armies have to be supplied from base, even in ww2 in the east Germany abandoned that and lived of the land for food and fodder.
Sure Lee was able maneuver for a month away from a rail head in the Gettysburg Campaign, but his Corps were widely dispersed and moving to fresh forging areas for most of the time, which compromised his operational security. (Jeb Stewart being off a-raiding at the critical moment being the most famous). When the AoP closed and forced him to concentrate all his Corps in one space he could only sustain himself in one place for 4 days before he had to move off. Had Meade blocked and fixed him, it would have been a bad day for the ANV.
kinda, if you have yet to read the retreatfrom Gettysburg, logistics of the Gettysburg campaign, the author lkent master ton, ooks at the campaign to determine if it was a giant raid first, an opourtunity to defeat the app only if opourtunity to do so second, as proposed by street so he for instance has a comprehensive account of what Lee came back with, 90000sheep, enough beeves to feed the anv till winter and so on, so it's not a certainty that logistics forced Lee to move, but that's a possible explanation i grant, we do know he had thing about holding the battlefield to show his opponent he had won, it being the accepted way of winning, along with asking for a ceasefire to collect wia bury dead.
Grant's Vicksburg campaign proved you could live off the land long enough for a two week maneuver from one base of supply to another. His bet payed off because he moved fast and prevented Pemberton and Johnston from combining and blocking him. (Which if they had stopped him somewhere short of Vicksburg, he would have been in trouble.)
nope, there was no resupply from base, he received munitions, and hardtack twice, he still had the hard tack after Vicksburg fell. If you read his own words, he resupplied himself after Forrest burnt his base of supply, by confiscating a 30 mile radius from the civilians, leaving them2months supply, and taking the rest, he goes on to say it was enough to sustain his army for 2 months, let alone the 2 weeks, and he learnt an important lesson for the future, being amazed at the abundance of the south agriculture, and its ability to sustain armies moving through it. The 2 weeks reference is a planned limit, of supplies, not a real life number. Page 258, he explains your completely wrong, freely available online, from a search on I was amazed at the quantity of supplies.
Sherman's March to the Sea proves only that when there is no enemy around you can spread an army 100 miles wide and have and have a grand old harvest time stroll through the state of Georgia. When Sherman was moving ON Atlanta with the AoT opposing him, he was most certainly dependent on that rail line.
first is an example of living of the land, Sherman wrote he cut loose from a base of supply and relied on living of the land, he would do so again for longer going north to Carolina, second is incorrect, as Forrest et all removed supply lines forcing him to live of the land, which he found he rather liked doing as it allowed more freedom of manover
And while the men could do pretty well living off the land, a whole lot of horses and mules starved to death because of the inability to sustain them.
nope, equips require only grass to survive, this is a repeat of the last time you thought this, if you look at m v crevelds supplying war, logistics from wAllenstein to Patton, which explains a lot of what I posted above, explains an acre of green fodder can supply 50 equips with all they need, so an army of 40000 equines needs 800 acres to graze on, when moving, they only need to use under a percent of the available green fodder, spit only becomes an issue when static, sieges, so it's almost certain it's other factors that explain the loss, not lack of fodder.
To get back to the thread,
regions need a pop level, that gives your attrition rate for the size of the force, say 5 leaves of pop, and 4 force sizes, small can live for ever, Huge will always suffer attrition, each and every turn it hits you.