Captain_Orso wrote:Everybody's talking about balance, but nobody's talking about what balanced is. Aside from my flights into other aspects of the game, I've only talked about adjusting VP's to better reflect the player's progress, or success, in the game. I've said nothing about changing any other parameters, or units, or leaders, or time-frames; only VP's. And practically nobody has mentioned their thoughts on the subject.
In fact the devs are aware of this situation, and have stated that the VP's are not a measure of who is doing better than expected at any given time. VP's are just a vague measure of who won if the game went full length, and because of this, some balancing was done through allocating different VP's for each side at the start of the grand campaigns.
That's a simple solution, but I was thinking about using VP's differently, as I have stated.
in game terms, you know Mac is poor general and you dont give him command of the army.
Lets imagine Lincoln did that. Would he suffer any political and senior problems cor doing so. How the game simulates it?
aariediger wrote: By the way, what cities can be a capital?
Gray Fox wrote:Here's an assessment of the Union military situation at the end of 1860.
Imagine that you and your American friends are at a sports bar. For some reason a Cricket match is on TV. You decide to go out in the parking lot and play the game yourselves. You Google the rules and by default someone eventually wins. Unfortunately, it was filmed and this goes viral. Now, the Presidsent wants you to take several hundred thousand people and create a National Cricket League overnight.
This is basically what Lincoln wanted from his Generals, with the additional kick in the nuts that 2% of all Americans were going to die. No one in the Western Hemisphere had ever led an army of tens of thousands onto a battlefield. Many of the engagements still hold benchmarks that have not been surpassed after 150 years in this half of the world. The States' volunteer units were virtually men's clubs that showed up at parades. West Point was basically an engineering college. The peace time army was not a school for training to fight an enormous total war. Military command was like being the manager at Dairy Queen, only you never actually made any ice cream.
If the game was actually realistic and historical to reflect this, then hardly anyone could even play it.
So how does one implement these major factors into the game? On the one side, the Union player, who knows McClellan, and on the other side, a McClellan who doesn't do what the player wishes, when he wants, and then Washington (actually the player, but not in this case), meddling with the plans of McClellan (in this case, actually the player)?
aariediger wrote:I think you have to decide which part of the Lincoln/McClellan frustration battle you want the player to be. Are you Lincoln, who is desperate for a fighter who will actually take his army to war? Or are you McClellan, whose plans are constantly disrupted by the CiC, to the point where Lincoln actually picks your corps commanders for you, and then holds back McDowell's backdoor attack on Richmond because Jackson gave Lincoln the willies?
BTW making McClellan 2-3-0 is an horrendous ideal. It's and invitation for attack, versus a defensive rating of 0. It will pull down every corps' defensive rating as well. It would be like Hood on heroin as army commander.
not correct, expecting mc to win, and then have to face a democratic war winning general in th next election, with war winning record, he cut off all replacements, removed 50k from mc control and settled for not winning Richmond, in addition, restoring the union as it was and a constitution as it is, was not what he and the radicals were fighting the war to achieve. The war was fought with one hand for the simple reason that the north was not united in fighting to achieve what the republicans wanted from it, it's that simple, as simple as the in game values do not do what the historical record shows commanders doing with the resources given them in combat. Nor is the relative numbers of formations or manpower an accurate one, so the number of factors being incorrectly used is beyond anyone's modding, as it must be the result of game balancing by the design team for game play.Captain_Orso wrote:The game has decided for you; you are always Lincoln, you are always Washington.
And you are going off the point.
- Lincoln didn't know how bad McClellan was, so he appointed him commander. (You, on the other hand, as the player know McClellan, and can and may, with hardly a consequence, send McClellan off to Portland, Maine to count Canadian Geese flying south for the winter.)appointed twice, being the best officer for the post, saving the union from defeat both times according to Lincoln. Lincoln knew Mc was the only commander to inflict more losses on the ANV than his own army suffered in doing so, Lincoln was dead before reading both Lee and Longsreeet write Mc was the abelest commander they faced in the war. Point is Mc in game values in no way whatsoever reflect his effect on the offensive and defensive losses forces under his direction would inflict, nor do grants, who was incometent in the extreme, only achieving success because he was given the resources no other commander was allowed. mc penn campaign had won the war in va in 62, but Lincoln stopped mc from having the 150k he wanted, closed the recruiting offices and then withheld 50k from mc in mid campaign, and then refused him permission to cross the river and come at Richmond from behind its right and be supplied by sea. Grant asked for 300k to do the same and was given them and permission to do what Mc said would take Richmond. Mc was statistically one of the best offensive and defensive army commanders the union had, putting more cs casualties up than anyone else, devised the strategy that would take Richmond, create the army control, medical, etc structures, and had the highest recruitments via vol means of all commanders, it's only northern revisionists writers who claim he was poor, because it's either him or the administration was poor, and they prefer to have the democrats mc as the fall guy rather than write correct history in that mc was only after fighting to maintain the union as it was, and the administration was fighting for something else and was willing to risk defeat to achieve those political aims. Lincoln also wrote he was not strong enough to stand up against mc political opponents who opposed him and his direction of the war. Mike Griffith has a web page with a fairly good explanation of how why and when mc became the fall guy for the adminsistrations failures.fact free, Potus acepts rejects or gave specific orders to corps commanders or army ccomanders directly or through Stanton. What you get in game is not a reflection of the effects on combat that the officers had in reality.- Lincoln couldn't control McClellan, because he felt he had no choice but to accept almost any plan McClellan decided on. (You control McClellan, in that you can move McClellan at will, although you cannot make him be active. You can be unhappy with his stats, but never with what he does, because you are doing it.)- Lincoln didn't trust McClellan, so in the middle of McClellan's campaign, Lincoln ordered McClellan to leave more of his force behind in northern Virginia to cover the capital. (You are McClellan and Lincoln, and trust your own plans, and will not mess with them in the middle of deployment, unless you yourself decide to do it.)
odd you mention grants memoirs, as in it he recounts by 64 when he lived of the land by abandoning supply from base, to swing around vicks urg,taking what the army needed from a 15 mile frontage, amply feeding the army, he learnt an important lesson of logistics, this policy of living of the land then became national military policy as part of yhe strategy of exhustion, to win militarily coupled with mild political post conflct policy to prevent insurgency, as living of the enemys land ment its civilian population had its food taken to support the passing army, which was why cs desertions went through the roof when all us armies adopted living of the land for food stuff from 64 onward.your mule comment is wrong, but still interesting, cs po of 800k to us 300k, horse 6 million to 1.5 million, gave differnt edges to each side.my guess is your thinking og roth for roman empire and engeles for macedonia using mules as logistic manovering of field forces requirments that show neither empire contained enough mules to do so, being widly used as examples in logistic courses. 1100000 mules has the forward lift capacity of 220 million lbs, which is equal to the requirements of a 200000 man army for a years campaign, having 3000 calories a day per man in its 3lbs daily ration.Gray Fox wrote:Welcome back, pgr!
Speaking of old posts, when players objected to the "all east strategy", we discussed the importance of the Mississippi River to the Union. Everyone seemed to agree that railroads and the Erie Canal had eliminated the need for the Midwest to rely on the waterway. After the fall of New Orleans, it was no longer a commercial highway for the CSA either. After the river was "cleared", I could only find that Union ironclad warships used it to transport wounded and cotton plunder. At least one struck a mine, so it wasn't really open to commerce. In Grant's memoirs, he alluded to the fact that Texas cattle no longer fed the Confederate army for justification of his campaign. Logistically, if a Civil War army moved very far away from a railhead, then it would starve. There weren't enough mules in North America to move supplies to them. Rivers also offerred an easy supply route for military operations. IMHO, that is why the Mississippi and the Cumberland were targets, not for economic reasons.
different statement, your first is completely false, this is a different question, 1100000 mules with 6 on a wagon gives me now 183000 wagons each with 2000 lbs forward lift which can now instead provide 2 times the first example, I showed where you have no idea I how the army's supplied themselves. Aparantly you have never how armies marched a certain distance, put the horses mules out to eat grass so as not require grain feed, or if static for a period had to send them further afield to obtain grass, example brags arty horses miles away when attacked and is why so many of his guns could not move or be withdrawn at missionary ridge, this was common practice. and yes the amount of mules does change it when you put them with wagons, it increases forward lift by a factor of 2 or so, either distance or time period goes up by the same ratio.Gray Fox wrote:The mules pulled wagons. The wagons were loaded with food for the army...and food for the mules. The mules had to eat on the way out and the way back. The longer the journey, the smaller the portion of the load was for the army. At a certain distance, the wagon would only be full of food for the mules. No amount of additional mules changes that.
you really have no understanding of the war, Sherman's Qm report shows he arrived with more food stocks than he set out with. setting out with 5000 beeves he arrived in savvanah with 10,000, sending fresh beef to the blockade squadron. He writes his army has abundance of everything except cloths coffe and sugar.Us naval resupplied him with munitions , siege guns, with which he informed Hardee's he would use in the harshest way possible if he did not surrender the city, and medical supply, new uniforms and took back his wounded, they provided no food stocks as they were not required, as Sherman had enough to march to join grant, moving for 50 days and living on new cs land, without resupply from base, with already with him, already having lived of the land for 5 weeks in getting to savannah,Sherman didn't march to the sea. He marched to the U.S. Navy and resupply. If he had not taken the fort protecting Savannah and forced the city's surrender, his army would have starved. That's why armies don't live off the land as a rule.
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