Does Anaconda on the Mississippi effect the CSA?

[plasticpanzers]

Does seizing the Mississippi from the CSA crimp their supply and/or production? Does it seem easier to just go after
their armies in 1863 then worry about clearing the 'Father of Waters' for the Union? Is there a real effect in dividing
the CSA Western 1/3?

[charlesonmission]

The game sets New Orleans, Vicksburg and Memphis as objective cities. Further, there are some Victory Point places as well (Island 10?) and Baton Rouge - I believe. So, the Union can gain a lot by clearing the Mississippi and the CSA loses lots - particular if New Orleans is lost. There isn't a special impact though when the Mississippi is cleared completely that I'm aware of.

Does seizing the Mississippi from the CSA crimp their supply and/or production? Does it seem easier to just go after
their armies in 1863 then worry about clearing the 'Father of Waters' for the Union? Is there a real effect in dividing
the CSA Western 1/3?

[plasticpanzers]

I can understand that (objective points) but the point was not geographical targets but cutting the CSA into parts. This should effect
rail (at least some is seperate from the rest of the CSA) as well as supplies (beef and leather) and some other items and effect production
overall in the CSA.

[charlesonmission]

If you take over a town, set up batteries, patrol the rivers, take over RRs via military control, any of those impact CSA overall productions and supply flow.

I can understand that (objective points) but the point was not geographical targets but cutting the CSA into parts. This should effect
rail (at least some is seperate from the rest of the CSA) as well as supplies (beef and leather) and some other items and effect production
overall in the CSA.

[plasticpanzers]

I am not being obtuse but trying to understand that if i take the Mississippi does production done such as in Texas still end up in
Richmond for the CSA player/AI to use or is it restricted to the West only as historically it was.

[Mickey3D]

There is no special rule in the game restricting supply flow if Mississippi is in Union hands. But as explained by Charlesonamission, you can cut the flow as per standard rules.

[Captain_Orso]

Yes, everything represented on the map (units, GS, Ammo) can be restricted in its movement. Things represented only in pools (RailTP, RivTP, WSU, CC's, Money) cannot be restricted.

Holding all of the Mississippi has its own merits, in mobility and restricting mobility.

Strategy cannot always be measured in pounds and cents, but in pounding some sense

[ArmChairGeneral]

The short answer to the original question is no. Though there are many benefits to securing the river, it does not have any special effects beyond the tactical considerations and the VPs the river cities produce (and the fact that if you can execute Anaconda you have the game well in hand already).

For the most part there is not much actual supply movement going on across the Mississippi, (although quite a bit happens north-south) and the stuff that does occur happens in a few obvious places. It is relatively easy to block that flow without total control of the river, but it isn't all that important to do so. Many people have argued that there ought to be some concrete benefit to successfully executing the Anaconda plan, (the Texas Beef argument) but in the end the effects of the component parts (like capturing New Orleans and Memphis) are pretty serious for the CSA in and of themselves.

[plasticpanzers]

Thank you all for your replies. Have been very helpful in figuring out "Why we fight". Some games are for
territory and some for destruction of enemy armies. Its important to know where to apply pressure and why.

[Rod Smart]

Capturing New Orleans and Memphis cripples the Confederacy.
Securing all the forts along the river immensely helps the Union.

Capturing the little podunk towns along the river in Arkansas and northern Louisiana does nothing.

[BattleVonWar]

Sometimes you have to stomp on a few ants to get to the Queen. Securing the Missippi River also forces the CSA to stop supplying troops it built on the other side Eastward where they could be fighting for valuable real estate.

Texas/Arkansas/Missouri provide enough troops in their builds to augment several medium Corps in time. Cut the River early, they don't. NOLA/Memphis and Eastern Tennessee are juicy...very juicy. NOLA was the largest city in the South at the outbreak of war. Biggest port at one time in THE USA : ) (control left click on NOLA) very yummy! In my current PBEM, I've devoted an entire Army and Corp to it and I will die before I surrender it. Richmond will far first and rightfully should. :P

Capturing New Orleans and Memphis cripples the Confederacy.
Securing all the forts along the river immensely helps the Union.

Capturing the little podunk towns along the river in Arkansas and northern Louisiana does nothing.

[RebelYell]

Could Northern cities get more money when the river is cleared like Richmond gets if you can take Fort Monroe?

Holding all the cities along the river could also give extra 10 NM for the Union and take 10 NM from the CSA?

[RebelYell]

Well the NM thing would have to work for both so that wont work well as the situation can go around many times, extra VPs for Union for every turn it remains open?

[Gray Fox]

We did a thread on the strategic importance of the Mississippi river last year. It was decided that early in the 19th century the river was vital to all cities, north and south, along it and its tributaries. Even today, NO is the 5th largest port in the world. However, by mid-century we felt that railroads and canals had replaced old Miss' as an economic highway at least for northern cities. However, military supplies and armies can move over rivers easier and quicker than over land. Controlling great rivers gave the Union the ability to strike deep into the CSA. So how important were these battles ultimately? In his memoirs, Grant explained that control of the Mississippi prevented cattle from Texas supplying the Confederate armies in the east. However, Lee's army was hungry because the railroads couldn't get food that was still in abundance in Alabama and Georgia to VA. If Grant can't adequately explain the Mississippi Campaign, then...

[RebelYell]

We did a thread on the strategic importance of the Mississippi river last year. It was decided that early in the 19th century the river was vital to all cities, north and south, along it and its tributaries. Even today, NO is the 5th largest port in the world. However, by mid-century we felt that railroads and canals had replaced old Miss' as an economic highway at least for northern cities. However, military supplies and armies can move over rivers easier and quicker than over land. Controlling great rivers gave the Union the ability to strike deep into the CSA. So how important were these battles ultimately? In his memoirs, Grant explained that control of the Mississippi prevented cattle from Texas supplying the Confederate armies in the east. However, Lee's army was hungry because the railroads couldn't get food that was still in abundance in Alabama and Georgia to VA. If Grant can't adequately explain the Mississippi Campaign, then...

The question is should the historical political pressure from Mid-West, especially from Illinois be a factor in the game.
Many of us think that it should or the game lacks a lot of historical accuracy, there should be pressure to move down the river valley or pay some price in NM and loyalty in those states.

[Rod Smart]

The question is should the historical political pressure from Mid-West, especially from Illinois be a factor in the game.
Many of us think that it should or the game lacks a lot of historical accuracy, there should be pressure to move down the river valley or pay some price in NM and loyalty in those states.

Did that pressure exist?

I know of no reference to any such political pressure.

[RebelYell]

Did that pressure exist?

I know of no reference to any such political pressure.

Lincoln woud be the most famous but who where the people behind him, I have read several mentions during the years about the rich and powerful Illinoiss business and merchant class seeing the river still important.

[Keeler]

Lincoln woud be the most famous but who where the people behind him, I have read several mentions during the years about the rich and powerful Illinoiss business and merchant class seeing the river still important.

I've read this somewhere as well, but can't think of any sources offhand.

Political pressure also lead to the disastrous Red River Campaign in 1864, and the Knoxville Campaign in 1863.

Perhaps there could be some sort of event like the "On to Richmond" one to encourage players to attack the Mississippi, but is it necessary? The NM and objective points are already there. Would it help negate the "all east" strategy in multiplayer games, and do multiplayers want something like that?

[Durk]

What is real and what is imagined as real are so hard to differentiate. An answer to the question of pressure might be found in the trade in cotton during the war. As even today, the Mississippi provides the cheapest, most available mode of transportation of mid-western goods to overseas markets. Despite claims that the railroad rendered the Mississippi irrelevant to war winning, this river was still the hub of commerce. Once controlled, it not only cut off far west supplies, it open the sale of cotton to fill Union coffers.

Lincoln was constantly lobbied by Union traders in cotton to get the trade with Europe going again as even the North was worried that Britain was developing cotton production in Egypt and India.

[RebelYell]

What is real and what is imagined as real are so hard to differentiate. An answer to the question of pressure might be found in the trade in cotton during the war. As even today, the Mississippi provides the cheapest, most available mode of transportation of mid-western goods to overseas markets. Despite claims that the railroad rendered the Mississippi irrelevant to war winning, this river was still the hub of commerce. Once controlled, it not only cut off far west supplies, it open the sale of cotton to fill Union coffers.

Lincoln was constantly lobbied by Union traders in cotton to get the trade with Europe going again as even the North was worried that Britain was developing cotton production in Egypt and India.

True, some Union officers where also practically working for the merchants and setting up private venture campaigns to steal cotton warehouses.

One thing Grant had to watch over often not to effect his own plans and most likely to give in at times to the money behind financing and supplying his armies.

[RebelYell]

I've read this somewhere as well, but can't think of any sources offhand.

Political pressure also lead to the disastrous Red River Campaign in 1864, and the Knoxville Campaign in 1863.

Perhaps there could be some sort of event like the "On to Richmond" one to encourage players to attack the Mississippi, but is it necessary? The VP and objective points are already there. Would it help negate the "all east" strategy in multiplayer games, and do multiplayers want something like that?

The all East should come with a high risk of damaging the ability to continue the war if it does not go fast and smooth.

Bringing down loyalty in the Mid-West and Union National Morale would be a fair trade for this strategy.

[RebelYell]

Does anyone have access to Chicago newspapers during the war?

That would be a good source for the political lobbies present at the time.

[Gray Fox]

Historically, the Anaconda plan was hated by the Union papers and was only reluctantly adopted by the Lincoln administration, so I can't imagine that it was ever the plan of the Midwest. I also doubt that civilian transports filled with midwestern trade items safely used the Mississippi river until after the war. Again, we had a pretty good discussion about this in an older thread and it was fairly obvious that the river is one trade route, but that railroads and canals had made it much less necessary to the Union. If I want to get my raw materials in St. Louis to the factories of the NE, it doesn't make much sense to send them south hundreds of miles to NO and then around FL and back north again. The same is true for finished products sent back to the Midwest. Thus, we could not reasonably determine an economic reason for the Union to control the Mississippi. Militarily, controlling the river split the CSA in two. As a retired soldier, I might point out that normally one splits an enemy in two and then crushes the weaker part into surrender. This was not done to Texas, Arkansas, etc. So, I believe the goal of the Mississippi campaign was to keep popular opinion high by doing something, anything, to get a headline.

The "On to Richmond" event makes economic, political and military sense because the Union really should take the Confederate capital. These reasons are debatable for a "Divide the South" event.

http://www.ageod-forum.com/showthread.php?35195-Importance-of-opening-the-Mississippi

[Rod Smart]

Taking the Mississippi is a "win" because it cuts the Confederacy in two.

But is it any more of a "win" than cutting the Confederacy in two by taking Atlanta and Savannah? Or going overland and taking Birmingham and Mobile?


Unlike the drive to take Richmond, or the panicked local newspapers demanding local garrisons, I am unaware of any political pressure to reopen the Mississippi.

[RebelYell]

MEMOIRS OF GENERAL U. S. GRANT

When General Sherman first learned of the move I proposed to make, he called to see me about it. I recollect that I had transferred my headquarters from a boat in the river to a house a short distance back from the levee. I was seated on the piazza engaged in conversation with my staff when Sherman came up. After a few moments' conversation he said that he would like to see me alone. We passed into the house together and shut the door after us. Sherman then expressed his alarm at the move I had ordered, saying that I was putting myself in a position voluntarily which an enemy would be glad to manoeuvre a year—or a long time—to get me in. I was going into the enemy's country, with a large river behind me and the enemy holding points strongly fortified above and below. He said that it was an axiom in war that when any great body of troops moved against an enemy they should do so from a base of supplies, which they would guard as they would the apple of the eye, etc. He pointed out all the difficulties that might be encountered in the campaign proposed, and stated in turn what would be the true campaign to make. This was, in substance, to go back until high ground could be reached on the east bank of the river; fortify there and establish a depot of supplies, and move from there, being always prepared to fall back upon it in case of disaster. I said this would take us back to Memphis. Sherman then said that was the very place he would go to, and would move by railroad from Memphis to Grenada, repairing the road as we advanced. To this I replied, the country is already disheartened over the lack of success on the part of our armies; the last election went against the vigorous prosecution of the war, voluntary enlistments had ceased throughout most of the North and conscription was already resorted to, and if we went back so far as Memphis it would discourage the people so much that bases of supplies would be of no use: neither men to hold them nor supplies to put in them would be furnished. The problem for us was to move forward to a decisive victory, or our cause was lost. No progress was being made in any other field, and we had to go on. Sherman wrote to my adjutant general, Colonel J. A. Rawlins, embodying his views of the campaign that should be made, and asking him to advise me to at least get the views of my generals upon the subject. Colonel Rawlins showed me the letter, but I did not see any reason for changing my plans. The letter was not answered and the subect was not subsequently mentioned between Sherman and myself to the end of the war, that I remember of. I did not regard the letter as official, and consequently did not preserve it. General Sherman furnished a copy himself to General Badeau, who printed it in his history of my campaigns. I did not regard either the conversation between us or the letter to my adjutant-general as protests, but simply friendly advice which the relations between us fully justified. Sherman gave the same energy to make the campaign a success that he would or could have done if it had been ordered by himself. I make this statement here to correct an impression which was circulated at the close of the war to Sherman's prejudice, and for which there was no fair foundation.]

http://www.gutenberg.org/files/4367/4367-h/4367-h.htm#ch37

[BattleVonWar]

Interesting RebelYell, thank you for that piece!

I think that there is no incentive for the Union in game to perform Anaconda. Should there be a NM loss for the CSA or boost to the Union. New Orleans/Memphis are two of the primary objectives along the line which are pretty nifty to take but so very costly that few would go out of there way. I have never once lost NOLA in a single game, in 5 CSA PBEM games. Why? Cause it's easy to defend and hard to attack. Should Richmond and Anaconda be required to end the Confederacy?

Or should the entirety of the Confederate Power solely rest East of the Missippi in Atlanta to Richmond? I am a bit worried as it stands the way the game is played you simple cannot defend the Missippi as The CSA till July 1863

[FightingBuckeye]

RebelYell, I'm reading that more as Grant expressing his opinion on what a reverse in the only theater the North was making progress would have on the conduct of the war and the pressing need for a 'decisive victory'

Nowhere do I see any indication that controlling the entirety of the Mississippi was a goal in and of itself.

[RebelYell]

RebelYell, I'm reading that more as Grant expressing his opinion on what a reverse in the only theater the North was making progress would have on the conduct of the war and the pressing need for a 'decisive victory'

Nowhere do I see any indication that controlling the entirety of the Mississippi was a goal in and of itself.

In other parts he talks about the pressures that Lincoln has to advance in the West,, when Vicksburg siege starts Illinoiss politicians and merchants flock to visit Grant.
Maybe I am wrong but usually things happen for a reason.

[Gray Fox]

Grant writes that freedmen worked to cut trees for the steamers that came to his base of supply before the battle of Vicksburg. Obviously, these were not ships laden with trade goods for Europe, because they could not continue on to NO. The merchants in the Midwest and their politicians came to Grant to see how much military supplies they could transfer to his effort. It is most likely that the merchants would do this for a profit to the satisfaction of their elected officials. So the economic and political effort for a Mississippi campaign can thus be explained rather easily. If you build a supply base, they will come. This is still not a war winning economic or political reason to secure the river. Although it is certainly arguable that the surrender of thirty thousand Confederate soldiers at Vicksburg was more significant than defeating Lee's army at Gettysburg, I'm sure that Lincoln used the Gettysburg victory more to alleviate the recruitment and NM points that Grant mentions in the above post than any other victory.

[tripax]

In previous threads I've argued that we shouldn't over-estimate the importance of military control of individual cities to the economy; in the thread linked earlier, I weakly make a similar argument about New Orleans. That said, I think I was too dismissive of the importance of the Mississippi (and I hope I wasn't too dismissive of the importance of other cities). As evidence, I'd really just like to link to a couple fun anecdotes.

The opening of the Mississippi was a big deal and civilian transportation along it of both goods and people was quite robust. The New York Times in 1863 after the fall of Vicksburg has a number of articles about steamships on the river which are quite fun to read, two of the first such are here and here. I still haven't looked for or found a definitive work on the economics of New Orleans during and immediately before and after the Civil War. One problem with what I have seen is they rely heavily on anecdotes - which are great but I prefer to more generalizeable information.

As I've mentioned before, I think we should be careful to keep somewhat separate events that were good for the economic well being of Union civilians and businesses and events that were good for the economic well being of the Union war effort. They were very connected, but not identical. For example, the affect of opening the Mississippi was different for Northern steamboat companies than for the Union government.