elxaime wrote:Agree on the relative army size issue. In game after game as the Union I have found that when I advance, the CSA has at least as many divisions opposite. Added to the way defense is handled, the USA simply lacks the numbers to make successful attacks. Eventually they do, but meanwhile there is a lot of sitting around. All it takes is one big failed attack and you lose 20-30 morale points as you watch your army get "pinned" by the game mechanics into making more attacks even after it is clear they are defeated.
Captain_Orso wrote: Did I hear my name?
Not sure what I can add to what you've already said. Without just getting philosophical.
To defeat an enemy you must eliminate his ability to resist your force militarily. You have a few options to do this.
- You can undermine his--his nation's--will to fight [can't really be done in this game, nor effectively in the real world]
- Attack his force to reduce it's size an effectiveness [can be very dangerous and costly]
- Limit the ability of your enemy to field an army {economics} [generally the cheapest way to limit an enemy / goes hand-in-hand with brute force, it's like getting your enemy to open a door to a small crack.... and then smashing a pry-bar into the crack, beats the hell out of trying to break a solid, steal, security door down with a sledge hammer].
Lee was preparing to pull out of Richmond and Petersburg when his right flank started to collapse; he had already informed Davis to be ready to leave within the next week or so. His army's strength had been waining since the onset of winter, from disease, fighting, but also greatly from desertion.
They were on short rations for nearly the entire time because they couldn't get supplies to the troops. Sherman's march played a role in this, but maybe not as much as simply the South's lack of transportation infrastructure.
The South's economy ran on the export of cotton and the import of practically everything they needed. Because of this the depended on shipping for trade which meant that their trade routes went down the rivers and into the sea, but not across the land from one state or region to the next. So when war broke out and transportation from one harbor to the next became limited or eliminated through the blockade, getting produce from one region to another fell back on rail and roads. The former was limited by the lack of a need to build it up before the war; the latter by the same reason plus it's nature [dirt roads were not dependable (mud) and macadamized roads were still pretty rare].
So the way the South's antebellum economy limited it by its nature during the war. The north needs to exploit this, which is how the anaconda was born.
RebelYell wrote:Isnt this NM in the game?
I think it is the best way for CSA to win in the game and also historically the only way?
Captain_Orso wrote:What I mean with influencing NM is that the only organizations or options dealing specifically with lowering the enemie's NM; things like trying to assassinate certain politicians or celebrates, spreading rumors, etc. The closest you come are the options that can lower FI.
You can go for the targets that raise your own NM and they will also lower the enemie's NM, but I think that is more coincidental. But all those 'strategic' and 'objective' locations implemented to the game are also strategic in games-play-sense in that they simply do have strategic importance.
Asher413 wrote:Sorry if it's been said, in the wrong place or too late for AACW2 but...
One thing that I feel needed improvement from AACW was management of generals. I literally would have notebook pages full of generals and their stats to constantly decide who I wanted where- it would be nice if there was a leger of sorts just listing the generals, and their basic stats (Strat-Off-Def-Senority) to help with this.
Stauffenberg wrote:What many of us would really welcome is a fix on the promotion dynamic that will allow generals to be promoted--without having to break them free into independent stacks in order to do so.
Asher413 wrote:Sorry if it's been said, in the wrong place or too late for AACW2 but...
One thing that I feel needed improvement from AACW was management of generals. I literally would have notebook pages full of generals and their stats to constantly decide who I wanted where- it would be nice if there was a leger of sorts just listing the generals, and their basic stats (Strat-Off-Def-Senority) to help with this.
aryaman wrote:As an Historian focused on premodern military history I would like to clarify the point of campaigns in winter season. There are multiple examples of those campaigns, however it is true that most of the time it was avoided. The reason for that is not the weather in itself, it is the lack of green fodder for the horses and mules. Fodder was the largest supply item for any army, a horse requirement being more than five times the weight of what a soldier required (and taking still much more room in cart). If an army moved out of camp in winter season, aproximately between December and April/May it would find very little green fodder, and could not supply itself while in the march, so that the supply required for the army from a his supply depot would be greatly increased, and since the extra supply required would be carried in carts, any extra cart would add to the supply requirement. To add to this, the condition of the horses would deteriorate fast. For all this, armies that elected to campaign in winter were exposed to suffer a very high attrition.
That in the game should be translated into a high attrition/loss of cohesion for armies moving not just in bad weather, but in the time period in which green fodder was not available in the field. Bad weather will add misery but it is not the main factor itself.
H Gilmer3 wrote:That is completely awesome point. I always, always, always thought, "There's no way there would be reduced movement/stoppage of movement in winter in places like Alabama, because most winters see very little actual 'winter'". This from having lived here for 30 years. Now, that's not to say we never see snow and bad weather, but it seems to me from my living here, the majority of time is sunny weather that is fairly cold, but not real cold - we get a lot of days in the 40s.
elxaime wrote:I would add this wastage is also potentially true even without the cold weather. Napoleon's 1812 attrition rates were horrendous even before Borodino and the Russian winter hit. Aside from railways, Civil War troops were pretty much in the same boat as Napoleonic troops - everything had to be hauled by men and beasts.
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