ERISS wrote:At least in makhnovist area, there were White subversion operation, aiming to remove Black loyalty to them having less troop levy or to try to launch Green upheaval. It is written by White generals themselves(!), telling they disguised their cavalry as makhnovists to raid their paesants and shout pogromming insults. It is said too by makhnovists, writing they captured false paesants telling lies to make the makhnovists unconsidered. Makhnovists knew not all paesants were liking them, but when one slanderer was known by nobody they were supposed White at first.
Whites knew they could not hope make the mujiks to revolt for them, but White could hope to make them revolt against some other.
Often too, Green slogans could be perfect as political White message, such as "Kill the bolsheviks and the jews". So a spy white believer could be pleased to shout it.
So, I think White should at least have one Subversion, not to have better loyalty in an enemy region, but to enhance the Green loyalty, in hope of armed troubles.
Orel wrote:I am not aware of such examples when Whites, with their quite limited forces that could barely hold the frontline in 1919, would launch such complex operations instead of using the same cavalry for better objectives.
Though I suppose there could have been different partisan units that switched sides from Greens to Petliura to Reds to Grigoriev with a tiny number serving the Whites that you may be speaking of, they were never really controlled by the Armed Forces of South of Russia.
, what is the benefit of the player to use this option? I would suppose almost none would actually try it, as their resources would rather go to increasing their own army than relying on the AI to do some harm.
, the command of the Volunteer Army actually was very much against Jewish pogroms
Receiving a hostile reception from the inhabitants of Taurida, experiencing failure in his efforts to bring about an uprising in the Don territory, and being unsuccessful in his efforts in establishing dependable relations with the Makhno forces, Wrangel turned his attention to the Kuban. Here the remnants of the counter-revolutionary forces, having taken cover in the hills during the collapse of the Don army in the spring, once more now raised their heads, gathering about them the wealthier peasants and higher Cossack elements who were dissatisfied with the Soviet government (including such White elements as the bans of Colonel Skakun, Colonel Lebedev, General Fostikov, etc.) Greatest activity was manifested by the white-green detachments, operating in the Maikop, Batalpashin and Labinsky sections. Unified under the banner of the so-called "Army of Russian Renaissance" (General Fostikov), the early part of August these reached a total strength of about 6,000 to 7,000 infantry and cavalry troops with 30 to 40 machine-guns, and several guns.
The Kuban contingent of General Wrangel is of considerable interest to the historian of our civil war, constituting as it did an operation based on political rather than military considerations. Wrangel sent his forces to the Kuban for the purpose of organizing a mass uprising. Scattered insurgent detachments were to gather about these forces, which were to serve as the nuclei of the insurrection.
Wrangel was convinced that "later on, proceeding in their native localities, among their friendly people, joined by numerous insurgent elements, the troops would succeed in seizing Yekaterinodar - the heart of the Kuban, and before the Red command would have time to concentrate sufficient forces, the northern part of the Kuban territory could be cleared of the Reds." For political reasons, as commander of the White forces here was selected General Ulagai, a man (according to Wrangel himself) who was very popular among the Cossacks, a man of daring and resolution, one "capable of performing miracles". It was assumed that "everyone would follow him". As we know, Wrangel was mistaken in these optimistic calculations. The attitude of the leading Cossack elements (represented to General Wrangel by his agents in a rather optimistic light) had been mistaken to represent the attitude of the entire Cossack population, and General Ulagai found himself unprepared for the organizational and leadership task that this undertaking involved.
Wrangel's plan of action here contemplated the landing of the main force of his landing detachment in the vicinity of the Akhtyr-Primorskoi railway station, swiftly moving it up to the important railway junction of Timoshevskaya and, basing the operation on this point, to seize the city of Yekaterinodar (re-named Krasnodar).
Smaller detachments were landed on the Taman peninsula (General Kharlamov) and between Anapoi and Novorossiiek (General Cherepov), whose mission was, on the one hand, to divert as much of the enemy forces as possible from the direction of the main effort, and on the other, after capturing, respectively, the Taman peninsula and Novorossiisk, to advance on Krasnodar (Yekaterinodar), having the local insurgents join in the undertaking. Thus, in the Yekaterinodar (Krasnodar) area, there was to be effected a junction of all forces for a further offensive to be carried into the depth of the Kuban territory.
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