I need a mod that adjust battles results.
It is May, 62. I have spent all of 1861/62 using $2000 volunteers and full mobilization to create the largest possible army I can due to experiences in past PBEMs. I spent almost no money at all on my blue water navy. I have build enough brown water navy to support the West but it is much smaller than in my past games. My entire focus was creating the largest possible ground army I could create.
I finally launch my Spring 62 offensive in the West.
It was a massacre.
I launched my two best corps (power-2600) under two very good commanders, Grant (5-6-4) and Sheridan (4-3-2), across the Cumberland to Humboldt against a weaker segment of a long, entrenched reb line. Humboldt was manned by a Reb corps/division (power-450) under Edward Johnson (3-2-2). Now Johnsons Corps spent the whole winter digging in and was certainly at 8 entrenchment level.
So with odds of around 5/6-1 with superior leadership, the Union suffered 26,477 casualties to 9873 Reb casaulties. That was a massacre.
So what happened during the battle. Zollicoffer was north of Humboldt and he marched to the guns. Albert Johnson was in Nashville, he also marched to the guns. So my attempt to attack a single isolated corps with 5/6-1 odds turned into 103 Union elements vs 98 Rebel elements. The odds were 1-1. Also strangely, Grant's Corps who was first across the river, apparantly did not suffer a single casaulty. Sheridans corps fought the entire battle and lost 26,477 men. There isn't much left of Sheridan's Corps. (I thought 1.07 was suppose to fix that problem of only a single formation fighting a battle.) And I won't be able to replace Sheridan's Corps for months.
Now perhaps we can consider this battle just an odd result.
But in Dec 61, I launched an attack on Clarke, Virginia. My two corps had a power of a little over 2000. The defense was around 450-500 power but also completely entrenched. So I am attacking with approximately 4-1 odds. My losses were 20,000 men and the rebs lost 10,000 men. Although in that case also, I fought the troops at Clarke as well as large numbers of troops that "marched to the guns" from Manassas and possibly Culpepper. It is another battle I don't want to repeat.
My opponent fully understands the value of entrenchments and march to the guns. His western defense is an entrenched line streching from south of Nashville all the way to Columbus, Ky and anchored with Forts Donelson and Island Number 10. And remember this is in 1862. In early 1862, the rebs have a fortified, entrenched line of approximately 160-240 miles in the west. And with all the troops the rebs receive with full mobilization, the line is well manned. The eastern front is the same entrenched line of corps. Nowhere can I attack without having to batter through a heavily entrenched enemy with reinforcements immediately available. I cannot maneuver...I can only go "over the top" against heavily entrenched formations of rebs.
This is World War One--50-60 years early. From the trench lines streching for hundreds of miles to the attackers mowed down as they try to close.
If I didn't have to attack to win, I wouldn't. It seems I am going to need 8/10to 1 odds to win a battle without my troops ended up totally decimated. Not good. As the Union doesn't have anywhere near to 8/10-1 advantage in numbers-not to mention a substantial Union leadership deficit.
As the Union, I can beat a newbie in a PBEM if they make mistakes. Kilcavalry was a newbie in the AAR game. He made the mistake of often attacking my troops which put him in a big hole as he didn't realize the strength of defense. Well, he has learned his lessons. In this rematch PBEM, he is not attacking. He has entrenched lines streching for 100's of miles. I am doing the attacking as I must. So we are now both experienced and using the best tactics as we understand the game. And my losses are appalling. They are not sustainable. I cannot see any way to reasonably challenge the entrenched defenses of the East or the West. Seaborne invasions are the only option I see left. And I am not optimistic about them as it is very easy to "stop them up".
I doubt if people playing the AI are seeing these sorts of defenses. But between two experienced players in a PBEM using the game as designed, these are the tactics used and they produce the results as I described.
So what parts of the game are encouraging these types of World War One defenses which produce such lopsided results?
IMO, I see three factors and perhaps there are others. One is the strength of entrenchments. Two is "March to the Guns". Three is the lack of penalties for spreading corps out over 280 miles instead of concentrating their army. All of these factors contribute to a World War One style of defense, lack of maneuvering space and the WWI casualty rates, IMO.
I am posting this in the mods forums rather than the general forum as I know the people here and AGEOD are always considering how to improve the game.
So any thoughts, ideas or arguments? Any suggested corrections. Is there something I am missing in terms of tactics which might explain why I am experiencing these sort of results in PBEMs?
Does anyone else see these results as needing some tweaking???
-
McNaughton
- Posts: 2766
- Joined: Wed Mar 21, 2007 8:47 pm
- Location: Toronto, Canada
I just don't see this, as explained, as a problem.
What I do see as a problem, is the real lack of 'drive' to attack when the odds are not in your favour. As a Confederate player, why would you ever attack Maryland/Pennsylvania/Missouri/Kentucky/West Virginia when you can just sit back and let the Union attack you without penalty?
Historically, Lee's attacks into Union territory were critical. If not, then Northern Virginia would experience another season of being pillaged and plundered, with the economy of the state completely desintegrating due to the pressures. Why would Bragg/Hood ever invade Kentucky when defending will pay off much more profitably?
The problem isn't that troops march to the guns, and that entrenchments are powerful, it is that one side can afford to be totally defensive, while the other must always attack. This, to me, is the real issue, not the battle mechanics.
If the South had to attack, in order to maintain morale/victory points, then they would not be able to form such entrenchments, and neither could the union.
Battles did get entrenched and bloody late in the war, when the South could not attack the North (even here, there was a major attempt on Washington, Missouri and Kentucky in 1864, to bring pressure off the attacks in the South).
So, there should be more encouragement, through events, or through the engine, for the South to attack. There should be severe morale losses should the South not take the war to the North, at all. Imagine the knowledge that you are always fighting on your ground, with your homes destroyed/invaded, and your opponent living without such fears?
I figure, that every 6 months there would be events that would trigger should the South (or North, to encourage movement on both sides) only if certain territories are not occupied, and occupied by specific numbers of troops.
For example, in 1862, if Maryland does not have X many provinces under Confederate control for Y turns then a morale event fires that reduced Confederate morale because no invasion of Maryland took place. In 1863, if no invasion of Pennsylvania takes place then a morale hit takes place, and so on, to encourage at least historic actions are taken. Also, the morale hit should be something that one would want to avoid, rather than be able to easily make up by all of the combat victories they experience while sitting on the defensive.
This, or specific missions (take city X by month Y) could be in place to encourage both sides to take realistic objectives, but at least prod them to attack (the choice is always theirs, but they face a morale loss should they choose to ignore it, which sould hopefully affect troop combat ability).
Yet, as it is now, the South can afford, and profit, by sitting and let the Union do the dirty work. The South could not afford to sit back in its forts all winter, and wait for the Union to attack, every campaign season.
Wars are fought and won (and lost) as commanders had to take risks. In this game, as is, the South doesn't really have to risk attacking the North.
After the mechanics of my mod is complete, I am going to toy with the events, with the following priorities...
#1. variable AI General promotions (based on random additions of seniority, instead of set promotions, maybe Franklin gets promoted in early 1862, but maybe Hooker does instead).
#2. AI General command assignments (have events that make the AI change Army commanders via event based on historic situations, so Beauregard will be replaced by Johnston in the winter of 1861, and who may be wounded in 1862 and replaced by Lee depending on the situation, but only for the AI).
#3. Special Mission events (take and hold a Maryland town with X many units by this month and gain this, or, if you don't you will lose this, or maybe there is a chance you get something, like additional conscritps representing Maryland volunteers, or even a new, free unit).
#4. Every-day Disease (add high freqnency, yet low effect events to put constant attrition on your forces, meaning that rarely will a unit be at 100%, and you are constantly having to produce replacements to keep troop numbers 'high')
#5. Armoury events (historically armouries were very prised in 1861, the capture of Harper's Ferry gave the CSA a major boost, and the inability to capture St. Louis resulted in the Missouri State Guard to be perpetually ill and under equipped).
What I do see as a problem, is the real lack of 'drive' to attack when the odds are not in your favour. As a Confederate player, why would you ever attack Maryland/Pennsylvania/Missouri/Kentucky/West Virginia when you can just sit back and let the Union attack you without penalty?
Historically, Lee's attacks into Union territory were critical. If not, then Northern Virginia would experience another season of being pillaged and plundered, with the economy of the state completely desintegrating due to the pressures. Why would Bragg/Hood ever invade Kentucky when defending will pay off much more profitably?
The problem isn't that troops march to the guns, and that entrenchments are powerful, it is that one side can afford to be totally defensive, while the other must always attack. This, to me, is the real issue, not the battle mechanics.
If the South had to attack, in order to maintain morale/victory points, then they would not be able to form such entrenchments, and neither could the union.
Battles did get entrenched and bloody late in the war, when the South could not attack the North (even here, there was a major attempt on Washington, Missouri and Kentucky in 1864, to bring pressure off the attacks in the South).
So, there should be more encouragement, through events, or through the engine, for the South to attack. There should be severe morale losses should the South not take the war to the North, at all. Imagine the knowledge that you are always fighting on your ground, with your homes destroyed/invaded, and your opponent living without such fears?
I figure, that every 6 months there would be events that would trigger should the South (or North, to encourage movement on both sides) only if certain territories are not occupied, and occupied by specific numbers of troops.
For example, in 1862, if Maryland does not have X many provinces under Confederate control for Y turns then a morale event fires that reduced Confederate morale because no invasion of Maryland took place. In 1863, if no invasion of Pennsylvania takes place then a morale hit takes place, and so on, to encourage at least historic actions are taken. Also, the morale hit should be something that one would want to avoid, rather than be able to easily make up by all of the combat victories they experience while sitting on the defensive.
This, or specific missions (take city X by month Y) could be in place to encourage both sides to take realistic objectives, but at least prod them to attack (the choice is always theirs, but they face a morale loss should they choose to ignore it, which sould hopefully affect troop combat ability).
Yet, as it is now, the South can afford, and profit, by sitting and let the Union do the dirty work. The South could not afford to sit back in its forts all winter, and wait for the Union to attack, every campaign season.
Wars are fought and won (and lost) as commanders had to take risks. In this game, as is, the South doesn't really have to risk attacking the North.
After the mechanics of my mod is complete, I am going to toy with the events, with the following priorities...
#1. variable AI General promotions (based on random additions of seniority, instead of set promotions, maybe Franklin gets promoted in early 1862, but maybe Hooker does instead).
#2. AI General command assignments (have events that make the AI change Army commanders via event based on historic situations, so Beauregard will be replaced by Johnston in the winter of 1861, and who may be wounded in 1862 and replaced by Lee depending on the situation, but only for the AI).
#3. Special Mission events (take and hold a Maryland town with X many units by this month and gain this, or, if you don't you will lose this, or maybe there is a chance you get something, like additional conscritps representing Maryland volunteers, or even a new, free unit).
#4. Every-day Disease (add high freqnency, yet low effect events to put constant attrition on your forces, meaning that rarely will a unit be at 100%, and you are constantly having to produce replacements to keep troop numbers 'high')
#5. Armoury events (historically armouries were very prised in 1861, the capture of Harper's Ferry gave the CSA a major boost, and the inability to capture St. Louis resulted in the Missouri State Guard to be perpetually ill and under equipped).
First things first, have you played the Union in a PBEM against a good CSA player? 
To me, I have great difficulty accepting an entrenched line streching 8 regions or 180-240 miles in a simulation of the American Civil War.
In May 1864, Grants 4 corps faced Lee's entrenched 3 corps at Spotsylvania. The front line was approximately 2-4 miles in length. That is the entire armies of Grant and Lee facing each other, both heavily entrenched. Grant made a couple of really stupid assaults resulting in heavy losses, learned his lesson and then did an end run around Lees army. Grant hoped to catch Lee out of his entrenchments. But he wouldn't have been able to do an end run if Lees entrenchments streched from the Atlantic Ocean to the Appalachian Mountains. Fortunately they didn't and Grant could do an end run.
So there were no entrenched lines of 180-240 miles as I am seeing in the West in my PBEM. The rebels did not have the manpower for those sort of lines.
Nor did armies spread their divisions and corps over 180-240 miles. Tactical and strategic doctrine of the day, based on real life factors, resulted in concentrated armies for control, protection and strength.
Of course, entrenchments were used extensively. Lee used them heavily as early as 1862 in the Peninsula. And they were very effective. But because entrenched armies were so strong, armies would maneuver around them. Sherman and Grant constantly maneuvered around strongly entrenched armies even though they did make some disasterous assaults as well. Throughout the war, battles would occur during maneuvers. Because neither army was entrenched while on the move.
But we can't maneuver. The rebs can create an entrenched line streching across a theater for hundreds of miles. The entire theater is shut down in terms of maneuver leaving only one choice-assault with the attacker often completely decimated. And I do the same thing. With 4-5 corps, I can create a nearly inpenetrable wall blocking any attempt by the rebs to move north in the Eastern Theater.
I am not a purist as to a game simulation. I know compromises are necessary. However I am concerned that an extraordinarily strong defense can be used to create a wall across an entire theater, thus eliminating land maneuver. Unfortunately in PBEMs, it is not producing a good or balanced game. It reminds me of World War One instead of the American Civil War.
To me, I have great difficulty accepting an entrenched line streching 8 regions or 180-240 miles in a simulation of the American Civil War.
In May 1864, Grants 4 corps faced Lee's entrenched 3 corps at Spotsylvania. The front line was approximately 2-4 miles in length. That is the entire armies of Grant and Lee facing each other, both heavily entrenched. Grant made a couple of really stupid assaults resulting in heavy losses, learned his lesson and then did an end run around Lees army. Grant hoped to catch Lee out of his entrenchments. But he wouldn't have been able to do an end run if Lees entrenchments streched from the Atlantic Ocean to the Appalachian Mountains. Fortunately they didn't and Grant could do an end run.
So there were no entrenched lines of 180-240 miles as I am seeing in the West in my PBEM. The rebels did not have the manpower for those sort of lines.
Nor did armies spread their divisions and corps over 180-240 miles. Tactical and strategic doctrine of the day, based on real life factors, resulted in concentrated armies for control, protection and strength.
Of course, entrenchments were used extensively. Lee used them heavily as early as 1862 in the Peninsula. And they were very effective. But because entrenched armies were so strong, armies would maneuver around them. Sherman and Grant constantly maneuvered around strongly entrenched armies even though they did make some disasterous assaults as well. Throughout the war, battles would occur during maneuvers. Because neither army was entrenched while on the move.
But we can't maneuver. The rebs can create an entrenched line streching across a theater for hundreds of miles. The entire theater is shut down in terms of maneuver leaving only one choice-assault with the attacker often completely decimated. And I do the same thing. With 4-5 corps, I can create a nearly inpenetrable wall blocking any attempt by the rebs to move north in the Eastern Theater.
I am not a purist as to a game simulation. I know compromises are necessary. However I am concerned that an extraordinarily strong defense can be used to create a wall across an entire theater, thus eliminating land maneuver. Unfortunately in PBEMs, it is not producing a good or balanced game. It reminds me of World War One instead of the American Civil War.
-
McNaughton
- Posts: 2766
- Joined: Wed Mar 21, 2007 8:47 pm
- Location: Toronto, Canada
No, have not played PBEM, but know that players will always abuse aspects of a game, given limited restrictions and no incentive to take risks.
IMO, it isn't that the system is broken, but that players can afford, using hindsight, and lack of urgency, to take whatever strategy they choose, and run with it and maximize all of your ability.
The CSA had not chance in hell to fight a purely defensive war. While they could have, their morale would have dropped to nothing after 1862. Even with the failed invasions of the North, there was knowledge that the war was taken out of the south, and into the north. It relieved the pressure on the economy, soldiers didn't desert to defend their homes, etc.
Without this pressure, players can take certain advantages in the game, and run with them. The CSA player now can entrench to level 8, as their forces never have to move. They can spread out, as their troops are always at 100%, rested, total cohesion, and able to respond as needed.
The 'fortifications' that we see in AACW are not linear, but strong-point based. Troops are concentrated at transportation hubs, or critical geographic strongpoints. This effectively controls a region without a long line (the WW1 analogy is not totally accurate).
It just happens that the CSA player can have the absolute freedom to sit on the defensive, prepare all winter, and know that the USA must come to them in order to 'win' (due to VP levels) without moving from their fortifications.
If the CSA historically did this, no doubt their defenses and forces would have caused such defeats on the Union. However, the choice did not exist to sit on the defensive.
#1. Antietam. After the Second Battle of Bull Run, Lee had the option to defend (waiting for another Union army to invade Virginia territory, ravage the countryside and siege Richmond), or use the initiative gained and take the war North (possibly getting support from Maryland, and definitely giving relief to Virginia).
#2. Gettysburg. With pressure out west, Lee had the option to send troops west, to bolster Johnston, or attack the North and draw troops away after the victory at Chancellorsville.
The concept of 'initiative' isn't as powerful as it should be. Having the initiative, being the one who determines where the battles are fought is what raises your morale, and lowers your opponents. Lee knew, that in order to keep initiative, and keep his army together he had to attack the North in 1862, 1863, and even in 1864. While all of the attacks were 'battlefield failures', one can imagine what would have happend should Lee not moved into the North, to take the war there.
So, causing more movement, and eliminating the option for the CSA player to fight purely a defensive war should mitigate many of the problems you have experienced. Fortresses, given time and devotion, should be very potent. Plus, a good command system needs to be in place to make a quantity vs. quality war, which the ACW was all about.
-------
One also saw the usefullness of dispersing ones forces. The CSA forces were constantly 'dispersed' to different regions, and were able to effectively support one another given the need (1st Bull Run, Antietam, etc.) even over long distances.
I do think, that the problem arises in play style, over that of game mechanics. Encourage the Antietams, the Gettysburgs, the Chatenoogas, and you will not find the same massive entrenchments so early in the game, and with such effect (the CSA only entrenched to very high levels when they were sorely outnumbered).
IMO, it isn't that the system is broken, but that players can afford, using hindsight, and lack of urgency, to take whatever strategy they choose, and run with it and maximize all of your ability.
The CSA had not chance in hell to fight a purely defensive war. While they could have, their morale would have dropped to nothing after 1862. Even with the failed invasions of the North, there was knowledge that the war was taken out of the south, and into the north. It relieved the pressure on the economy, soldiers didn't desert to defend their homes, etc.
Without this pressure, players can take certain advantages in the game, and run with them. The CSA player now can entrench to level 8, as their forces never have to move. They can spread out, as their troops are always at 100%, rested, total cohesion, and able to respond as needed.
The 'fortifications' that we see in AACW are not linear, but strong-point based. Troops are concentrated at transportation hubs, or critical geographic strongpoints. This effectively controls a region without a long line (the WW1 analogy is not totally accurate).
It just happens that the CSA player can have the absolute freedom to sit on the defensive, prepare all winter, and know that the USA must come to them in order to 'win' (due to VP levels) without moving from their fortifications.
If the CSA historically did this, no doubt their defenses and forces would have caused such defeats on the Union. However, the choice did not exist to sit on the defensive.
#1. Antietam. After the Second Battle of Bull Run, Lee had the option to defend (waiting for another Union army to invade Virginia territory, ravage the countryside and siege Richmond), or use the initiative gained and take the war North (possibly getting support from Maryland, and definitely giving relief to Virginia).
#2. Gettysburg. With pressure out west, Lee had the option to send troops west, to bolster Johnston, or attack the North and draw troops away after the victory at Chancellorsville.
The concept of 'initiative' isn't as powerful as it should be. Having the initiative, being the one who determines where the battles are fought is what raises your morale, and lowers your opponents. Lee knew, that in order to keep initiative, and keep his army together he had to attack the North in 1862, 1863, and even in 1864. While all of the attacks were 'battlefield failures', one can imagine what would have happend should Lee not moved into the North, to take the war there.
So, causing more movement, and eliminating the option for the CSA player to fight purely a defensive war should mitigate many of the problems you have experienced. Fortresses, given time and devotion, should be very potent. Plus, a good command system needs to be in place to make a quantity vs. quality war, which the ACW was all about.
-------
One also saw the usefullness of dispersing ones forces. The CSA forces were constantly 'dispersed' to different regions, and were able to effectively support one another given the need (1st Bull Run, Antietam, etc.) even over long distances.
I do think, that the problem arises in play style, over that of game mechanics. Encourage the Antietams, the Gettysburgs, the Chatenoogas, and you will not find the same massive entrenchments so early in the game, and with such effect (the CSA only entrenched to very high levels when they were sorely outnumbered).
-
Jabberwock
- Posts: 2204
- Joined: Thu May 31, 2007 12:12 am
- Location: Weymouth, MA
- Contact: ICQ
Jagger -
I would like to see more testing and results posted from your command control mod. Possibly an AAR like Clovis is doing with his. If I had more time free in the next month, I would offer to work on one with you over a PBEM. Your mod theoretically seems like a more than adequate solution to the problem of extended lines of corps. The idea that even a great commander like Grant could provide strategic bonuses from the Appalachians to the Mississippi stretches credulity. I'm not sure I would cut it back quite as far as you have, that is why I would like to see more test results.
I also agree that entrenchments seem slightly too powerful.
McNaughton -
I like your thoughts as well. I have some alternatives to your proposed 'solution by event', although they would be much harder to implement.
1. You mentioned keeping territory from being plundered. The invasions of the North were definitely influenced by the need to preserve the confederate supply base, and also find new supplies and recruits. By 1864-65 Confederate cavalry in Virginia were feeding their horses tree bark, when they could find it. Sheridan burned his way back and forth across the Shenandoah Valley. Cass, MO and the surrounding territories were almost completely depopulated by 1863. This not only solved the guerilla problem, it meant that no supplies were available there for Price's second Missouri campaign. Lets not forget 'Mississipi burning' and 'Sherman monuments'. The supply pressure these kinds of tactics created on the south is hard to recreate in the full campaign. Perhaps pillaging should be made more common, or a second more powerful and permanent level of pillaging created.
2. NM and recruiting probably need to be tied more closely to control of territory and cities. That way, If the union is successful anywhere, it puts more pressure on the confederates to be aggressive elsewhere. This idea has been kicked around a bit, and dormant for about a month. I think this is a good place to bring it up again.
I would like to see more testing and results posted from your command control mod. Possibly an AAR like Clovis is doing with his. If I had more time free in the next month, I would offer to work on one with you over a PBEM. Your mod theoretically seems like a more than adequate solution to the problem of extended lines of corps. The idea that even a great commander like Grant could provide strategic bonuses from the Appalachians to the Mississippi stretches credulity. I'm not sure I would cut it back quite as far as you have, that is why I would like to see more test results.
I also agree that entrenchments seem slightly too powerful.
McNaughton -
I like your thoughts as well. I have some alternatives to your proposed 'solution by event', although they would be much harder to implement.
1. You mentioned keeping territory from being plundered. The invasions of the North were definitely influenced by the need to preserve the confederate supply base, and also find new supplies and recruits. By 1864-65 Confederate cavalry in Virginia were feeding their horses tree bark, when they could find it. Sheridan burned his way back and forth across the Shenandoah Valley. Cass, MO and the surrounding territories were almost completely depopulated by 1863. This not only solved the guerilla problem, it meant that no supplies were available there for Price's second Missouri campaign. Lets not forget 'Mississipi burning' and 'Sherman monuments'. The supply pressure these kinds of tactics created on the south is hard to recreate in the full campaign. Perhaps pillaging should be made more common, or a second more powerful and permanent level of pillaging created.
2. NM and recruiting probably need to be tied more closely to control of territory and cities. That way, If the union is successful anywhere, it puts more pressure on the confederates to be aggressive elsewhere. This idea has been kicked around a bit, and dormant for about a month. I think this is a good place to bring it up again.
[color="DimGray"] You deserve to be spanked[/color]
Jabberwock wrote:Jagger -
I would like to see more testing and results posted from your command control mod. Possibly an AAR like Clovis is doing with his. If I had more time free in the next month, I would offer to work on one with you over a PBEM. Your mod theoretically seems like a more than adequate solution to the problem of extended lines of corps. The idea that even a great commander like Grant could provide strategic bonuses from the Appalachians to the Mississippi stretches credulity. I'm not sure I would cut it back quite as far as you have, that is why I would like to see more test results.
I think the mod helps but doesn't completely solve the problem. I think "March to the Guns" and entrenchments contribute more to defense and spread out armies than command control bonuses. Although the mod could increase the attk/defend bonus for being with the army-make the army benefit more powerful.
The "march to the guns" feature is extremely powerful. In my PBEM games, reinforcements always "march to the guns". The feature turns three corps in three linear regions into two corps, three corps and two corps defending. So three corps in line is the equivalent of 7 corps. Even more, if the army is in a diamond formation. It definitely and powerfully increases defense without any sort of penalty-such as creating a hole by vacating a region. I have reservations about "March to the Guns" without penalty. I am not even sure it is a good idea at all considering the already tremendous strength of entrenched defense. Perhaps it should be a very rare event.
I also agree that entrenchments seem slightly too powerful.
I agree with the power of entrenchments for the late war timeframe. Recently, I have been reading about Shermans battles outside of Atlanta and Grant against Lee in 64. Entrenchments were absolutely murderous on attackers even when defended by small numbers of troops.
But I suspect entrenchments were always extremely powerful and murderous. It just that no one would attack them---except Grant and Sherman and maybe Burnside at Fredericksburg. I think most generals just maneuvered around them and refused to attack them.--which we can't really do against a human line of entrenched formations.
Actually I would like to take you up on a test PBEM game of the command mod. If you can find the time somewhere in October, let me know.
BTW, I took Humboldt a little earlier this evening by committing two more corps. It took 10 of my 15 Ky/Tn divisions to capture Humboldt which was "technically" the best weak spot in the line to attack.
McNaughton wrote:No, have not played PBEM, but know that players will always abuse aspects of a game, given limited restrictions and no incentive to take risks.
In my mind, my opponents are not abusing the system. They are simply using the game features as designed--entrenchments, command&control and march to the guns all encourage a dispersed army. Actually I would play exactly the same if I was the CSA.
The CSA had not chance in hell to fight a purely defensive war. While they could have, their morale would have dropped to nothing after 1862. Even with the failed invasions of the North, there was knowledge that the war was taken out of the south, and into the north. It relieved the pressure on the economy, soldiers didn't desert to defend their homes, etc.
But what if Lincoln had lost the election of 1864? War weariness is a valid concern which could have ended the war even if the CSA had used a purely defensive strategy. Of course, there are benefits to limited offenses as well.
Without this pressure, players can take certain advantages in the game, and run with them. The CSA player now can entrench to level 8, as their forces never have to move. They can spread out, as their troops are always at 100%, rested, total cohesion, and able to respond as needed.
True enough.
The 'fortifications' that we see in AACW are not linear, but strong-point based. Troops are concentrated at transportation hubs, or critical geographic strongpoints. This effectively controls a region without a long line (the WW1 analogy is not totally accurate).
Unfortunately, the end result is the same as a continuous trench line as you can't go around them.
If the CSA historically did this, no doubt their defenses and forces would have caused such defeats on the Union. However, the choice did not exist to sit on the defensive.
I think both sides often entrenched throughout the war if they were going to be in place for substantial timeframes. Late war, they entrenched immediately after each move. But only a few generals, Grant/Sherman, were willing to attack them. I think most generals went around them or looked for indirect pressure to cause the enemy to move out of them.
The concept of 'initiative' isn't as powerful as it should be. Having the initiative, being the one who determines where the battles are fought is what raises your morale, and lowers your opponents. Lee knew, that in order to keep initiative, and keep his army together he had to attack the North in 1862, 1863, and even in 1864. While all of the attacks were 'battlefield failures', one can imagine what would have happend should Lee not moved into the North, to take the war there.
If Lee had not gone on the offensive in the East, I suspect that maneuvering would have eventually put him into a siege situation in Richmond which he could not win-till Grant showed up. The offenses prevented that situation occuring.
So, causing more movement, and eliminating the option for the CSA player to fight purely a defensive war should mitigate many of the problems you have experienced. Fortresses, given time and devotion, should be very potent. Plus, a good command system needs to be in place to make a quantity vs. quality war, which the ACW was all about.
I think it would help but I don't think the CSA would be any more successful attacking entrenched US troops than the US attacking entrenched CSA troops. IMO, attacking against heavily entrenched troops with march to the guns reinforcements is not a good idea for either side.
Wow, lots of things here.
First I want to say I wholly disagree with McNaughton about the CSA being unable to fight a purely defensive war. There doesn't need to be any impetus or reason for the CSA to invade the north in a meaningful way. Historically, the invasions of Kentucky, Maryland and Pennsylvania gained nothing for the CSA and consumed much irreplacable manpower. The strategy of a shrewd CSA player should be to outlast the USA's morale, and win as many defensive battles as possible.
That said, it is rather easier to stand on the defensive in AACW than it was historically. This is because it is harder to turn intrenchments in AACW than it was in real life. For example during the Chancellorsville campaign, Lee had intrenchments and corps posted from Fredericksburg to many miles upstream along the Rappahannock, but Hooker's crossing came at a weak point in the Wilderness, forcing Lee to bring reinforcements out from intrenchments east and west to meet the threat.
Now, it is also important to realize that the marching to the guns and the ability of the CSA to spread out corps is essential in AACW because of the length of the 15 day turn. When the Union moves, they always get what I think of as 'The 15 Day Jump' on the CSA player, because while the turn runs, the CSA cannot react and give new orders. Thus, the march to the guns represents the ability of leaders on the ground to anticipate and react to enemy movements inside that 15 day turn, which the player cannot do for gameplay reasons. Without the ability to spread out corps to cover territory, that is if the CSA had to concentrate armies on a narrow front, then given the length of the 15 day turn the USA player would easily be able to maneuver around the CSA armies turn after turn. The CSA would have the very unrealistic handicap of being 15 days late to every Federal movement.
Obviously, the solution to this problem would be to have smaller turns. Maybe 5 day turns or less. Then march to the guns wouldn't be necessary. On the other hand, the game would also take three times as long to play.
So, let's set aside smaller turns and accept that march to the guns is a must have game mechanic.
What to mod then? Well, I think the best solution would simply be to cut the efficacy of field entrenchments, so as to better model their somewhat limited capacity to protect troops throughout a region which might be 20 or 30 miles wide and deep. Lots of things can happen in an area of that size, including turning field intrenchments. The game, on the other hand, always seem to take it for granted that the attacker is hitting the strongest part of the line, like Burnside at Fredericksburg.
So, play with reducing the power of intrenchments in the game.
Finally Jagger, in response to your first post about the impossibility of breaching long lines of intrenchments at level 8+, I have a few tactical gameplay suggestions. First, I would suggest that you do everything in your power to prevent the CSA player from creating level 8 intrenchments by hitting him before they are completed. It occurs to me that you may be too passive if you are allowing him to intrench all winter before you finally get up an offensive.
Second, I don't think it is possible, at least not in my experience, to create a strong line at all points as the CSA player. I know I have tried to create lines, but I always had places that were very weak, because I simply didn't have enough troops to go around. There must have been such weak points somewhere in the game you talk about. It may not have been where you really wanted to start an offensive, but you should have tried to shift to whatever the weakest point was, therby forcing your opponent to maneuver out of stronger areas. If there really weren't any weak points anywhere along the line from the Mississippi to the Atlantic, then again, I suspect that is partly because you weren't aggressive enough in preventing such a leisurely buildup on the CSA side.
First I want to say I wholly disagree with McNaughton about the CSA being unable to fight a purely defensive war. There doesn't need to be any impetus or reason for the CSA to invade the north in a meaningful way. Historically, the invasions of Kentucky, Maryland and Pennsylvania gained nothing for the CSA and consumed much irreplacable manpower. The strategy of a shrewd CSA player should be to outlast the USA's morale, and win as many defensive battles as possible.
That said, it is rather easier to stand on the defensive in AACW than it was historically. This is because it is harder to turn intrenchments in AACW than it was in real life. For example during the Chancellorsville campaign, Lee had intrenchments and corps posted from Fredericksburg to many miles upstream along the Rappahannock, but Hooker's crossing came at a weak point in the Wilderness, forcing Lee to bring reinforcements out from intrenchments east and west to meet the threat.
Now, it is also important to realize that the marching to the guns and the ability of the CSA to spread out corps is essential in AACW because of the length of the 15 day turn. When the Union moves, they always get what I think of as 'The 15 Day Jump' on the CSA player, because while the turn runs, the CSA cannot react and give new orders. Thus, the march to the guns represents the ability of leaders on the ground to anticipate and react to enemy movements inside that 15 day turn, which the player cannot do for gameplay reasons. Without the ability to spread out corps to cover territory, that is if the CSA had to concentrate armies on a narrow front, then given the length of the 15 day turn the USA player would easily be able to maneuver around the CSA armies turn after turn. The CSA would have the very unrealistic handicap of being 15 days late to every Federal movement.
Obviously, the solution to this problem would be to have smaller turns. Maybe 5 day turns or less. Then march to the guns wouldn't be necessary. On the other hand, the game would also take three times as long to play.
So, let's set aside smaller turns and accept that march to the guns is a must have game mechanic.
What to mod then? Well, I think the best solution would simply be to cut the efficacy of field entrenchments, so as to better model their somewhat limited capacity to protect troops throughout a region which might be 20 or 30 miles wide and deep. Lots of things can happen in an area of that size, including turning field intrenchments. The game, on the other hand, always seem to take it for granted that the attacker is hitting the strongest part of the line, like Burnside at Fredericksburg.
So, play with reducing the power of intrenchments in the game.
Finally Jagger, in response to your first post about the impossibility of breaching long lines of intrenchments at level 8+, I have a few tactical gameplay suggestions. First, I would suggest that you do everything in your power to prevent the CSA player from creating level 8 intrenchments by hitting him before they are completed. It occurs to me that you may be too passive if you are allowing him to intrench all winter before you finally get up an offensive.
Second, I don't think it is possible, at least not in my experience, to create a strong line at all points as the CSA player. I know I have tried to create lines, but I always had places that were very weak, because I simply didn't have enough troops to go around. There must have been such weak points somewhere in the game you talk about. It may not have been where you really wanted to start an offensive, but you should have tried to shift to whatever the weakest point was, therby forcing your opponent to maneuver out of stronger areas. If there really weren't any weak points anywhere along the line from the Mississippi to the Atlantic, then again, I suspect that is partly because you weren't aggressive enough in preventing such a leisurely buildup on the CSA side.
-
McNaughton
- Posts: 2766
- Joined: Wed Mar 21, 2007 8:47 pm
- Location: Toronto, Canada
Runyan, you are looking solely at the military results of some specific battles and campaigns.
What the invasions also did, was to take the war from their territory which was ravaged, and took the battle North.
The Southern Soldier deserted at greater lengths than their Union counterpart, as they felt the need to protect their individual homes from the torch, or looter, when their county had fallen to Union troops. This total drain of men was more than all of the losses during the campaigns North.
Had Lee or Bragg or Hood or Price not have tried to invade the North, or Border States, then the war would have been compeletely fought on their territory, with the eventuality of defeat given war-weariness and desertion of men to their homes. The problem aren't the entrenchments, but that the CSA players are given time to dig massive entrenchments, and never feel the need to leave them. You should have the ability to massively entrench, yet it should not be such an easy decision to make.
Looking at it from a total military standpoint, with victory in battle determining success, then it was a failure. But, there were more issues at play.
First, it gave a much needed rest to the Southern economy from facing both Union and Confederate foragers. The land in Virginia in late 1862 was incapable of supporting the Confederate army which was a lot more reliant on foraging. They simply could not fight in Northern Virginia anymore during that season.
Second, it took the war to their enemy. The morale of the troops marching north was stupendous.
Third, you know that these attacks failed, but, yet again it is hindsight interfering with playing a historic wargame! There was the possibility of gain along with the dire need to take the war somewhere outside your territory. This makes the risk worthwhile, yet, players have no need to take risks, and prove that they won't...
Players play like Joe Johnston and George McClellan, regardless that their hero's are Lee and Grant.
Why?
Because they can win fighting a defensive war as Johnston, and win fighting a war of numbers and slow movement as McClellan.
There is no impetous to take risks, to be daring like Lee, or aggressive and relentless like Grant. Johnston and McClellan were replaced as they lost the confidence of those with the grand battleplan (Davis and Lincoln), and did not get positive results. While Johnston and McClellan lost few battles, their lack of aggressiveness was their downfall.
You couldn't win a war, by winning battles yet not winning 'land'. I have yet to see a war of attrition won by a party who solely stays on the defensive. It didn't work for Germany in the Great War, and they knew it (hence the 1916 and 1918 offensive campaigns).
The attacks on the North were meant to hit when the South still had initiative. The goals were to gain recruits from border states (something that I think should be a possibility in the game, given an invasion of a border state occupied by one side, controlling key areas, there should be a % that you gain free conscripts).
While we know that attacking was stupid, since the battles were all lost, does not mean that there was not a chance for victory, and not a need to attack. We simply allow the CSA player to fill a role of total defence, which was impossible (hence the offensive campaigns on all CSA fronts throughout the war).
These weren't stupid generals, they attacked for very good reasons.
Unfortunately, at 5 days per turn, the game would be unplayable (with 300+ turns per full campaign). Everything would be revised (movement, resources, events, etc.) and very little would get done during a turn (take 3 turns to move anywhere of distance when it just took 1).
What the invasions also did, was to take the war from their territory which was ravaged, and took the battle North.
The Southern Soldier deserted at greater lengths than their Union counterpart, as they felt the need to protect their individual homes from the torch, or looter, when their county had fallen to Union troops. This total drain of men was more than all of the losses during the campaigns North.
Had Lee or Bragg or Hood or Price not have tried to invade the North, or Border States, then the war would have been compeletely fought on their territory, with the eventuality of defeat given war-weariness and desertion of men to their homes. The problem aren't the entrenchments, but that the CSA players are given time to dig massive entrenchments, and never feel the need to leave them. You should have the ability to massively entrench, yet it should not be such an easy decision to make.
Looking at it from a total military standpoint, with victory in battle determining success, then it was a failure. But, there were more issues at play.
First, it gave a much needed rest to the Southern economy from facing both Union and Confederate foragers. The land in Virginia in late 1862 was incapable of supporting the Confederate army which was a lot more reliant on foraging. They simply could not fight in Northern Virginia anymore during that season.
Second, it took the war to their enemy. The morale of the troops marching north was stupendous.
Third, you know that these attacks failed, but, yet again it is hindsight interfering with playing a historic wargame! There was the possibility of gain along with the dire need to take the war somewhere outside your territory. This makes the risk worthwhile, yet, players have no need to take risks, and prove that they won't...
Players play like Joe Johnston and George McClellan, regardless that their hero's are Lee and Grant.
Why?
Because they can win fighting a defensive war as Johnston, and win fighting a war of numbers and slow movement as McClellan.
There is no impetous to take risks, to be daring like Lee, or aggressive and relentless like Grant. Johnston and McClellan were replaced as they lost the confidence of those with the grand battleplan (Davis and Lincoln), and did not get positive results. While Johnston and McClellan lost few battles, their lack of aggressiveness was their downfall.
You couldn't win a war, by winning battles yet not winning 'land'. I have yet to see a war of attrition won by a party who solely stays on the defensive. It didn't work for Germany in the Great War, and they knew it (hence the 1916 and 1918 offensive campaigns).
The attacks on the North were meant to hit when the South still had initiative. The goals were to gain recruits from border states (something that I think should be a possibility in the game, given an invasion of a border state occupied by one side, controlling key areas, there should be a % that you gain free conscripts).
While we know that attacking was stupid, since the battles were all lost, does not mean that there was not a chance for victory, and not a need to attack. We simply allow the CSA player to fill a role of total defence, which was impossible (hence the offensive campaigns on all CSA fronts throughout the war).
These weren't stupid generals, they attacked for very good reasons.
Unfortunately, at 5 days per turn, the game would be unplayable (with 300+ turns per full campaign). Everything would be revised (movement, resources, events, etc.) and very little would get done during a turn (take 3 turns to move anywhere of distance when it just took 1).
-
McNaughton
- Posts: 2766
- Joined: Wed Mar 21, 2007 8:47 pm
- Location: Toronto, Canada
Here are my solutions...
#1. Gain Victory Points or National Morale when you attack a strong enemy position with a large force in their territory. This represents you taking the war to your enemy. VP and NM will not just be given for the battle results, but also where you take the battle too.
#2. Event missions. Have events in place (like the March on Richomond event) that looks for the capture of a certain city, and holding it with substantial forces. Players can ignore, and face penalties, or achieve and get some benefits. This represents the pressures from the population and administration. This can be done with a carrot, or stick, program.
#3. Boder States. When 'liberating' a border state city with population, that is 30% or more loyal to you, you get a chance at free conscript points (representing men loyal to your side joining the cause). This can only happen per city once a year (to avoid abuse) and must be done by a stack with X many units (to avoid a lone cavalry unit doing this 'liberating').
#4. Foraging. Put weight on the counties based on the men in them. Most troops were fed by forage parties, and if large armies remained in a territory too long, then the local supply runs out. Richmond's population boomed during this era (up to 150 000), primarily because of the inability to live a sustained existence in Northern Virginia (and the multitude of military jobs in Richmond). A county could only support a large multi-corps unit only for a given time, before its resources are stripped. A portion of supply should always be gained via foraging, meaning that if a county is stripped of supply, the only supplies you get are through wagon trains, which should not be enough to cover all needs (hence more units going out of supply, even in friendly controlled areas, if they stay too long in one spot, with too large of a force).
You should have the ability to entrench into very strong positions, this should not be removed, but, the ability to have the time to do so, and impetous to remain in them for years on end should not be there.
Presently, it only counts to attack if you can take, and then hold, territory. It makes no sense in attacking and temporarily taking, or making battle in your opponent's territory.
#1. Gain Victory Points or National Morale when you attack a strong enemy position with a large force in their territory. This represents you taking the war to your enemy. VP and NM will not just be given for the battle results, but also where you take the battle too.
#2. Event missions. Have events in place (like the March on Richomond event) that looks for the capture of a certain city, and holding it with substantial forces. Players can ignore, and face penalties, or achieve and get some benefits. This represents the pressures from the population and administration. This can be done with a carrot, or stick, program.
#3. Boder States. When 'liberating' a border state city with population, that is 30% or more loyal to you, you get a chance at free conscript points (representing men loyal to your side joining the cause). This can only happen per city once a year (to avoid abuse) and must be done by a stack with X many units (to avoid a lone cavalry unit doing this 'liberating').
#4. Foraging. Put weight on the counties based on the men in them. Most troops were fed by forage parties, and if large armies remained in a territory too long, then the local supply runs out. Richmond's population boomed during this era (up to 150 000), primarily because of the inability to live a sustained existence in Northern Virginia (and the multitude of military jobs in Richmond). A county could only support a large multi-corps unit only for a given time, before its resources are stripped. A portion of supply should always be gained via foraging, meaning that if a county is stripped of supply, the only supplies you get are through wagon trains, which should not be enough to cover all needs (hence more units going out of supply, even in friendly controlled areas, if they stay too long in one spot, with too large of a force).
You should have the ability to entrench into very strong positions, this should not be removed, but, the ability to have the time to do so, and impetous to remain in them for years on end should not be there.
Presently, it only counts to attack if you can take, and then hold, territory. It makes no sense in attacking and temporarily taking, or making battle in your opponent's territory.
I'm wholly unswayed by your arguments for Confederate invasions. The reasons you give are the reasons Lee gave why he undertook the invasions of the north, and I have always thought those reasons hollow. The invasions of the north were in fact nothing but desperate gambles to capture spectacular objectives. These gambles failed, and they did not have to be taken.
You believe that a purely defensive war would inevitably lead to defeat, yet this ignores the possibility of a different outcome in the 1864 election (for which Lincoln was almost not even nominated until the fall of Atlanta changed the political landscape) which very likely would have led to a Democratic victory and a negotiated end to the war. Your comparison to Germany in WWI is not relevant, because the Germans couldn't vote the Kaiser out of office and end the war.
There are clearly two schools of thought regarding the Confederate war effort. One is the Lee-Jackson school which says the CSA had to be very aggressive and attack to win the war. I suspect these players will lose AACW more than not against competent USA players. The other is the school which sees the futility of this policy, and adopts a more defensive tone to the war and plays the long game, wearing down Union morale until the north just gives up.
Now, it is rather too easy in AACW to hold defensive lines, and replace combat losses? Yes, probably. That can be fixed by reducing the power of entrenchments and reducing the manpower available from the draft.
You believe that a purely defensive war would inevitably lead to defeat, yet this ignores the possibility of a different outcome in the 1864 election (for which Lincoln was almost not even nominated until the fall of Atlanta changed the political landscape) which very likely would have led to a Democratic victory and a negotiated end to the war. Your comparison to Germany in WWI is not relevant, because the Germans couldn't vote the Kaiser out of office and end the war.
There are clearly two schools of thought regarding the Confederate war effort. One is the Lee-Jackson school which says the CSA had to be very aggressive and attack to win the war. I suspect these players will lose AACW more than not against competent USA players. The other is the school which sees the futility of this policy, and adopts a more defensive tone to the war and plays the long game, wearing down Union morale until the north just gives up.
Now, it is rather too easy in AACW to hold defensive lines, and replace combat losses? Yes, probably. That can be fixed by reducing the power of entrenchments and reducing the manpower available from the draft.
-
McNaughton
- Posts: 2766
- Joined: Wed Mar 21, 2007 8:47 pm
- Location: Toronto, Canada
I cannot recall too many wars that were won by a side being defensive.
A side being ineffectual, being constantly on the defensive, always reacting to the other side's moves, loses initiative, loses morale, and loses the war.
Attacking the North was a calculated risk, and just because it historically didn't pay off for the South, doesn't mean that it was a foolish decision. The potential gains were high enough to warrant an attack (bringing a border state to their side, bringing the battle to your enemy, relieving the burden of war from the civilian population, gaining much needed supplies and machinery, etc.). For example, the 1862 Maryland Campaign was actually a 50-50 success for both the Confederates and the Union. With the capture of Harper's Ferry, the South gained significant artillery and small arms. By 1863 all pre-war smoothbores were replaced with rifled muskets in the Army of Northern Virginia. This could not have been done had they not invaded the North and captured this vast arsenal of weaponry. Manpower losses were made up, and the Fredricksburg Campaign was set in motion (a substantial Confederate success) in prime conditions (entrenched Confederates, attacked by Union Forces in poor weather). Had the Antietam campaign not have occurred, the Union would have attacked before this inclement weather which aided them so greatly.
It wasn't just Lee who attacked, but Price, Bragg, AS Johnston, Polk, Hood, etc. The Confederate plan of action was not one of passive defensiveness, as wars weren't won by simply sitting back and letting your opponent attack.
Part of Lincoln's difficulties had been that the Confederates showed the North that they were strong enough to invade. Similarly to the Tet Offensive, while the battle may have been a draw, or even a Union Victory, the effects on the population had a different result. The fact that Southern Armies were in Northern Soil meant to the average Northerner that they weren't winning the war. Also, just as Lincoln had to prove that he was doing something, so did Davis. Johnston was repeatedly fired for waging a defensive war, even though he fought it well. No matter what, a defensive war gives ground, and eventually you will run out of ground.
I believe that entrenchments are being made the scapegoat in a situation where players choose not to play historically, as there is no gain in taking risks, and no loss in being extremely cautious.
A side being ineffectual, being constantly on the defensive, always reacting to the other side's moves, loses initiative, loses morale, and loses the war.
Attacking the North was a calculated risk, and just because it historically didn't pay off for the South, doesn't mean that it was a foolish decision. The potential gains were high enough to warrant an attack (bringing a border state to their side, bringing the battle to your enemy, relieving the burden of war from the civilian population, gaining much needed supplies and machinery, etc.). For example, the 1862 Maryland Campaign was actually a 50-50 success for both the Confederates and the Union. With the capture of Harper's Ferry, the South gained significant artillery and small arms. By 1863 all pre-war smoothbores were replaced with rifled muskets in the Army of Northern Virginia. This could not have been done had they not invaded the North and captured this vast arsenal of weaponry. Manpower losses were made up, and the Fredricksburg Campaign was set in motion (a substantial Confederate success) in prime conditions (entrenched Confederates, attacked by Union Forces in poor weather). Had the Antietam campaign not have occurred, the Union would have attacked before this inclement weather which aided them so greatly.
It wasn't just Lee who attacked, but Price, Bragg, AS Johnston, Polk, Hood, etc. The Confederate plan of action was not one of passive defensiveness, as wars weren't won by simply sitting back and letting your opponent attack.
Part of Lincoln's difficulties had been that the Confederates showed the North that they were strong enough to invade. Similarly to the Tet Offensive, while the battle may have been a draw, or even a Union Victory, the effects on the population had a different result. The fact that Southern Armies were in Northern Soil meant to the average Northerner that they weren't winning the war. Also, just as Lincoln had to prove that he was doing something, so did Davis. Johnston was repeatedly fired for waging a defensive war, even though he fought it well. No matter what, a defensive war gives ground, and eventually you will run out of ground.
I believe that entrenchments are being made the scapegoat in a situation where players choose not to play historically, as there is no gain in taking risks, and no loss in being extremely cautious.
I really think problem pointed by Jagger is greatly due to :
- ability for both sides to get too much troops too early. In April 62 Shiloh was fought by 40,000 confederates whose a significant part came from the coastal defense... Grant had 6 divisions numbering about the same. Fewer troops will lead to weaker defense line if this strategy is chosen.
- the real advantage North had was the possibility to deliver multiple strikes at the same time, peculiarly on the Coast. The concentration at Shiloh had for consequences the capture of New Orleans. Any player strategy has to do the same... to the condition troops aren't too numerous on the Confederate side...
- ability for both sides to get too much troops too early. In April 62 Shiloh was fought by 40,000 confederates whose a significant part came from the coastal defense... Grant had 6 divisions numbering about the same. Fewer troops will lead to weaker defense line if this strategy is chosen.
- the real advantage North had was the possibility to deliver multiple strikes at the same time, peculiarly on the Coast. The concentration at Shiloh had for consequences the capture of New Orleans. Any player strategy has to do the same... to the condition troops aren't too numerous on the Confederate side...
McNaughton wrote: I cannot recall too many wars that were won by a side being defensive.
I think the Russians have had some success winning defensive wars.
McNaughton wrote:
It wasn't just Lee who attacked, but Price, Bragg, AS Johnston, Polk, Hood, etc. The Confederate plan of action was not one of passive defensiveness, as wars weren't won by simply sitting back and letting your opponent attack.
The model for victory should have been Fredericksburg (using the power of the tactical defensive) and Chancellorsville (counterattacking to regain lost ground, while remaining on the strategic defensive).
The strategic defensive does not mean being always passive, and does not preclude offensive action in all cases. Some offensives, like Shiloh, made sense because they were offensives in Confederate territory to throw back the attacker and regain lost ground.
Lee's invasions of the north however, do not fit into this category. And, concluding from Lee's example that such gambles were a necessary part of the Confederate war strategy is, in my opinion clearly wrong.
-
McNaughton
- Posts: 2766
- Joined: Wed Mar 21, 2007 8:47 pm
- Location: Toronto, Canada
Technically, the numbers are right, but, attrition levels are too low. Units face attrition in only these ways.
#1. Out of Supply
#2. In poor weather
#3. Facing an epidemic
#4. Combat
The Epidemics should be increased in frequency, but lowered in effect (representing the constant drain on manpower even in a relatively healthy situation due to illness). The number of units you can build are about right, however, there is no drain so all of your resources can be devoted toward replacing combat losses (if you don't attack, and are passive, you don't have to worry), or building new units. If your losses (due to all factors) are low, you can build larger forces.
#1. Out of Supply
#2. In poor weather
#3. Facing an epidemic
#4. Combat
The Epidemics should be increased in frequency, but lowered in effect (representing the constant drain on manpower even in a relatively healthy situation due to illness). The number of units you can build are about right, however, there is no drain so all of your resources can be devoted toward replacing combat losses (if you don't attack, and are passive, you don't have to worry), or building new units. If your losses (due to all factors) are low, you can build larger forces.
Clovis wrote:- ability for both sides to get too much troops too early. In April 62 Shiloh was fought by 40,000 confederates whose a significant part came from the coastal defense... Grant had 6 divisions numbering about the same. Fewer troops will lead to weaker defense line if this strategy is chosen.
I agree that this is a factor. Confederate manpower seems far more robust than it was historically, which only makes forming and holding strong defensive lines that much easier.
runyan99 wrote:I agree that this is a factor. Confederate manpower seems far more robust than it was historically, which only makes forming and holding strong defensive lines that much easier.
And new units are too quickly built too.
IMHO there are the primary factors. In the West after the breaking of the Columbus Lexington line, Frederal player should get plenty of maneuver room.
Breaking the line requires to push on several points simultaneously ( Pope, Buell and Grant operations in the first months of 1862).
In the East, any Confederate line can be turned by amphibious operation ( Peninsula campaign)
But all this supposes Confederate player can't get sufficient troops to cover both fronts and the Coast...
-
McNaughton
- Posts: 2766
- Joined: Wed Mar 21, 2007 8:47 pm
- Location: Toronto, Canada
runyan99 wrote:I think the Russians have had some success winning defensive wars.
They didn't get to Berlin in 1945 and Paris in 1814 by defending. Even here, they strove to gain the offensive and initiative whenever they could. The goal was to drive out the opponent and invade their territory (remember, Russia was the one who initially attacked France). It just happened that the Germans/French had the initiative until it passed to the Russians, then they had the opportunity to attack.
The model for victory should have been Fredericksburg (using the power of the tactical defensive) and Chancellorsville (counterattacking to regain lost ground, while remaining on the strategic defensive).
Fredericksburg was a battle, fought on particular ground, with particular forces, and particular commanders in a particular season. It wasn't necessarily a textbook success for Lee, but a textbook failure for Burnside. One cannot say "lets defend the high ground, along a river, against a foe who attacks head on and in poor weather conditions". Your opponent might not always agree with this plan...
The strategic defensive does not mean being always passive, and does not preclude offensive action in all cases. Some offensives, like Shiloh, made sense because they were offensives in Confederate territory to throw back the attacker and regain lost ground.
Lee's invasions of the north however, do not fit into this category. And, concluding from Lee's example that such gambles were a necessary part of the Confederate war strategy is, in my opinion clearly wrong.
You forget, Lee wasn't the only one making attacks. Every Confederate command had an offensive up north. Their goals were to relieve pressure on certain national centres. Hood knew that a direct attack on Sherman's army would not accomplish anything, but, if Hood threatened Sherman's supply line, Kentucky, then Sherman would have to retreat (lucky for the North, there were sufficient forces to stop Hood without Sherman's entire army). His action was an attempt to save Atlanta. It failed, but Johnston's attempt at a purely defensive operation was a guarantee (giving ground means that eventually you end up giving everything away).
You cannot rely on hindsight, to see that the historic Southern invasions of the North failed, meaning that this was a poor strategy. Battles aren't destined to be won or lost, factors unknown to the men at the time come into play and affect the outcome.
Here's the course of the war. Lee wins at the Battle of Seven Days. Lee wins at the Battle of Second Bull Run. What does he do next? Sit and wait for McClellan to reform his army, and wage a third campaign in one summer? No, he strikes North when the Union army is (assumed to be) in disorder after its series of defeats. Fortunately, McClellan was a supreme organizer and reorganized the Army of the Potomac much faster than Lee had guessed. Instead of Lee able to raid Maryland and capture Harper's Ferry, he was caught unaware of true Federal strength. This was a strategic gamble, which almost destroyed his army, yet, was a sound operation.
In late 1862, Lee had recovered from the first invasion, defeated Burnside at Fredricksburg, defeated Hooker at Chancellorsville, but what to do about this pesky Union army that is still sitting in Northern Virginia (Burnside and Hooker did not pull out, like McClellan). The only thing to do is to threaten Washington. It worked, the Union Army followed the Confederates (who also managed to clear out the Shenendoah Valley at the same time). The Battle of Gettysburg didn't have to be a defeat, but it was (luck of the draw).
The attacks served a purpose, to draw Union forces away from Richmond. It worked, and delayed the end of the war years.
The North and South were comparable to Police and Criminals. The Police (Union) could afford to be foiled time and time again, while the Criminals (South), once they make a mistake, it is pretty much their last mistake. Had Lee made a mistake in Northern Virignia, it would be game over. He knew this, and knew that brigning the war far from the critical centres of industry and power in the south meant that if a battle was lost, it would not end the Confederacy.
Clovis wrote:And new units are too quickly built too.
But all this supposes Confederate player can't get sufficient troops to cover both fronts and the Coast...
I agree. I think the massive early manpower allows the CSA to build and man long defensive lines. I think of the large CSA manpower as a fourth but secondary factor.
If penalties existed to spreading out troops, then you would see all those troops concentrated into larger armies instead of spread out in entrenched lines across theaters.
Jagger wrote:I agree. I think the massive early manpower allows the CSA to build and man long defensive lines. I think of the large CSA manpower as a fourth but secondary factor.
If penalties existed to spreading out troops, then you would see all those troops concentrated into larger armies instead of spread out in entrenched lines across theaters.
There are many example during the war of the Northen Virginia Army being dispersed in several reasons, either on offensive ( Gettysburg and Antietam campaign) or in defensive ( simply because supply was too short and so army has to forage in several zones). So the march to the gun was a often used.
What is different in AACW is the army size: to create a defensive line, you need much more than 50,000 men, even on Eastern theater.
-
McNaughton
- Posts: 2766
- Joined: Wed Mar 21, 2007 8:47 pm
- Location: Toronto, Canada
What also tends to be different is that players don't just keep two Corps under Longstreet and Jackson, with concentrated forces. They tend to have more corps, with fewer divisions in them. This results in more flexibility, even though technically having troops under Jackson and Longstreet will multiply their combat power significantly more than under other corps commanders.
Jagger wrote:Is it possible to mod entrenchment values? I could see lowering max entrenchment values early in the war and adjust upwards as the war progresses.
Is it possible to adjust "march to guns" values? I would like to experiment with the percentage chance of occurance.
Dunno about entrenchments, but Pocus addressed "marching to the sounds of the guns" in http://www.ageod-forum.com/showpost.php?p=44915&postcount=15
Unfortunately:
Pocus wrote:Notes: These variables are not yet exported.
Rafiki wrote:Dunno about entrenchments, but Pocus addressed "marching to the sounds of the guns" in http://www.ageod-forum.com/showpost.php?p=44915&postcount=15
Unfortunately:
I know of a very clunky and time consuming way to adjust the value of entrenchments through abilities. Unfortunately the amount of work would be very substantial.
Pocus, any chance we can get the data for "march to the guns" and entrenchment values to experiment with?
I just looked at the "march to the guns" parameters. I am wondering if they are working properly. In our game, we have only had three or four major battles between armies and each time, march to the guns has resulted in many outside formations arriving for the battle. In one case, I know the railroads were down in the region. I thought that would help prevent March to the guns but it didn't help. I will have to go back and look more closely at who actually arrived and the conditions at the time of the battle..
-
McNaughton
- Posts: 2766
- Joined: Wed Mar 21, 2007 8:47 pm
- Location: Toronto, Canada
Jagger wrote:I just looked at the "march to the guns" parameters. I am wondering if they are working properly. In our game, we have only had three or four major battles between armies and each time, march to the guns has resulted in many outside formations arriving for the battle. In one case, I know the railroads were down in the region. I thought that would help prevent March to the guns but it didn't help. I will have to go back and look more closely at who actually arrived and the conditions at the time of the battle..
Railroads don't apply, as it is "Marching Distance".
Which commanders were in the field?
Which commander was in the Army HQ?
What terrain were you fighting in?
What was the weather?
What was the time of year?
These need to be stated before an aspect can be determined if it is broken. If you have leaders with 7 strategic ratings (+35%), who are not loaded down or slowed by weather or terrain, with army HQs nearby then expect a good chance of things to happen. Plus, you aren't seeing which units don't respond, just those who do. While it may appear that there are a lot of units responding, you cannot tell who did not (so it may be that 50% of your possible forces responded, but it looked like a lot). There are just so many factors at play.
I would expect that in rough terrain, in poor weather, to rarely expect a troop to come to the aid of another. However, with good generals, in good weather and optimal terrain (remember, rails don't matter), and (critical) a well placed and well commanded HQ (who apply bonus' to their corps commanders), you can have a good chance at marching to the guns.
I would loath to see the only way to attack, or defend, being to put troops in one big stack and just move them toward the other big stack.
McNaughton wrote:I would loath to see the only way to attack, or defend, being to put troops in one big stack and just move them toward the other big stack.
Don't worry. There will always be a need for detached corps and divisions. As the Union with poor corps strategic leadership, even now I commonly detach divisions if I want to get anything done. But the penalties are high for independent divisions. Currently there are no penalties for independent corps.
Reduced command control and march to guns would still result in independent corps as poor leader activation requires their use. But the penalties would be harsher.
The check is made every round... I'm sure you are suprised 
But this is normal... A battle can be won or lost in a single round. So to have the rule give you a fair % (say 40%) every round to get support is stringent enough for us.
I can export the data yes, give me some days though.
But this is normal... A battle can be won or lost in a single round. So to have the rule give you a fair % (say 40%) every round to get support is stringent enough for us.
I can export the data yes, give me some days though.
Hofstadter's Law: "It always takes longer than you expect, even when you take into account Hofstadter's law."
I am going to run through how "March to the Sound of Guns" currently works within the game as I understand the process. If anybody sees errors, please let me know.
Below are the factors that determine whether reinforcements "March to the Guns"-
--100% base chance with the following factors adjusting base chance.
// -10% for each day of marching ---(inactive commanders have longer marching times)
// +10% if adjacent to army HQ
// +25% if the army HQ itself
// +5% for each pt of strat factor of the leader
//Every 5% of MC lacking gives -1% chance (both for start and end region- MC is military control)
Here are some examples from the defensive perspective. I won't consider military control as in the great majority of cases, defending units will have 100% military control. I am assuming good weather-no mud/snow, etc. Also I am assuming reinforcing units start marching from a stationary stance within their region. One other point to bear in mind is that only troops in adjacent regions may "March to the Guns" according to the manual. Also remember there are 6 rounds of combat per battle unless it ends early. March to the Guns reinforcements are checked each round of the 6 rounds of battle.
Example--Corps using railroad with leader of strat level 3 and adjacent to Army HQ.
100%+ [10% (adj to HQ)-10% (1 day railroad movement)+ 15% (strat 3 leader)]= 115% chance of "march to the guns".
Troops will always arrive on turn 1 of 6 rounds of combat.
----------------------------
Example--Corps marching in clear region without railroad with leader of strat level 3 and adjacent to Army HQ.
100%+ [10% (adj to HQ)-50% (5 day clear terrain movement)+ 15% (strat 3 leader)]= 75% chance of "march to the guns" for each 6 rounds of combat.
Troops should arrive on round 1 or 2 of 6 combat rounds.
----------------------------------
Example--Corps in woods region without railroad with leader of strat level 3 and adjacent to Army HQ.
100%+ [10% (adj to HQ)-60% (5 day clear terrain movement)+ 15% (strat 3 leader)]= 65% chance of "march to the guns" for each 6 rounds of combat.
Troops should reinforce by round 1 or 2 of 6 combat rounds.
---------------------------------------------
Example--Corps in hills region without railroad with leader of strat level 3 and adjacent to Army HQ.
100%+ [10% (adj to HQ)-130% (13 day clear terrain movement)+ 15% (strat 3 leader)]= -10% chance of "march to the guns" for each 6 rounds of combat.
Troops will not join the battle.
----------------------------------------------
This table below gives the strategic rating of the leader at top with the type of movement along the side (RR, clear, woods and hills movement). I am assuming units are adjacent to HQ. The intersecting table data are percentages of arriving each round of combat.
--6----5----4----3----2----1--Leader Strategic Ratings + adjacent HQ
130--125--120--115--110--105--Railroad movement
-90---85---80---75---70----65--Clear movement (5days)
-80---75---70---65---60----55--Woods movement (6days)
-10----5------------------------Hills movement (13days)
Adjacent troops connected by Railroad to the battle will automatically reinforce the battle on round one by use of March to the Guns regardless of terrain or leadership. If movement is through clear or woods regions, reinforcements should not arrive later than round two of the six rounds of combat unless you have very bad luck. The chance of March to the guns is reduced by a slower marching speed if the reinforcing corps commander is inactive except along railroads.
Should automatic reinforcement be expected from adjacent regions if traveling by railroad? I am not comfortable with automatic reinforcements as basically corps in adjacent regions along railroads are considered in both locations simultaneously for defensive purposes.
When we receive the "March to the Guns" data, I am going to experiment with the following data values.
25% base chance
// -5% for each day of marching ---(inactive commanders have longer marching times)
// +5% if adjacent to army HQ
// +15% if the army HQ itself
// +5% for each pt of strat factor of the leader
// Every 5% of MC lacking gives -1% chance (both for start and end region)
Using the above data values, here are the adjusted percentage chance per each round of 6 rounds of combat.
--6----5----4----3----2----1--Leader Strategic Ratings + adjacent HQ
-55---50---45---40---35---30--Railroad movement
-35---30---25---20---15---10--Clear movement
-30---25---20---15---10----5--Woods movement
--0-----------------------------Hills movement
Reinforcements will still almost always arrive by railroad but far less likely to be immediately available at the start of the battle. Marching through clear or woods terrain, troops may not arrive at all or arrive late heavily dependent on the strategic leadership and active/inactive status of the commander.
An alternative could involve increasing the cost per travel day and then tweaking the importance of strategic leadership and HQ influence. Might actually give better results.
Any thoughts or questions on March to the Guns? Also have I misinterpreted or miscalculated anything?
Below are the factors that determine whether reinforcements "March to the Guns"-
--100% base chance with the following factors adjusting base chance.
// -10% for each day of marching ---(inactive commanders have longer marching times)
// +10% if adjacent to army HQ
// +25% if the army HQ itself
// +5% for each pt of strat factor of the leader
//Every 5% of MC lacking gives -1% chance (both for start and end region- MC is military control)
Here are some examples from the defensive perspective. I won't consider military control as in the great majority of cases, defending units will have 100% military control. I am assuming good weather-no mud/snow, etc. Also I am assuming reinforcing units start marching from a stationary stance within their region. One other point to bear in mind is that only troops in adjacent regions may "March to the Guns" according to the manual. Also remember there are 6 rounds of combat per battle unless it ends early. March to the Guns reinforcements are checked each round of the 6 rounds of battle.
Example--Corps using railroad with leader of strat level 3 and adjacent to Army HQ.
100%+ [10% (adj to HQ)-10% (1 day railroad movement)+ 15% (strat 3 leader)]= 115% chance of "march to the guns".
Troops will always arrive on turn 1 of 6 rounds of combat.
----------------------------
Example--Corps marching in clear region without railroad with leader of strat level 3 and adjacent to Army HQ.
100%+ [10% (adj to HQ)-50% (5 day clear terrain movement)+ 15% (strat 3 leader)]= 75% chance of "march to the guns" for each 6 rounds of combat.
Troops should arrive on round 1 or 2 of 6 combat rounds.
----------------------------------
Example--Corps in woods region without railroad with leader of strat level 3 and adjacent to Army HQ.
100%+ [10% (adj to HQ)-60% (5 day clear terrain movement)+ 15% (strat 3 leader)]= 65% chance of "march to the guns" for each 6 rounds of combat.
Troops should reinforce by round 1 or 2 of 6 combat rounds.
---------------------------------------------
Example--Corps in hills region without railroad with leader of strat level 3 and adjacent to Army HQ.
100%+ [10% (adj to HQ)-130% (13 day clear terrain movement)+ 15% (strat 3 leader)]= -10% chance of "march to the guns" for each 6 rounds of combat.
Troops will not join the battle.
----------------------------------------------
This table below gives the strategic rating of the leader at top with the type of movement along the side (RR, clear, woods and hills movement). I am assuming units are adjacent to HQ. The intersecting table data are percentages of arriving each round of combat.
--6----5----4----3----2----1--Leader Strategic Ratings + adjacent HQ
130--125--120--115--110--105--Railroad movement
-90---85---80---75---70----65--Clear movement (5days)
-80---75---70---65---60----55--Woods movement (6days)
-10----5------------------------Hills movement (13days)
Adjacent troops connected by Railroad to the battle will automatically reinforce the battle on round one by use of March to the Guns regardless of terrain or leadership. If movement is through clear or woods regions, reinforcements should not arrive later than round two of the six rounds of combat unless you have very bad luck. The chance of March to the guns is reduced by a slower marching speed if the reinforcing corps commander is inactive except along railroads.
Should automatic reinforcement be expected from adjacent regions if traveling by railroad? I am not comfortable with automatic reinforcements as basically corps in adjacent regions along railroads are considered in both locations simultaneously for defensive purposes.
When we receive the "March to the Guns" data, I am going to experiment with the following data values.
25% base chance
// -5% for each day of marching ---(inactive commanders have longer marching times)
// +5% if adjacent to army HQ
// +15% if the army HQ itself
// +5% for each pt of strat factor of the leader
// Every 5% of MC lacking gives -1% chance (both for start and end region)
Using the above data values, here are the adjusted percentage chance per each round of 6 rounds of combat.
--6----5----4----3----2----1--Leader Strategic Ratings + adjacent HQ
-55---50---45---40---35---30--Railroad movement
-35---30---25---20---15---10--Clear movement
-30---25---20---15---10----5--Woods movement
--0-----------------------------Hills movement
Reinforcements will still almost always arrive by railroad but far less likely to be immediately available at the start of the battle. Marching through clear or woods terrain, troops may not arrive at all or arrive late heavily dependent on the strategic leadership and active/inactive status of the commander.
An alternative could involve increasing the cost per travel day and then tweaking the importance of strategic leadership and HQ influence. Might actually give better results.
Any thoughts or questions on March to the Guns? Also have I misinterpreted or miscalculated anything?
Return to “Modding AGE engine games”
Who is online
Users browsing this forum: No registered users and 23 guests