Clovis wrote:Drewry's Bluff : The eight cannons in the fort, including field artillery pieces and five naval guns, some salvaged from the Virginia, commanded the river for miles in both directions. (Source Wikipedia)
Naval guns are
certainly not coastal artillery.
Clovis wrote:Port Hudson and others: I never said they weren't any shore bombardments. But they were consisting only in attack of fortified positions like harbours. What never existed was a battle between a fleet and a field army whose best protection was to hide some kilometers away from coast at a period where indirect fire was almost unknown.
Going back to previous threads: Malvern Hill and Baton Rouge.
Clovis wrote:And field artillery was designed to damage unprotected units. Howewer a wooden boat is by itself a sort a protection for his crew. I highly doubt field artillery had the power to seriously damage a wooden vessel.
I suppose you are entitled to doubt that. I don't however, concede that point in any way at all.
Clovis wrote:Interestingly, no naval units were armed with small caliber guns but resorted to very large smoothbore types and some preety monstruous rifles one, in short numbers, as rifle guns were hopeless against armored units and for patent reasons not so accurate on sea than on land...
That is interesting, I thought monstrous rifled guns were used in short numbers because most ships couldn't take the strain of using them in broadside. I don't recall any attack by ships on fortifications being made in anything over 2-3' swells. Below that, the reasons are not so patent.
Clovis wrote:The CSA had naval artillery, largely thanks to the capture of Norfolk in 1861 and some guns bought in Great Britain.
Not coastal artillery in significant numbers. Almost all CSA coastal artillery was field artillery. Please don't confuse coastal artillery with naval artillery. In some cases, guns similar to coastal artillery were used as pivot-guns for ships, but they are not the same thing.
Clovis wrote:You will fing here and there fire exchange between a gunboat and some troops ashore. What's missing is both the ability of boats to do substantial damages to a mobile field unit and on the contrary a mobile field unit able to block naval movement with field artillery.
You've made the argument that the most effective defense against gunboats was avoidance. That is correct. Now you are making the argument that gunboats lacked the ability to damage field units. When they interacted, which did happen, as I have provided several links now in different threads giving evidence for (I could provide more, but it gets frustrating when I realize that those debating the other side will just dismiss those as insignificant as well), there was usually a significant amount of damage to the field units. When those units were in permanent fortifications, there was
usually a significant amount of damage to the gunboats, and less damage to the shore force. When the fortifications had elevation or effective localized obstructions, that is when the situation was totally unbalanced in favor of the shore force.
Fortification, elevation, obstructions and torpedoes, and concealment/suprise, were all force multipliers. The less you had of them, the more the advantage went to the naval force. AACW only has one of those variables, fortification, with not enough values, and therefore doesn't model ship-to-shore interaction well.