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Jabberwock
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CinC East - War Board

Wed Jul 30, 2008 1:17 am

War Department
Washington, Novemver 6, 1861

To: General Kurtz
From: Gen. Wool

Andrew -

Apologies for the misunderstandings. I did not have a map readily available to consult when I wrote you previously.

Somerset refers to Salisbury, in Somerset County, MD. It is a good launching point for amphibious operations near Norfolk, Petersburg, and Richmond. It is also a rail terminus, easy to get to. This will put them in preliminary position to take part in Fateful Lightning. The more single regiments of cavalry we can use, the greater the chance of success.

Again, the actual initiation of that plan will depend on enemy movements. If it is called off, and the war lasts another year, I would like to have the option of trying something similar. It can only work with complete surprise. If the Norfolk operation is successful, we will reinforce and make Edenton and Garys the next targets. Using those point as cavalry bases, and clearing the CSN out of Albemarle Sound, could also increase our chances of success. Taking Garys would also greatly simplify the planned Carolinas operation. Petersburg is tempting, but it might cause Beauregard to "turtle up" around Richmond, which is undesirable.

Agreed regarding the Tennessee rail line. It will be a difficult mission to even get to the Lynchburg section or the Danville line in winter conditions. That is why I am hoping for General Cai's cooperation to thoroughly break up that road further west.

Understood and approved regarding Keyes Brigade. I do expect them to be taken under fire as they cross the James. Please move a small infantry or militia force to James City soon, if you have one available.

One more question, is Mansfield forming a division? I will need to send him some additional staff if he is.


JW
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AndrewKurtz
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Wed Jul 30, 2008 2:27 am

CiC East
Alexandria, November 9, 1861

To: General Wood
From: Gen. Kurtz
cc: General Cai

General Wood,

Cavalry diverted from Chambers to Salisbury.

A brigade from Butler's force has been ordered to occupy James City ASAP. They are traveling by river.

Mansfield has formed a division.

Best regards,
General Kurtz

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CinC West - War Board

Wed Jul 30, 2008 12:50 pm

War Department
Washington, November 7, 1861

To: General Cai
From: General Wool

John -

Your part of preparing for operation Fateful Lightning is to break up the Tennessee & Virginia Railroad. If we can break it in three locations east of Chattanooga before January 1, that would be optimal. The effects of successfully pulling off Fateful Lightning are expected to be greater in your department than in the East.

Also, do you think it is possible to spare both Fremont and Porter? We could use Fremont at Grafton, and Porter at Frederick, if they can start east immediately. Otherwise we may have to delay operations here until more generals are available.

With Bragg's capture of Ft Pickens, Berwick and Beaumont are the only suitable sites close enough to base Operation Rattler from. The Florida Keys forts are too distant for adequate coordination. If we attack Berwick, it may cause the enemy to reinforce Louisiana and Texas, or it may cause them to reinforce Louisiana at the expense of Texas. Attacking West Baton Rouge along with Berwick would put the emphasis on Louisiana. That would be a diversion, and troops used (one regiment) at WBR would be withdrawn to participate in Rattler. I'd like your thoughts on whether we should consider this option, and how the rebels would react to such a move.


JW

P.S. Little Miss Owens of Marion is apparently a very popular young lady.
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johnnycai
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Wed Jul 30, 2008 8:54 pm

West Theatre HQ.
Lexington, Nov 07, 1861

From: Major General Cai
To: General Wool, General Kurtz, Navy Dept.

Sirs:

I will endeavour to cut the Tenn. & Vir. railroad as requested, but I fear we may be be sending those units to their demise with the terrain and harsh weather anticipated. I will review the logistics reports about to arrive and submit an alternate plan if feasible.

I will order Porter to Grafton since I believe he will perform better in the active role you will have planned for him. Plus I plan to keep generals in Cairo and St. Louis until there is zero threat to those strategic cities. This means the whole of the West Command will have a total of 7 generals assigned to it at this time. I certainly hope and expect this glaring deficiency will be remedied before the spring arrives.

Perhaps my understanding is flawed, are we sending Butler to Washington and Hooker is leaving the Fredricksburg area also? Does this not mean we will be leaving Fredricksburg open to a possible counter-attack? Holding Fredricksburg in force extends the rebel lines to near breaking. We must hold it and its depot at all costs in my opinion.

Operation Rattler:
Our troops can board from the East Coast and expect to sail to Beaumont directly without the need to restover in Florida. Berwick or West Baton Rouge would be an excellent diversion 14 days prior, perhaps a 2 regiment battalion on brigs can accomplish this task, which should coincide with Sumner attacking Beaumont. This will leave the rebels unsure, even if they spot our flotilla sailing into the Gulf, what the true target is. I favour 2-3 regiments for this as a single (or 2 regiments) regiment is likely to be decimated after an amphib landing at WBR for example, and the rebels would then not deem them an immediate threat which is what we seek as a diversion.

General Kurtz, I will be ordering the 10th Ohio Cav to Louisville at this time. Thank you.
Grant and I are now preparing to break camp and expect to join Wallace/Hunter near Bowling Green in about 10 days. I ensure you this time Grant will arrive, sober and ready for action.

Sincerly,
General Cai

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CinC West - War Board

Wed Jul 30, 2008 10:32 pm

War Department
Washington, November 9, 1861

To: General Cai
From: General Wool

John -

I could make more specific suggestions for mountain operations, if you ask. I would like to see what you come up with, though, using some or all of the regiments I suggested earlier. I'm not asking for "perfect targets" in these conditions, just hit what you can.

The specific deficiency of leaders in the west has been noted, and will be remedied ASAP. In the meantime, there is never zero threat, but there can be virtually zero threat. If Pagan's cavalry is dealt with, the 1st AR cavalry is the only remaining possible immediate threat to St Louis, and no matter what they do in the next few weeks, it will weaken them. Additional forces and a leader can reach there before any other threat can materialize. The rebels have to deal with winter conditions, too. Anyway, I understand your reasons for not wanting to move Halleck and his training command immediately from that point. We definitely need a leader (no matter how bad) at Cairo. Thank you for sending Porter. He is appreciated.

Holding Fredericksburg is not realistic. The possibility was considered. We are expecting a massive strike there by Jackson. Using Fredericksburg as bait to draw the rebel army away from the Potomac, and to keep them from reinforcing Norfolk, is realistic. If we could successfully hold Fredericksburg, Beauregard might choose an all out defense of Richmond, which is not what we want, yet. He will have spotted our cavalry on his main supply line now, and should be feeling very exposed in his present position. Right now we want him to pull back from the Potomac, but still in a position where his army and Richmond are two separate objectives. Hopefully as he shifts to a new position, it will create new vulnerabilities.

Thank you for the suggestion regarding WBR. I will use one of the new amphibious brigades about to be detached from McDowell there, and one at Berwick. I will try to have it timed so that the landing is just prior to or simultaneous with Sumner's arrival at Beaumont. Fresh sailors or cavalry units staged out of Berwick could possibly reach Milam in boats, but other units will need time to reembark on transports. We will be immediately recruiting additional militia and cavalry in New England. The forces departing the Carolinas and in transit will need to stop in the Florida Keys before returning to combat. The raising of cavalry should give them time to rest, and still be the vanguard of our attack. Waiting for cavalry will also give units departing from Delaware time to properly organize and assign objectives, if they stop in Florida. That should give Sumner adequate time to first get to Dallas, then organize, and then proceed downriver.

I have not received any recent intelligence on Polk's activities. Do you have an idea what he is up to?


JW
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CinCs East & West - War Board

Thu Jul 31, 2008 3:33 am

War Department
Washington November 10, 1861

To: Major Generals Cai & Kurtz
Copies to: President Lincoln, Secretary Cameron, Secretary Welles, Major General McClellan
From: Major General Hitchcock, Brigadier General Meigs

Sirs -

It is our honor to present you with a proposal for reinforcements and allocation of resources, made possible by the recent call for volunteers and issuance of war bonds.


Eastern Theater

3 brigades of Infantry, 2 regiments each, conscripts (PA)
1 regiment of Zouaves (PA)
2 regiments of Sharpshooters (PA)
2 regiments of Cavalry (PA)
1 regiment of Cavalry (NY)


Western Theater

1 brigade of Infantry, 2 regiments, mixed volunteers and conscripts (IA)
2 brigades of Infantry, 2 regiments each, mixed conscripts and militia (MO)
2 regiments of Militia (IL)
2 regiments of Militia (IN)
3 regiments of Cavalry (IA)
1 battery of Siege Artillery (PA)


Amphibious Corps

1 mixed brigade, 3 regiments of Infantry, 1 regiment of Cavalry, 1 battery of Light Artillery (MA)
2 regiments of Sharpshooters (CT)
1 regiment of Militia (MA)
1 regiment of Militia (ME)
1 regiment of Militia (NH)
5 regiments of Cavalry (CT)


Unassigned

1 regiment of Infantry
2 regiments of Cavalry
1 battery of Field Artillery
1 Supply Train


Economic

moderate investment in Texas and New Mexico
15 Steamboats


This should fulfill the requirements for the Amphibious Corps until next year.

Planned heavy equipment for the remainder of the year, by order of priority, will include:

artillery for the western theater
brigs for coastal blockades and amphibious support
engineers and medical units for both theaters
continued transportation and economic development
frigates for blockading Nassau and Havana
additional gunboats for the inland rivers
artillery for the eastern theater
additions to the merchant marine

Additional conscripts and cavalry will be sent to both theater commanders.

Please notify the the board through Major General Wool of any concerns or specific requests.


Respectfully submitted by your obedient servants,
Major General Ethan Hitchcock, Military Advisor to the President
Brigadier General Montgomery Meigs, Quartermaster General


2nd draft approved for distribution.
E. Stanton
J. Wool
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CinC West - War Board

Fri Aug 01, 2008 6:40 am

War Department
Washington, November 11, 1861

To: General Cai
From: General Wool

John -

I heard directly from Grant.

He claims he was ordered to rendezvous with Hunter at Brandenburg. Before Grant could leave Lexington, Hunter had gone down the Ohio River in boats, destination unknown (to Grant). Apparently enemy cavalry burned all the boats at Lexington and Frankfort while they were in possession of those places.

Very imaginative. It's a better excuse than "passed out drunk", but it still sounded like "passed out drunk" when I read it out loud.


JW
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johnnycai
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Tue Aug 05, 2008 8:48 pm

West Theatre HQ.
Enroute to Bowling Green, Nov 11, 1861

From: Major General Cai
To: General Wool, General Kurtz

Sirs,
I believe my orders to General Grant were clear. Proceed to Muhlenburg, and once there, to join Hunter's command. If I cannot ask my generals to follow such simple instructions then the Union is indeed in dire straits.

I will personally see to Grant's arrival and taking command of Wallace/Hunter at Bowling Green.
The President will have Kentucky secured by the end of the year as promised.

Sincerely,
General Cai

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CinC West - War Board

Tue Aug 05, 2008 10:30 pm

War Department
Washington, November 12, 1861

To: General Cai
From: General Wool

John -

I suppose we will find out if we need to change operational methods, depending on whether Wallace shows up in Bowling Greene when he is supposed to, due to possible issues with organizing reinforcements at Muhlenburg. This is similar in some ways to the previous situation with Grant. I also remember Scott stating that he thought our counter-attack at Grafton would get stalled due to similar issues, but it went through successfully. These subjects may require in-depth analysis from sources outside the current command structure.

Early reports indicate that 4th and 5th IL Cavalry regiments may not have received copies of the new doctrine. Please make sure some copies get through the lines to them (without falling into enemy hands).


JW
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CinC West - War Board

Thu Aug 14, 2008 3:40 am

War Department
Washington, November 16, 1861

To: General Cai
From: General Wool

John -

Any time our plans call for a rendezvous prior to or in conjunction with another maneuver, please consult with me. We can try to figure out together what the consequences could be. If you have any logistics experts that you can call on, I would say that now is a good time to do it, before we try any more of these maneuvers.


JW
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johnnycai
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Thu Aug 14, 2008 2:51 pm

West Theatre HQ.
Bowling Green, Nov 16, 1861

From: Major General Cai
To: General Wool

Sir,
Have arrived at Bowling Green and it appears our attack there was anticipated and the Johnston's have reinforced the position.

Is your previous telegram referring to Wallace/Hunter's advance?? My orders were to march to seige the city and have Grant meet them there. It appears Wallace and Hunter choose to wait for Grant before proceeding. Considering our enemy reinforced Bowling Green ahead of us, this delay has likely been a positive for the Union.

I am considering a bold move at this time. I believe we need to retake Bowling Green and force the enemy there to fight on our terms. Perhaps manoevering to the South of the town to cut-off their lines of communication and supply to Nashville or Ft. Henry. I dont believe we have sufficient forces to cross the Tennessee and attack Ft. Henry or Nashville at this time with the Johnston's holding Bowling Green.
Lyon can move again against Columbus but this seems to be a trap laid out to entice our troops to move there.

Good news at Tucson, the investment there has produced a new factory that can support our units. The weather has turned in Texas, so my intent is to recall Sumner's division to Tucson and prepare for Operation Rattler in April.

Sincerely,
General Cai

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CinC West - War Board

Thu Aug 14, 2008 5:20 pm

War Department
Washington, November 16, 1861

To: General Cai
From: General Wool

John -

I agree that the delay was positive. Your luck continues to hold in that respect. The delay was caused by reinforcements that were supposed to rendezvous with Wallace at Bowling Green. Upon finding Wallace still at Muhlenberg, they joined his forces there, complicating his command problems on the march to Bowling Green.

It is impossible for any infantry currently with Grant to maneuver south. I suggest reorganizing his force, detaching several small infantry and cavalry brigades, and holding the main force in defence of their current position. The Johnstons together are estimated to have 40,000 troops with 5 artillery batteries under their command. They are strongly fortified in previously prepared entrenchments. After Grant's troops recover and reorganize from the Muhlenberg march, and have the possibility of retreating towards Louisville if the attack fails, then we should consider whether to attack.

In the meantime, an additional cavalry regiment should bypass this area to the southeast, and cut in behind the rebel force, while cavalry currently at Bowling Green raids across the Cumberland. Detached volunteers should move through Grayson or Falcon Creek to take firm possession of Glasgow & Brownville, opening a new line of communication and supply for Grant, and limiting enemy options in the direction of Louisville.

If Columbus is a trap, what forces do the rebels have available to close it? If they commit there, they won't be able to use those forces somewhere else. I don't have information on Polk's whereabouts or strength readily available. Do you have an idea where he is? In the absence of positive information, I believe he sent his troops to Bowling Green, and may personally be moving to join Price. What plans do we have for Lyon in the meantime?

Please order the Louisville Militia regiment (that specific regiment) to move out of the town and start rebuilding entrenchments. Please order both old and new militia garrisons to take over for trained garrisons at our second-line depots. Having the trained garrisons available as reinforcements would help out on the front line. Please have forces at Prestonburg rebuild fortifications there, both inside and outside of the town. This is planned to be a forward depot, and will need to be secure. If you choose to follow suggestions from Washington, please pay attention to which regiments are suggested.

Please note that the 7th OH Mil is now departing Dover, and will rejoin your forces in Texas. Please also note that due to the current situation in Tennessee, I was unable to provide one of the proposed cavalry regiments in Iowa. Additional cavalry were raised in Connecticut, and will be temporarily available for your use in Texas.

The 4th and 5th IL Cav have not followed specific suggestions from Washington, and not followed doctrine. Now they are in a bad situation, and not providing much benefit. If you would like specific suggestions to make use of them and possibly escape their predicament, let me know. If you would like specific suggestions for operations in eastern Kentucky or Missouri, let me know that as well. You are expected to push forward in those locations. If you would like more specific suggestions on the best way to restructure Grant's force, I can provide them.

Your proposal for New Mexico and Texas is approved. Please have a cavalry regiment from somewhere in the west take possession of the encampments in Indian Territory. Give the 3rd Naval regiment a break before they spontaneously disband. Sailors cost money.

As always, I hope for a review of your proposed orders, before they go into effect. Further disobedience of this directive would be unfortunate and unpleasant.


JW
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CinC East - War Board

Thu Aug 14, 2008 6:02 pm

War Department
Washington, November 16, 1861

To: General Kurtz
From: General Wool

Andrew -

Beauregard and Jackson have pulled back to Culpeper, and are now operating on interior lines. The rail line has been reopened south of that point. As I see it, Jackson has six options. I will list them in my percieved order of probability.

1. Attack McDowell at Alexandria.
2. Remain in Culpeper to threaten multiple points, while repairing railroads.
3. Attack southeast, attempting to isolate and destroy Hooker.
4. Attack Suffolk.
5. Attack northwest, trying to pick off small units as they move forward towards the Shenandoah Valey.
6. Fall back on Richmond.

In any of these cases, I believe a small force, possibly the Laurel Brigade, will recapture Fredericksburg.

Please let me know where this differs from your perception of the situation, so that we have a basis to discuss your next moves.


JW
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AndrewKurtz
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Sat Aug 16, 2008 12:28 am

CiC East
Alexandria, November 16, 1861

To: General Wood
From: Gen. Kurtz

General Wood,

I'm pleased to report that our operations for the past two weeks have been successful and create some opportunities to occupy important territory, thus moving the front away from Washington as the winter approaches.

1. The depot in Fredricksburg has been destroyed and the town has been evacuated. General Hooker succeeded in taking Williams and is in position to threaten Richmond and defend the York Peninsula.

2. As expected, the enemy moved in force towards the forces that threatened Richmond. Manassas is weakly defended by three brigades, Winchester is only held by a small militia force and Harpers Ferry has been completely abandoned.

3. Unfortunately, we have no forces active an in a position to take Manassas.

4. Planned cavalry operations

All forces not specifically identified will remain stationary to either rest and resupply or because there are not targets within an acceptable range:

2nd MD - To Waverly to block reinforcements to Norfolk and to destroy rail.
1st NY, 7th PA and 1st MD - Raid south of Richmond and around Petersburg and Burkville
5th PA and 1st MD - Take Harpers Ferry and move to Winchester.
6th PA - Destroy rail in Lexington region. Long raid of 50+ days.
11th WV - Continue retreat to Prestonbug
US Cav - To F. Monroe for Rest and Resupply
3rd MD - Rain on Henrico

5. NVA 5th - Divert to take Winchester

6. #19 DE Artillery to Harpers Ferry

7. Philadelphia Brigade forced march to occupy Harpers Ferry

8. McC's corps to Ludon, leaving 1st MA behind in trenches. This will move the front forward into Virginia

9. The forces in Suffolk will clear the area of enemy forces.

10. All forces around Norfolk will be placed under the single control of General Meagher and will assault Norfolk. The enemy if outnumbered by 3-4x.

11. Mansfield and the 11th Division will take Edenton which is unoccupied.

12. Portor has almost arrived in Grafton. Next turn the forces their will be organized under his control.

13. 2nd Ohio Militian will destroy the rail in Whyte and then move to Prestenburg.

14. 1st NH and 1st MA militia will be merged into a single brigade and moved to the front along with other available reinforcements.

15. 14th Sharpshooters will be ordered to join McC while the 16th Sharpshooters will join McD.

Please review and advice.

Regards,
General Kurtz

9.

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CinC East - War Board

Sat Aug 16, 2008 4:10 am

War Department
Washington, November 17, 1861

To: General Kurtz
From: General Wool

Andrew -

I don't think Beauregard will be content to hold in place or keep retreating. He is massing troops under Jackson in Culpeper. Bee is still in Loudon, although some scouting reports initially placed him at Manassas. If he joins either Bonham or Jackson's corps, and Jackson attacks Alexandria, Bory will have ~ 50,000 troops available there. We currently have 23,000 there for defense, and are planning to send 3,000 of the cavalry elsewhere. Given the leadership difference, those aren't great odds, even with fortifications. Butler's corps clearly must return to Washington (preferably by rail), which leaves McClellan as the only possible source of substantial reinforcements for McDowell.

Specific items:

1 & 3. Noted. I don't understand what you mean by "active and in a position to take Manassas". Please note my concern (T-223) for Hooker's Division and the brigades at Tappahannock. If Jackson chooses, given the current "Indian Summer" conditions in eastern VA, he could march to either Williamsburg or Tappahannock in under ten days time from his current position.

2. Also noted. Those are, however, three of the best brigades in the rebel army at Manassas.

4. Excellent.

a. 2nd Maryland - Approved. Excellent choice of objective. Suggest they continue moving towards Suffolk after reaching their objective.

b. 1st MD "Union", 1st NY, 7th PA - can you be more specific? What are their planned routes and modes of transport towards the objectives? (I'm thinking if they travel separately, they can all reach Norfolk by steamboat by the end of the month, which should make a good starting point for the raids you have planned. I'm also thinking one of those regiments could head south to Fredericksburg, and then turn southwest for a rail raid at Lynchburg, moving towards Franklin after that; while another proceeds south to Buckingham, then turns northwest for a railroad raid at Charlottesville, falling back towards Palmyra upon completion. There is the possibility that a regiment could raid Louisa, detouring to Westmoreland along the way, and continuing to Buckingham. They could all continue from those points to their final objectives. Those are riskier options, requiring evasion of expected enemy forces in Spotsylvania, Louisa, and Albemarle before they reach the preliminary targets. If you have better plans, please let me know.)

c. 5th PA and 1st MD "Potomac" - the entire 44th Detachment is in need of relief. If the 1st MD temporarily holds the 44th's current position until more suitable (volunteer) troops can arrive, then the 1st PA Brigade can accompany the artillery to occupy Harper's Ferry, while the Philadelphia Brigade won't have to forced march there and could take another mission. That would however, also mean a reduced presence at Winchester (5th PA Cav + NVA/5th).

d. 6th PA - I wouldn't choose Lexington right now due to the weather conditions. If the 6th PA rails toward and occupies Pendleton county, the B & O railroad should be reopened from Grafton through to Bath, giving FJ Porter the option to quickly move east if that becomes necessary.

e. 11th WV - Approved. Please continue the retreat into Prestonburg.

f. US Cavalry - Approved. I can't find a better option. I will ask Gideon to move additional transports along their route, in the hopes of keeping them supplied. We need to note what happened to them due to CSN interference, for future reference.

g. 3rd Maryland - Approved. If this regiment proceeds straight west to Palmyra (Amherst), and then southeast to City Point, they will have a reduced time on target at their objective of Henrico.

5. Approved.

6. Approved. Refer to item 4c.

7. Refer to item 4c.

8. This is at your discretion. See my concerns above. If McClellan gets into a fight in Loudon, while Jackson takes Alexandria, we would have insufficient reserves left for the defense of Washington. The War Board consensus (with some dissent) is that McC's corps head for Alexandria temporarily, to take up a newly fortified position directly supporting McDowell (by rendezvous with a small detachment from McD's command). You are probably correct in not worrying about an attack into Montgomery County. Use of volunteers to hold that position is approved. I respectfully suggest using the Baltimore Btty, along with a brigade from the 50th detachment for that purpose. My thinking is that Montgomery may become more important in the near future, and the 1st MA Brigade is currently more suitable for front line operations than any of the brigades in the 50th detachment.

9. Approved. I would like to mention the possiblities that Keyes brigade could make a forced march attack on Garys, at your discretion; also that the 3rd PA Cav could amphibiously assault Columbia, at your discretion. If the forced march were unsuccessful, Keyes Brigade would be in a position to tear up rail, and either attack Garys or some other point nearby. If you do order the amphibious option, I suggest that you order them to continue beyond the objective, and only take possession of the town if there is no opposition. These are by no means orders, barely even suggestions. If you choose to wait for more concrete opportunies for those objectives, I will not feel disappointed.

10. Approved.

11. Approved.

12. Noted. Refer to item 4d. In the meantime, please move some fresh troops into the entrenchments around Grafton, and the road-weary troops into the fortifications in town. Please give these orders one regiment at a time, so that we don't lose good positions in the shuffle.

13. This area and regiment are part of General Cai's command due to the adjustment of theater borders (T-177). Please continue to review forces, terrain, missions, etc. as far west as the OH/IN border and points south along that line, in case another adjustment becomes necessary.

14. 1st NH & 1st MA Regiments are amphibious troops, as are all forces in New England (T-81). Please do not order those regiments into a single brigade, as they (along with the 1st ME & 7th OH) are intended for garrison duties in Texas, hopefully for the duration of hostilities. They will be departing Boston for their staging areas immediately.

15. This is at your discretion. McC's Excelsior Brigade already contains a sharpshooters regiment, as does the Philadelphia Brigade in the same area. There is no such regiment at Grafton.

Additional notes:

16. The 1st RI (Franklin, PA) is in need of relief. Could a brigade be split off from the 50th Detachment for this purpose? Once they have been relieved, the 1st RI will be available for front line duties. They would be an ideal regiment to brigade with sailors. Can an additional brigade be split off from the 50th for the relief of the garrison forces in Chambers? The board will try to provide addition single regiments of volunteers for this purpose by the next relief cycle.

17. The governor of Pennsylvania is making inquiries why entrenchments in Harrisburg were abandoned last month. Can the 1st PA militia regiment (that specific regiment) be ordered back inside the city while the PA State Guard (that specific regiment) holds the current position?

18. Btty C, WV Light Art. is probably not needed at Elizabeth any longer, and you can use it elsewhere if you wish.

19. No matter which destination you order McClellan to, I worry that any 50th detachment reinforcements could slow his arrival. I would hate to see him arrive even one day late with his troops worn down from an extra day of marching, in the event of a battle. Could they be ordered to join with McDowell or their orders be revised somehow so that they don't intercept McC on the march?

20. Please order all troops mustering at Philadelphia into separate commands. Scott has been authorized to deliver similar orders at Boston.

21. At your discretion, the NJ Volunteer Brigade may halt for rest and resupply at Warsaw (Westmoreland). Port Tobacco is now adequately protected by naval forces in the Potomac River. The NJ Volunteers are not in any shape to take a role in possible developments closer to Washington. This also means that the 3rd MD Mil at Port Tobacco are available for a more active role.

22. At your request, I could ask for additional naval forces to move into the Potomac. I don't think they are immediately necessary, but I don't want to have to rush them there in an emergency situation, either.

I know that I stated I wouldn't give specific advice about cavalry routes, but I think this once it may help you to see how I plan cavalry raids.


Thank for your excellent analysis and hard work in planning all this,
JW
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Jabberwock
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CinCs East & West - Winfield Scott

Sat Aug 16, 2008 5:28 am

New York City, November 17, 1861

To: Major Generals Cai & Kurtz
From: Lt. General Winfield Scott (ret.)

Sirs -

I would like to take this opportunity to state that it has been my distinct pleasure and privilege to work with you both in sheperding our country through the difficult period of the last few months. It is with deep regret that I have left the service that includes such honorable, responsible, and capable officers as yourselves. Please extend to my successors the kind regards that you have shown me. If I can be of any further service to either of you in any way, please do not hesitate an instant to ask or visit. For the foreseeable future, I can be reached at the undersigned address.

Your Humble, Faithful, and Ever Obedient Servant,
Winfield Scott

Superintendent
U.S. Maritime Academy & Amphibious Warfare Institute
Buzzard's Bay, MA
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AndrewKurtz
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Sun Aug 17, 2008 3:16 am

CiC East
Alexandria, November 18, 1861

To: General Wood
From: Gen. Kurtz

General Wood,

Yours of November 16th was not received prior to the preparation and trasmission of the planned orders.

I would like to first add to your analysis. I believe there is one other option and that is to occupy Manassas in strength. From this position, Richmond is better protected and they force us to plan for the defense of Washington. I believe this or the reoccupation of the valley as the most likely moves by the enemy.

I have reviewed your comments and would like to recommend the following adjustments to my original orders:

1. I recommend a change to the cavalry raid as follows
1a. 1st MD raid Henrico (14 days to target)
1b. 7th PA raid Louise via Caroline (14 days to target)
1c. 3rd MD raid Burkville via Buckingham/Appomattox (15 days to target)
1d. 1st NY raid Albemarle via Amerhest (14 days to target)

2. I recommend ordering Hooker to fall back toward Ft. Monroe if attacked by Jackson.

3. I do not show Bee in Loudon. From where is this information being received? I would like to understand this intelligence report and your thoughts on the excepted enemy actions prior to deciding final orders for McC.

4. Why MUST Butler be ordered to DC? I recommend we instead land his Corps is Alexandria and add them to the forces defending Alexandria. They will be ordered to join a detachment from McDowell. They would arrive in five days and be well entrenched.

5. I have, and have not had, any intention to take Manassas at this time.

6. I agree with the opening of the B&O railroad as a higher priory to a raid on Alexander.

7. I agree with the adjustments to the orders to take HF, and would like to also recommend that we hold on an attack on Winchester at this time. Instead, I recommend we concentrate forces at Harpers Ferry to be better able to defend should Jackson return to the valley. Instead, the NVA 5th will continue to assist in the opening of the B&O and, afterwards, will take rail to reinforce HF.

8. I like the idea of taking and destroying the depot at Garysburg and further recommend that the 4th Naval join Keys for the attack, allowing them to arrive within 8 days and attack with a greater force.

9. No orders will be issued to the 1st NH and 1st MA.

10. Agree that Grafton is a better rendevous point for the 14th Sharpshooters

11. Naval support in the Potomac to impeed potential enemy actions would be wise and is hereby requested.

Regards,
General Kurtz

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CinC East - War Board

Sun Aug 17, 2008 4:17 am

War Department
Washington, November 19, 1861

To: General Kurtz
From: General Wool

Andrew -

Beauregard and Jackson just left Manassas. They are not likely to vacillate. Given Jackson's "foot cavalry" ability, I believe they threaten Washington almost as much from their current position as from Manassas. Either they are moving south, holding where they are to threaten more than just Washington, or they are using Bonham's corps as a screen and support for attacking Alexandria.

1. I see your goals - Richmond will be thoroughly isolated, and forces in northern Virginia will have that much more difficulty reaching eastern Virginia. Some high-risk objectives, but all approved, as long as all regiments evade contact and continue beyond their objectives, recieving orders for more than just the next two weeks.

2. Approved. Any orders for the units at Tappahannock, or hold in place? There is an excess of transports available there, due to the sudden ice storm that drove them out of the Rappahannock River, and resulted in Butler's corps all being crammed onto brigs.

3. Scouts sent to inquire specifically about Bee's command report him in Loudon. This is similar to some reports showing the Philadelphia Brigade near Frederick City, although we know they are actually in Montgomery County.

4. Must was a poor choice of words. Given my concerns about Jackson attacking Alexandria, I dont want Butler's corps back on the front line until they have had a chance to recover from the Fredericksburg operation. I judged that Washington is the ideal place for them to recover, and it does have a direct rail connection with Alexandria. I was hoping to use them as a reserve in case everything else goes wrong, and Butler's presence at Washington would enable them to call for additional help as a last resort. This, as other items, is left to your discretion.

5. Noted.

6. Excellent.

7. Approved, act at your discretion. However, note the NVA/5th will be in need of resupply shortly.

8. Approved, at your discretion. Note that Huger (exact forces unknown) has been operating in the area around Petersburg and Garys.

9 & 10. Thank you.

11. Done.


Regards,
JW
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AndrewKurtz
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Location: Greenville, SC

Sun Aug 17, 2008 4:29 pm

CiC East
Alexandria, November 21, 1861

To: General Wood
From: Gen. Kurtz

General Wood,

A proposed change to the orders for the US Cav is to have them ordered to Edenton, which should be in General Mansfield hands by the time they arrive.

No resistance is expected in Edenton. It is more risky as it assumes Mansfield will succeed in his attack, but it also provides more immediate relief to the US Cav. Supply Transports are request to be sent to Edenton immediately to provide relief supplies.

Also, request permission to order the forces currently holding Tappahannock to Edenton using the available transports. This provides the above requested supplies and these forces can be used to eventually help defend Suffolk. I would have preferred to have them go directly to Suffolk, but the guns at Norfolk great to great a risk. Note that these forces are consider to vulnerable to being isolated and destroyed in their current position.


General Kurtz

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CinC East - War Board

Sun Aug 17, 2008 5:14 pm

War Department
Washington, November 21, 1861

To: General Kurtz
From: General Wool

Andrew -

Change of base to Edenton approved. Can the 3rd PA Cav proceed there as well? Transports cannot be ordered directly to Edenton until it is in our possession, but Gus Fox suggests ordering the bulk of Farragut's fleet (with transports, but without ships detached for Potomac River duty) to Albemarle Sound, to surprise Buchanan, who will probably only be expecting transports.

The objectives of protecting Washington and harassing the Merrimac are considered sufficient to justify the delay in resuming the blockade of Richmond.

The USS Erie and USS Ontario (Transport Squadron #13) can reach Suffolk in 5-9 days, unless seriously delayed. Taking that mode of transport would leave the troops in better condition for combat on their arrival.


JW
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AndrewKurtz
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Sun Aug 17, 2008 5:22 pm

CiC East
Alexandria, November 22, 1861

To: General Wood
From: Gen. Kurtz

General Wood,

What would be the purpose of ordering the 3rd PA Cav to Edenton? Their current orders are to join the forces in the Suffolk trenches to defend against possible attack while Keys Brigade is headed to Gary and to rest if not attacked, preparing for future raiding activities.

Is there a larger goal in mind? If not, I prefer to keep them in Suffolk for the next few weeks.

The support of Farragut's fleet would be beneficial. Please request the support from our navy friends.

General Kurtz

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CinC East - War Board

Sun Aug 17, 2008 5:38 pm

War Department
Washington, November 22, 1861

To: General Kurtz
From: General Wool

Andrew -

I expect Buchanan to attempt disrupting Mansfield's landing operations again. The 3rd PA would be our insurance of taking Edenton. They could still attack the 2nd VA cavalry along the way. This would also put them closer to other objectives around the Sound. If we can secure Garys, Edenton, and the other Albemarle Sound cities, it gives us all the tributaries of that Sound as a highway of invasion deep into North Carolina. That would greatly increase the chance of success of next summer's planned operation. (I.e. it would be easier to reach Goldsboro and Raleigh from the Roanoke River than from the Lumber River, for the northen flank of that attack). Operation Fateful Lightning near Richmond this winter is considered a valuable diversion and harassment exercise. Scott's March to the Mountains plan next summer should win the war. Small adjustments that could advance the success of that plan need to be weighed against more current requirements. If you judge the need in Suffolk more pressing, by all means keep them there. Proceed at your discretion.


JW
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AndrewKurtz
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Sun Aug 17, 2008 5:50 pm

CiC East
Alexandria, November 22, 1861

To: General Wood
From: Gen. Kurtz

General Wood,

I understand and agree with the objective. However, the 3rd PA is in no shape to leave Suffolk.

Instead, I have ordered the NVA 3rd Brigade detached from Hooker and to proceed directly to Suffolk, occupying the entrenchments with the3rd PA Cav.

The NJ Volunteers have been ordered to support the assault on Edenton.

The 3rd PA Cav will rest in Suffolk.

General Kurtz

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CinC East - War Board

Sun Aug 17, 2008 6:00 pm

War Department
Washington, November 22, 1861

To: General Kurtz
From: General Wool

Excellent. Proceed.
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CinC East - War Board

Sun Aug 17, 2008 6:08 pm

War Department
Washington, November 22, 1861

To: General Kurtz
From: General Wool

Andrew -

I had missed the change that Tappahannock forces would be moved to Edenton rather than Suffolk. This is approved.


JW
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AndrewKurtz
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Sun Aug 17, 2008 7:56 pm

CiC East
Alexandria, November 26, 1861

To: General Wood
From: Gen. Kurtz

General Wood,

I apologize for the confusion related to the force leaving Tappahannock. An early draft of the orders was released without approval. It was quickly realized that the defenses of Norfolk posed too large a risk to proceed directly to Suffolk.

Further care will be taken in the future.

General Kurtz

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Sun Aug 17, 2008 10:10 pm

War Department
Washington, November 26, 1861

To: General Kurtz
From: General Wool

Andrew -

Not a problem about the Tappahannock orders. This happens in my office as well. I would have prefered that they were ordered to the Albemarle Sound where naval forces can protect them while disembarking, rather than the Chowan River.

Some notes for the future based on the orders that were issued:

1. We need to work on raiders moving beyond objectives. For example, If the 1st MD "Union" had been ordered to City Point, they would not have reached City Point. They would still have been able to do their job in Henrico. If they are only ordered to the objective, cavalry regiments often relax evasive discipline on arrival, and get into unwanted skirmishes. Orders are approved and sent. Don't worry about this right now.

2. I created some confusion with my suggestion regarding Philadelphia. Mustering troops should be split into separate commands, within the bounds of the city where they are mustering. I'm sending General Totten with orders to sort out the immediate situation in Philadelphia. Sorry for the confusion.

3. Why are you sending me a telegram dated the 26th? Now we are cutting deep into General Cai's time to discuss his situation. We need to encourage him to participate in this type of discussion.


JW
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johnnycai
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Tue Aug 19, 2008 2:50 am

West Theatre HQ.
Bowling Green, Nov 18, 1861

From: Major General Cai
To: General Wool

The staff has discussed Bowling Green.
Grant believes our odds are less than theirs...about 35-40% of hanging in there. I can muster about 30,000 men and we can give them a good show but I can not cutoff CSA reinforcements.
Lyon has sent word that his troops can attack the Ft. Henry/Donelson. His staff have devised an overland route and where he can dislodge Floyd then lay seige with supply. His division can march 14,000 at the Forts as the weather is fair enough.
Grant and I are divided on his plan, and the only objection is because of Grant being perhaps wary of both his and Lyon's commands being committed at the same time and divided. There is supply and reinforcements ready to support both but not enough commanders.

the 4th and 5th Ill. will find its way home once it crosses the Tennessee.

At Little Rock, we have heard that the weather has cleared that Price is preparing in Fayetteville. Our staff believe Price will need 18-20 days to march to Ft. Smith, so our retreat path thru Englewood IT could be gone if they are not ordered to march. Plus the Arkansas has thawed slightly so that rebels could operate on the river.

Perhaps the War Dept. has new insights to report?

johnnycai
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Tue Aug 19, 2008 3:03 am

West Theatre HQ.
Bowling Green, Nov 18, 1861

From: Major General Cai
To: Lt. General Winfield Scott (ret.)
CC: General Kurtz


To our Most Honourable Sir -

The USA will mark this day as a milestone to the Army, the President and our Country.

Your Faithful Servant,
General Cai

Western Theatre Command, KY.

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CinC West - War Board

Tue Aug 19, 2008 6:54 am

War Department
Washington, November 19, 1861

To: General Cai
From: General Wool

John -

I'm not worried at the moment about cutting off reinforcements or taking the town. If the rebels attack, Grant should be able to wear them down considerably, as long as he has reorganized properly. Judging from readiness reports, he could increase the effectiveness of his force by almost 50% with the proper adjustments. That would leave 4 small infantry brigades available to thoroughly secure the remainder of the Louisville rail line, and two cavalry regiments available for raiding. The cavalry can reach Maury, and either Humphreys or Carthage (by forced march). I would prefer Humphreys. If the forced march fails, the raiders can tear up rail in Davidson. Humphreys is also a critical point for crossing the Cumberland River. I'm quite surprised that the Johnstons haven't begun fortifying there already.

I would prefer that Grant and Lyon do two separate thing simultaneously, because that means the rebels have difficulty reacting to both. I would prefer that all our mobile forces act simultaneously. Sounds like Grant is getting his advice from Halleck. I have very little use for 3rd-hand advice from that source.

Price will circle around through Indian Territory, and reach Fort Smith in 10-14 days. The 2nd US can take an Indian village. One of the other regiments can be sent to Ozark harbour. I leave to your discretion what to do with the third. I strongly advise you to tell me what that will be.

The 4th and 5th IL Cavalry are not an it. They are two cavalry regiments. Unless Colonels Dickey and Updegraff need to stay together in order to wipe each other's behinds with our doctrine, you need to separate them. Had they been separated previously, they could both have been across the Tennessee already, possibly resupplied, and operating against enemy railroads instead of running from hunger and a few snowflakes in the middle of nowhere. They clearly must have read the doctrine because they managed to flout nearly every single precept at once. Unless you are going give me details of your plans for them or ask for advice (which you clearly do not want), all you do by mentioning them is raise my blood pressure, and doubly ensure that I will exact payment for additional doctrinal lapses. If these units are lost in a manner that goes against doctrine and has not been approved from here, I will still exact additional payment. Then you will be expected to do more with less.

If the 10th OH and 10th IN Cav remain in their present positions, they will either be sent east, or the eastern theater will be expanded to include their positions. The 10th OH Cav is not ready for the front line, but they could be inside a city closer to the front line, so that they can recover rapidly, and they can move up rapidly as soon as they are ready. If the other cavalry units had moved to positions where they could be of use previously, they would have been in Tennessee last month, instead of using the weather as an excuse for not trying to get there now. The same principle applies to garrison units. If volunteers had moved up previously, we would have additional regular troops moving towards the front line. We would be using the towns along the border as bases for effectual raids, which would be of use to Grant and Lyons.

Have Halleck immediately send the Michigan Brigade with the 14th MO SS by rail to assault Springfield. The 11th IL Cav will continue under their current pursuit orders. They should act in support to prevent any escape from the town. You may send additional troops separately, at your own discretion. I suggest sending a regular brigade in that direction, so that I don't have to tell you to send one in the future. Halleck will also send your engineers regiment to immediately join Fremont at Cairo.

The 4th OH Cav may stop at Huntsville. I expect you to get a garrison to that location quickly, without abandoning entrenchments near the front line. The 3rd OH should proceed straight to Livingstone. I expect you to get another garrison there shortly. The regular regiment at Vincennes, and one of the volunteer brigades at Lexington are both readily available for this purpose.

Order the 1st OH to rail to Lebanon (Marion), proceed from there to Tompkinsville (Macon), and assault Gallatin on their way towards Clarksville. If they find opposition at Gallatin, they will not engage.

The fortification at Dayton is no longer required. Move the 11th OH Mil immediately to Lexington, KY; to provide a regular garrison there. Have them rendezvous with one of the militia units there, so that they can continue to expand the entrenchments.

I basically trust you to handle the large forces under Grant and Lyon, but your focus is too narrow. Grant and Lyon alone will not succeed. Using only forces that have generals will not succeed, especially when there is an extreme shortage of generals, even poor ones. If sending McClernand temporarily to St Louis, so that Halleck can move elsewhere, would help you, then do so.

Due to the shortage of generals, on the advice of military authorities, the President provided you with the most effective troops for operating independently and delaying enemy operations and concentrations. You have chosen not to use them that way. Concentrating cavalry and trying to use them like infantry will not succeed. It does not lay the groundwork for success. Look at the difference between the maps of Virginia and Tennessee, ignoring the armies. Any rebel army, reinforcement, or supply train trying to move across Virginia is going to have a problem. That is the groundwork for success.

If you refuse to send me details of your orders for review, I can't help you. I witnessed Scott's and Lincoln's frustration with this practice. I can only give disincentives to continuing this way, watch with frustration when your plans don't work out and ours are largely ignored, and send you orders for specific supporting operations, to correct the most glaring lapses in reporting. If you start sending adequate reports, I will not be sending so many orders. If I thought you would pay attention to suggestions, I would continue to make suggestions. If you need help with a format, I have enclosed a copy of T-224 from General Kurtz, which you may use as a template.

Don't offer an apology. I don't require an apology. I require an adequate review prior to issuing orders so that we can discuss them.


JW
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