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Jabberwock
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CinC East - Strategic Advisor to the President

Sat Jul 05, 2008 8:42 am

Fort Haggerty
Washington Defenses, October 16, 1861

From: Lt. Gen. Scott
To: Maj. Gen. Kurtz

Sir -

I have devised a plan for disrupting enemy rail behind their lines at Culpeper.

The 3rd Maryland Cavalry is currently on scouting duty with my forces around Washington. If they were ordered to proceed to Calvert, rendezvousing with steamships at that point, they could proceed via Chesapeake Bay and up the Rappahanock River in boats (portaging around Scott's Dam) to land near Kelly's Ford, from which point they should be able to strike the rail lines and withdraw before Beauregard's cavalry can react.

Your Obediant Servant,
Winfield Scott
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CinC West - Strategic Advisor to the President

Sat Jul 05, 2008 9:05 am

Battery Vermont
Washington Defenses, October 17, 1861

From: Lieutenant General Scott
To: Major General Cai

Sir -

I have received word from General Sumner. He has sent off the expedition to Dallas. His other forces are not yet ready to proceed after their exhausting journey from the west coast. He states that an attempt on his part to intercept the Dallas expedition and assume personal command would cause an excessive delay. I therefore suggest that he be ordered to organize the bulk of his other forces into a division at Fort Craig, which will expedite further operations. Development attempts in the area are reported as continuing, but should they be unsuccessful, he may need to largely abandon the area within the next month.

Your Obedient Servant,
Lt. General Scott
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CinC East - Strategic Advisor to the President

Sat Jul 05, 2008 8:11 pm

Fort Ethan Allen
Washington Defenses, October 17, 1861

From: Lieutenant General Scott
To: Major General Kurtz

Sir -

Given the enemy naval presence in Albemarle Sound, I would suggest that General Mansfield proceed in boats to the Chowan River (attempting to avoid contact with enemy naval forces), while the Narraganset and Mohican are returned north for other duties. Mansfield can either proceed further up the Chowan to assault Garys, in support of the 1st US Cavalry, or he can assault Edenton, supported by the cavalry regiment. The Petersburg militia is judged too strong for an attempt to take that city with the limited forces available. The Garys option would likely meet with more favor from the authorities here, but the decision is up to you and Mansfield.

Admiral Dahlgren will return to Fort Monroe to prepare the Monitor for a move to Albemarle Sound.

Due to General Meagher's report that his troops are unprepared for an assault, it is also left to your discretion whether he should push immediately to the Norfolk area, or continue up the peninsula to threaten Richmond from the vicinity of Hanover, and to expedite the escape of our raiding forces, crossing over to Norfolk in late November.

Your Obedient Servant,
Lt. General Scott

P.S. The 4th PA cavalry at Tolersville should probably try to make their escape by passing to the west of Richmond for an attack on City Point. Other raiding forces in eastern Virginia can reach Fort Monroe via the York River.

P.P.S. Colonel Amherst's 1st Maryland Brigade at Annapolis can reach James City by taking rail to the eastern shore and crossing the Chesapeake in boats. They could rendezvous there with the 5th NJ Light Battery, arriving from Atlantic City in naval transports.
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CinC, US Army

Sat Jul 05, 2008 9:46 pm

3rd Corps HQ
Frederick, MD, October 17, 1861

From: Major General George McClellan
To: President Lincoln, General Scott, General Kurtz, General McDowell

Sirs -

I have read and reviewed with great interest communiques of orders and operations at various points in the eastern theater of the war. They all seem to ignore the fact that Generals Jackson, Bonham, and Beauregard continue to build their forces for an assault on the capital.

The obvious point of attack is here at Frederick, which is much weaker than other points held by our forces. I have here a single division of just over 10,000 men, half of it being militia and other light troops, with "supporting artillery" consisting entirely of obsolete 6 lb. smoothbores. With this force, I am expected to hold off 40,000 confederates under Jackson and Bonham. Other points of our line are held by more than twice as many troops, and adequately supported. I have accordingly withdrawn troops from forward entrenchments along the Ohio and Chesapeake Canal, to create fortifications around Frederick City. My faint hope is to preserve some of this force when General Jackson attacks. If this point falls it will be due to the negligence exhibited in failing to reinforce it. Sirs, I must have adequate reinforcements if I am to save our nation.

Major General George B. McClellan & c.
Commanding General in Chief, US Army
Acting Field Commander, 3rd Corps
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CinC East - Strategic Advisor to the President - confidential

Sun Jul 06, 2008 8:15 am

Fort Baldy Smith
Washington Defenses, October 17, 1861

From: Lieutenant General Scott
To: Major General Kurtz

Sir -

Considering the strategic situation along the Potomac, the state of fortifications near Frederick, the political situation in Washington, and the onset of winter, you may want consider the option of sending the bulk of the McClellan/Hooker force down to Stafford or Aquia, VA - leaving behind the 2nd NVA (to be reinforced with some artillery) to hold the town.

Thoughts?

Your Obedient Servant,
Lt. Gen. Scott
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CinC East - Strategic Advisor to the President

Sun Jul 06, 2008 9:50 am

Fort Baldy Smith
Washington Defenses, October 17, 1861

From: Lieutenant General Scott
To: Major General Kurtz

Sir -

My thoughts regarding the McC situation have provoked a new idea. Ben Butler states that his forces are ready for offensive operations. We could send him to assault Holmes' isolated position at Fredericksburg, McDowell with the 7th Division to Alexandria, McC to Stafford, and Meagher to Hanover. Butler can leave behind one brigade (2nd Wisconsin?) to guard trenches and balloons pending McDowell's arrival. McDowell can leave his balloons with Tyler in Montgomery, which gives an adequate covering force for Washington. Butler would have about a 5:2 force ratio against a weak position. He might even catch Holmes on the move to deal with problems to his south or east. If Holmes is defeated and retreats towards Hanover, Meagher could catch him and finish him off.

That leaves Meagher as a direct threat to Richmond with Butler in support (or Meagher can proceed from there down the York River to Norfolk, still a possibility), strong forces still defending Washington, and the rebel army with their rail lines cut (by the 3rd MD Cav) and a large portion of our army, well supported, between them and Richmond. That will definitely move some of them out of trenches, one way or another, as the weather gets worse. The 3rd PA could try a strike at the railroad near Lovington, retreating towards Staunton, to further complicate the rebel transport situation.

If it fails, Butler can fall back on McC at Falmouth, from which point one of them can return to Washington by boat. If the rebels choose to attack Frederick, they will only hit the 2nd NVA, which given the situation they are likely to find themselves in at that point, I would consider an acceptable loss. Bory has chosen Longstreet and Huger as his division commanders ... given their reputations for favoring the defensive, a blocking move from Manassas is considered highly unlikely.

Alternatively, Butler could clear out enemy cavalry from Culpeper and Gordonsville, before assaulting Fredericksburg from the west (without using pontoons). In that case, McClellan would have arrived in a position to directly support the assault, and the 3rd MD Cavalry would have additional opportunities after their arrival at Culpeper. It would, however, give Butler less time to accomplish the reduction of Fredericksburg, and might cause him some additional losses prior to the assault. Also, should the operation fail, Butler is more likely to retreat in a poorly chosen direction.

Please reply soonest with your thoughts.

Your Obedient Servant,
Winfield Scott
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CinC West - Strategic Advisor to the President

Sun Jul 06, 2008 12:11 pm

Fort Ramsey
Washington Defenses, October 18, 1861

From: Lt. General Scott
To: Major General Cai

Sir -

In regards to my missive of the 16th instant, it would make more sense for the 4th Illinois to assault either Winchester or Pulaski rather than Murfreesboro, whichever one was not targeted by the 5th Illinois.
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johnnycai
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Tue Jul 08, 2008 5:19 pm

West Theatre HQ.
Lexington, Oct20 1861

From: Major General Cai
To: President Lincoln, General Scott, General Kurtz

Mr. President/Sirs:

Reports are trickling in from the fronts.
Firstly, General Sumner is reporting that no advance or offensive can be begun at this time without a depot and wagons at Ft. Craig. I second this opinion and believe the War Dept. will need to decide on this. My recommendation is for a depot immediately if a spring offensive is to be undertaken once we have this supply capability in place. Otherwise, another choice would be for a landing on the coast and direct assault on Houston/Galveston where we could support a sufficient force to occupy Texas.

Secondly,
Ft. Smith has fallen to our cavalry forces during a daring assault and my orders are to hold at all costs for the next month. I believe their position is tenuous but can be strategically important if it draws further CSA forces away from the fronts. I believe firing the depot there can wait but if its destruction is required immediately, perhaps to deprive Sprinfield of supplies during the upcoming winter, then that depot can be destroyed immediately.

Thirdly,
Grant, in my company, has secured Lexington we are discussing the reports from Lyon, who has somehow been forced to abandon his direct landing on Ft. Henry/Donelson area and has landed at Paducah instead. His report is stating that a continued push against that target would be suicidal. I am inclined to believe him at this point as 5,000 CSA troops are dug in there and Polk is heading a significant force that cannot be prevented from reinforcing them. I am therefore formulating a strategic plan which involves directing Grant/Wallace against Bowling Greene while Lyon moves to block Polk from moving northward while holding Paducah, I believe we can isolate the forts effectively only when we have cutoff the surrounding CSA forces from reinforcing.

I am not getting clear indications why Lyon was forced to abandon his landing as Foote had cleared the river of rebel gunboats, perhaps your reports are better detailed?

General Grant and I are beginning preparations to land North-West of Bowling Green and will either strike directly or to the south around Clarksville again which has been secured tentatively. General Thomas and his division will join our forces west of Bowling Green and our assault will be in 2weeks time.

Most Sincerly,
General Cai

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CinC West - Strategic Advisor to the Prestident

Tue Jul 08, 2008 8:37 pm

Fort DeRussy
Washington Defenses, October 20, 1861

From: General Scott
To: General Cai

Sir -

I agree that General Sumner should not send out additional troops until they have had a chance to rest from their journey. We would like to create a depot at Fort Craig or Fort Bliss, however, by the time sufficient supplies could be sent to do it, the troops in the area would starve. In that case I expect Sumner will move whether he 'can begin' or not. If development projects remain ineffectual, then without a depot the area cannot support more than a single regiment. Apparently Sumner has been able to build up ammunition production and stockpiles, so we should try to hold there with as much force as we can realistically support. My best suggestion is for him to attempt an expedition down the Sabine River in the direction of Beaumont with the bulk of his forces, gathering supplies from towns along the way, as opposition is expected to be less there than would be encountered by a direct strike towards the coast. I am requesting that naval transport be sent immediately from Fort Pickens towards Dallas. I don't have a map of that area immediately available, but I have wired Secretary Welles to provide you with an estimate of its arrival. If the navy can spare additional transports, it is possible that they could create a depot somewhere on that river. In the greatest extremity, Sumner's forces could be brought to Fort Pickens or the Florida Keys for rest and recuperation.

I shall endeavor to see that the decision whether to immediately destroy the depot at Fort Smith or try to hold it, is left to your determination. Information received here suggests it would be unwise to either advance or retreat at this time. Please order that the regiments in the worst shape are allowed to recuperate while the others dig in. It does appear that Price has been strongly reinforced at the expense of some other areas, and may attempt a move soon. Intelligence reports indicate that his move was planned towards Jefferson City, although that would be extremely unwise of him. If he chooses to move back towards Arkansas, or additional reinforcements are drawn to the area of Fort Smith, then you will have additional opportunities.

In my telegram of the 16th (regarding cavalry operations - have you received it?), I forgot to congratulate you on your capture of Lexington. Congratulations! Well done! How is Grant working out otherwise? If you require both Grant and Thomas in the west, could you send some other talent to the east soon? I won't be here to work with them, but I know General Kurtz would surely appreciate it. The other day I had to ask him if he would order Ben Butler to lead an assault on Fredericksburg with half the army. That should give some idea how dire the leadership situation is here.

From what I can piece together of the various telegrams, news reports, and recriminations that have arrived here, apparently the engines of Foote's new ironclads are underpowered, Lyon (being Lyon) arrived several hours ahead of the fleet, and the captains of his transports collectively decided to put into Paducah, rather than proceed directly through the rebel fleet as he ordered. We are still trying to sort out who exactly "mutinied" against whom, and it may be a long time before that question is answered.

In your judgement, could General Wallace attempt a new landing at Donelson with the 6th Division?

I anticipate a strong enemy counter-attack at Clarksville, and would not leave the cavalry regiments there.

Your Friend and Ever Obedient Servant,
Lt. General Winfield Scott &c.&c.
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CinC West - Navy Department

Thu Jul 10, 2008 10:32 am

Navy Department
Washington, October 20, 1861

From: Sec. Welles
To: Major General Cai

Sir -

Transports departing Fort Pickens immediately can reach the Sabine River near Dallas by November 12, if they are not delayed. It will not be possible to create a depot using naval resources on the Sabine above Beaumont, but we can resupply any troops that can meet the squadron. The only other possible naval depot sites in Texas are Matagorda, Galveston, and Navasota.
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CinC West - Executive

Thu Jul 10, 2008 10:38 am

Executive Mansion
Washington, October 21, 1861

To: General Cai

Sir -

I can have a supply train put together immediately in Iowa for support of operations in Texas and New Mexico, along with several locomotives and steamboats; or I can provide you with two new regiments of cavalry, while ordering a new blockade squadron for the navy. Please let me know your preference.
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johnnycai
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Thu Jul 10, 2008 2:42 pm

West Theatre HQ.
Lexington, Oct21 1861

From: Major General Cai
To: President Lincoln, General Scott, General Kurtz, Navy Dept.

Mr. President/Sirs:

I have assessed the reports and the current status of our troops and positions. My staff and I generally feel we need to protect our recent gains and continue to pressure the CSA forces east and west of Ft. Henry/Donelson.
The cav regiments at Clarksville will cut the rail and attempt a similar raid to the East, north of Nashville.
My intents are to keep our gains at Paducah while getting Grant/Porter/Wallace in position to retake Bowling Green before the new year. Lyon will advance but will remain near Paducah where we can supply him and support him with fresh troops for a spring campaign.
In the South-West, my feeling is that an amphibious campaign attacking Galveston/Magtorda/Houston is the best way to occuply Texas. The supply and logistic challenges of having Ft. Craig as a base for this campaign are too great to adapt to any rebel mobilization in Texas. Our troops arriving from the north or west are just not enough for this operation, as they cannot be supplied currently. The amphib supply option proposed is risky as the reb navy including river ironclads are very likely in better position than our Gulf fleet and can easily interdict them. Basically the rebels will raise more troops and have them ready to counter the 6-10 regs. we can expect to begin an offensive with from Tucson. My suggestion is for a midsize to strong fleet led by one of our able Seamen to disembark 2-3 divisions from Galveston Bay, where they can choose the best landing zone and direct assault Galveston or Houston and all before the rebs can reinforce and raise enough troops to counter. This operation can occur during the winter as the forces around Washington will likely be seeking winter quarters and local CSA operations will likely cease.
Also, Ft. Smith's depot will be fired this turn so as to not risk a reb riverborne attempt in reclaiming it. The cav will remain there as long as possible as they have retreat options and a further raid on Little Rock is possible next month. This should affect Price's plans in Missouri as his supply situation will no longer be stable until Ft. Smith and his supply in Arkansas is restored.

I ask you for further direct instructions. My general requests are for more troops, artillery, leaders, medical units for the winter campaign and engineers for rail repair.

Lastly, I am pleased with Grant's performance at Lexington. The man has great vigour and self-esteem, especially when enjoying the Kentucky bourbon he has recently become attached to. Grant will command the forces aimed at Bowling Green and my hope is he will show himself ready for a new Army command shortly.

Most sincerely,
General Cai

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CinC West - Strategic Advisor to the President

Thu Jul 10, 2008 7:16 pm

War Department
Washington, October 21, 1861

From: General Scott
To: General Cai

Sir -

Have you had a chance to review telegram #150? From here, a cavalry raid north of the Cumberland seems riskier than a series of raids beyond Nashville. It is unknown which way the Johnstons will jump, but significant troop movements are expected through both Clarksville and Gallatin. Deeper raids will also interdict staff, supplies, and reinforcements, and draw some enemy forces back into Tennessee. That will make the jobs of Grant, Wallace, and Lyons easier. A considerable portion of our front line troops are still 90-day men, they will need all the help they can get.

Proposed activities of Lyon are approved. Please have him reorganize the available forces prior to movement, so that the regiments having seen the most combat or other activity can hold Paducah while he moves forward. Will his initial objective be Columbus or Paris? From your note I am guessing Columbus.

I suggest pushing the 6th Division forward amphibiously to Donelson, or overland directly to Bowling Green, to support either Lyon or Grant. Spies report the Donelson batteries are not operational. Can you try running several gunboat squadrons into the Cumberland as soon as possible? If we can isolate the enemy forces in Kentucky, that is more than worth the risk to the gunboats. I would suggest running the gauntlet in one large fleet, then splitting into squadrons on the other side. If your sources agree with the assessment of the Donelson batteries, you could even give Wallace the assignment of an amphibious assault on Nashville, as he has Zollicoffer's command outnumbered by 6-1, and his troops are better trained and organized.

From Porter's command, the 2nd Ohio volunteers are most suited to rail repair. You have a choice to either commit the entire division to that task, or move the division forward while a single brigade attempts it.

It will probably be February before capably led new brigades or divisions can realistically arrive off of the Texas coast. Please review our history of the Hampton Roads campaign to date, to see why I project delays. In the meantime, I see waterborne resupply not as a good option, only as the best of the options that are available. I agree that Fort Craig or even Fort Bliss are not optimal supply bases. Creation of a depot in New Mexico would almost certainly cause the enemy to reinforce Texas. If Sumner can occupy some towns along the Sabine prior to any landing, we should be able to rapidly close out a Texas campaign, before significant new enemy reinforcements are organized there. Gideon would prefer taking an extra month to organize, if it means the ability to strike at all targets simultaneously with surprise. That way, some of the amphibious troops can be used as garrisons, while the remainder, and Sumner's regular army regiments, can reboard transports for use elsewhere. Deployments will be made in boats from Port Arthur Bay, the Middle Colorado River, the Lower Neches River, and/or Charles Bend. Galveston Bay is not considered suitable, as it is under direct enemy observation. We may have brigs run a scouting mission to Goodwill Landing prior to the main attack.

Amphibious forces currently in the Carolinas are proceeding towards the Florida Keys, in preparation for operations in the Gulf.

Your preferences in new troops are noted, but we are not projecting a large number of choices until the planned call-up in December. That is why additional cavalry is favored here, as an interim measure. If you can get the support of General Kurtz, you may be able to convince the president to issue the call before then. In that case, some large amphibious brigades (3 Inf, 1Cav, 1 6lb) could possibly arrive along the Texas coast sooner than February, but they wouldn't be formed into divisions.

Respectfully Yours,
W. Scott
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CinC West - Executive

Fri Jul 11, 2008 6:34 am

Executive Mansion
Washington, October 22, 1861

To: General Cai

Sir -

Concerning your request for additional instructions, I had personally requested General Scott limit his suggestions to you to smaller supporting forces and special opportunities. His retirement party will take place in just over a week, and we all must get used to operating without his services.

I can give you one specific instruction, as it may relate to me personally. I have just read a totally unneccesary editorial attack in the Chicago Tribune regarding the size of the "honor guard" made up of my former neighbors at Springfield. I reside in Washington now. Leave sufficient forces in Springfield to protect the depot, but move the 3rd Illinois regiment forward. I would suggest sending them to St. Louis for additional training under Halleck, as raiders in Missouri are showing signs of renewed activity. Please note this is not the 3rd Illinois Militia regiment at Salem. That regiment is also ready to be sent forward, but not until they can be relieved by additional militia.
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CinC East - Strategic Advisor to the President

Fri Jul 11, 2008 7:44 am

War Department
Washington, October 22, 1861

Sir -

I have some further refinements to suggest to my Butler plan.

Have Butler's 4th Corps proceed through Falmouth to Culpeper, clearing out the cavalry there. He can then descend on Fredericksburg by Kelly's Ford, U.S. Ford, and Scott's Ford (on the 9th). That way he will be crossing the river at a narrow point before deploying his troops at Fredericksburg behind Holmes' main position. He will not have to march through the area known as "the Wilderness". Order him to attack Holmes Corps, but not assault Fredericksburg.

Have Joe Hooker's 2nd division proceed (by rail as far as Alexandria) directly to Fredericksburg and assault the town. They should arrive after Butler (on the 13th). Enemy forces inside the town are likely to surrender, as Butler will have them surrounded. If Butler has not completely defeated Holmes prior to the Hooker's arrival, Hooker can assist him. That should give Hooker the chance to show his potential, and increase the threat to Richmond.

Later in November, either Hooker or Butler can bring the regiments least ready for additional combat either back to Maryland or to Fort Monroe.

Have the Philadelphia Brigade and some other "extra" forces from Annapolis, Montgomery MD, Adams PA, Baltimore, and Newark rendezvous either with McClellan and my current command around Washington to be incorporated into his reorganized corps in defense of the Capitol; or with McDowell at Alexandria. In either case, one of Tyler or Keyes should remain in Montgomery while the other accompanies McDowell to Alexandria.

Order the 5th PA cavalry (currently in Carroll, MD) to proceed through Stafford and Culpeper for an assault on Charlottesville. Expected opposition is one single militia regiment, as additional enemy forces in the area are expected to be chasing other cavalry raiders. Alternatively, they can choose not to use rail transportation, and not assault the town. They can proceed back towards Culpeper from the vicinity of Charlottesville, destroying tracks along the way.

If the entire operation works as planned, we will have three cavalry regiments (3rd PA, 5th PA, 3rd MD) along adjacent streches of the O & A railroad, in addition to the other benefits previously mentioned. With the Virginia Central cut as far west as Tolersville, the rebels will lose virtually all north-south rail capability across Virginia, and their ability to sustain significant forces north of the Rappahanock River or effectively relieve Norfolk. The greatest risk is to the 3rd PA, as they may be targeted by enemy cavalry and would be deepest in enemy territory with the least supplies. Their route across rivers and mountains should help throw off pursuit. They should be able to rendezvous with supplies south of Grafton.

I fervently hope that this plan meets with your approval, and that you can further refine it to reap additional benefits. You are welcome to take any credit for its successful execution, while I personally will readily accept the blame if it fails. I believe that this would be what the President terms a "special opportunity".

Respectfully, Your Ever Obedient Servant,
W. Scott, &c.
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CinC East - Navy Department

Fri Jul 11, 2008 11:32 am

Navy Department
Washington, October 22, 1861

To: General Kurtz
From: Sec. Welles

Sir -

I request your permission to officially designate the US Cavalry Regiment, 7th Cavalry Company, Lower Lumber River, SC - as an amphibious cavalry regiment, rather than returning it for further operations in Virginia.

Your Obedient Servant,
Gideon Welles
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Sat Jul 12, 2008 12:36 pm

CiC East
Alexandria, October 23, 1861

To: Sec. Welles
From: Gen. Kurtz

Sir -

Permission granted to officially designate the US Cavalry Regiment, 7th Cavalry Company as an amphibious cavalry regiment.

Regards,
General Kurtz

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CinC West - Strategic Advisor to the President

Mon Jul 14, 2008 10:45 am

War Department
Washington, October 23, 1861

To: Major General Cai
From: Lt. General Scott

Sir -

I have received a copy of your latest set of orders here. After review, I can only hope that it is an incomplete copy.

The specific reasons that I state my hope that your orders are incomplete:

1. The 2nd Ohio Volunteers at Marion, VA have been given no orders. None for defense, none for destroying enemy rail, none for continuing their retreat to a source of supply. If I recall correctly, this is a unit that I specifically requested not be used for mountain operations at this time of year. Since they have been used for that purpose, they will need further direction in order to extricate themselves from their current situation. They will at a minimum attempt to destroy rail along their path of retreat. No unit in enemy territory is excused from this duty without prior discussion. I have the full agreement of all executive members of the War Department on that point. If necessary, that specific order will be relayed from here.

2. The 10th Indiana cavalry at Marietta is awaiting orders. It is understandable that the 10th Ohio at Grafton be given additional time before returning to front-line operations, but there is no reason for the 10th Indiana to remain at Marietta. They could at least be ordered to retake the harbor at Portsmouth, on their way elsewhere.

3. The Missouri Cavalry Brigade apparently is in need of further instructions. This is a high value unit. Therefore, they should endevour to obtain rest and supplies from the same source at the same time, so that they can be rapidly returned to combat duties.

4. General Sumner has not been given the necessary orders to form a divisional organization. If he needs such an organization at a later time to expedite movement or combat, it may not be possible for him to create such an organization at that time.

If I do not receive a timely reply to this telegram, I will take it as cause to assume that you acquiese to further needed orders being sent from here addressing those points.


The 3rd Illinois currently at Springfield has been detached from your command, and ordered to report to Boston, MA.

I understand we have a difference of opinion regarding the value of minor operations. My primary purpose in suggesting these operations has been to promote a series of coordinated movements not against small towns, but against enemy transport and communications, using those small towns as forward bases. My secondary purpose has been to threaten critical points that the enemy is not expecting us to attack immediately, forcing him to pull his front-line troops back to a new line. My tertiary purpose has been to discourage the enemy from considering offensive operations, as they spend time and effort considering how to counter our minor offensive efforts. We might be able to catch enemy forces on the move responding to those minor efforts, rather than entrenched across the path of our larger forces. This will also cause the enemy to spread his forces, defending points that are not primary objectives, and therefore weakening the primary objectives.

The small towns along the eastern Kentucky-Tennessee border lead mainly into the mountains, but those mountains screen cavalry operations to an extent that no man-made power can, and should be considered a possible pathway to eastern Tennessee and northern Georgia, albeit not an all-weather pathway. Our presence at those points also would prevent the enemy from using the same strategy in reverse, to harass our supply line across Kentucky.

It is a shame that you do not see the interdiction of an east-west train bearing a special cargo, as a proper objective. These decisions are properly yours to make, unless ordered otherwise. You have not been ordered otherwise, but given your preferred doctrine of keeping cavalry relatively close to the main forces, and using them to attack points that are within saber range, where in my opinion their maneuverability is relatively useless and they are at higher risk than when operating independently, I could see where such orders might be issued by my successor.


The following is as painful for me to dictate, as I'm sure it is for you to read. After several requests, hints, and suggestions; you received an order, sir, direct from the President, that if suggestions from myself or certain other persons were disregarded, an explanation be provided. An explanation may consist merely of a disagreement of opinion with supporting statements. Silence prior to the issuance of orders is no more an explanation than it is an endorsement. The military telegraph system has been set up and maintained at considerable expense to the government for timely communications. I assure you that lack of adherance to this order causes far more difficulty here, and far more resulting difficulty for yourself, than an original disagreement possibly could. I will leave the matter there, for my successor to address if necessary. Hopefully it will not be necessary.


I am ever Your Humble and Obedient Servant Sir,
Winfield Scott &c.
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AndrewKurtz
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Tue Jul 15, 2008 1:34 am

CiC East
Alexandria, October 24, 1861

To: General Scott
From: Gen. Kurtz

Sir -

I have reviewed your numerous dispatches. Due to the fast approach of winter, I am not fearful of an enemy attack upon Frederick. I believe such an attach would leave the enemy vulnerable to having their retreat paths cutoff and subject to a cold, long death.

I agree that the lone, isolated corps at Fredricksburg is a unique opportunity and have, thus, given orders to Butler to attack immediately. The other main forces of the army will siddle to the left to fill the gap left by Butler. Should this attack succeed, Richmond will be immediately threatened and the enemy forced to react accordingly.

General Meagher has been ordered to leave behind Keyes brigade to hold Hampton Roads while the remaining forces under his command have ben ordered to Hanover to cutoff possible retreat paths for Holmes. General Meagher has also been told to look for an opportunity to hit the enemy in the flank should they try to retreat.

An immediate assault has been ordered on Suffolk to take the city before reinforcements can arrive. The final assault on Norfolk will be postponed pending the success of the operation against Fredricksburg.

The 2nd Ohio has been ordered to retreat slowly, tearing up rail along the way. As ordered, the 10th WV Cavalry has been ordeed to Tazewell, although my intelligence officers do not report the train.

The 3rd MD Cavalry has not been ordered to leave Washington as I need further clarification of the planned attack. However, Cavalry forces on their raid will continue south, attempting to cut the enemy rail lines at Lovingston.

Best regards,
General Kurtz

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CinC East - Strategic Advisor to the President

Tue Jul 15, 2008 5:34 am

War Department
Washington, October 25, 1861

Sir -

The 3rd Maryland can achieve its objective by travelling from their current location near Washington, by boat to the Rappahanock Estuary, and then straight up the Rappahanock River into Culpeper, thus avoiding "straggling opportunities". They should arrive in Culpeper on the last day of the month.

The mission to Tazewell has been cancelled due to a lack of participation by General Cai's forces. You may still send the cavalry to Tazewell if it supports your operations. By my reports that regiment just recently encountered the train at Christianburg. Proceed with forces in the western portions of your department as you see fit, but please provide some security for supply trains as they move south from the vicinity of Grafton. If it is necessary to detach part of the forces before Covington to do this, you are authorized to take that measure. I also suggest positioning some cavalry along the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, to hasten the time when you can make use of that asset, and restrict its use by the rebels.

You may choose to bring forward some units from the areas I mentioned in my telegram of the 22nd. Special attention should of course be paid to the areas of Baltimore and Annapolis. If you find it efficient to put some portions of the city garrisons into the outer trenches, you are certainly authorized to take that step.

Please be wary of making the initial attack at Fredericksburg using pontoons. If Butler can use the upstream fords, I believe he can flank the enemy position at Telegraph Hill. That would also clear a path for the 5th PA cavalry to proceed through. If General Hooker is assigned follow on operations, and can demonstrate adequate leadership, I may be able to push his promotion through before my retirement.

Have you reached a decision regarding General Mansfield's force and Maj. Palmer's Cavalry? If you decide that retreat is the best option, the cavalry can reach Fort Monroe via Suffolk and the James Estuary, and Mansfield can remain on transports for a return there or to another specified location.

One further suggestion ... General Keyes is more senior than General Tyler, and I believe better suited temperamentaly to semi-independent command. If you wish to modify their divisional or operational assignments, it is certainly within your authority to do so.

Your Respectful and Obedient Servant,
Winfield Scott
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johnnycai
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Tue Jul 15, 2008 2:09 pm

West Theatre HQ.
Lexington, Oct26 1861

From: Major General Cai
To: President Lincoln, General Scott, General Kurtz, Navy Dept.

Mr. President/Sirs:

Thank you for bringing to my attention the units where no orders were received.
The units mentioned will be sent orders within 12 hours.

General Scott, I in no way wish to offend your office and rank or person. It is unfortunate but my spies do not report the train from the East as your office has reported. I will continue to order the troops, with respects to you and USA overall objectives, when local knowledge or gathered intelligence indicates differently from your directives.

regards,
General Cai

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CinC West - War Department

Tue Jul 15, 2008 3:31 pm

War Department
Washington, October 26, 1861

From: General Scott
To: General Cai

Sir -

No offence taken, and I hope none on your end. Merely trying to solve a problem before it gets too far out of control. This is not a issue that I wish to leave for my successor.

The 10th and 11th WV Cavalry encountered the train at Christianburg, VA on the 14th, but were driven off by additional enemy forces in the area. If you reconsider your decisions in that regard, please inform General Kurtz, so that your forces may cooperate effectively.

Respectfully Yours,
W. Scott
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AndrewKurtz
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Tue Jul 15, 2008 5:55 pm

CiC East
Alexandria, October 25, 1861

To: General Scott, General Cai
From: Gen. Kurtz

Sir -

We are experiencing a shortage of transport craft to allow all planned operations. It would appear that most transports have been moved west to support General Cai's plans, resulting in insufficient transports to move General Butler's force in full.

There are three options.

1. Can additional transports be spared from the wester operations?

2. The plan can be revised to only transport as large a force as current transport constraints will allow to the region east of Fredricksburg and to avoid a direct attack across the river. However, General Meagher will not be able to be transported via the river, thus, he will be ordered to maintain his current position and prepare to attack either up the Peninsula or attack Norfolk early next month.

3. Use the transports to move General Meaghers forces to Hanover to support and harass and risk a cross river attack.

Please advise.

General Kurtz

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Tue Jul 15, 2008 5:56 pm

CiC East
Alexandria, October 25, 1861

To: General Scott
From: Gen. Kurtz

Sir -

General Mansfield will be ordered to Suffolk to support the operations against Norfolk.

General Kurtz

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Tue Jul 15, 2008 6:19 pm

War Department
Washington, October 26, 1861

From: General Scott
To: General Kurtz

Sir -

Apparently there is some misunderstanding? My conception was for General Butler's corps to move overland through Stafford, turn west to Culpeper, and then strike southeast across the fords to Fredericksburg (rather than using pontoons to cross directly from Falmouth). Alternatively, Butler could turn south at Culpeper, cross the Rapidan, and attack Fredericksburg from the west, avoiding any assault across a river, but that involves a march through the Wilderness, and gives him limited time to accomplish his attack before Beauregard figures out what's going on.

That should leave plenty of transport available for Meagher, or Meagher could attempt to push through overland as well, since enemy patrols in New Kent will not be entrenched.

Only the cavalry which would be tasked with breaking the rail lines at Culpeper, possibly Meagher, and raiders and reinforcements near the coast were intended to use waterborne transport. If Hooker joins Butler, I intended for him to do so by rail to Alexandria, and then direct overland (using pontoons to cross the river) from there.

This reminds me. We've accumulated quite a collection of blue-water transport at Fort Monroe. Can you turn some of them (maybe half?) back over to Sec. Welles?

I will inform the President of a projected need for additional steamboats.
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AndrewKurtz
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Thu Jul 17, 2008 12:38 am

CiC East
Alexandria, October 26, 1861

To: General Scott
From: Gen. Kurtz

Sir -

I am concerned that General Butler will be hampered by enemy cavalry forces reported to be in the Culpepper, but due to the lack of transports, have ordered the attack as recommended.

Also, General Mansfield's orders have been modified. It was decided that he would not add sufficient weight to the Norfolk attack to justify the risk of bypassing the enemy forces blocking the mouth of the river. Instead, he has been ordered further up river.

Yours truly,
General Kurtz

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CinCs East & West - War Board

Thu Jul 17, 2008 2:24 am

War Department
Washington, October 27, 1861

To: Major Generals Cai & Kurtz

The President has graciously let me be the one to tell you, due to General Scott's pending retirement, I have been appointed to chair and be the spokesman for a War Board which will handle military strategy, recruitment, and logistics. I will be the primary liason between yourselves, General McClellan, Congress, other members of the board, Abe Lincoln, and his cabinet. I have worked with and for General Scott for the last 20 years (except for a brief period earlier this year when I was taking some "involuntary retirement") - You will find that we have different styles of leadership.

John, it appears that we will be going with the supply train option for your newest reinforcements. Is Iowa the best place for it? You'll be getting a sharpshooters regiment. Do you need them more in Ohio or Missouri? We'll be putting together more Surgeons and Engineers regiments, and sending them west as soon as we can. We are also starting construction of some transports in Ohio, intended to supply Prestonburg and points beyond.

Andrew, I plan for you to get some additional cavalry and sharpshooters in Pennsylvania, in case Ashby decides to get frisky up there this winter, and since all your other cavalry appears busy. The sharpshooters can join the main army later. Let me know if that is not suitable, and I'll try to work with you on it.

As of now - John, you're officially responsible for Virginia from Wheeling to Greensville and all points west of that line. Reinforcements from that area are still part of the eastern department unless you both agree otherwise in specific cases. Andrew, you keep everything from the OH-PA border to Christianburg and east. Agree amongst yourselves how units crossing back and forth will be handled if you have to. There has been good cooperation here, I expect it will continue with the new border.

Major General John Wool,
JW
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CinC East - War Board

Thu Jul 17, 2008 5:10 am

War Department
Washington, October 28, 1861

To: General Kurtz

Andrew -

We have some problems. The orders that have gone out leave Washington too vulnerable, and some units in danger. Here's two checklists, sorted by priority, not location.

These are mandatory, they have to be fixed:

The forces headed to Alexandria aren't sufficient. Nobody here authorized McDowell to move past Alexandria. There is little value in holding Stafford in force right now. It allows options further south, and supports Butler, but leaves Washington vulnerable. A serious winter offensive further towards Richmond led by McDowell and Butler is not realistic. The purposes of Butler's operation are: defeat Holmes, occupy or destroy the Fredericksburg depot, threaten Richmond so that the rebels have to pull back to defend it, limit Beauregard's mobility, reduce the flow of supplies to Manassas & Harper's Ferry, give Hooker a chance to demonstrate his talents, and divert attention from Norfolk. That's plenty. Once we manuever Beauregard's army away from the Potomac, and have better leadership, we can think about other objectives. If we are forced to destroy the depot and evacuate, we can afford to do that. Transports will be standing by in the Rappahanock. At least one division could move back north on steamboats if it becomes necessary.

Butler completely abandoned his trenches. He needs to leave a holding force. If a brigade from inside Alexandria moved into his trenches before he left, McDowell and the other reinforcements could meet that brigade.

The 3rd Maryland Cavalry did not target Culpeper to limit enemy options. This is the best opportunity we will get. It is high priority. We need to take advantage of it. They don't need to spend extra time in the area, that's why Scott suggested a longer amphibious raid instead of overland.

The 11th West Virginia Cavalry will starve if they move to Salem, that is, if they don't get killed some other way first. Good aggressiveness, but not a good idea with that regiment right now. Their quickest and safest source of supply is Prestonburg.

Nobody here authorized moving the 1st PA out of the Harrisburg depot. Depots near the front lines have to be defended inside and out. Speaking of which, Grafton needs a trench line around it.

The 2nd PA Cavalry is in no shape to continue fighting, even defensively. They need to tear up tracks and get out of there. They can reach Fort Monroe by sailing down the York River. Meagher is not expected to hold the area long-term. Even if he does, the tracks are no good to us until we take Richmond.


These are optional:

Too many supply trains are being left with single regiments to guard them. If they're going to be out there, they need to be in safer locations. Supplies or relief units for those regiments can easily be pushed up the rail lines, even in bad weather. Ashby's cavalry may get jumpy soon. The idea of having troops out there is to limit enemy targets, not give them more. Keyes could use extra supplies more than the 1st RI militia.

The 3rd PA Cavalry are not meant to fight the enemy on their own, so they need to keep moving beyond their objective. If the extra move is towards supplies (meaning Rockbridge) which are coming to meet them, they may survive. Two supply trains are ready near Grafton, either can move to Beverly, where they can be guarded, and help in case of an attack there.

The 5th PA Cavalry can't do anything against a confederate corps but get themselves killed. I wouldn't fret if they were militia, but horses cost money. They don't need to be facing the center of the rebel army, they need to be on or around the flank somewhere, where they can accomplish something. If they're meant to be a counter-raiding unit, they need to stay further back, and stay on a railroad. If they're meant to be scouts, they need to be in a division or on the flank.

If Mansfield's transports run into problems in the Chowan River, the US Cavalry Regiment is left with no source of supplies, unless they can capture some. Again good aggressiveness (and good target choice), but we need to watch the supplies of our raiders.

The 1st Maryland Cavalry are not meant to fight the enemy on their own, they stand a better chance of survival if they keep moving towards our lines and supplies.


Please take care of it,
JW

P.S. I like your McC, Keyes, Excelsior combination. If Hooker earns a promotion, Butler can take over the Washington defenses instead of McC.
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AndrewKurtz
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Fri Jul 18, 2008 1:12 am

CiC East
Alexandria, October 29, 1861

To: General Wood
From: Gen. Kurtz

Sir -

Orders received.

1. McDowell will remain in Alexandria, although in so doing, I fear Butler's corps and Hookers Division risk being isolated instead of attacking the isolated. But your orders were not optional.

2. One brigade has been ordered to stay in Butler's trenches to greet McDowell.

3. 3rd Md Cav ordered to Culpepper as required. However, these orders were not originally given as I consider their arrival too be too late to be of any significant benefit.

4. 11th WV ordered to Prestonburg.

5. 1st PA orders have been remanded.

6. 2nd and 4th Cav have been ordered to Ft. Monroe to rest and recover.

7. Supply trains move to support McC and McDowell.

8. 3rd PA ordered to support McC

9. Mansfield is intended to threaten Garysburg but will likely land at Greensville to support the attack on Norfolk, He is not deemed to be in danger.

General Kurtz

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CinCs - War Board - Cavalry Doctrine

Fri Jul 18, 2008 6:51 am

War Department
Washington, October 29, 1861

To: Generals Cai and Kurtz

John, Andrew -

Apparently General Scott never clearly explained raiding cavalry doctrine.


Time-on-target:

If cavalry is operating as raiders, they are not expected to occupy territory. That function is for infantry. Therefore, cavalry time-on-target should be limited to the least possible to accomplish their objective. They need to time their arrival at a target to minimize enemy opportunities to fight them. They need to keep moving beyond their target, so that they can evade enemy garrisons and counter-attacks. If the movement beyond the target is back towards our lines and supplies, so much the better. Therefore, orders to cavalry raiders are expected to extend beyond the next two weeks.

This may mean that exploring different routes or that adjusting waypoints along the entire route is needed so that a target that is not at the limit of cavalry range reaches that limit, because the cavalry did not take the shortest route. Often waypoints can be adjusted to move through multiple targets. That is not my job. My job is explaining the concept. Performing it is your job. Learn to do it well.


"Telegraphing" intentions:

If cavalry can hit an objective at the limit of their range, that is much better than hitting one nearby. It makes time-on-target easier to adjust, and keeps the enemy off balance. Moving to a point halfway to an objective or near the starting point tells the enemy what the next possible objective is, makes the cavalry easier to intercept at the stopping point, and makes time-on-target harder to adjust when we do hit the objective, because it is not at the limit of their range anymore. In reviewing our first three months of operations, I noticed a disturbing habit amongst cavalry commanders to stop just short of a target for scouting purposes. This practice will not be tolerated. It uses up supplies and opportunities, while possibly letting the enemy know the objective and absolutely ruining time-on-target. If careful attention is paid to time-on-target principles and evasion, it is also completely unnecessary.

In short, look for targets near the limit of your range, explore movement options, hit them, and keep moving.


Picking targets:

Enough cavalry are being provided to you for widespread strategic damage along enemy rail and supply lines. They will be used for that purpose. If they are not used for that purpose, there will be consequences, beyond the direct military consequences.

It has been stated previously: "No unit in enemy territory is excused from the duty of destroying rail lines without prior permission." That still applies.

Towns are considered targets for resupply. Since they possibly have garrisons, they should be moved through. (See time-on-target). The intent of raiding cavalry is not to fight enemy garrisons, except in special cases, which will be decided through discussion. If establishing a resupply point is important, the cavalry regiment is in good shape, and the enemy garrison is known to be militia, an assault may be ordered, if I am notified and given the opportunity to discuss before the order is issued.

Professor Runyan has written an excellent treatise on strategy. If you haven't read it, find a copy and read it. If you have read it, re-read it, paying particular attention to concepts #6 & #1. Unfortunately, Prof. Runyan did not extend his treatise to include railroads or supply, or the effects of not being able to use railroads. Perhaps not so unfortunate, because I can assure you that the enemy has read his work. Apply those concepts to overall cavalry strategy and railroads, keeping in mind that cavalry does not hold territory. The effects of strategic levels of cavalry raids are to slow enemy movent, limit their movement options, and decrease supplies and reinforcements.


Fighting:

Cavalry's major advantages are in mobility and surprise. They are not in combat power. Combat power is for infantry and artillery. Combining cavalry regiments should be saved for two purposes. They can be used to hit enemy garrisons that defend critical points that are at the limit of the cavalry's range. They can be used to defend against enemy cavalry forces on the offensive. Either situation should be discussed with myself, before combining regiments.

Raiders should only be ordered to attack or assault as they move through possibly ungarrisoned enemy towns. They may be ordered to attack or assault in other special situations with prior discussion. They may occasionally be ordered to defend if facing single enemy cavalry regiments.

If raiders encounter unguarded enemy artillery, supplies, support units, or HQ units, then an attack should be ordered, with prior notification, so that strategic and time-on-target issues can be discussed.

Divisions can use one or two cavalry regiments for fighting and scouting. Wherever possible, those regiments need to come from cavalry that is included in brigades. Individual cavalry regiments have unique abilities which are too valuable for their widespread use in divisions.


Picking rail targets:

[font="Courier New"]-----[/font] unraided
[font="Courier New"]X---X[/font] poorly raided
[font="Courier New"]XX---[/font] poorly raided
[font="Courier New"]-XX--[/font] poorly raided
[font="Courier New"]X--X-[/font] better raided
[font="Courier New"]X-X--[/font] better raided
[font="Courier New"]-X-X-[/font] well raided
[font="Courier New"]X-X-X[/font] well raided
[font="Courier New"]XXXXX[/font] completely raided

If that diagram is not self-explanatory, ask. The concept is to limit the number of adjacent unraided stretches of enemy railroad. Either of the well-raided conditions have the same effect on enemy movement and supplies as completely raided, because trains cannot move more than 20 miles.

Of course, rail junctions make better targets than through rail.

Rail targets near large enemy forces should be primary targets, but careful attention should be paid to time-on-target priciples, because of increased danger.


Supplies:

Cavalry raiders can carry supplies for 6 weeks in hostile territory, unless they capture supplies along the way. At week 4, they need to either capture a resupply point or be in a position to get to a safe resupply point. Not at week 6, at week 4. That means planning for resupply begins at week 2. If at week 6 they are within a few days of safe resupply, that is good enough.


Amphibious:

Cavalry can often move further in boats than they can overland. This includes boats taken from the enemy while in enemy territory. They are often safer moving in boats. If they are being chased by the enemy, and have taken all the available boats, then they are not being chased by the enemy anymore. If they deliberately target areas that give them amphibious options, then they will have amphibious options if they need them. If they establish resupply points that give them multiple amphibious options, then the enemy has many more possible targets that need reinforcement.

If cavalry (or any other forces) in boats stop at a position that is not under direct observation by enemy troops, then they have effectively "dropped off the map" as far as the enemy is concerned. Their next movement will be made with surprise.

Time-on-target adjustments can often be made on the water, and it is safer to do it there than on land. It also causes less straggling.


Mountains:

The enemy cannot see through mountains. They particularly cannot see cavalry through mountains. Mountains slow advances and retreats, but they also slow enemy responses. As long as weather and supply levels are carefully watched, mountains are almost as good an environment for cavalry as riverbanks and coastal areas.


Detection:

There is an additional way to detect enemy movement beyond direct observation. If enemy troops move through friendly territory in an aggressive manner, the local population will notice. Control of the area will change slightly. This can be found out through careful questioning of civilians. This applies to our cavalry moving through enemy territory as well. Since the purpose of cavalry is not to hold territory or engage the enemy directly, approach and retreat marches should be made in the least aggressive manner. This applies to both direct orders and orders concerning rules of engagement.

Long approach marches should be made so that stopping points are in loyal territory if possible. This reduces the risk of both direct and indirect detection.


Evasion:

Yes. Raiders are expected to use evasion at almost all times. It is critical to the time-on-target principle. If there is a special reason to not use it, that will be decided through discussion.


Offensive vs. defensive:

If our cavalry is behind enemy lines, and enemy cavalry is chasing them, then that enemy cavalry is not behind our lines. If enemy rail is well raided, then the enemy will have limited resupply, and is less likely to go on the offensive. They are also less able to reinforce or respond to our raids and offensives. If the enemy is spending money and supplies to repair rail, that is money and supplies they aren't spending for additional troops. If the enemy is unable to send supplies forward, then their front-line troops will have to move out of trenches to either attack or retreat, so that they can get supplies.

If cavalry takes enemy towns, those towns become our resupply points, garrisons will be sent forward to hold those towns. They are no longer enemy resupply points. We don't have to garrison as many targets, and can move our garrisons forward. Our cavalry can begin looking for additional targets, and the enemy has to reinforce additional targets.

If individual cavalry regiments spend time facing enemy infantry, then they aren't cavalry anymore. They are infantry with horses to take care of. Scouting and counter-raiding operations should be handled by brigades that include cavalry. If it becomes a habit for cavalry regiments to confront infantry formations, future cavalry reinforcements will be discontinued. They will be replaced with reinforcements to the other theater commander, or to amphibious forces in the case that both theater commanders have problems with the concept. This is in addition to those individual units being detached for amphibious duty. Horses cost money.


Enemy raiders:

Enemy raiders will be destroyed prior to their return to enemy territory. They will be constantly harrassed and attacked by multiple converging units while in our territory. They will not be harassed to the point of encouraging them to leave our territory. They will be harassed to the point of destruction. Riverine forces will assist by cutting off possible lines of retreat.


Final Concept:

I don't need to be looking after individual cavalry regiments and brigades. I have better uses for my time and health than constantly urging operations on reluctant commanders. If you aren't comfortable with this doctrine, get comfortable with it, and use it.

I won't argue with you about any of this like Scott did. I'm stating it once. Cavalry that are well rested or supplied will follow this doctrine aggressively, unless there is an upcoming strategic initiative, requiring another use for them. I will inform you in that case. I will continue to review orders for failure to follow this doctrine. I will not continually suggest new objectives for individual units.

We have lost quite a few opportunities this summer and fall through doctrinal arguments and commander prerogatives. That loss of opportunities means that I have to find new opportunities through amphibious operations this winter, where weather will not come into affect. Regiments that don't follow this doctrine will be ordered to Boston, New York, Atlantic City, or Dover. (Assuming they survive. If they don't survive another unit will be chosen from the rear echelon.) There should be no confusion about why they are there, or who will issue orders for them after that point. I will notify the theater commander of the cause, after the fact. There will be no prior notification other than this one, and no appeal for this process. The process will start with November orders. If you would like to volunteer units for amphibious operations, do by sending them to one of those points. We could really use them, we have a current total of 3 amphibious regiments.

If you have questions, ask them now. If you don't have questions, save this telegram as a reference. Re-read it before notifying me of your orders. Inform me of your ideas before issuing orders. Re-read it before issuing orders. Re-read it while issuing orders. Inform me of your orders before submitting orders. Re-read it before submitting orders. Questions are welcome and will be clarified. Problems or arguments will be addressed by "review T180 - (topic)".


JW
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