Getting frustrated on the offensive and wrong icon location

[kyle]

Historically, Union troops where in Florida, South Carolina, and North Carolina by the end of 1861. Battles were being fought. So if someone is just sitting........

The Chronological Tracking of the American Civil War of the War of the Rebellion by Ronald Mosocco

1-5-61 1st expidition sails to relieve Ft. Sumter
1-9-61 With shots fired Star of the West turns around at South Carolina
2-9-91 Additional Federal troops arrive at Ft. Pickens Florida but refused
3-5-61 Federal Texas troops ordered to New York
4-8-61 Troops from New York head to Fort Pickens Florida
4-10-61 Troops from New York head to Ft. Sumter.
4-12-61 “(un)Official” start of war—though numerous forts and arsenals were already being seized as early as January of 1961 with shots being exchanged.
4-12-61 Bombardment of Ft. Sumter
4-15-61 Ft. Sumter evacuated
--point of interest—4-18-61 Lee “allegedly turns down an offer by President Abraham Lincoln to command Union forces” pg. 10.

4-20-61 Movement to Ft. Monroe and destruction of Norfolk dock (two separate operations)
8-26-61 9 ships sail with Butler and troops to attack Fort Clark and Hatters in North Carolina

8-27-61 Troops land in North Carolina
8-28-61 Union captures North Carolina forts
10-9-61 Battle in Florida
11-7-61 Capture of South Carolina Forts
11-8-61 Union troops marching in South Carolina
11-9-61 Southern forces evacuate Rockville South Carolina after battle.
1-11-62 Burnside Expedition leaves for North Carolina
2-8-62 Southern defenders surrender after battle in North Carolina
Early March several Union forces occupy several positions in Florida pages 49 and 50.
………
I don't think I need to go on.

And if the South wants to keep there forces all nicely bundled and stacked in one spot... how are they going to stop the Union????The union should be able to match any static line the south forms...which means open space on the flanks and no more Southern land.....No Southern land ...no southern morale and no reinforcents or supplies....

[kyle]

Back to the same old discussion I guess...

The problem isn't with the fortifications and their strength, it is historically accurate that as early as 1862 strong fortifications were built and manned (Donelson, Washington, Lee after Antietam, etc.). The real problems are...

#1. No incentive for the CSA to attack and become mobile.
#2. An abundance of manpower for the CSA to build large numbers of units.

Remove these to issues, and the use of fortifications will be much more realistic. It is a player exploit based on skewed manpower gains and players becoming substantially more cautious than their historic counterparts.

Give Lee a reason to invade Maryland, Bragg a reason to invade Kentucky, and Price a reason to invade Missouri, then there will be fewer fortifications.

???#2???? It's not like the South at the beginning of the war had a shortage of units. First Bull run was about 30k against 30k. Gettysburg 90-85k to 72k...going with the smaller figure we are talking about one division.

The Union gets 48 divisions. The South 24. That's plus 24.

Maybe the South in real life ran out of troops because Lee did stupid things like split his forces.... 20k under Early lost on "manuavers" on washington. Hill right before Gettysburg was allowed to go to Carolina with Several of his veteran brigades. Couple of brigades equals near 85k. Look at that. Same size as the Union....

Out west, I read someplace that the Vicksburg force was not allowed to unit with I think it was Bragg by order of Davis. As a result... troops were eventually split by the Union. Combined they would have outnumbered.

Just as in the real world... the Union eventually did outpace the South with troops. But when you call so called "success" such as Chancelorsville (it was an excellent plan--but crap(going a little far but it wasn't all that great) for execution and success given the surprise etc.)--- where the South lost more men then the Union did...eventually you are going to lose the war.

The thing that probably hurt the South the worse, was losing 17k at Ft. Donalson while the North only lost like 3k. Well, the worse other than losing Jackson, which forced several new and inexperienced corps commanders (countless examples of a good tactical commander is not the same as a Corps commander)

#1 incentive...?????? Was there incentive in real life???? there's reasons Lee probably didn't assualt Washington directly. And Lee wasn't invading, maybe as he should like Sherman(though this would have presented the potential problem of alienating the large northern populous into arms), to Pillage and reduce the Unions morale. But the destruction of an army???

The more I read about the Civil war, I don't believe invading the north simply to destroy the Union army was all that bright of an idea. Nor was that Lee's intention. One of the main ideas was to get the Union out from "fortifications" and achieve a major victory. Not necessarily destroy the Union army. The south was looking for recognition and help and legitimacy. That's what Lee destroyed at Gettysburg. His army was still rather intact and sizable. At the wars conclusion, there was at least 60-70k solders that surrenedered. How many troops did Washington have when the USA became a nation. I think Washington maybe had a quarter of that. And if the French never came to our assistance(Thank you French) who knows. It wasn't the defeat of the British at Yorktown as much as it was now we have a "someone" backing us.

The south also had a desetion rate of near 80-75% in some reports. The Union had a lot more people it "could" have brought to the field but there are many reasons it didn't.

Why venture North??? Well eventually the Union will have everything but Virginia if you don't attempt some moving.

I think you people are trying to end the war in one-two months just like the papers. It's just not plausible.

[kyle]

USA: Commander: Grant.
Wilderness
25,416
U: 17,666
C: 7,750


Spotsylvania
27,399
U: 18,399
C: 9,000


Milroy isn't a Grant I think we could agree on that. Hooker... but looking at your screen, I would think the CSA would win. The US was outnumbered in troop number and quality.

[McNaughton]

I would have to respectfully disagree. In multiple PBEM games, I have seen the power of entrenched defense combined with massive manpower to create lines of entrenchments that cannot be penetrated by assault without unsustainable losses.

The south would never be able to launch a successful assault north from the eastern theater past 61 regardless of incentives.

It would only be possible in the west if the Union left gaps because they are on the offensive. Although there really are no objectives in the west worthy of the risk of a confederate offensive.

I try to imagine repeating the offenses of the ACW. Against the AI, it is possible and fun. Against a human, it is not.

What you have it a Catch-22.

The south doesn't attack, because the north doesn't attack. The north doesn't attack, because the south doesn't. The situation perpetuates itself because in reality, nobody HAS to move (There isn't any 'real' pressure to move forward and consequences for being inactive).

In most games, players tend not to do things along historic lines if they do not have to. Take any WW2 game, a competent French player will never get over-run in 1940 as they refuse to make the same mistakes. Is it a problem with the game? Not really, just the fact that a human will be more cautious in a risky situation, meaning that they will take the easiest route of they aren't encouraged to do otherwize.

If you provide incentive to attack, for both sides (not just the Union, as is in the game currently), then the lines will be more fluid. As it is, the Union can afford to sit back and be passive to a point (in reality they weren't).

[McNaughton]

???#2???? It's not like the South at the beginning of the war had a shortage of units. First Bull run was about 30k against 30k. Gettysburg 90-85k to 72k...going with the smaller figure we are talking about one division.

The Union gets 48 divisions. The South 24. That's plus 24.

Maybe the South in real life ran out of troops because Lee did stupid things like split his forces.... 20k under Early lost on "manuavers" on washington. Hill right before Gettysburg was allowed to go to Carolina with Several of his veteran brigades. Couple of brigades equals near 85k. Look at that. Same size as the Union....

Out west, I read someplace that the Vicksburg force was not allowed to unit with I think it was Bragg by order of Davis. As a result... troops were eventually split by the Union. Combined they would have outnumbered.

Just as in the real world... the Union eventually did outpace the South with troops. But when you call so called "success" such as Chancelorsville (it was an excellent plan--but crap(going a little far but it wasn't all that great) for execution and success given the surprise etc.)--- where the South lost more men then the Union did...eventually you are going to lose the war.

The thing that probably hurt the South the worse, was losing 17k at Ft. Donalson while the North only lost like 3k. Well, the worse other than losing Jackson, which forced several new and inexperienced corps commanders (countless examples of a good tactical commander is not the same as a Corps commander)

#1 incentive...?????? Was there incentive in real life???? there's reasons Lee probably didn't assualt Washington directly. And Lee wasn't invading, maybe as he should like Sherman(though this would have presented the potential problem of alienating the large northern populous into arms), to Pillage and reduce the Unions morale. But the destruction of an army???

The more I read about the Civil war, I don't believe invading the north simply to destroy the Union army was all that bright of an idea. Nor was that Lee's intention. One of the main ideas was to get the Union out from "fortifications" and achieve a major victory. Not necessarily destroy the Union army. The south was looking for recognition and help and legitimacy. That's what Lee destroyed at Gettysburg. His army was still rather intact and sizable. At the wars conclusion, there was at least 60-70k solders that surrenedered. How many troops did Washington have when the USA became a nation. I think Washington maybe had a quarter of that. And if the French never came to our assistance(Thank you French) who knows. It wasn't the defeat of the British at Yorktown as much as it was now we have a "someone" backing us.

The south also had a desetion rate of near 80-75% in some reports. The Union had a lot more people it "could" have brought to the field but there are many reasons it didn't.

Why venture North??? Well eventually the Union will have everything but Virginia if you don't attempt some moving.

I think you people are trying to end the war in one-two months just like the papers. It's just not plausible.

Early on the North did not mobilize its forces to the same proportion as the South. This takes into account the military parity. Also, the North tended to have larger garrison forces than the south (which drained their main combat force to a certain extent). Plus, the inactivity of many early generals meant that sizable frontline forces were not actively engaged.

Sure, I guess you could fault the South for not being 'perfect', but, who ever is perfect in war? War is full of risks, sometimes they pay off, other times they do not. Just because one risk pays off does not mean that it was inherently better than a risk that fails (luck, timing, etc. come into play). The South did not lose significantly more forces in these blunders than the North, the main problem was that even though the south tended to have fewer casualties, they were proportionately greater.

Donelson was an early major setback, those 16 000 at Donelson, and 5000 at Island #10 would have resulted in another full corps of troops availaible at Shiloh (instead of partity with Grant, AS Johnston would have had significant numeric superiority). Yet, during the 'invasion of Kentucky' and 'Price's 1861 attack into Missouri' sizable Union forces were captured (probably equalling the early Confederate losses).

Incentives? Well, the chance at rallying a Border state to join you was a major incentive for all of the 'Northern Invasions'. Attacking into Kentucky and Maryland were reasoned to provide the South with thousands of eager volunteers. While this did not materialize (depended on where they attacked, how friendly the population was), it was a major driving force.

Also, taking the war to your enemy was a major morale boost for the nation. With battles being fought in enemy territory, with their farms being pilliaged to feed the armies, etc., the population will get a breather (Northern Virginia was a wreck during the war).

Capturing Northern supplies and material was also a major reason to advance north. Capturing Harper's Ferry in 1862 was a major boost to the material size of the Army of Northern Virginia (they left Antietam with a significantly smaller, but substantially better equipped force).

True, Southern generals realized that there was significant political pressure in the North to defeat the south quickly, and that the situation in the border states that remained loyal was tenuous. With a confederate army in Union territory, it signified that the war was not going well for the North (regardless of the real situation), and would draw forces to deal with this intrusion.

With the Union attacking south, they dictate the terms of the battle, when and where it is fought. However, with the Confederate Army in the North, the initiative is on the side of the south. Longstreet's dream was to invade the north in 1863, and position the confederate army in a significantly powerful position, requiring the Northern forces to dash itself to pieces against it. Unfortunately for him, Lee was over-ambitious and overly sure of himself that he pretty much fought the battle of Gettysburg backwards.

What is needed?

#1. Incentive (material and manpower) for the South to temporarily capture northern (border) territories. Currently, capturing territory only matters if you expect to hold it for a prolonged period.

#2. Pressure for the North to keep the south from Union territory. The outrage at allowing a confederate force into the north would be extreme, and not dealing with this threat would cause significant political issue.

#3. Pressure for the North to achieve conquests in the south based upon a certain timeline.

#4. Pressure for the South to keep the North out of their territory. The reason for 50% desertion rates was akin more to protecting their families from rampaging Northern pilliagers than a lack of patriotism or bravery.

There needs to be incentive to be aggressive, to manoever, and to 'raid in force'. Otherwize players will take the simplest option.

[Brochgale]

I don't buy the situation about static lines. I think it comes down to play style over that of the 'real' situation in the game. If you are moving, and encouraged to move (both sides), then there will be little chance for entrenchment since everyone will be encouraged to move. Amphibious assaults were critical to the USA strategy, therefore, their use to thin out Confederate main armies is not only required, but historic.

The USA won't win if they defend. They need to move. Their goal is to stretch the CSA too thin. If they do not accomplish these goals, then of course the battles will be stalemates.

I fully believe that it is play style which is the problem here, not the game itself.

However, I would like greater payback to represent the Confederate 'raids' of the North or the Border states, as currently fighting on your own lines of defence are too easy to do. Why attack when you do not have to?

It was the genuis of Grant if indeed it was genuis - he was relentless in attack! If he could not totally stretch the CSA then he would grind them down and he did that even though the Union forces paid a very heavy price in casualties. In the end the CSA could not replace thier casualties - the union could and then by 1964 the amount of CSA soldiers going AWOL was also taken a toll on Lee especially?
In other words - if you are the union - be prepared to suffer losses.

[Brochgale]

Back to the same old discussion I guess...

The problem isn't with the fortifications and their strength, it is historically accurate that as early as 1862 strong fortifications were built and manned (Donelson, Washington, Lee after Antietam, etc.). The real problems are...

#1. No incentive for the CSA to attack and become mobile.
#2. An abundance of manpower for the CSA to build large numbers of units.

Remove these to issues, and the use of fortifications will be much more realistic. It is a player exploit based on skewed manpower gains and players becoming substantially more cautious than their historic counterparts.

Give Lee a reason to invade Maryland, Bragg a reason to invade Kentucky, and Price a reason to invade Missouri, then there will be fewer fortifications.

In most games I play I invaded Kentucky and Missouri! Just as a matter of how I shold conduct my own strategy as CSA - I think there is incentive enough within the game for CSA player to do this. Invading Missouri even though I got usually my butt kicked did buy time for force build up in Arkansas. Arkanasa being somewhere I usually industrialise?
In Kentucky I held all of it except for Loiusville. Invading Kentucky also buys CSA time in Nashville and along Mississippi I believe - especially early in the game before union gets really built up? I am sure that takes union forces away from Virginia front but not sure about that - union attacks into Virginia seem to be a bit half hearted.
I do raid into Maryland in force with Jacksons whole corps - him alone. It was if anything the only way to get some of my promotable generals the experience to get promoted so I think there is incentive enough for CSA to adopt a more fluid strategy in game! I just think from my view point that it is a bit dangerous just to sit and wait for Union to come at me - they could come at me with forces with significant amounts of Seige Artillery in which case even as a defender I get slowly pulverised without inflicting serious casualties on Federals!

[Brochgale]

Back to the same old discussion I guess...

The problem isn't with the fortifications and their strength, it is historically accurate that as early as 1862 strong fortifications were built and manned (Donelson, Washington, Lee after Antietam, etc.). The real problems are...

#1. No incentive for the CSA to attack and become mobile.
#2. An abundance of manpower for the CSA to build large numbers of units.

Remove these to issues, and the use of fortifications will be much more realistic. It is a player exploit based on skewed manpower gains and players becoming substantially more cautious than their historic counterparts.

Give Lee a reason to invade Maryland, Bragg a reason to invade Kentucky, and Price a reason to invade Missouri, then there will be fewer fortifications.

In most games I play I invaded Kentucky and Missouri! Just as a matter of how I shold conduct my own strategy as CSA - I think there is incentive enough within the game for CSA player to do this. Invading Missouri even though I got usually my butt kicked did buy time for force build up in Arkansas. Arkansas being somewhere I usually industrialise?
In Kentucky I held all of it except for Loiusville. Invading Kentucky also buys CSA time in Nashville and along Mississippi I believe - especially early in the game before union gets really built up? I am sure that takes union forces away from Virginia front but not sure about that - union attacks into Virginia seem to be a bit half hearted.
I do raid into Maryland in force with Jacksons whole corps - him alone. It was if anything the only way to get some of my promotable generals the experience to get promoted so I think there is incentive enough for CSA to adopt a more fluid strategy in game! I just think from my view point that it is a bit dangerous just to sit and wait for Union to come at me - they could come at me with forces with significant amounts of Seige Artillery in which case even as a defender I get slowly pulverised without inflicting serious casualties on Federals!

[McNaughton]

In most games I play I invaded Kentucky and Missouri! Just as a matter of how I shold conduct my own strategy as CSA - I think there is incentive enough within the game for CSA player to do this. Invading Missouri even though I got usually my butt kicked did buy time for force build up in Arkansas. Arkanasa being somewhere I usually industrialise?
In Kentucky I held all of it except for Loiusville. Invading Kentucky also buys CSA time in Nashville and along Mississippi I believe - especially early in the game before union gets really built up? I am sure that takes union forces away from Virginia front but not sure about that - union attacks into Virginia seem to be a bit half hearted.
I do raid into Maryland in force with Jacksons whole corps - him alone. It was if anything the only way to get some of my promotable generals the experience to get promoted so I think there is incentive enough for CSA to adopt a more fluid strategy in game! I just think from my view point that it is a bit dangerous just to sit and wait for Union to come at me - they could come at me with forces with significant amounts of Seige Artillery in which case even as a defender I get slowly pulverised without inflicting serious casualties on Federals!

This will not happen in games where you have players who 'number crunch' and are completely focussed on victory at any cost. They will not attack as the CSA because they will do better being static. There is no real gain in attacking (even though you hurt the North to an extent, the potential loss is greater than the risk of benefits).

Give the South VP/NM benefits for raiding, as well as VP/NM penalties for keeping the war purely in the south, the North VP/NM penalty for Southern raids, as well as inactivity of not attacking the South, then you will see more action, as neither side can afford to sit back.

[runyan99]

If you provide incentive to attack, for both sides (not just the Union, as is in the game currently), then the lines will be more fluid. As it is, the Union can afford to sit back and be passive to a point (in reality they weren't).

I don't know why you say this. The Union clearly has a need to be aggressive, because if they don't take strategic cities, eventually the game gets to 1866 and the Union loses the game by VPs.

[Jagger]

This will not happen in games where you have players who 'number crunch' and are completely focussed on victory at any cost.

When you mass every free division and corps in a theater to attack a weak link in your opponents entrenched line at 6-1 and 4-1 odds and then lose 46,000 men to the defenders 20,000 men, I call it common sense to realize that defense is immensely powerful.

http://www.ageod-forum.com/showthread.php?t=5728

Number crunching is when you start looking at the game mechanisms to understand why you lost 46,000 men to 20,000 with 6-1 and 4-1 odds.

For example, looking at ATTFire and DEFfire shows that the same unit is twice as powerful on defense as offense.

Looking at March to Guns formulas reveals MTG is basically automatic in many, many situations. This means when you attack one region, you are also attacking all the units in the surrounding regions as well. Which means if you spread three corps across three regions, all three corps defend the central region. The flanks are defended not by one corps but the second center corps as well which will march to the guns. If there is the fourth corps in the rear but adjacent to the three forward regions, he will also MTG's and you will have to beat that corps as well. MTG is very powerful addition to defense and encourages spread out defenses.

When you look at entrenchments, you discover why entrenchments are so powerful as they add 40% to the strength of an artillery unit and 20% to a line unit.

Then when you realize that command control benefits will easily extend 100-200 miles, you have the final ingredient, combined with maximum manpower, for creating entrenched lines streching for a hundred or two hundred miles.

Number crunching, common sense and experience all lead to the same conclusion of immensely powerful defense available to both sides-Union and CSA.

The Union has a 1.4-1 advantage in numbers within the game. The Union simply does not have the numbers to batter their way through entrenched lines when both are using maximum manpower. The CSA player with a 1-1.4 manpower deficit certainly cannot take the losses. By the end of 61 in the narrow east, the Union can build an impregnable line from Winchester south to Stafford which cannot be penetrated by the confederate player. So forget the CSA dash to Antietam or Gettysburg because they are not going to get past the Union entrenchments at Winchester.

The only reasonable option is to move around the entrenched lines. But then, the game turns into a very slow, Union strategic amphibious offensive combined with tactical defenses. The biggest consistent mistake I have seen of newbies are trying to repeat the aggressive offenses of Stonewall, Lee, Grant or Johnson. They invariable end up massacred. It takes awhile to realize the immense power of defense.

And incentives given to encourage the south to attack north in 62 or 63 simply will not change the fact that a southern attack north is doomed with massive losses from the start if the Union has established an entrenchment wall in the East. Lee is not going to get through the entrechment wall-period.

Number crunching, common sense and experience all show that attacking a line of entrenched corps is not going to work. And neither side has the manpower to sustain the disportionate losses.

[McNaughton]

This will not happen in games where you have players who 'number crunch' and are completely focussed on victory at any cost.

When you mass every free division and corps in a theater to attack a weak link in your opponents entrenched line at 6-1 and 4-1 odds and then lose 46,000 men to the defenders 20,000 men, I call it common sense to realize that defense is immensely powerful.

http://www.ageod-forum.com/showthread.php?t=5728

Number crunching is when you start looking at the game mechanisms to understand why you lost 46,000 men to 20,000 with 6-1 and 4-1 odds.

For example, looking at ATTFire and DEFfire shows that the same unit is twice as powerful on defense as offense.

Looking at March to Guns formulas reveals MTG is basically automatic in many, many situations. This means when you attack one region, you are also attacking all the units in the surrounding regions as well. Which means if you spread three corps across three regions, all three corps defend the central region. The flanks are defended not by one corps but the second center corps as well which will march to the guns. If there is the fourth corps in the rear but adjacent to the three forward regions, he will also MTG's and you will have to beat that corps as well. MTG is very powerful addition to defense and encourages spread out defenses.

When you look at entrenchments, you discover why entrenchments are so powerful as they add 40% to the strength of an artillery unit and 20% to a line unit.

Then when you realize that command control benefits will easily extend 100-200 miles, you have the final ingredient, combined with maximum manpower, for creating entrenched lines streching for a hundred or two hundred miles.

Number crunching, common sense and experience all lead to the same conclusion of immensely powerful defense available to both sides-Union and CSA.

The Union has a 1.4-1 advantage in numbers within the game. The Union simply does not have the numbers to batter their way through entrenched lines when both are using maximum manpower. The CSA player with a 1-1.4 manpower deficit certainly cannot take the losses. By the end of 61 in the narrow east, the Union can build an impregnable line from Winchester south to Stafford which cannot be penetrated by the confederate player. So forget the CSA dash to Antietam or Gettysburg because they are not going to get past the Union entrenchments at Winchester.

The only reasonable option is to move around the entrenched lines. But then, the game turns into a very slow, Union strategic amphibious offensive combined with tactical defenses. The biggest consistent mistake I have seen of newbies are trying to repeat the aggressive offenses of Stonewall, Lee, Grant or Johnson. They invariable end up massacred. It takes awhile to realize the immense power of defense.

And incentives given to encourage the south to attack north in 62 or 63 simply will not change the fact that a southern attack north is doomed with massive losses from the start if the Union has established an entrenchment wall in the East. Lee is not going to get through the entrechment wall-period.

Number crunching, common sense and experience all show that attacking a line of entrenched corps is not going to work. And neither side has the manpower to sustain the disportionate losses.

This number crunching happens with every game, where players optimize everything to 100%, accepting nothing but perfection in their strategy and tactics. I have seen this in every strategy game online. The problem is, there will never be the perfectly balanced game, as someone will always find a 'tactic' that overcomes the system.

AACW is not 'designed' to be played as a static wargame, but, must show the strength of these historic fortifications (they were supremely effective). The problem is, players not having to follow a historic timetable, as there is not the same pressure at play. There is no pressure to attack, even as the Union, until you are 100% ready.

March to the guns needs to be at this extent due to the game turn limitations. A lot happens in 15 days, and without such command radius' for troops to march to the guns, the game will be unrealistically poor in its strategic model (unless days per turn are drastically reduced). An entire campaign can happen in 15 days, and without this 'march to the guns' which fills in for player-micromanagement during the long turns, you will end up with too many small forces that should have been supported destroyed piecemiel.

How could forces concentrate to represent the battles of Antietam and Gettysburg if march to the guns is reduced? The Federal army was spread out from Franklin to Fredericksburg, and had to concentrate in reaction to the Southern encounter at Gettysburg (the South too had to concentrate).

'March to the Guns' is representative of the army high command, filling in for the player, during the days of a combat turn. Reducing this, reduces the 'intelligence' or ability of forces to act during these long 15 day turns.

In reality, I cannot find many examples where forces did not respond and concentrate at the sight of a major battle, and yes, they were spread out.

I think that the solutions for the problem are cosmetic, they aren't dealing with the true issue that given the choice, a player of a computer game will be cautious enough to only participate in tactics that are guaranteed to win. Players do not take risks, as it is better to be safe and win in 4 game years, than to be daring and win in 1 game year...

Nobody could form a solid line of defence if they were encouraged to attack, to take ground, at least temporarily. Your point about the South not having the opportunity to strike north due to Union fortifications is mute, since the Union should required to be mobile enough to be engaged at moving south.

New players are the ones who are playing the game correctly.

The initial PBEM games discussed on this board were playing the game correctly.

However, what happened is that a few people calculated the odds, the numbers, and found the optimal strategy so people only play this way. This is the problem, with players exploiting a real aspect and over-using it, and ignoring any sense of urgency, risk, or daring. It is better to add incentive to do things, than to artificially eliminate some of the game mechanics.

March to the guns is important, as it represents command and control during this 15 day period (not just immediate reaction, but the AI filling in for the human player in regards to orders and concentration). Fortifications are important, as they were key positions of contention and protection. Eliminate these, and the real problem has not been solved, just the symptoms have been covered up.

You must be moving, from day 1, and keeping your opponent reacting, and never allow them time to create these fortress lines. Even in winter, the Federals kept up the pressure on the Confederates (1862-1863 was exceptionally active in the eastern theatre).

[Jagger]

March to the guns needs to be at this extent due to the game turn limitations. A lot happens in 15 days, and without such command radius' for troops to march to the guns, the game will be unrealistically poor in its strategic model (unless days per turn are drastically reduced). An entire campaign can happen in 15 days, and without this 'march to the guns' which fills in for player-micromanagement during the long turns, you will end up with too many small forces that should have been supported destroyed piecemiel.

Actually MTG can be significantly altered without the game falling apart. See my two AAR's for examples of games with severely reduced MTG's. In those two games, only by use of rails can you consistently expect MTG reinforcments. The games played absolutely fine but with a different style of play.

Reduced MTG is one method of encouraging the concentration of armies rather than having them spread out over hundreds of miles.

In reality, I cannot find many examples where forces did not respond and concentrate at the sight of a major battle, and yes, they were spread out.

The corps of an army were typically concentrated within a day or two march of each other during operational marches-20-40 miles except when not campaigning. They were never spread out in an entrenched line over hundreds of miles. When in near proximity of an active enemy army, the concentration was in much smaller spaces-typically less than 20 miles or one region. In 1864, if you examine Lee's army in the field vs Grant, the entrenched lines for the entire armies of both sides covered about 4-7 miles. That is far less than one region. At Atlanta in 1864 with very extensive entrenchments, I doubt they extended further than 50 miles or two regions. The manpower, weapons, tactics, command and control of the ACW simply could not support entrenched lines of a couple hundred miles. I have seen entrenched lines in the west covering 8-9 regions or 180-270 miles.

New players are the ones who are playing the game correctly.

I would have to disagree. New players do not understand the game well and typically lose badly against experienced players. I know I did. And it is not because they are playing the game "correctly". If they were playing correctly, they would be using the tactics and strategy rewarded by the game. The game mechanisms are designed to reward certain behaviors and punish "wrong" actions with the aggressive new players consistently and harshly punished for attacking. Newbie players learn pretty quickly that attacking is not smart and become those experienced players that create the entrenched walls. So if new players lose, they are not playing "correctly" as intended by the game design.

However, what happened is that a few people calculated the odds, the numbers, and found the optimal strategy so people only play this way. This is the problem, with players exploiting a real aspect and over-using it, and ignoring any sense of urgency, risk, or daring. It is better to add incentive to do things, than to artificially eliminate some of the game mechanics.

Again, I would have to disagree. Regardless of whether someone understands the numbers/odds/mechanisms, the game play results are the same. If you attack at 6-1 odds and lose 26,000 men to 10,000, the results are the same whether you understand why or not. Game experience will quickly discourage attacks and encourage entrenching your troops in as long a line as you can make. And if you are playing the CSA, maximizing manpower, you quickly discover you can make very long lines filled with plenty of troops to hold those lines. You perform the actions which produce a reward and you cease the actions which result in punishing losses. If attacks consistently are massacred, you stop attacking whether you understand the odds/numbers or game formulas. And telling someone to attack, will not make those attacks any more successful regardless of how urgent, risky and daring the player.

It is not an exploit to seek reward and avoid punishment. That is the intent of game design.

You must be moving, from day 1, and keeping your opponent reacting, and never allow them time to create these fortress lines. Even in winter, the Federals kept up the pressure on the Confederates (1862-1863 was exceptionally active in the eastern theatre).

How do you keep moving turn after turn in the East during the harsh winter months taking 40-60 weather hits every turn of movement so the enemy does not entrench? How do you keep victoriously attacking turn after turn so the enemy doesn't remain stationary long enough to entrench? You can't unless you completely dominate your enemy offensively. What happens when your troop cohesion drops to zero and you can't move or attack? Marching cohesion losses quickly reduce troops to almost zero combat power in very short timeframe if they don't rest. Your concept is great in theory but my experience doesn't support the idea as practical or successful in the ACW game reality against a human player.

[kyle]

I don't know why you say this. The Union clearly has a need to be aggressive, because if they don't take strategic cities, eventually the game gets to 1866 and the Union loses the game by VPs.

And if the South just sits, the north should be able to, even slowly, envelope them. Isn't the winner the one with the most victory points at the end?

Or does the Union have to have a certain margin of victory.

Still even if they didn't have the "margin" of victory needed at the end of 1866... if all they have is a few connected and static lines... who cares what the PC says ... you lost.

I think people are trying to jump from step A to step F in order to achieve victory. Step A being build troops to step F being Victory (something along the lines of the underpant gnomes in South Park..Step 1 steal underpants..step 3 make profit).

The south's objective is to survive and form a country, the norths objective is to restore the union. The south already has there country in a way. They don't need incentive to go north per say.

The North has to go South in some fashion. Can't isn't an option.

[kyle]

[quote="Jagger"]March to the guns needs to be at this extent due to the game turn limitations. A lot happens in 15 days, and without such command radius' for troops to march to the guns, the game will be unrealistically poor in its strategic model (unless days per turn are drastically reduced). An entire campaign can happen in 15 days, and without this 'march to the guns' which fills in for player-micromanagement during the long turns, you will end up with too many small forces that should have been supported destroyed piecemiel.


You're getting Campaign confused with battle.

7-day battle in Penninsula was that. Battle in a bigger campaign. It takes one turn to get to a penninsula (15 days) and another to leave. This is already 1 month. Suitable I'd say.

The Gettysburg Campaign lasted several months. There were other battles than just Gettysburg with the Campaign. You just only here about the 3 days in gettsyburg. I don't know anyone who can get from fredricksburg to Gettysburg in the game, in just 1 turn. Reflected truly.

Even the first Bull run was more than a 15 day affair. And this is even reflected in the game.

Name a campaign, not a battle, that lasted less than 15 days. I'm willing to bet there are very few if any.

Yes a lot happens in 15 days. A lot of movement "within" the boundaries that already exist in the game. The boundaries of the "county" abstract these micromanagement moves.

[kyle]

[B]
The corps of an army were typically concentrated within a day or two march of each other during operational marches-20-40 miles except when not campaigning. They were never spread out in an entrenched line over hundreds of miles. When in near proximity of an active enemy army, the concentration was in much smaller spaces-typically less than 20 miles or one region. In 1864, if you examine Lee's army in the field vs Grant, the entrenched lines for the entire armies of both sides covered about 4-7 miles. That is far less than one region. At Atlanta in 1864 with very extensive entrenchments, I doubt they extended further than 50 miles or two regions. The manpower, weapons, tactics, command and control of the ACW simply could not support entrenched lines of a couple hundred miles. I have seen entrenched lines in the west covering 8-9 regions or 180-270 miles.

The game reflects troops only one or two days out and near by. A unit doesn't occupy the center of the game space but troops within those boundaries. The game also abstracts scouting and the anticipation of enemy movement. So I don't see anything wrong with the "march to the guns".

Richmond I believe is about 180 miles from washington. There's about 5 spaces, than assuming washington and richmond are at the center about 6 spaces in between. That's six days.

Six Days of marching!!!! That's half a turn.

And the entrenchment isn't a wall of entrenchment but defensive obstacles and defenses through out the "county". Not one spot.

For every "big" battle there are also numerous other battles outside your 4-7 mile concentration. Case in Point Gettysburg. There were numerous cavalry fights and cavalry vs. infantry outside your 4-7 zone. If one broke it down, one may be able to say Jackson and Ewells portions of Chancelorsville were outside your zone (one would have to look into that though/research).Actually, I dont even need to look that up, Hooker had cavalry go south to cut supply lines, so that's another case of outside your 4-7 zone of entrenchment. And at the end of the battle I believe it was McLaws division that came in from a day or so out to support Lee.

And how far away was Jackson/Johnston during the beginning of bull run?

The game reflects built defenses at key junctures not a wall. So one could easily move elsewhere within the "county"/region and still have built defenses. Hence why you don't get instant entrenchment.

[kyle]

New players are the ones who are playing the game correctly.

I would have to disagree. New players do not understand the game well and typically lose badly against experienced players. I know I did. And it is not because they are playing the game "correctly". If they were playing correctly, they would be using the tactics and strategy rewarded by the game. The game mechanisms are designed to reward certain behaviors and punish "wrong" actions with the aggressive new players consistently and harshly punished for attacking. Newbie players learn pretty quickly that attacking is not smart and become those experienced players that create the entrenched walls. So if new players lose, they are not playing "correctly" as intended by the game design.

There is a difference between attacking "positions"/points of interest and attacking an army/troops.

What happened in real life when armies attacked. High Casualties. The game isn't punishing newbies. It's punishing battle plan ignorance.

Attacking is brilliant! It's knowing when to attack and how to attack that is the difference.

The game encourages campaign/operational planning. There is a reason battles are abstract.

Last time I checked, this was an operations type game. Thus operation planning and strategy are needed.

Newbies try to win campaigns at the tactical level. They may make a good Hood. But one needs to win and plan at the operation/strategy level. Who can make a good Corps/army commander.

We really shouldn't be calling entrenchments "entrenched walls". They are not walls. They are defenses. Lookouts. Retreat points. Choke points. Observation points.and then also walls etc.

[kyle]

...And if you are playing the CSA, maximizing manpower, you quickly discover you can make very long lines filled with plenty of troops to hold those lines. You perform the actions which produce a reward and you cease the actions which result in punishing losses. If attacks consistently are massacred, you stop attacking whether you understand the odds/numbers or game formulas. And telling someone to attack, will not make those attacks any more successful regardless of how urgent, risky and daring the player.

It is not an exploit to seek reward and avoid punishment. That is the intent of game design.

[B]You must be moving, from day 1, and keeping your opponent reacting, and never allow them time to create these fortress lines. Even in winter, the Federals kept up the pressure on the Confederates (1862-1863 was exceptionally active in the eastern theatre).

How do you keep moving turn after turn in the East during the harsh winter months taking 40-60 weather hits every turn of movement so the enemy does not entrench? How do you keep victoriously attacking turn after turn so the enemy doesn't remain stationary long enough to entrench? You can't unless you completely dominate your enemy offensively. What happens when your troop cohesion drops to zero and you can't move or attack? Marching cohesion losses quickly reduce troops to almost zero combat power in very short timeframe if they don't rest. Your concept is great in theory but my experience doesn't support the idea as practical or successful in the ACW game reality against a human player.

The south shouldn't have to attack. They are not the ones trying to restore the Union.

How do you keep moving east in the winter? Well, supply carts exchange hits for one.

Success of an attack is a matter of perspective. Grant was found to be successful. Yet there are times he lost 20k to the South only losing 10k.

Some say Lee was successful and won Chancelorsville. Yet the south had more loses than the Union. The South destroying a bigger portion of their army. The Union escaping perhaps sever losses by chance. Who really won?

How do you keep victoriously attacking? Again, attacking is not just attacking troops.

What happens when troop cohesion goes to zero? You're complaining that the game is historically accurate. I have yet to see a game where troop levels have gone from full to zero all in one sweep of the wand. And in reality, lost cohesion that prevented advancement was typical.

I march my troops all the time without a problem and without much if any cohesion loss. Use the green button called "passive".

[kyle]

"And if you are playing the CSA, maximizing manpower, you quickly discover you can make very long lines filled with plenty of troops to hold those lines."

Just like reality.

I have only played as the South in PBEM. Where are these impossible entrenched lines that you are talking about?????????

For every soldier I can bring to arms, the North can match and eventually surpass. Just like it was historically.

Union players play to much within the "tactical"/battle frame of mind.

You have to think operationally.

I've also expiremented with the Union.

The South will move. Or the south will lose. It is very simple.

The south can't sit the entire game.

I'd say you are playing Union newbies who aren't thinking and have no foresight.

Either that, or you move more than what is implied.

[McNaughton]

"And if you are playing the CSA, maximizing manpower, you quickly discover you can make very long lines filled with plenty of troops to hold those lines."

Just like reality.

I have only played as the South in PBEM. Where are these impossible entrenched lines that you are talking about?????????

For every soldier I can bring to arms, the North can match and eventually surpass. Just like it was historically.

Union players play to much within the "tactical"/battle frame of mind.

You have to think operationally.

I've also expiremented with the Union.

The South will move. Or the south will lose. It is very simple.

The south can't sit the entire game.

I'd say you are playing Union newbies who aren't thinking and have no foresight.

Either that, or you move more than what is implied.

The North does have as much manpower as they truely need in order to field their historic forces. However, they do gain a lot of free brigades via events (they have 2-3x as many elite brigades as the south), yet even here they cannot field as large of a force as they should.

I figure, if manpower gets re-organized, and the south is encouraged to raid the north in force (causes morale problems in the north, and possibilities of material gain for the south) then the south has to rely on quality of force, while the north must defend their posessions, plus advance on the south (meaning that neither side can build a wall). Bragg, Price and Lee honestly believed that their invasions would result in Maryland/Kentucky/Missouri rising up and joining the South (I believe that this should be a possibility, alibiet a historically low chance, say 30%).

[Queeg]

Bragg, Price and Lee honestly believed that their invasions would result in Maryland/Kentucky/Missouri rising up and joining the South (I believe that this should be a possibility, alibiet a historically low chance, say 30%).

I agree with this suggestion, though I'd suggest odds of 30% for Kentucky and 20% each for Maryland and Missouri.

[kyle]

Early on the North did not mobilize its forces to the same proportion as the South. This takes into account the military parity. Also, the North tended to have larger garrison forces than the south (which drained their main combat force to a certain extent). Plus, the inactivity of many early generals meant that sizable frontline forces were not actively engaged.

Sure, I guess you could fault the South for not being 'perfect', but, who ever is perfect in war? War is full of risks, sometimes they pay off, other times they do not. Just because one risk pays off does not mean that it was inherently better than a risk that fails (luck, timing, etc. come into play). The South did not lose significantly more forces in these blunders than the North, the main problem was that even though the south tended to have fewer casualties, they were proportionately greater.

Donelson was an early major setback, those 16 000 at Donelson, and 5000 at Island #10 would have resulted in another full corps of troops availaible at Shiloh (instead of partity with Grant, AS Johnston would have had significant numeric superiority). Yet, during the 'invasion of Kentucky' and 'Price's 1861 attack into Missouri' sizable Union forces were captured (probably equalling the early Confederate losses).

Incentives? Well, the chance at rallying a Border state to join you was a major incentive for all of the 'Northern Invasions'. Attacking into Kentucky and Maryland were reasoned to provide the South with thousands of eager volunteers. While this did not materialize (depended on where they attacked, how friendly the population was), it was a major driving force.

Also, taking the war to your enemy was a major morale boost for the nation. With battles being fought in enemy territory, with their farms being pilliaged to feed the armies, etc., the population will get a breather (Northern Virginia was a wreck during the war).

Capturing Northern supplies and material was also a major reason to advance north. Capturing Harper's Ferry in 1862 was a major boost to the material size of the Army of Northern Virginia (they left Antietam with a significantly smaller, but substantially better equipped force).

True, Southern generals realized that there was significant political pressure in the North to defeat the south quickly, and that the situation in the border states that remained loyal was tenuous. With a confederate army in Union territory, it signified that the war was not going well for the North (regardless of the real situation), and would draw forces to deal with this intrusion.

With the Union attacking south, they dictate the terms of the battle, when and where it is fought. However, with the Confederate Army in the North, the initiative is on the side of the south. Longstreet's dream was to invade the north in 1863, and position the confederate army in a significantly powerful position, requiring the Northern forces to dash itself to pieces against it. Unfortunately for him, Lee was over-ambitious and overly sure of himself that he pretty much fought the battle of Gettysburg backwards.

What is needed?

#1. Incentive (material and manpower) for the South to temporarily capture northern (border) territories. Currently, capturing territory only matters if you expect to hold it for a prolonged period.

#2. Pressure for the North to keep the south from Union territory. The outrage at allowing a confederate force into the north would be extreme, and not dealing with this threat would cause significant political issue.

#3. Pressure for the North to achieve conquests in the south based upon a certain timeline.

#4. Pressure for the South to keep the North out of their territory. The reason for 50% desertion rates was akin more to protecting their families from rampaging Northern pilliagers than a lack of patriotism or bravery.

There needs to be incentive to be aggressive, to manoever, and to 'raid in force'. Otherwize players will take the simplest option.

Yes, one of the reasons Lee went North was to relieve pressure on the Southern economy.

But why was that?

Because the Union had been ravaging the south with War.

Thus, starting , there is no incentive, nor should there be.

"#1. Incentive (material and manpower)" This is already reflected in the game by national moral and victory points. The more nm and victory points the more troops and funds you can raise.

"#2. Pressure for the North to keep the south from Union territory. "
This is reflect in the game already. If the Union doesn't take care of the problem. They'll lose victory points. And then the War. That's pressure enough. And with the retreat rules, I believe the game reflects in good fashion the inability to just march anywhere without some risk.

"#3. Pressure for the North to achieve conquests in the south based upon a certain timeline."
Once again, this is already reflected in the game. The north loses I believe 10 NM for not marching on Richmond. The game ends in 1866.

"#4. Pressure for the South to keep the North out of their territory. The reason for 50% desertion rates was akin more to protecting their families from rampaging Northern pilliagers than a lack of patriotism or bravery."

Source?

The war of the rebellion started more closely to January of 1861. There was tremendous upheaval and revolt throughout 1861.

So much so that Lincoln suspended citizens right to writ of habues corpus, or however it's spelled, in several towns/cities(which I believe is right to trial).

One could probably argue, that there wouldn't have been panic or revolting with a march by the south. For it was already occurring/occurred.

A Lee led army could just as easily, in a hypothetical situation, captured a major city like Philadelphia or New York.

So what? The British held Philidelphia. The lost. Napoleon had Moscow. He lost.

The point is the Union army is still intact. The only thing Lee has accomplished is cut his army of from a safe retreat and supply source. The Union controlled the seas.

This is reflected in the game. Not only will Richmond have thin defenses, but if the Union achieves victory near Philadelphia or further north, Lee's army will be no more. Just like it may have been in real life. Well, Lees retreat from Gettysburg destroyed him as it was.

And in the game, capturing supplies is reflected. My supply carts always seem to be full when I capture a North city. What other supplies do you think would be coming?

"Sure, I guess you could fault the South for not being 'perfect', but, who ever is perfect in war?"
I would not fault the south for not being perfect. But everyone craps on the Union when the south did no better, and in many cases worse.

"The South did not lose significantly more forces in these blunders than the North" No they did not. But they failed to capitalize on chances for greater losses to the North. This doesn't make them bad, it just makes them no better than the North.

[kyle]

The North does have as much manpower as they truely need in order to field their historic forces. However, they do gain a lot of free brigades via events (they have 2-3x as many elite brigades as the south), yet even here they cannot field as large of a force as they should.

I figure, if manpower gets re-organized, and the south is encouraged to raid the north in force (causes morale problems in the north, and possibilities of material gain for the south) then the south has to rely on quality of force, while the north must defend their posessions, plus advance on the south (meaning that neither side can build a wall). Bragg, Price and Lee honestly believed that their invasions would result in Maryland/Kentucky/Missouri rising up and joining the South (I believe that this should be a possibility, alibiet a historically low chance, say 30%).

Maryland populous did revolt in 1861 to an extent. There was "Martial Law" to some degree. Lincoln didn't exactly let Maryland choose to succeed. From what I've read, one could infer that it was going to be Union whether it liked it or not.

The south had a call for Mizzou militia/volunteers. In about the proportions that are available via militia in the game. One could argue Mizzou is more CSA loyal than should be reflected.

As per Kentucky, the Union pledged their assistance to the Kentuckians even though they declared neutrality.

"Bragg, Price and Lee honestly believed that their invasions would result in Maryland/Kentucky/Missouri rising up and joining the South"---Each of those states already had their chance to "rise up". Doesn't seem like much ever came of it. Plus militia units are already available for purchase in the game for both sides in Kentucky and Mizzou.

Who knows, but I don't think Maryland could have "rised up" much more than it did, already does in the game. Lincoln didn't exactly let it be a choice.

[kyle]

Oh, don't forget the South was in Bowling Green and had battles in Kentucky.

I could have sworn there was even an army of Kentucky at one point that later combined with the Shiloh force. But it was nothing major. 8-10k. Which there are militia available, and a brigade later in the game.